THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

GIFT  OF 


Malbone  W,  Graham 


2>V?^ 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON   -    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE 
END  OF  THE  WAR 


BY 

WALTER  E.   WEYL 

Author  of  "The  New  Democracy,"  American 
World  Policies,"  etc. 


Jl5eto  gork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1918 


All  rights  reserved 


COPTEIQHT,    1918 

bt  the  macmillan  company 


Set  up    and   electrotyped.      Published,    May,    1918 


jy 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Postscript        1 

I    The  Elusive  Victory 17 

II     Pacifists  and  Patriots 38 

III  The  Conversion  of  America 50 

IV  The  War  Against  Militarism 73 

V     Spoiling  the  Enemy 98 

VI     Sacred  Egoism 121 

VII    America  as  Arbiter 139 

VIII     The  True  Alignment 157 

IX    The  War  Beneath  the  War 174 

X     Is  Germany  Incorrigible? 189 

XI     A  Conclusive  Peace 207 

XII    Guarantees 224 

XIII  The  Grand  Alliance 232 

XIV  Obstacles  to  Internationalism     ....  248 
XV    At  the  Peace  Conference 273 

XVI    After  the  Peace  Conference 296 


15%!-^-^ 


POSTSCRIPT 

As  I  write  this  postscript,  which  is  also  an  intro- 
duction, the  fate  of  the  world  is  being  decided  upon 
the  fields  of  Picardy.  Hundreds  of  millions  in  all 
the  Allied  countries  are  praying  for  the  success  of 
the  British,  French  and  American  soldiers,  who  are 
seeking  to  stem  the  tide  of  German  invasion  and  end 
for  all  time  the  dream  of  a  German  world-dominion. 
While  that  battle  rages  all  other  pre-occupations  are 
thrust  from  our  minds.  If,  by  evil  chance,  the  Ger- 
man arms  are  crowned  with  success,  the  end  of  the 
war  will  be  one  that  we  cannot  contemplate  except 
with  horror.  The  Allies  must  hold,  must  fling  back 
this  gigantic  onrush,  or  the  power  of  decision  will 
pass  from  them  and  will  rest  with  their  German 
conquerors. 

The  book  to  which  this  is  a  postscript  is  based 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  Allies  can  hold  their 
own  and  can  thus  exert  a  decisive  influence  upon 
peace  and  upon  the  diplomacy  that  leads  to  peace. 
The  book  is  an  appeal  to  America  to  assume  leader- 
ship in  that  diplomacy,  to  eliminate  imperialistic 
elements  from  the  demands  of  our  Allies,  and  to  at- 
tempt a  settlement  based  on  internationalism.  Dur- 
ing the  period  while  the  book  was  being  written  the 
chances  for  such  an  American  leadership  were  ex- 


2  POSTSCRIPT 

cellent  and  the  President  showed  signs  of  moving  in 
this  direction.  He  made  repeated  advances,  though 
frequently  too  late.  But  at  all  times  he  met  with 
obstinate  and  usually  successful  resistance.  As  a 
consequence  less  was  accomplished  than  might  have 
been  desired. 

During  the  six  months  from  April  1  until  October 
1,  1917,  and  even  afterwards,  the  war  might  have 
been  concluded  on  the  basis  of  internationalism  and 
democracy.  The  Germans  were  discouraged;  their 
U-boat  campaign  had  netted  less  than  had  been  ex- 
pected and  America's  participation  promised  an 
eventual  victory  to  the  Allies.  Russia,  although 
tottering,  was  still  capable  of  offering  resistance; 
the  Italian  army,  as  yet  undefeated,  stood  firm  in 
the  Julian  Alps;  in  Germany  itself  a  democratic 
movement  was  in  full  swing.  German  discontent 
was  stronger  than  at  any  previous  time,  and  clamor- 
ous demands  were  being  made,  as  also  in  Austria, 
for  a  democratic  peace.  It  was  a  golden  oppor- 
tunity. 

That  opportunity  has  now  been  lost.  By  mal- 
adroitness,  by  diplomatic  errors  and  by  a  display  of 
callousness  and  insincerity,  our  Allies  proved  that 
they  did  not  understand  and  could  not  act.  The 
Allies  revealed  an  inelasticity,  an  intolerance  of  the 
new  Russian  democracy  and  a  thinly  disguised  de- 
sire for  conquered  territories  that  made  diplomacy 
on  a  high  level  impossible.     Rather  than  revise  their 


POSTSCRIPT  3 

imperialistic  war  aims,  they  permitted  Russia  to  go 
down,  almost  forced  her  to  make  a  separate  peace, 
and  allowed  Germany  to  break  her  up  into  a  number 
of  smaller  states,  easy  to  pit  against  one  another. 
Italy's  desire  to  gain  hasty  possession  of  coveted 
territory  and  lack  of  unity  among  the  Allies  led  to 
Italian  defeat  in  the  fall  of  1917  and  to  a  further 
strengthening  of  the  autocratic  and  militaristic 
classes  in  Germany.  Finally,  by  permitting,  if  not 
encouraging,  Japan  to  invade  Siberia,  in  circum- 
stances which  indicated  that  the  proposed  interven- 
tion was  to  be  a  predatory  attack,  our  AUies  set  upon 
themselves  the  stamp  of  imperialism. 

To  these  short-sighted  actions  and  omissions  of 
our  Allies  the  President  of  the  United  States  has 
been  steadfastly  opposed.  Repeatedly  he  has  stood 
alone  for  the  long-time  policy  based  on  principle, 
while  statesmen  in  the  Allied  countries  clamoured 
for  immediate  ends,  a  profitable  victory  and  a  puni- 
tive peace.  For  his  owm  country  President  Wilson 
has  made  no  special  claims  and  he  has  insisted  re- 
peatedly that  America  fights  only  for  democracy. 
His  influence  has  been  cast  on  the  side  of  a  reason- 
able peace  based  on  internationalism.  If  hitherto 
he  has  failed  to  bring  the  Allied  governments  to 
his  point  of  view,  it  may  be  argued  in  his  defence 
that  the  task  was  difficult  and  the  opposition  strong. 

It  may  be  conceded,  perhaps,  that  President  Wil- 
son's ideals  were  sometimes  left  to  hang  high  in  the 


4  POSTSCRIPT 

diplomatic  heavens  and  were  not  always  brought 
down  to  solid  earth.  As  in  his  protests  to  the 
belligerents  before  our  entrance  into  the  war,  so  in 
his  world-addresses  since,  there  have  been  at  times 
a  lack  of  reality,  a  failure  to  put  force  back  of  ideas, 
an  unwillingness  to  use  even  the  pressure  of  world 
opinion  to  compel  opponents  to  accept  his  con- 
clusions. The  crucial  defect  of  his  policy  has  been 
its  detachment.  Here  was  a  great  man  uttering 
noble  sentiments  in  noble  language,  yet  missing  one 
chance  after  another  to  translate  those  sentiments 
into  decisive  action  and  to  force  adherence  upon  un- 
willing Allies. 

It  is  notoriously  easy  to  judge  after  the  event  and 
notoriously  difficult  to  be  fair  towards  those  com- 
pelled to  make  immediate  decisions.  We  cannot 
reasonably  demand  that  President  Wilson  should 
have  foreseen  all  the  incalculable  events  of  the  world 
war.  He  made  errors,  but  he  avoided  innumerable 
worse  errors,  and  in  his  ideals,  in  his  sympathy  for 
democracy,  as  also  in  his  broad  view  of  the  whole 
situation  he  proved  himself  immeasurably  superior 
to  the  statesmen  of  our  Allies.  In  the  light  of  sub- 
sequent events,  however,  it  now  seems  obvious  that 
before  our  declaration  of  war  we  should  have  at- 
tempted a  firm  settlement  with  our  Allies.  At  that 
time,  when  we  had  already  broken  off  negotiations 
with  Germany  but  had  not  yet  begun  hostilities,  we 
already  surmised,  if  we  did  not  actually  know,  that 


POSTSCRIPT  5 

our  co-belligerents  had  entered  into  mutual  agree- 
ments hostile  in  spirit  to  all  that  we  hoped  to  achieve 
in  this  war.  Instead  of  merely  insisting  upon  our 
individual  innocence  we  should  have  demanded,  as 
a  condition  of  our  belligerency,  a  general  statement 
of  the  terms  of  the  Allies.  We  might  quietly  have 
said  to  their  governments:  ''Either  revise  your 
war  aims  in  conformity  with  principles  of  interna- 
tionalism, so  as  to  rob  them  of  all  tinge  of  imperial- 
ism and  vindictiveness,  or  we  will  not  join.  We 
will  arm  and  build  merchant  ships  and  shall  be  ready 
when  you  have  so  changed  your  terms,  but  until  then 
not  a  man,  nor  a  ship,  nor  a  dollar.  We  are  willing 
to  fight  on  your  side  for  world-democracy  but  not 
for  secret  treaties  which  you  may  have  made  among 
yourselves." 

A  second  opportunity  to  urge  an  international 
peace  presented  itself  when  the  Russian  Republic 
published  its  formula  of  ''no  annexations  and  no  in- 
demnities." We  should  immediately  have  accepted, 
if  not  that  exact  formula,  at  least  one  that  breathed 
the  same  spirit,  and  should  have  insisted  upon  its 
acceptance  by  our  Allies.  We  should  thus  have 
strengthened  the  Kerensky  Government  and  retained 
the  aUogiance  of  Russia.  The  projected  Stockholm 
Conference  was  another  of  our  failures.  Again  we 
were  given  the  chance  to  invite  publicity  and  again 
we  refused.  Like  our  Allies,  we  pretended  to  con- 
sider this  Conference  a  mere  German  subterfuge; 


6  POSTSCRIPT 

in  other  words  we  played  the  German  game.  If 
Allied  imperialism  had  more  to  fear  from  open  dis- 
cussion than  had  German  militarism,  if  we  were 
afraid  to  risk  a  clarification  and  publication  of  war 
aims,  then  our  moral  position  in  the  war  was  pre- 
carious. 

Nor  does  this  end  the  list  of  our  disastrous  omis- 
sions. In  July,  1917,  the  majority  of  the  delegates 
in  the  German  Reichstag  offered  peace  resolutions 
which  for  many  months  President  Wilson  ignored, 
although  it  was  obvious,  from  the  President's  own 
speeches,  that  only  by  strengthening  this  inconstant 
and  insecure  parliamentary  majority  could  we  hope 
to  achieve  the  peace  for  which  we  fought.  Similarly, 
our  attitude  towards  the  secret  treaties  of  the  Allies, 
of  which  the  President  learned  in  the  late  spring  of 
1917,  revealed  an  uncertain  and  hesitating  diplo- 
macy. It  must  be  remembered  that  it  was  the  knowl- 
edge of  these  treaties  that  enabled  the  German 
rulers  to  smother  the  discontent  of  their  own  peo- 
ple ;  the  Junkers  appealed  to  German  democrats  on 
the  plea  that  the  AUies  wished  to  crush  Germany. 
At  any  time  after  June,  therefore,  the  President,  by 
calling  a  public  inter- Allied  conference,  might  have 
forced  a  denunciation  of  these  treaties  and  a  revision 
of  peace  terms.  On  the  other  hand,  without  such 
action  it  was  impossible,  as  events  proved,  to  hold 
Russia  to  our  side.  For  the  Russians,  fully  ac- 
quainted with  these  secret  imperialistic  compacts, 


POSTSCRIPT  7 

entered  into  by  England,  France,  Italy,  Roumania 
and  Japan,  firmly  believed  that  the  governments  of 
those  nations  were  as  grasping  as  was  that  of  Ger- 
many. If  America  had  a  different  policy,  why  did 
she  consort  with  these  nations?  Why  did  she  not 
frankly  state  her  opinion  concerning  those  secret 
agreements,  published  in  Petrograd  but  not  pub- 
lished in  the  leading  journals  of  London,  Paris  and 
New  York? 

It  would  be  quite  unfair  to  describe  this  American 
diplomacy  as  tepid  and  timid ;  and  equally  unfair  to 
represent  Mr.  Wilson  as  a  man  who  is  always  missing 
trains.  Such  general  accusations  do  not  justly  ap- 
praise the  moral  quality  and  the  intellectual  percep- 
tions of  the  President,  who  with  little  forewarning 
was  faced  with  a  new,  menacing,  complicated,  and, 
above  all,  a  constantly  and  rapidly  changing  situa- 
tion. It  was  difficult  for  him  (or  us)  to  apply 
coercion  to  friends  and  Allies  and  ungracious  to  dis- 
trust the  aims  of  nations,  whose  sacrifices  in  this 
war  had  been  larger  and  their  loyalty  older  than 
our  own,  and  it  was  equally  difficult  to  know  how  far 
we  might  trust  even  the  most  fair-spoken  of  our 
enemies.  Moreover,  the  defect  of  the  President's 
policy  was  a  defect,  in  a  sense  even  a  function,  of 
its  qualities.  A  policy  that  aims  at  international- 
ism, at  mutual  confidence  among  nations,  must  rely 
in  large  measure  upon  moral  forces,  must  be  patient 
and  tolerant,  even  at  the  risk  of  becoming  leaden- 


8  POSTSCRIPT 

footed.  It  cannot  always  make  quick  decisions  or 
summary  judgments.  Its  path  is  not  laid  out  in 
advance,  and  its  errors  must  be  judged  more  lightly 
than  are  those  of  the  traditional  diplomacy  with  its 
narrower  and  more  selfish  aims  and  its  more  ancient 
rules  of  procedure. 

Whatever  the  cause  of  our  inability  to  influence 
our  Allies,  however,  it  is  within  the  province  of  fair 
criticism,  even  in  these  dangerous  times,  to  suggest 
that  this  failure  of  ours  to  act  decisively  has  dimin- 
ished the  moral  value  of  our  participation.  We  have 
erred  on  the  side  of  caution  and  generosity.  We 
have  too  highly  valued  the  intelligence  of  Allied 
statesmen  and  too  sharply  discounted  our  own. 
Striving  for  concord  within  the  Alliance,  we  have 
feared  to  speak  the  truth  lest  it  offend  one  or  another 
of  the  nations  heroically  fighting  by  our  side.  But 
a  true  concert  among  allies  is  attained  not  when  each 
is  promised  everything  but  when  all  are  inspired  by 
a  single  ideal.  We  have  been  silenced  by  what  we 
were  assured  was  the  superior  wisdom  and  the  older 
experience  of  European  statecraft.  We  have  held 
our  peace. 

In  so  doing  we  have  involved  ourselves  in  a  grave 
and  general  error.  We  have  forced  ourselves  to 
believe  that  we  could  fight  for  democracy  and  main- 
tain the  integrity  of  the  Alliance  despite  secret  ar- 
rangements violating  the  principles  for  which  we 


POSTSCRIPT  9 

fight.  We  have  believed  that  we  could  trust  to 
selfishness,  enlightened  and  unenlightened,  to  over- 
come the  brutal  militaristic  spirit  of  Germany.  We 
have  fought  fire  with  fire  and  been  burned  in  the 
process.  We  have  kept  our  own  skirts  clean  and  not 
considered  whether  those  of  our  Allies  were  clean  or 
filthy.  We  have  believed  that  an  alliance  could  be 
half-moral  and  half-immoral,  half-democratic  and 
international  and  half-imperialistic.  We  have  not 
faced  the  problem  squarely.  By  not  facing  the  prob- 
lem we  have  allowed  the  military  supremacy  to  pass 
temporarily  to  our  enemy  and  have  destroyed  for 
the  time  being  our  moral  advantage,  the  greatest 
source  of  our  strength. 

Today  the  chance  for  a  peace  based  on  interna- 
tionalism is  slimmer  than  at  any  time  since  our  en- 
trance into  the  war.  Having  handed  over  Russia 
to  the  Germans  and  isolated  and  lost  Roumania,  we 
now  seem  likely  to  force  Russia  to  become  a  politi- 
cal, as  well  as  an  economic  ally  to  Germany.  We 
have  created  conditions  where  time  no  longer  fights 
decisively  in  our  favour  and  where  the  pressure  of 
war  begins  to  bear  as  heavily  upon  our  associates  as 
upon  our  enemies.  We  have  robbed  ourselves  of 
the  solace  and  unifying  power  of  a  great  ideal,  and 
have  made  it  possible,  both  in  the  countries  of  our 
Allies  and  in  those  of  our  enemies,  for  tlie  worst 
elements  in  the  population  to  gain  control  and  to 


10  POSTSCRIPT 

end  the  war  by  a  compromised  imperialist  peace. 
We  have  failed  because  we  did  not  have  the  courage 
of  our  convictions. 

The  opportunity  is  lost,  and  yet  it  may  return. 
If  I  believed  that  no  chance  remained  for  a  peace 
based  upon  international  principle,  I  should  be  loth 
to  publish  this  book.  The  chance,  though  dwindling, 
still  exists.  There  may  again  come  about,  perhaps 
as  a  result  of  the  gigantic  battle  now  fought  in 
France,  such  a  balancing  of  belligerent  forces  as  will 
permit  the  United  States  once  more  to  occupy  the 
favourable  moral  and  strategic  position  which  she 
held  during  the  months  from  April  to  October  1917, 
and,  to  a  less  degree,  even  until  February  1918.  If 
the  opportunity  again  occurs,  if  we  are  no  longer 
faced  with  the  naked  need  of  defence  against  a  mili- 
taristic Germany  entrenched  and  fortified  by  our 
mistakes,  we  cannot  afford  to  repeat  the  vital  errors 
which  render  our  present  situation  so  hazardous. 

Yet  it  is  exactly  these  errors  which  we  are  again 
urged  to  commit.  In  our  present  mood  of  exag- 
gerated depression  the  claim  is  made  that  the  policy 
of  reconciliation  has  failed.  But,  in  truth,  it  has 
not  failed;  it  has  not  been  tried.  Indeed  what  has 
so  signally  failed  has  been  the  exactly  contrary 
policy  of  fighting  imperialism  with  imperialism  and 
greed  with  greed.  Today  we  are  again  exhorted  to 
shut  our  eyes,  to  offer  no  negotiated  peace  and  ac- 
cept none,  to  make  no  distinction  among  Germans, 


POSTSCRIPT  11 

all  of  whom  are  equally  brutal  and  hypocritical,  and 
not  to  think  of  peace  until  the  enemy  is  prostrate, 
starved,  shattered,  beaten  to  a  pulp.  Then  we  may 
talk  terms. 

Doubtless  this  advice  is  a  natural  reaction  from 
the  new  revelation  of  German  militarism  vouchsafed 
to  the  Russians.  The  punitive  peace  inflicted  by 
Germany  upon  Russia  and  Roumania  has  once  more 
proved,  what  was  painfully  familiar  before,  that  the 
Imperial  German  Government  is  still  heartless, 
truculent  and  utterly  remote  from  considerations  of 
common  decency  and  even  of  larger  statesmanship. 
The  Junkers,  again  in  the  saddle,  are  the  same  swag- 
gering brood,  unrepentant  and  exultant.  The  radi- 
cal and  democratic  movement  in  Germany  seems  at 
low  ebb,  for  German  liberals  are  crushed  by  German 
victories  and  are  overborne  by  a  rising  flood  of 
jingoism. 

Yet  the  task  of  all  democrats  opposed  to  German 
militarism,  tliough  now  more  difficult,  is  the  same  as 
before.  Our  aim  is  to  end  this  menace,  to  end  it 
once  for  all,  to  end  it  in  the  only  way  it  can  be 
ended,  by  the  creation  of  a  secure  international  sys- 
tem. Today  we  still  strengthen  German  militarism 
when  we  threaten  Germany  with  destruction ;  we  still 
tie  German  democrats  to  the  Junker  chariot  wliecl 
when  we  fight  for  conquests  and  punitive  indemni- 
ties instead  of  for  the  things  that  they,  as  well  as 
we,  desire.     It  will  now  take  longer  and  more  des- 


12  POSTSCRIPT 

perate  fighting  to  gain  our  ends  than  if  we  had 
adopted  a  wiser  policy,  and  we,  like  our  enemies, 
must  pay  a  heavier  toll.  At  our  own  great  cost  we 
must  break  down  anew  the  Junker  prestige,  which 
was  sinking  in  1917  but  has  again  risen.  Unless, 
however,  we  fight  for  a  program  to  which  German 
democrats  also  can  subscribe,  unless  we  fight  liter- 
ally to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy,  for  the 
German  as  well  as  the  American,  British  and  Rus- 
sian democracies,  all  our  new  expenditure  of  blood 
will  be  futile.  We  shall  accomplish  nothing  even 
if  after  unparelleled  sacrifices  we  gain  the  supreme 
military  victory  and  our  khaki-clad  soldiers  march 
in  triumph  down  the  silent  Unter  den  Linden. 

If  we  and  our  Allies  fight  this  war  as  we  have 
fought  it  for  almost  four  years,  for  Dalmatia,  Con- 
stantinople and  various  Turkish  islands,  if  we  fight 
for  a  peace  in  which  we  at  our  own  will  and  pleasure 
are  to  determine  German  and  Austrian  boundaries 
as  Germany  now  determines  those  of  Russia,  the 
war  is  lost.  Not  necessarily,  or  at  least  not  pri- 
marily, in  a  military,  but  in  a  moral  sense.  We  may 
end  the  dream  of  German  world  dominion  but  shall 
not  have  come  nearer  to  a  peace  based  on  interna- 
tionalism, and  shall  have  incurred  the  danger  of 
a  compromised  imperialist  peace.  The  war  might 
have  ended  in  a  compromise  which  would  have  been 
a  victory  had  the  compromise  been  based  on  a  new 
international  order.     If,  however,  the  compromise 


POSTSCRIPT  13 

ending  the  war  is  nothing  but  a  dividing  up  of  Rus- 
sia, China  and  a  few  other  countries  by  nations  too 
tired  to  fight,  by  nations  reconciled  solely  by  the 
privilege  of  spoiling  enemy  and  ally,  then  we  have 
an  ignoble  peace,  and  the  war  for  democracy  is  a 
failure  and  our  high  pretensions  are  a  mockery. 

The  opportunity  for  a  democratic  peace  may  again 
recur.  By  pressure  upon  the  Western  front,  the 
Allies  may  force  democratic  groups  in  Germany  to 
make  overtures  for  a  peace  based  on  international- 
ism and  on  a  true  self-determination  of  Russia,  for 
a  peace  free  of  all  taint  of  spoliation.  It  will  be 
difficult  to  do  this,  however,  unless  our  Allies  refrain 
from  giving  final  sanction  to  plans  of  Japanese  con- 
quest in  Siberia.  Once  we  concede  to  Japan  the 
right  to  conquer  this  territory  we  shall  find  it  im- 
possible, except  by  sheer  force,  to  prevent  German, 
Austrian  and  Turkish  aggressions  against  Russia. 

The  war  for  democracy  and  internationalism  will 
not  end,  however,  with  the  treaty  of  peace.  The 
present  war  is  but  an  incident,  disastrous  and 
ghastly,  in  a  larger  development,  in  a  struggle  be- 
tween two  principles:  the  principle  of  autocracy, 
militarism  and  nationalistic  imperialism,  and  the 
principle  of  democracy.  The  moment  the  war  ends 
the  struggle  wall  change  its  form,  though  not  its 
character.  There  will  be  renewed  the  same  conflict 
which  we  have  witnessed  for  several  generations, 
the  same  steady  upward  push  of  the  masses  of  all 


14  POSTSCRIPT 

nations.  A  victory  for  Germany  would  immensely 
hamper  this  movement  and  delay  an  eventual  victory 
of  the  democratic  principle.  It  would  re-establish 
the  prestige  of  autocracy.  Not  even  such  a  catas- 
trophe, however,  would  end  the  struggle  between 
democracy  and  the  autocratic  principle,  though  the 
centre  of  conflict  might  shift  from  Manchester, 
Roubais  and  Pittsburg  to  Essen  and  Leipzig. 

To  a  great  extent,  moreover,  the  war,  even  if  its 
outcome  be  calamitous,  mil  have  contributed  to  the 
victory  of  the  democratic  principle.  The  war  has 
meant  nothing  if  it  has  not  meant  enlightenment. 
To  the  peoples  of  all  countries  it  has  shown  the  lack 
of  prevision  and  of  moral  quality  of  the  governments 
which  they  have  so  long  obeyed.  Not  only  the 
autocracy  of  Germany,  but  the  English,  French  and 
Italian  rulers  as  well,  have  revealed  crassly  egoistic 
class  motives  concealed  under  pious  phrases.  The 
wage-earners  of  the  world  and  the  hundreds  of  mil- 
lions who  make  up  the  poor  and  disinherited  will 
have  long  years  in  which  to  reflect  upon  the  lessons 
of  this  conflict.  They  will  come  to  see  that  back  of 
the  struggle  between  nations  lay  a  more  permanent 
conflict  between  ideas.  They  will  see  the  war  be- 
neath the  war,  and  will  realize  that  whatever  the 
immediate  issue,  the  victory  is  to  the  group  in  tlie 
community  that  is  most  conscious  of  its  interests  and 
most  insistent  upon  its  riglits. 

It  is  this  self-revelation  of  our  modern  ultra-na- 


POSTSCRIPT  15 

tionalism  and  this  baring  of  the  nakedness  of  class 
pretensions  that  will  constitute  in  the  end  one  of  the 
great  permanent  victories  of  the  war.  Whatever 
the  outcome,  there  will  remain  after  the  w^ar  the 
same  clash  within  the  nations  as  before.  A  present 
victory  for  internationalism  and  democracy,  how- 
ever, a  present  destruction  of  German  militarism, 
and  with  it  of  all  other  militarisms,  is  the  goal  to  be 
achieved  in  the  present  war  and  a  step  in  the  direc- 
tion of  an  ultimate  victory  in  the  years  to  come. 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   ELUSIVE   VICTORY 

In  this  fourth  year  of  the  war  all  the  world  longs 
for  peace.  The  fever  has  almost  run  its  course. 
Much  hatred  remains,  much  greed  for  territory  and 
wealth,  much  reliance  on  the  strength  of  armies  and 
navies.  Yet  the  world  over  men  are  sickened  by  the 
eternal  bloodshed.  The  early  optimistic  enthusiasm 
has  vanished,  and  there  opens  up  the  vista  of  an  end- 
less prolongation  of  a  senseless  slaughter.  No 
longer  is  there  hope  of  an  easy  victory  over 
dispirited  foes.  Instead  earnest  peace-loving  men 
are  asking  themselves  whether  this  conflict,  like  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  will  not  long  endure  and  end 
only  in  the  utter  decivilization  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world. 

Precisely  such  a  situation  as  we  are  now  facing 
was  presaged  in  a  remarkable  anticipation  by  an 
English  philosopher  in  the  spring  of  1914.  ''Let  a 
European  war  break  out,"  wrote  Mr.  Graham  Wal- 
las, "perhaps  between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
Triple  Entente,  which  so  many  journalists  and  poli- 

17 


18  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ticians  in  England  and  Germany  contemplate  with 
criminal  levity.  If  the  combatants  prove  to  be 
equally  balanced,  it  may,  after  the  first  battles, 
smoulder  on  for  thirty  years.  What  will  be  the 
population  of  London,  or  Manchester,  or  Chemnitz, 
or  Bremen,  or  Milan,  at  the  end  of  it  ? "  ^ 

A  thirty  years'  war,  lasting  until  1944,  still 
seems  to  us  impossible.  Flesh  and  blood  could  not 
stand  the  intolerable  strain ;  the  war  must  come  to 
its  end  earlier.  Yet  we  are  as  far  from  a  decision 
as  at  the  beginning.  On  land  the  Central  Powers 
are  victorious ;  at  sea  the  Allies ;  and  both  are  strain- 
ing their  resources  and  wasting  their  energies  at  a 
speed  inconceivable  four  years  ago.  The  war's  con- 
tagion has  spread,  and  nations,  uninterested  in  Ser- 
bia's fate  and  other  controversies  which  gave  rise 
to  the  contest,  now  marshal  their  forces,  sacrifice 
their  young  men  and  put  their  whole  future  to  the 
test.  The  chances  of  victory  for  the  one  side  or  the 
other  alter  continually,  and  statesmen  and  publicists, 
once  possessed  of  calm  judgment,  are  elated  or  panic- 
stricken  by  the  news  of  successive  days.  Through- 
out the  nations  the  gambling  spirit  is  rife,  and  the 
fate  of  the  world  is  the  stakes. 

From  the  gigantic  battling  of  more  than  three 
years  there  emerges  a  sense  of  the  elusiveness  of 
the  victory  sought.  In  the  beginning,  when  Ger- 
man  armies   were   rapidly   invading   France,    the 

1  "The  Great  Society"  by  Graham  Wallas,  New  York,  1914,  p.  12. 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  19 

Fatherland  believed  that  the  present  struggle,  like 
those  of  '66  and  70,  was  to  be  "a  fresh  and  merry 
war,"  and  just  before  the  Marne,  and  afterwards, 
France  was  dismembered  in  numberless  Kneipes 
throughout  the  German  Empire.  Similarly  in  the 
optimistic  spring  of  1915,  English  and  French,  rely- 
ing upon  the  coming  Big  Push  and  the  Slavic  steam- 
roller, amused  themselves  by  dividing  up  enemy  ter- 
ritories in  anticipation  of  an  early  decisive  victory. 
Since  then,  however,  much  water  has  flowed  \inder 
the  bridge.  Millions  of  careless  boasting  boys  have 
been  buried  deep  and  other  millions  are  hobbling 
about  on  crutches,  or,  blinded  or  diseased,  are  seek- 
ing to  live  out  mangled  lives  until  Death  comes  to 
this  generation  and  the  curtain  goes  dowTi  upon  the 
grotesque  tragedy.  During  all  this  time  amid 
alarms  of  defeat  there  have  been  exultant  shrieks  for 
the  victory  about  to  be  grasped.  The  victory  has 
never  been  grasped.  It  has  always  been  three 
months  ahead,  always  needed  just  one  more  million 
deaths,  a  few  billion  dollars  more.  And  so,  on  both 
sides  of  that  grim  fighting  line,  which  has  suddenly 
replaced  old  political  boundaries,  men  stumble  for- 
ward, their  eyes  blinded  by  the  flowing  blood,  their 
hearts  inspired  by  an  inner  ideal,  by  a  primitive,  in- 
vincible pride  and  by  the  persistent  hope  of  a  vic- 
tory that  is  always  to  be  and  never  is. 

Yet  however  patriotic,  men  remain  men,  and  all 
the  obsession  of  the  present  cannot  deaden  the  mem- 


20  THE  END  OF  THE  WAE 

ory  of  happier  days.  Even  the  Junker,  steeled  in  a 
philosophy  of  war,  has  his  moments  of  regret  for  the 
time  before  sons  and  brothers  died  daily  in  un- 
romantic  ways  on  distant  battle-fields,  when  men 
might  meet  present  enemies  on  terms  of  friendship, 
and  the  world  was  not  divided  against  itself  by  bul- 
warks of  bayonets,  ships  and  lies.  To  the  common 
run  of  unmartial  people  who  form  a  majority  of  all 
nations,  the  war  has  become  odious.  The  illusion  is 
gone.  It  is  no  ** merry  war"  but  a  desperate,  un- 
honourable  conflict,  a  war  of  money,  deceit,  bribery, 
murder  and  ruthlessness  both  against  neutrals  and 
enemies.  To  what  does  it  lead?  What  will  be  the 
gain  in  the  long  years  of  post-bellum  reckoning? 
Sober  people  begin  to  see  beyond  the  conflict  to  the 
grey  years  to  come.  They  still  hope  for  victory,  but 
it  is  a  lesser  victory  than  that  once  envisaged,  a  vic- 
tory in  which  the  victors  themselves  will  be  over- 
burdened with  debt  and  the  care  of  the  victims  who 
achieved  the  victory.  The  hope  of  adequate  in- 
demnities has  vanished ;  the  war  as  a  gigantic  whole 
is  unprofitable.  It  does  not  pay.  From  a  material 
point  of  view  even  a  victory  will  not  pay. 

Will  it  pay  morally?  Will  the  losses  in  blood  and 
treasure  be  made  good  by  permanent  gains  in  ideals  ? 

Here  lies  the  real  issue,  and  it  is  the  afifirmative 
answer  to  this  question  which  prolongs  the  war.  So 
universal  is  the  abhorrence  of  the  ceaseless  carnage 
that  nothing  but  the  deepest  ideals  could  reconcile 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  21 

men  to  the  struggle.  Millions  of  us  believe,  how- 
ever, that  to  give  over  the  battle  without  attaining 
the  war's  supreme  goal  would  be  to  suffer  disaster. 
The  war  is  as  odious  as  ever,  cruel,  barbaric,  vile; 
and  yet  there  seems  no  alternative  than  a  submis- 
sion to  enduring  evil.  Victory  will  consist  in  bring- 
ing about  a  new  state  of  the  world  in  which  men  will 
be  unharassed  and  free,  and  in  which  great  nations 
and  small  will  live  together  in  peace. 

Today  there  has  arisen  a  new  attitude  toward 
peace  and  a  larger  hope  for  peace,  because  of  the 
very  conditions  which  make  the  present  war  differ- 
ent from  any  other  in  history.  In  the  past  wars 
were  limited  by  the  narrow  bounds  given  to  political 
integration,  narrow  bounds  within  which  all  inter- 
course between  the  nations  took  place.  And  peace 
was  limited  by  the  same  conditions.  A  world  peace 
was  impossible  in  a  world  divided  up  into  thousands 
of  separate  communities  unconnected  by  industrial, 
social  and  intellectual  bonds.  Today  the  increas- 
ingly close  integration  of  the  world,  which  makes 
wars  utterly  destructive,  makes  a  world  peace  con- 
ceivable. For  the  first  time  there  is  possibility  of 
a  close  co-operation  among  nations,  a  sense  of  like- 
ness in  aim  and  destiny.  There  is  a  dream  of  mu- 
tual understanding  and  common  concert.  There  is 
a  propagation  of  an  international  faith  and  of  an 
international  allegiance. 

This  conception,  at  best  merely  struggling  for  ex- 


22  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

pression,  distorted  and  disfigured  in  the  throes  of 
its  birth,  this  faith  in  a  new  world  society,  in  a  new 
unity  and  a  new  concert,  is  the  one  fact  which  gives 
this  world  conflict  a  rational  and  moral  base.  De- 
stroy that  base  and  nothing  remains  but  the  maniac 
clashing  of  rival  peoples,  a  war  which  leads  to  a 
senseless  peace,  which  again  leads  to  war.  Destroy 
this  faith,  and  the  war  is  but  one  of  an  endless  chain 
of  wars.  In  some  manner  and  to  some  extent  all  the 
warring  nations,  including  even  those  opposed  to  us, 
accept  this  faith.  They  cling  to  it  despite  many 
facts  which  should  tend  to  make  them  sceptical.  It 
is  the  vindication  of  this  faith  which  alone  makes 
the  war  anything  more  than  a  mere  grotesque  trag- 
edy. It  is  by  this  vindication  alone  that  a  victory 
can  be  won. 

But  is  not  this  real  moral  victory  itself  elusive, 
and  do  we  not  clutch  at  it  ignorantly,  and  with 
clumsy  hands'?  It  is  significant  that  our  enemies, 
against  whom  we  are  fighting  for  tlie  security  of 
this  better  world,  are  themselves  fighting  for  secu- 
rity, so  that  echoes  of  our  ambitions  come  to  us 
from  across  enemy  frontiers.  Can  we  attain  inter- 
nationalism, democracy  and  permanent  peace  by  the 
mere  expedient  of  fighting?  In  the  beginning,  it 
must  be  admitted,  we  envisaged  the  whole  problem 
too  simply.  Wrapped  up  in  a  sense  of  the  perfect 
justice  of  our  cause,  we  believed  that  our  enemy  must 
soon  discern  and  acknowledge  that  he  was  fighting 


THE  ELUSIVE  \aCTORY  23 

against  the  light.  Many  idealists  among  the  Allies 
expected  that  in  a  few  months — in  a  year  at  most — 
they  would  overturn  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment and  confer  upon  the  un-hated  German  people 
the  blessings  which  they  themselves  enjoyed.  Bet- 
ter still,  the  Germans,  perceiving  the  abyss  towards 
which  their  dynasts  were  leading  them,  would  them- 
selves revolt,  and  stretch  out  their  hands  in  friend- 
ship to  their  rescuing  enemy.  None  of  all  this  has 
happened;  on  the  contrary  the  Germans  have  made 
common  cause  with  their  rulers,  and  believe,  quite 
sincerely,  that  they,  and  they  alone,  are  fighting  for 
the  right,  fighting  that  we  and  our  Allies  may  not 
crush,  dismember  and  humiliate  the  Fatherland. 
From  the  beginning  they  have  opposed  to  us  ideals 
as  firmly  held  as  those  that  we  hold. 

All  our  millions  of  soldiers,  our  hundreds  of  w^ar- 
ships,  our  mountains  of  explosives,  have  failed  to 
persuade  them  that  we  are  fighting  their  cause.  We 
are  unable  to  convince  them  and  to  their  surprise 
they  are  unable  to  convince  us. 

The  difficulty  seems  to  be  that  we  and  our  Allies 
are  bringing  to  this  problem  a  blunt  war  mind  and 
are  seeking  a  somewhat  impalpable  solution  by  ex- 
cessively palpable  instruments.  We  have  tried  to 
hammer  the  enemy  into  a  confession  of  sin  and  into  a 
state  of  grace,  not  realizing  that  for  this  purpose 
machine  guns  and  asphyxiating  gas  are  no  adequate 
instruments.     Though  we  cannot  win  this  war  with- 


24  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

out  arms,  we  cannot  win  it  by  arms  alone.  The  con- 
sequence of  our  exclusive  preoccupation  with  the 
war  tends  to  obscure  the  very  purposes  for  which 
it  is  fought,  with  the  result  that  the  ideal  victory, 
which  we  seek,  eludes  us. 

This  is  true  of  our  enemies  and  our  allies  as  of  our- 
selves. The  simple  faith  of  1914  is  gone.  In  Ger- 
many millions  now  perceive  that  they  were  enrolled 
in  this  conflict  by  a  conscription  of  lies  and  that  the 
real  objects  of  their  exalted  rulers  were  different 
from  those  avowed.  They  begin  to  doubt  the  wis- 
dom and  justice  of  invading  Belgium,  of  submarine 
warfare  and  the  bombarding  of  peaceful  cities ;  and 
a  few  are  wondering  whether  a  German  victory 
might  not  be  a  victory  over  Germany.  The  chains 
fastened  upon  Belgium  would  clank  upon  German 
ankles,  for  foreign  aggression  means  unfreedom  at 
home.  Similarly,  though  in  a  lesser  degree,  the 
Allied  peoples  are  beginning  to  dread  too  complete 
a  victory.  What  advantage  will  there  be  in  a  mere 
overpowering  of  Germany?  The  German  menace 
will  be  gone,  but  new  menaces  will  have  been  created. 
Crush  Germany  to  place  Italy  on  the  East  Adriatic 
and  the  seeds  are  sown  for  a  fresh  war  between 
Italy  and  Serbia  and  their  respective  allies,  a  war 
potentially  as  destructive  as  that  under  which  we 
now  live.  Dismember  Austria,  split  up  that  loose 
aggregation  into  a  larger  Balkans,  and  what  is  the 
permanent  gain  to  England  or  France  ?    Again,  what 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  25 

new  wars  are  to  be  staged  by  the  Peace  Conference 
in  Asia  Minor?  Everywhere  dangers  spring  up  like 
armed  men  from  the  ground.  Every\vhere  victory 
promises  to  create  new  warring  nations,  young,  un- 
wise, over-confident,  over-ambitious,  ruthless.  Such 
a  victory  is  no  victory.  Divide  all  conquered  terri- 
tories according  to  the  clashing  desires  of  the  flushed 
Allies  and  you  have  a  state  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world,  no  better  than  that  from  which  men  sought  to 
escape  in  the  insane  venture  of  1914. 

Humankind  is  proverbially  disregardful  of  dis- 
tant dangers  and  Europe  might  be  willing  to  pur- 
chase immunity  from  immediate  aggression  at  the 
risk  of  a  greater  peril  fifty  years  hence.  But  the 
menace  is  far  more  proximate.  In  1912  the  Balkan 
States  declared  w'ar  against  Turkey  upon  the  basis 
of  a  division  of  conquered  territories  more  carefully 
considered  than  that  which  today  binds  the  Allies; 
within  a  year  they  were  at  war  among  themselves. 
Can  the  Allies,  in  the  event  of  their  success,  surely 
hold  together  in  the  precarious  days  of  victory,  while 
distributing  territories  newly  acquired?  Let  Ger- 
many lay  down  her  arms — is  peace  then  assured? 
In  a  division  of  spoils  there  is  no  true  harmony. 
What  Italy  wants  Serbia  wants.  We  can  imagine 
the  ironic  laughter  of  the  defeated  Central  Powers  if 
at  the  final  grand  inquest  the  victorious  Allies  split 
upon  the  rock  of  clashing  expansions,  and  each 
courted  the  aid  of  the  German  victim.     For  unless 


26  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

some  new  principle  is  evoked,  other  than  that  of  giv- 
ing to  each  what  has  been  promised  to  each,  the  di- 
vision will  be  made  according  to  the  strength  of  the 
respective  victorious  nations,  according  to  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  within  the  Alliance,  and  in  case  of 
conflict  the  unsuccessful  group  may  appeal  to  the 
victim  to  redress  the  balance. 

It  is  a  discouraging  outlook,  a  vista  of  ever  new 
dangers,  a  dread  that  the  world  will  escape  from  the 
consuming  fire  of  this  war  only  to  fall  into  hotter 
conflagrations.  A  real  victory,  a  victory  of  peace, 
eludes  us.  And  when  we  inquire  why  it  eludes  us  we 
see  that  we,  the  Allied  nations,  carry  into  the  conflict 
something  of  that  evil  principle  against  which  we 
fight.  The  war  is  against  German  militarism,  ag- 
gression and  imperialism,  but  the  Allied  nations  are 
also  militaristic,  aggressive  and  imperialistic.  '  Be- 
tween Germany  and  Japan  there  is  little  to  choose  in 
the  matter  of  imperialistic  ambition;  between  the 
autocratic  Russia  that  was  and  the  Germany  that  is 
there  is  nothing  to  choose.  The  war  in  its  origin  was 
an  alignment  of  aggressive  nations  against  aggres- 
sive nations.  Moreover,  in  carrying  on  the  war  each 
combatant  group  has  gained  the  adhesion  of  former 
neutrals  by  appealing  to  greed  and  ambition.  The 
Allies  made  promises  to  Italy,  Roumania  and  Greece, 
as  Germany  made  promises  to  Bulgaria.  The  ce- 
ment of  both  alliances  has  been  the  very  thing  which 
caused  the  war.     The  Allies,  fighting  fire  with  fire. 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  27 

cannot  be  depended  upon  to  control  their  own  fire. 
A  war  for  internationalism  has  been  conducted  by 
expedients  opposed  to  the  principle  of  interna- 
tionalism. 

Small  wonder  then  that  the  world  is  disillusioned 
and  war-weary,  that  the  peoples  ask  themselves  if 
wisdom  and  justice,  moderation  and  tolerance  are 
not  more  likely  to  solve  problems  than  is  the  clash 
of  brutal  armies,  let  loose  by  stupid,  if  astute,  diplo- 
mats. No  wonder  that  tens  of  millions  are  seeking 
a  way  out  of  the  banal  slaughter  to  a  victory  that 
will  not  be  empty  and  to  a  peace  that  will  not  be 
transient. 

In  this  search  they  are  everywhere  impeded. 
They  cry  "peace,  peace,"  meaning  thereby  a  settle- 
ment that  is  lasting  and  just,  but  the  echo  answers 
"there  is  no  peace."  Those  who  desire  terms  which 
will  make  for  progress  and  civilization  find  their 
efforts  frustrated  by  two  groups,  by  sincere,  dog- 
matic pacifists,  who  desire  immediate  peace  on  any 
terms,  and  by  equally  sincere  bitter-enders,  jusqu'd 
houtistes,  who  are  either  imperialists,  conscious  or 
unconscious,  or  mere  instinctive  haters,  loving  the 
war  more  than  the  peace  that  is  to  be  gained.  The 
first  group,  if  successful,  would  pluck  the  fruit  be- 
fore it  was  ripe ;  the  second  would  fight  on  until  the 
fruit  was  rotten. 

To  tlie  irreconcilable  pacifist  the  war  has  brought 
an  endless  series  of  disillusionments.     He  has  an  in- 


28  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

vincible  repugnance  to  warfare,  not  because  he  is  a 
coward  (on  the  contrary  he  is  often  fanatically 
brave)  but  because  in  him  the  tribal  instinct  is  weak. 
He  tends  to  believe  in  the  inherent  goodness  and 
reasonableness  of  men.  Often  he  is  a  pacifist  and  a 
non-resister  because  he  is  a  Christian;  more  often 
he  is  a  rationalist  holding  fast  to  reason  and  dis- 
trusting instinct.  He  is  not  objective;  few  extrem- 
ists are.  He  is  not  bound  by  conclusions  drawn 
from  history,  for  he  looks  to  the  future  and  believes 
implicitly  in  the  revolutionary  conversion  of  whole 
peoples.  He  holds  to  his  dogma  that  nothing  can 
be  gained  by  war.  The  nearer  the  war  the  less  par- 
donable. 

The  dogmatic  pacifist  has  seen  the  ground  drift 
from  beneath  his  feet.  In  the  beginning  he  hoped 
that  all  nations  would  be  reasonable ;  they  were  not. 
He  hoped  that  non-resistance  would  evoke  non- 
aggression;  it  did  not.  He  believed  that  the  sober 
reason  as  well  as  the  economic  and  cultural  inter- 
ests of  the  world  would  prevent  nations  from  going 
to  war ;  they  did  not.  Even  in  the  midst  of  the  gen- 
eral conflagration  he  believed  that  a  semi-isolated 
nation,  like  the  United  States,  could  remain  out  of 
the  war,  could  maintain  a  solitaire  peace;  he  has 
discovered  that  it  could  not.  He  has  seen  great  peo- 
ples, ardently  desiring  peace,  continue  to  fight  as 
though  driven  by  an  invisible  maleficent  god. 

These  disillusionments  have  confused  the  judg- 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  29 

ment,  if  they  have  not  altered  the  convictions  of  the 
pacifist.  Though  he  at  first  held  that  we  in  America 
should  preserve  an  oasis  of  peace,  and  not  add  to  the 
universal  frenzy,  he  now  discovers,  when  it  comes  to 
a  question  of  ending  the  war,  that  peace  is  more  than 
a  mere  cessation  of  fighting.  It  is  a  thing  of  diflBcult 
terms  and  conditions;  a  thing  easier  broken  than 
made. 

To  the  militarist  also  the  war  has  been  disillusion- 
izing. In  the  beginning  he  thought  of  it  as  a  mere 
conflict  of  arms  and  as  a  chance  for  valour  and  dis- 
tinction in  the  ''imminent  deadly  breach."  There 
was  something  mystical,  romantic  and  sentimental 
in  his  concepton.  War  was  utterly  different  from 
the  dead  monotony  of  industrial  life,  with  its  glut- 
tonous production  of  standardized  goods,  its  hum- 
drum collocation  of  grimy  men  in  grimy  factories, 
its  plethoric  endless  heaping  up  of  commodities. 
With  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  all  that  would  be 
over.  To  his  confusion  the  war  turns  out  to  be 
nothing  but  the  same  industrial  process  in  a  differ- 
ent form.  He  discovers  that  not  armies  but  fac- 
tories give  the  decision.  Back  of  the  soldiers  stand 
the  same  grimy  workers.  The  Brigadier-Generals 
in  their  resplendent  uniforms  are  supplanted  by 
manufacturers,  merchants,  bankers  and  advertising 
men,  for  the  war  has  proved  that  war  is  business, 
and  that  military  eflBcicncy  is  useless  without  eco- 
nomic efficiency.     Success  in  war  depends  upon  the 


30  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

identical  men  and  processes  as  does  success  in  peace. 
As  a  consequence  the  military  man  of  the  old  type 
is  disappointed. 

Yet  though  pacifists  and  warriors  are  alike  dis- 
illusioned, the  war  drags  on.  Men  die  on  the  battle- 
field and  women  and  children  and  old  people  die  at 
home.  Food  becomes  scarce,  fuel  scarcer  and  the 
whole  industrial  machine  creaks.  The  birth-rate 
falls;  the  death  rate  rises.  Tuberculosis  spreads 
through  vast  sections  of  the  populations  and  vene- 
real diseases  make  fearful  ravages.  Everjnvhere 
are  sick  who  cannot  be  tended,  and  weak  who  die  un- 
necessarily. The  nations,  not  comprehending  each 
other,  vainly  strive  for  a  mutual  understanding  that 
will  relieve  them  from  this  excruciating  agony. 
Then  failing  to  reach  any  end  or  attain  any  concord 
they  listen  to  the  counsel  of  despair,  "Fight  on,  you 
peoples;  cut  your  throats,  lose  your  lives  and  with 
them  your  doubts  and  qualms  and  hesitations. 
There  is  peace  in  death  on  the  battlefield;  there  is 
peace  in  the  insensate  struggle  itself,  in  which  men 
cease  to  think,  and  mechanically  shoot  at  an  unseen 
enemy;  as  much  automata  as  are  the  machine  guns 
under  their  hands." 

It  is  as  though  we  were  driven  by  an  inner  impulse 
to  mass  suicide.  Whoever  seeks  a  rational  escape 
from  the  slaughter  is  exposed  to  a  merciless  fire 
from  the  rear,  to  appeals  to  hatred,  revenge,  nation- 
alistic gain.    Constantly  we  are  told  not  to  look 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  31 

within  but  outward  to  the  enemy.  All  the  suffering 
is  attributed  to  the  foe  and  not  to  the  struggle  itself. 
If  the  loved  ones  at  home  starve,  the  enemy  is  at 
fault,  not  the  war.  If  fathers,  husbands,  sons  die  on 
distant  fields,  it  is  the  enemy  who  has  killed  them, 
not  the  war.  In  each  country  we  forget  that  war  is 
the  opponent  and  remember  only  a  grinning,  con- 
temptuous foe.  Those  who  have  something  to  gain 
or  nothing  to  lose  from  the  conflict  insist  on  a  mere 
fighting.  So  also  do  those  who  have  forsworn 
thought  *'for  the  duration  of  the  war."  They  urge 
the  nation  to  grasp  that  ever-elusive  victory,  to  gain 
by  just  a  little  more  effort  the  balm  that  is  to  salve 
all  wounds,  to  save  itself  from  the  last  unutterable 
calamity  of  destruction.  They  demand  that  the 
nation  fight  that  'Hhese  honoured  dead  shall  not 
have  died  in  vain."  Foolish,  vainglorious  hope. 
More  millions  may  die  and  more  and  more  millions, 
and  yet  die  in  vain.  For  unless  the  war  is  rational- 
ized, spiritualized,  saved  from  gross  corrupting  ele- 
ments, unless  it  is  fully  harmonized  with  the  new 
spirit  struggling  to  be  born,  all  who  die,  die  in  vain. 
Until  then,  those  who  cry  for  "peace,  peace,"  even 
though  the  military  victory  be  won,  must  be  answered 
"there  is  no  peace." 

Could  there  be  a  more  striking  illustration  of  our 
tragic  incapacity  to  rise  above  a  fighting  clan  spirit 
to  a  view  of  humanity  in  its  world  relations?  The 
war  lasts  because  we,  like  our  foes,  cannot  put  our- 


32  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

selves  in  the  enemy's  place,  cannot  view  the  world 
from  his  standpoint,  or  test  our  ideals  by  his  needs. 
We  do  not  concede  to  him  a  common  humanity  or  a 
common  rationality,  but  see  in  him  only  the  brute 
and  moral  idiot.  We  close  our  ears  to  what  he  has 
to  say,  as  he  closes  his  ears,  and  both  sides  hurl 
threats  across  the  national  boundaries.  The  loose 
curses  of  some  unrepresentative  Englishman  or 
Frenchman,  printed  in  large  type  in  German  papers, 
shut  the  mouths  and  consciences  of  patriotic  Ger- 
mans, clamouring  for  a  democratic  peace.  People  in 
Britain  or  America,  who  stretch  out  their  hands  in 
the  dark  to  feel  the  friendly  touch  of  peace-lovers  in 
enemy  lands,  are  struck  by  a  Reventlow  or  von  Tir- 
pitz,  and  are  silenced.  In  these  circumstances  there 
is  no  peace. 

For  the  peace  that  is  desired,  the  only  peace 
worthy  of  the  name  or  worth  fighting  for,  is  more 
than  a  pact  between  diplomats  coming  to  the  rescue 
of  tired  warriors.  What  is  needed  is  a  constructive 
peace,  that  will  mean  the  progress  of  humanity,  not  a 
peace  of  subjugation  nor  a  peace  precedent  to  a  new 
war.  To  such  a  true  peace  all  the  war  irreconcilables 
of  all  countries  are  unitedly  opposed.  For  these 
Maxses  and  Barres  and  Reventlows,  though  revil- 
ing each  other,  are  true  allies.  Theirs  is  a  curious 
unconscious  internationalism.  Leagued  tog;ether  for 
war,  imperialism  and  subjection,  they  are  the  real 
censors   both  of  democratic   speech   and   thought. 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  33 

They  keep  the  flame  alive,  arousing  for  ever  the  war 
spirit  at  home  and  abroad.  Against  these  strutting 
little  men,  with  their  vicarious  heroism  and  their 
prestige  manufactured  in  enemy  lands,  the  advocates 
of  an  honourable  peace  struggle  ineffectually.  For 
these  little  war-makers,  though  not  intrinsically  pow- 
erful, represent  the  vast  unreason  of  the  world. 

Thus  the  nations  long  for  a  true  peace  and  fight 
on.  Great  is  the  contagion  of  war,  and  so  near  lies 
the  fighting  spirit  to  our  primitive  instincts,  and  so 
easy  is  the  refuge  from  the  task  of  solving  prob- 
lems to  the  thoughtless  routine  of  battle,  that  one 
nation  after  another  is  dragged  into  the  contest. 
Finally  the  United  States,  the  last  great  neutral,  was 
forced  into  the  war. 

There  was  no  way  out.  The  struggle  was  on 
whether  we  were  in  or  not,  and  our  participation 
seemed  to  promise  the  end.  It  was  for  us,  we  be- 
lieved, to  resolve  the  problem,  to  untie  the  knot  that 
had  resisted  Europe's  efforts.  To  this  task  we 
brought  men,  munitions  and  money,  and  also  a  new 
spirit.  We  wanted  no  conquests  or  indemnities, 
nothing  but  an  honourable  permanent  peace.  War- 
weary  even  before  we  entered  the  war,  we  strove  to 
be  disinterested,  to  fight  without  hatred  and  with- 
out ambition.    We  were  literally  fighting  for  peace. 

Thus  America  became  the  chief  hope  of  the 
world's  peace.  We  were  cast  for  this  role  not  be- 
cause we  were  better  people  than  Europeans — we 


34  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

were  neither  better  nor  worse — ^but  simply  because 
our  safe  geographical  and  economic  position  not  only 
permitted  us  to  develop  ideals  of  internationalism 
but  also  took  from  us  any  powerful  selfish  interest  in 
the  conflict.  As  peace-makers  we  had  an  advantage 
over  other  great  Powers. 

We  had  a  corresponding  disadvantage.  As  a 
nation  we  were  ignorant  of  those  complex  historical 
and  political  problems  of  Europe,  those  intimate 
repulsions  and  inherited  prejudices  out  of  which 
wars  arise.  We  knew  little  about  Russia,  less  about 
Austria-Hungary,  still  less  about  the  Balkan  situa- 
tion, and  our  ignorance  concerning  the  intricate  prob- 
lems of  Asia  Minor  was  almost  complete.  Before 
the  war  few  Americans  had  even  heard  of  the  Bag- 
dad Railway.  Disregarding  these  problems  we  be- 
lieved that  peace  could  be  maintained  by  keeping 
things  as  they  were  and  we  never  asked  ourselves 
whether  things  could  be  kept  as  they  were.  Ignoring 
their  difficulties  and  their  temptations  we  felt  a  con- 
tempt for  nations  which  sought  to  fight  out  problems, 
not  realizing  that  in  like  circumstances  we  too  should 
have  fought.  We  thought  of  peace  as  a  self -regulat- 
ing device,  as  a  thing  natural  and  good  and  easy,  and 
of  any  people  that  broke  the  peace  as  a  self-confessed 
malefactor. 

Since  then  we  have  learned  much.  We  have  in- 
vestigated the  rotting  foundations  upon  which  peace 
in  the  past  has  been  built  and  we  have  come  to  rec- 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  35 

ognize  that  in  some  cases  the  peace-breaker  is 
blessed.  We  have  learned  that  not  every  peace  will 
do ;  that  peace  is  a  highly  perishable  integument,  to 
be  adjusted  or  fitted,  so  to  speak,  to  the  needs  of 
peoples,  to  the  spread  of  ideas,  ideals,  interests,  an- 
tagonisms ;  that  it  must  grow  with  the  growth  of  the 
nations  it  holds  together.  It  is  not  a  glass  case, 
rigid  and  fragile,  but  a  living  container,  a  web, 
of  the  nature  of  the  things  it  holds,  growing,  chang- 
ing, alive — and  mortal.  It  is  a  condition,  good, 
bad,  improving,  degenerating.  It  is  a  part  of  the 
enveloping  atmosphere  of  the  nations,  and  the  na- 
tions may  grow  up  healthy  in  its  atmosphere  or  they 
may  stifle  and  die. 

We  have  also  learned  that  no  nation,  nor  all 
nations  together,  can  proclaim  '^Let  there  be  Peace" 
and  there  will  be  peace.  For  that  peace  which  the 
world  desires  is  an  organic  and  vulnerable  thing, 
which  must  grow  out  of  the  ideals  and  passions  of 
men,  which  must  be  better  or  worse,  which  must  die 
day  by  day  and  be  renewed  day  by  day,  as  our  skin 
dies  and  is  renewed.  We  have  only  begun  to  learn 
the  vast  toxicolog}^  of  peace;  the  virulent,  recondite 
poisons  that  destroy  it,  poisons  not  placed  there  by 
wicked  men  but,  like  fatigue  germs,  generated  by  the 
international  body  itself.  We  find  the  enemy  of 
peace  to  be  not  Germany  alone  but  also  those  dis- 
tract iugly  difficult  questions,  which  Peace  must  con- 
front and  answer  or  be  herself  destroyed.     Our  own 


36  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

pat  replies  of  three  years  ago,  as  we  now  realize, 
were  no  answers,  but  mere  evasions.  We  have 
studied  and  learned  though  we  are  still  ignorant. 
So  is  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  blind  lead  the  blind ; 
the  ignorant  teach  the  ignorant;  the  passionate 
preach  to  the  passionate  the  virtues  of  peace. 

Disheartening?  Surely.  Yet  so  the  world  has 
always  been  governed  and  the  race  survived.  To- 
day if  our  difficulties  are  intricate  we  have  at  least 
a  broader  basis,  in  a  new  world  created  under  our 
feet,  upon  which  to  build  for  the  future.  More  men 
and  more  women  than  ever  before  are  striving  not 
for  any  peace  but  for  one  that  is  true  and  perma- 
nent and  just.  The  task  of  attaining  such  a  peace  is 
paralyzingly  difficult,  but  we  hope  and  believe  that  it 
is  not  impossible. 

But  to  attain  it  requires  a  larger  spirit  than  to 
fight  a  war.  It  requires  broader  sympathies,  a 
clearer  vision,  a  greater  faith  and  a  nobler  charity. 
The  problem  is  no  less  than  the  planning  of  the 
world,  the  provision  of  a  place  in  the  sun  for  all  the 
nations  (including  our  enemies),  the  evening  of  the 
path  over  which  all  peoples  in  their  daily  arduous 
lives  must  pass.  The  peace  to  be  attained  must  be  a 
peace  that  lays  the  foundations  upon  which  a  world 
society  may  be  built.  Such  a  peace  does  not  come 
automatically,  nor  is  it  attained  by  fighting,  which 
can  achieve  only  the  removal  of  some  of  the  ob- 
stacles.    The   end   of   the  war   does   not   of   itself 


THE  ELUSIVE  VICTORY  37 

bring  peace,  just  as  the  battle  won  does  not  bring  the 
victory;  all  that  war  assures  us  is  a  partial  cleaning 
of  the  slate  upon  which  a  new  message  may  be  writ- 
ten. What  that  message  will  be  depends  upon  what 
spirit  animates  the  peoples  who  are  to  do  the  writing. 
It  is  in  something  of  this  mood  and  with  the  sense 
that  she  is  a  nation  chosen  by  circumstances  to  lead, 
that  America  must  approach  the  problem  of  world 
peace.  The  task  comes  to  us  more  immediately  than 
ever  before.  Plunged  into  the  World  War  to  sink  or 
rise  with  the  other  nations,  we  may  either  fight  on  to 
the  elusive  victory  that  is  defeat,  or  may  strive  by  in- 
telligence and  a  true  spirit  to  attain  to  that  moral 
victory  without  which  this  war  is  an  unmeaning 
curse. 


CHAPTER  II 

PACIFISTS   AND   PATRIOTS 

Superficially  there  could  have  been  no  more  star- 
tling volte  face  than  that  of  America  in  April,  1917. 
We  had  just  re-elected  Mr.  Wilson,  who  had  "kept 
us  out  of  war ' ' ;  immediately  afterwards,  and  under 
his  leadership,  we  entered  the  war. 

Since  then  we  have  quickly  learned  to  despise  our 
former  attitude,  and  men  who  have  recently  boasted 
of  their  staunch  pacifism  now  hold  that  point  of  view 
to  be  obnoxious  and  contemptible.  Yet  to  those  who 
look  beneath  the  surface  the  basic  impulse  which 
caused  us  to  fight  was  the  same  that  had  long  kept 
us  from  fighting.  It  was  in  the  main  idealism  which 
thrust  us  in  as  it  had  once  held  us  aloof.  Beneath 
our  sudden  change  in  policy  lay  a  perfect  continuity 
in  sentiment  and  conviction. 

To  understand  our  present  attitude  and  to  for- 
mulate an  American  policy,  we  must  understand  and 
emotionally  experience  that  strong  sentiment  out 
of  which  our  actions  flowed.  For  we  are  today  and 
will  be  tomorrow  essentially  what  we  were  a  year 
ago.  A  traditional  popular  impulse  manifests  it- 
self differently  under  varying  conditions,  but  itself 
does  not  quickly  change.     Consequently  we  approach 

38 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  39 

the  end  of  the  war  with  much  the  same  instinctive 
reactions,  with  much  the  same  tenacious  but  undi- 
rected idealism  as  in  the  days  in  which  we  held  our- 
selves aloof  from  the  conflict. 

It  was  not  to  be  anticipated  that  our  present  Al- 
lies ^  should  regard  our  past  abstention  as  heroic  or 
indeed  as  anything  but  materialistic  and  selfish. 
Themselves  bearing  the  brunt  of  a  desperate  strug- 
gle, they  naturally  believed  that  all  neutrals  were 
careless  of  great  moral  issues  and  shortsighted  in 
their  national  egoism.  America  especially  was  de- 
nounced, since  of  all  neutrals  she  was  the  strongest 
and  most  prosperous.  It  was  inevitable  that  all  the 
ancient  accusations  against  Yankee  callousness 
should  be  raised  against  us. 

These  accusations  fitted  in  with  the  traditional 
dispraise  of  America.  We  were  held  to  be  the  most 
unidealistic  of  nations — in  our  land  birds  had 
no  'Song,  flowers  no  scent,  and  men  no  souls.  To 
myriads  of  Europeans  our  life  seemed  cold,  clear, 
hard,  without  shade  or  colour  or  atmosphere,  un- 
romantic,  unmysterious.  They  found  in  us  a  narrow 
and  ill-informed  rationalism,  a  grotesque  emphasis 
upon  the  practical,  a  materialistic  self-seeking. 
Our  cis-Atlantic  civilization  was  styled  gaunt, 
ugly,  monotonous,  clamourous.    Americans  were  the 

1  Technically  America  is  not  an  ally  of  Great  Britain.  France  and 
Italy,  but  merely  an  associate  or  co-belligerent.  For  the  sake  of 
convenience,  however,  it  is  often  better  to  use  the  word  "ally"  since 
it  corresponds  with  general  usage. 


40  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

slaves  of  a  tyrannical  money  instinct.  We  had  no 
soul  roots  in  a  distant  past,  no  long  national  conti- 
nuity. How  could  one  expect  idealism  from  a  mere 
accidental  assemblage  of  transplanted  humans  ? 

Doubtless,  as  our  critics  allege,  we  have  missed 
some  of  the  virtues  and  much  of  the  charm  inhering 
in  the  more  ripely  developed  nations  whose  history 
runs  back  to  an  ancient  folk  childhood.  Our  people, 
coming  from  many  sources,  have  had  their  dim 
lights  extinguished  in  the  glare  of  American  life. 
We  speak  of  the  American  crucible,  but,  in  a  true 
sense,  nations  are  not  chemically  fused  but  grow  as 
do  the  plants,  slowly  and  obscurely.  All  this  makes 
us  different. 

Yet  it  is  only  the  less  sympathetic  European 
observer  who  misses  the  deep  note  of  idealism  in 
American  character.  The  popular  misconception 
arises  because  in  America  so  much  of  our  spiritual 
life  seems  flat  and  arid,  because  we  have  not  been 
chastened  by  suffering,  but  have  always  been  chil- 
dren of  plenty  and  of  a  strenuous  uncomfortable 
comfort.  Our  idealism  itself  bears  the  traces  of  its 
derivation  in  being  cheerful,  self-conscious  and 
somewhat  pragmatic,  worshipping  the  thing  that  is 
to  be  and  ignoring  what  was.  It  is,  like  ourselves, 
mechanical  and  rationalistic,  holding  fast  to  steam, 
electricity,  power  and  bigness.  It  is  the  idealism  of 
a  wealthy  society  of  jostling,  unsqueamish  men, 
above  all,  an  idealism  of  success.    It  is  a  vent  for  all 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  41 

those  impulses  which  are  not  used  up  in  our  struggle 
for  wealth,  and  it  adopts  unconsciously  the  methods 
and  spirit  of  that  struggle.  In  this  check-book  ideal- 
ism, the  widow's  mite  is  less  regarded  than  the  mil- 
lionaire's donation,  and  the  one  sheep  less  than  the 
ninety  and  nine.  It  is  the  idealism  of  a  people  sat- 
isfied, perhaps  over-satisfied  with  itself,  giving  of  its 
plenty  and  determined  to  raise  the  world  to  what  it 
considers  its  own  level.  There  is  in  it  little  humility 
but  much  good  will,  good  sense  and  practical  wis- 
dom. Moreover,  it  is  an  idealism  with  its  feet  on  the 
ground,  an  idealism  which  works,  which  enters  into 
the  core  of  our  day-by-day  life  and  powerfully  influ- 
ences our  actions  and  decisions. 

It  was  this  unromantic  and  perhaps  unlovely  ideal- 
ism which  was  enlisted  a  year  ago  in  the  effort  to 
keep  America  out  of  the  war.  It  was  a  powerful 
ideal  motive  drawn  from  the  brief  traditions  of 
American  history,  and  buttressed  by  economic,  polit- 
ical and  geographical  considerations.  It  was  a  mo- 
tive that  was  rooted  in  a  belief  that  men  are  inher- 
ently good,  that  the  free  man  is  the  good  man  and 
the  good  citizen.  It  believed  theoretically  in  an 
equality,  liberty  and  fraternity,  transcending  na- 
tional boundaries.  Intensely  democratic,  it  de- 
manded the  equalization  of  opportunities,  though  it 
narrowly  conceived  of  equality  as  an  equal  chance 
to  compete  under  unequal  conditions.  Its  faith  was 
strong  in  the  right  of  a  nation  or  a  people  to  self- 


42  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

government.  It  disbelieved  in  repression,  regimen- 
tation, rigid  discipline,  abject  respect  for  the  pub- 
lished law.  ''Do  not  obey  the  law  too  much,"  ad- 
vised the  great  American  prophet,  Walt  Whitman. 

This  attitude  led,  and  still  leads,  to  opposition  to 
war.  The  liberal  does  not  believe  in  propaganda  by 
force.  He  distrusts  the  arbitrament  of  battle  much 
as  he  distrusts  duelling.  To  the  American,  more- 
over, a  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  peace  has  been  all 
the  more  natural  since  his  nation  was  never  called 
upon  to  fight  a  serious  foreign  war.  In  a  fluid 
society  in  which  there  was  elbow-room  and  the  right 
to  use  one's  elbows,  in  which  a  man  might  easily 
change  his  home,  city,  trade,  or  wife,  it  was  easier  to 
move  than  fight.  We  had  no  fighting  traditions  and 
no  specialized  fighting  class,  no  samurai  and  no 
Junkers.  Consequently,  our  patriotism  was  strongly 
pacific. 

This  American  pacifism  was  on  the  whole  conde- 
scendingly benevolent.  Believing  piously  in  our 
own  wisdom  and  good  fortune,  we  experienced  a  mis- 
sionary desire  to  spread  our  virtue  to  foreign  coun- 
tries. We  believed  that  we  were,  or  were  to  become, 
the  most  inspiring  nation  in  the  world,  and  that  we 
gratefully  owed  it  to  Divine  Providence  to  bring  to 
other  nations  the  blessings  that  were  ours.  We  must 
spread  our  civilization  by  example  and  free  gift. 
But  if  there  was  a  touch  of  Pharisaism  in  our  atti- 
tude, there  was  also  a  deeply  sincere  and  generous 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  43 

emotion.    We  wished  unselfishly  to  create  peace  for 
the  entire  world. 

It  is  easy  to  ridicule  this  attitude,  to  see  in  it  an 
intellectual  unripeness  and  a  blindness  to  complex 
facts.  We  lacked  detailed  knowledge;  we  were  far 
too  simple  in  our  hypotheses  and  far  too  summary 
in  our  judgments.  We  conceived  of  Europe  as 
merely  a  more  densely  populated  America,  and  we 
failed  to  grasp  the  infinitely  involved  problems  of 
nations  living  throughout  their  long  history  in  hos- 
tile juxtaposition,  with  their  martial  instincts  forti- 
fied by  the  constant  need  of  self-defence.  We  were 
inclined  to  pass  a  hasty  equal  judgment  upon  all 
combatants,  as  does  the  lazy  police  magistrate  who 
is  too  busy  to  investigate  a  petty  wrangle.  But  all 
this  intellectual  immaturity  was  natural.  If  our 
people  as  a  whole  failed  to  bring  to  this  problem  a 
full  and  dispassionate  mind,  other  neutrals  and  com- 
batants equally  failed.  As  one  looks  deeper  and  en- 
gages the  situation  from  a  moral  rather  than  an  in- 
tellectual point  of  view,  our  attitude,  fairly  radiat- 
ing good-will,  was  far  from  ridiculous.  It  was  an 
effort  to  apply  to  the  relations  between  nations  cer- 
tain obvious  moral  formulae.  If  the  formula  were 
too  simple,  the  effort  none  the  less  lay  in  the  line  of 
future  progress.^ 

1  The  state  of  mind  above  described  was  far  from  being  universal. 
Not  a  few  Americans  envisaged  the  European  War  from  a  purely 
personal,  financial  point  of  view  and  millions  of  others  were  indif- 
ferent. 


44  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Obviously  this  idealism  in  the  first  instance  held 
the  United  States  to  non-intervention.  Nations  and 
men  tend  to  discover  a  deep  moral  justification  for 
whatever  lies  in  their  interest,  but  apart  from  the 
obvious  benefit  to  us  of  non-interference,  there  was 
reason  to  believe  that  such  a  do-nothing  policy 
would  also  inure  to  the  ultimate  advantage  of 
Europe.  Our  underlying  thought  was  that,  as  a 
combatant,  we  should  lose  not  only  moral  prestige, 
but  also  a  disinterestedness  without  which  we  could 
never  become  impartial  mediators.  The  ambition  to 
settle  the  war  obsessed  the  nation.  It  was  in  this 
hope  that  President  Wilson  adjured  us  to  remain 
neutral  even  in  thought,  and  in  this  spirit  he  made 
his  famous  declaration  that  a  nation  may  be  too 
proud  to  fight.  We  did  not  seem  to  recognize  that 
in  our  efforts  to  preserve  a  rigidly  neutral  atti- 
tude we  were  sacrificing  our  right  even  to  pass  a 
moral  judgment.  Thus  the  President  refused  to 
state  his  opinion  concerning  the  morality  of  the  Bel- 
gian invasion  and  made  no  protest  against  German 
atrocities  in  Belgium  or  Russian  atrocities  in  Gali- 
cia.  In  this  abstention,  moreover,  he  was  supported 
by  the  general  sentiment.  ''Why  protest,"  asked 
Americans,  *' since  we  do  not  intend  to  back  up  our 
protests  by  force?  A  protest  will  do  no  good  and 
will  destroy  our  chance  to  become  the  peacemaker." 

Naturally  our  internal  racial  divisions  emphasized 
the  necessity  of  neutrality  and  peaceful  abstention 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  45 

from  European  quarrels.  We  were  no  longer  re- 
quired to  be  neutral  because  of  weakness  and  we  had 
long  ceased  to  believe  that  the  democratic  institutions 
of  the  United  States  needed  protection  from  the 
*' despotic  European  system."  Neutrality  had  be- 
come a  policy  of  convenience;  a  confirmation  of  an 
economic  process  by  which  American  interests  were 
centered  in  the  home  territory.  But  our  attitude 
towards  our  immigrants  confirmed  our  unwilling- 
ness to  interfere  as  a  belligerent  in  European  wars. 
We  were  the  refuge  of  the  world,  the  one  country  in 
which  war-weary  citizens  of  all  the  nations  could 
drown  their  ancient  embittered  animosities  in  the 
new  and  unifying  aspirations  of  American  life.  To 
these  immigrants  from  war-threatened  nations, 
moreover,  we  felt  ourselves  bound  to  offer  surcease 
of  warfare  that  they  might  forget  the  unhappy  days 
in  their  native  land.  Thus  and  thus  only  could  we 
create  a  United  States  of  Europe  on  American  soil. 
If  we  waged  war  against  one  or  another  of  the  Euro- 
pean peoples  we  should  only  rekindle  old  hatreds. 
The  bitter  feelings  aroused  in  America  during  the 
first  two  years  of  the  European  War,  the  only  half- 
suppressed  warfare  of  invective  between  American 
partisans  of  the  Allied  and  of  the  German  cause, 
seemed  to  us  a  forecast  of  the  much  deadlier  conflict 
that  was  to  be  feared  in  the  event  of  any  actual  par- 
ticipation by  the  United  States.  To  attack  Cicr- 
many,  we  believed,  would  be  to  de-Americanize  the 


46  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Germans  in  our  midst.  If  we  adopted  a  policy  ad- 
verse to  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  Sweden  or  Great 
Britain,  we  should  stir  up  new  racial  antipathies 
within  our  borders.  Our  internal  peace,  our  integ- 
rity as  a  composite  nation,  depended  upon  our  neu- 
trality. The  better  part  of  wisdom  was  to  remain, 
we  thought,  a  friend  to  all  nations  and  an  ally  of 
none. 

It  soon  became  obvious,  however,  that  our  policy 
of  non-intervention  led  to  difficulties.  The  role  of 
receptive  peacemaker  was  hardly  dignified  and  we 
were  the  alternate  victim  of  all  combatants.  Our 
failure  to  repel  the  aggression  of  one  group  led  to 
attacks  by  the  other,  and  as  the  months  passed  our 
neutrality  evaporated.  We  were  hated,  distrusted 
and  coldly  despised  by  both  sides.  Germany  claimed 
that  we  were  aiding  the  Allies ;  British  and  French 
publicists  intimated  that  we  were  subtly  pro-Ger- 
man. 

To  what  lengths  this  suspicion  of  America  went 
is  revealed  by  the  attitude  of  one  of  the  more  violent 
of  British  imperialists,  Mr.  L.  J.  Maxse.  In  an  arti- 
cle appearing  in  the  National  Revieiv  of  February, 
1917,  entitled,  '*  'Ware  Washington,"  Mr.  Maxse 
claimed  that  the  United  States  was  Germany's  secret 
ally,  that  a  war  between  those  two  countries  was 
practically  impossible,  but  that  a  war  with  England 
would  be  immensely  attractive  to  Americans.  *'It 
is  common  ground,"  he  said,  ''that  had  the  Pan- 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  47 

German  program  materialized  and  the  Mailed 
Fist  been  triumphantly  installed  from  Petrograd  to 
Calais  the  United  States  would  have  preserved  a 
scrupulous  neutrality  based  on  excess  profits.  But 
from  the  moment  failure  overtook  Germany  at  Ver- 
dun and  on  the  Somme,  American  action  became  in- 
evitable, because  German  failure  meant  British  suc- 
cess, and  their  ingrained  jealousy  of  this  country 
would  preclude  *our  American  kinsmen'  remaining 
quiet  while  we  *  came  into  our  own. '  "  "  The  fall  of 
France,"  he  asserted,  "the  fall  of  Russia,  the  fall 
of  Italy  would  have  found  American  altruists  look- 
ing the  other  way,  as  did  the  fate  of  Belgium,  Serbia, 
Montenegro,  Roumania,  and  Poland.  Any  catas- 
trophe to  the  British  Empire  would  have  aroused 
unconcealable  glee  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pa- 
cific. "  *  In  the  same  manner  and  to  an  even  greater 
extent  our  quasi-neutrality  exposed  us  to  the  gibes 
and  the  violent  abuse  of  German  critics. 

It  must  be  conceded  that  our  policy  of  theoretical 
neutrality  completely  failed,  and  that  in  our  efforts 
to  apply  a  few  moral  formulae  to  the  complex  and 
embittered  European  situation  we  barely  escaped 
appearing  irresolute  and  even  ridiculous.  We  fol- 
lowed no  one  lead  and  carried  out  no  one  consistent 
policy.  Had  we  really  wished  to  defend  the  prin- 
ciple of  neutrality  we  should  have  formed  a  League 
of  Neutrals,  and  organized  the  combined  neutral 

1  T/ie  National  Revieic,  Vol.  68,  p.  810. 


48  THE  END  OF  THE  WAE 

strength  to  enforce  our  decisions.  Had  we  desired 
to  exercise  a  moral  influence  we  should  have  boldly 
passed  judgment  upon  such  open  violations  of  inter- 
national law  as  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  and  pre- 
pared ourselves  for  an  eventual  vindication  of  such 
judgments.  Nor  did  we,  during  the  first  two  and  a 
half  years,  take  really  effective  steps  towards  bring- 
ing about  peace  upon  the  basis  of  a  firm  internation- 
alism. If  after  mobilizing  our  economic  and  mili- 
tary forces  we  had  put  pressure  upon  both  groups  of 
belligerents  to  force  them  to  state  terms,  we  should 
perhaps  have  aided  in  the  clarification  of  the  issues 
and  in  progress  towards  a  mutual  understanding. 

Actually  our  laissez-faire  attitude  towards  the 
war,  our  policy  of  waiting  to  be  called  upon  as  peace- 
maker, led  insensibly  to  a  conservative,  tepid  and 
constantly  shifting  program,  and  in  the  end  to  a 
seeming  pettiness  in  promoting  small  commercial 
interests  while  ignoring  vaster  moral  interests.  We 
kept  silent  about  Belgium,  but  protested  vehemently 
in  behalf  of  American  lard.  The  European  infer- 
ence was  obvious. 

"If  the  man  who  turnips  cries 
Cry  not  when  his  father  dies 
'Tis  a  proof  that  he  had  rather 
Have  a  turnip  than  his  father." 

But  the  inference  was  false.    We  did  not  care 
more  for  American  lard  than  for  human  rights,  al- 


PACIFISTS  AND  PATRIOTS  49 

though  as  a  matter  of  tradition  we  protested  about 
the  first,  while  we  were  inhibited  by  our  fundamental 
policy  towards  the  war  from  saying  a  word  in  behalf 
of  the  second. 

It  was  not  cowardice  on  our  part,  nor  timidity, 
nor  callousness.  Our  policy  of  non-interference, 
though  unintelligent  and  uninspired,  was  the  result 
not  only  of  an  old  tradition  coming  into  conflict  with 
a  new  state  of  the  world,  but  of  our  strong  idealistic 
belief  that  we  could  aid  internationalism  by  doing 
nothing,  and  our  hope  that  we  could  gain  the  friend- 
ship of  both  groups  of  belligerent  nations,  and  thus 
gently  bring  them  to  a  common  peace,  by  studiously 
refraining  from  giving  offence  to  either.  If  we  stag- 
gered from  one  error  to  another  and  from  one  pro- 
gram to  another,  if  in  the  end  we  entered  the  conflict 
abruptly  under  sudden  provocation  as  though  we 
had  stumbled  into  the  war,  the  cause  of  our  vacilla- 
tion was  in  the  main  a  not  ungenerous  aspiration. 
We  longed  for  a  universal  peace,  in  which  men  would 
no  longer  kill,  and  though  all  other  swords  in  the 
world  dripped  with  blood,  ours  at  least  should  be 
clean. 

Such  was  the  pacifist  patriot  attitude  of  America 
in  November,  1916.  Yet  in  April,  1917,  the  United 
States  '*to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy"  was 
engaged  in  a  great  war  with  Germany. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   CONVERSION    OF   AMERICA 

The  entrance  of  America  into  the  war  raised  in 
many  minds  a  seeming  dilemma.  Why  did  we  take 
part  in  April,  1917,  and  not  in  August,  1914?  If  it 
was  not  a  war  for  democracy,  why  were  we  in ;  if  it 
was,  why  had  we  not  been  in  from  the  beginning? 

Though  we  are  now  at  war,  and  war  inhibits  a  true 
freedom  of  thought,  yet  as  the  foundations  of  our 
morality  are  concerned,  we  must  face  this  problem 
honestly.  What  figure  have  we  cut  in  this  titanic 
shock  in  which  we  have  allowed  France  to  bleed  and 
Serbia  to  be  crushed,  permitted  Armenians  to  be 
slaughtered  and  suffered  the  democratic  nations,  in- 
cluding Australia  and  our  neighbour  Canada,  to 
make  supreme  sacrifices,  while  we  withheld  even  our 
approbation?  Why  did  we  not  protest  even  after 
the  fact  against  the  invasion  of  Belgium?  How  can 
we  today  justify  our  minatory  letters  to  England  con- 
cerning our  corn  and  beef  and  pig-iron?  If  this  was 
a  war  for  democracy,  as  the  Allies  claimed  and  as  we 
today  claim,  were  we  not  culpably  blind  or  viciously 
neutral? — knowing  and  not  caring,  like  "that  caitiff 
choir  who  were  not  rebels,  nor  were  faithful  to  God, 
but  were  for  themselves." 

50 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        51 

As  we  look  this  dilemma  over,  however,  we  shall 
find  that  there  is  a  wide  space  between  the  horns. 
There  were  reasons  for  our  participation  in  1917 
which  were  absent  before.  In  the  early  stages  of 
the  war  we  believed  that  we  had  no  responsibility 
for  wars  in  Europe,  and  at  all  events  did  not  con- 
sider this  conflict  as  in  any  true  sense  a  war  for 
democracy.  We  were  free  therefore  to  go  in  or  stay 
out.  Within  three  years,  however,  we  had  lost  this 
liberty  of  choice.  We  no  longer  could  decide 
whether  to  take  sides  but  only  which  of  two  sides 
to  choose.  Moreover,  as  the  issue  now  presented 
itself,  the  problem  was  not  whether  the  war  was  al- 
ready a  war  for  democracy,  which  we  did  not  be- 
lieve, but  whether  by  our  participation  it  could  be 
converted  into  a  war  for  democracy.  If  by  adher- 
ing to  the  Allies  we  could  persuade  their  govern- 
ments to  recede  from  their  extreme  and  unjustified 
demands  (of  which  we  knew  much  and  surmised 
more),  we  should  make  success  in  war  a  real  victory 
for  a  democratic  internationalism. 

Our  moral  right  to  remain  aloof  seemed  to  us 
indisputable.  All  through  our  history  we  had 
sought  to  remain  neutral,  even  where  our  sym- 
pathies were  strongly  engaged.  We  had  not  inter- 
fered in  behalf  of  Greece  struggling  against  Turkish 
oppression  nor  in  behalf  of  Hungary  fighting  against 
Austrian  domination.  Our  ofTlcial  attitude  towards 
Europe  was  not  Quixotic  nor  even  generous.     Ours 


52  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

was  a  conservative,  non-propagandistic,  non-inter- 
fering diplomacy.  There  were  cogent  reasons  for 
this  policy  of  non-interference.  We  were  weak;  we 
wished  Europe  not  to  interfere  with  us,  and  we 
believed,  quite  properly,  that  our  slack  democracy 
was  no  match  for  the  subtle  European  diplomacy, 
habituated  for  generations  to  all  the  intricacies  of 
the  Balance  of  Power.  True,  we  occasionally  failed 
to  observe  this  rule  of  non-abstention,  as  when  we 
made  representations  to  Russia  and  Roumania  in 
behalf  of  their  Jews.  On  the  whole,  however,  we 
sought  to  adhere  to  a  policy  limiting  our  diplomatic 
activity  to  those  parts  of  the  world  in  which  that 
activity  could  be  decisive.  We  were  willing  to  sym- 
pathize with  alien  causes  but  not  to  fight  for  them. 
Nor  did  this  American  policy  of  not  taking  up 
cudgels  in  defence  of  oppressed  nationalities  and  of 
broken  treaties  really  differ  from  that  of  other  na- 
tions. Great  Britain  had  been  no  more  willing  to 
fight  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Korean  Treaty, 
which  she  had  guaranteed  than  was  the  United 
States,  and  what  actually  forced  her  to  intervene 
in  Belgium  was  a  controlling  and  decisive  intej-est 
in  that  country's  neutrality.  No  mere  sentimental 
regard  for  Belgians  drove  England  into  the  war, 
any  more  than  a  sentimental  regard  for  Serbians 
and  Austrians  brought  Russia  and  Germany  into  the 
conflict.  Belgium  was  Britain's  flying  buttress,  as 
Austria  was  the  flying  buttress  of  Germany. 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        53 

That  the  war  did  not  appeal  to  all  Americans  as  a 
war  for  democracy  was  due  to  the  duality  of  its 
issues.  On  the  one  hand  was  the  assertion  of  a  cer- 
tain internationalism  against  the  exaggerated  and 
febrile  nationalism  of  Germany ;  a  ranging  of  politi- 
cal democracy,  of  respect  for  international  law,  and 
of  a  desire  for  international  government  against  the 
enemy's  disregard  and  distrust  of  these  things.  On 
the  other  hand  there  was  a  group  of  issues  consist- 
ing of  nationalistic  demands,  which  violated  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  internationalism.  The  Allies, 
as  accumulating  evidence  proved,  were  at  war  among 
themselves ;  they  fought  against  the  things  for  which 
they  fought.  In  each  of  the  Allied  nations  high  in- 
ternational ideals  were  in  conflict  with  selfish  nation- 
alistic plans.  Which  issue  overweighed?  The  an- 
swer obviously  was  quantitative  and  difficult  to  make. 

To  many  Americans  the  preponderance  seemed 
on  the  side  of  the  nationalistic  aims.  We  found 
both  groups  of  nations  selfish,  were  irritated  at  both. 
Undoubtedly  the  Junkertum  was  the  stronghold  of 
autocracy,  and  therefore  the  supreme  enemy,  but  the 
spectacle  of  the  Czar  of  Russia  leading  democracy 
to  a  victory  over  absolutism  was  ridiculous.  We 
believed  that  Germany  had  precipitated  the  war,  but 
in  the  long  course  of  events  leading  up  to  the  inevi- 
table declaration  there  had  been  so  much  aggression 
and  duplicity  on  both  sides  that  we  were  forced  to 
reserve  judgment.    We  trusted  neither  group.    The 


54  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

aggressions  against  the  Transvaal,  Korea,  Morocco, 
Persia,  Egypt,  Tripoli  were  too  recent  to  allow  us  to 
believe  that  the  Allies  in  the  present  war  were  meek 
nations  overrun  by  arrogant  tyrants.  In  Morocco 
not  all  the  good  faith  was  on  one  side;  in  Persia 
neither  England  nor  Russia  was  blameless.  The 
very  fact  that  the  war  broke  out  in  Serbia  clearly  re- 
vealed that  some  of  its  origins  lay  in  gross  nation- 
alistic impulses  and  in  a  struggle  for  prestige  and 
power. 

While,  therefore,  we  recognized  a  fundamental 
democratic  purpose  in  the  war,  we  believed  that  in 
no  real  sense  did  this  ideal  unite  the  Allied  nations. 
The  chief  cement  of  the  Alliance  seemed  to  lie  in 
fear,  greed  and  nationalistic  ambition,  not  in  any 
conception  of  a  true  harmony  among  the  nations  of 
Europe.  To  militaristic  and  autocratic  Japan,  for 
example,  the  ideals  of  democracy  meant  little.  She 
played  her  own  game,  hoping  not  for  a  speedy  Allied 
victory  but  for  a  protracted  struggle.  To  the  Rus- 
sian autocracy  the  war  reduced  itself  to  specific 
imperialistic  aims.  Italy  stood  on  the  brink,  bar- 
gaining with  both  sides,  willing  to  be  neutral  or 
partisan,  according  to  the  price.  Roumania  was  in 
like  position.  Even  in  France  and  England  senti- 
ment was  divided.  Weighing  the  preponderant  ele- 
ments in  the  minds  of  the  hundreds  of  millions 
opposed  to  Germany,  balancing  the  democratic,  inter- 
national ideals  against  the  desire  for  concrete  and 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        55 

sometimes  unjustifiable  nationalistic  gains,  we  were 
forced  to  conclude  that  the  war  was  not  wholly  a  war 
for  democracy. 

Given  this  state  of  mind  and  this  judgment  of  the 
causes  and  tendencies  of  the  war,  we  not  unnaturally 
preferred  the  maintenance  of  our  technical  neutral- 
ity. Several  factors,  however,  made  this  impos- 
sible. Forces  stronger  than  our  will  drove  us  into 
the  conflict.  Indeed  we  were  in  the  war  long  before 
we  made  our  formal  declaration. 

That  we  were  forced  may  not  at  first  glance  be 
obvious.  We  seemed  to  have  had  an  opportunity 
to  maintain  neutrality.  As  late  as  April,  1917,  we 
might  conceivably  have  raised  the  cry  ''Reparation 
after  the  war,"  pursuing  a  policy  towards  Germany 
like  that  towards  England  in  the  case  of  the  Alabama 
claims.  Actually,  however,  our  only  choice  was 
either  to  defeat  the  Allies  or  attempt  the  defeat  of 
Germany. 

The  resulting  declaration  of  war  was  merely  the 
culmination  in  an  unavowed  participation  which  had 
been  increasing  for  over  two  years.  Powerful  un- 
conscious forces  had  been  driving  us  from  neutrality 
to  belligerency — a  gradual  process,  divisible  into 
three  parts.  First  we  were  neutral,  favouring  the 
Allies  in  our  hearts,  but  holding  the  balance  of  action 
even.  The  illuminating  act  of  this  period  was  the 
President's  plea  that  we  remain  neutral  in  thought. 
The  second  stage  was  one  of  "benevolent  neutral- 


66  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ity,"  of  unconscious  belligerency.  During  this  pe- 
riod we  sent  money  and  munitions  to  the  Allies,  re- 
sisted the  German  blockade,  but  did  not  effectively 
oppose  the  British  blockade.  The  illuminating  act 
of  this  period  was  our  permission  to  Allied  merchant- 
men to  carry  guns.  Last  stage  of  all,  the  declaration 
of  war. 

We  ourselves  did  not  fully  understand  this  drift 
of  our  policy,  and  throughout  this  gradual  transition 
we  find  a  curious  retardation  in  the  intellectual  prog- 
ress of  the  nation.  Our  thought  moved  slower  than 
our  action.  While  helping  the  Allies,  partly  from 
inclination  and  partly  from  necessity,  we  sincerely 
protested  our  neutrality.  At  one  moment  Mr.  Lan- 
sing refused  merchantmen  permission  to  arm,  al- 
though we  were  already  committed  to  a  policy  of 
fighting  the  submarines.  Our  leaders  vaguely  saw 
the  drift  to  war,  but  strove  against  it;  Mr.  Wilson's 
peace  proposals  in  December  were  an  attempt  to  pre- 
clude the  necessity  for  a  war  message  in  April.  We 
were  willing  to  accept  any  semi-reasonable  settle- 
ment in  Europe  rather  than  ourselves  take  part  in 
the  contest.  And  this  not  from  timidity.  What  re- 
strained us  was  a  deep  conservative  instinct;  a  jeal- 
ous desire  to  hold  America  apart  from  these  strug- 
gles. We  hesitated  to  commit  our  bark  to  untried 
waters.  We  wanted  to  live  our  old  life,  develop  our 
democracy  at  home,  protect  with  the  aid  of  Latin 
America   the   isolation   and   immunity   of  the   two 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        57 

Americas.  Not  wishing  to  coerce  other  nations  nor 
endure  their  coercion,  preferring  our  independence 
narrow  and  free,  to  a  wider,  more  exacting  and  more 
perilous  interdependence,  we  were  as  regards  Eu- 
rope separatist.  Even  as  late  as  March,  1917,  we 
sought  to  establish  an  armed  neutrality  instead  of 
going  to  war.    Anything  but  war. 

That  our  resistance  was  vain  was  through  no 
fault  of  ours,  nor  in  a  larger  sense  through  the 
specific  inclination  of  any  nation.  It  was  the  shrink- 
ing of  the  earth  that  flung  us  so  violently  against 
the  European  continent.  We  had  little  volition  in 
the  matter. 

What  actually  ended  our  neutrality  long  before  we 
recognized  that  it  had  ended,  was  the  supreme  fact 
that  the  growth  of  industry,  interlacing  the  nations 
of  the  world,  had  made  a  complete  and  real  neutral- 
ity impossible.  The  traditional  concept  of  neutral- 
ity had  been  based  upon  the  idea  of  one  independent 
and  self-contained  nation  fighting  another  independ- 
ent and  self-contained  nation,  while  the  neutrals  held 
the  ring,  kept  the  scales  even,  and  did  ''nothing, 
neither  way."  But  today  there  are  no  economically 
independent  and  self-contained  nations.  The  change 
in  the  nature  of  war,  with  the  ultimate  dependence 
of  each  state  upon  its  neighbours,  completely  alters 
the  character  of  neutrality.  A  nation  may  be  tech- 
nically neutral  and  yet  trade  ad  libitum  with  either 
belligerent.    It  is,  however,  this  peaceful  trading 


58  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

which  today  is  of  enormous  and  even  decisive  influ- 
ence. A  war  of  attrition  is  in  large  part  economic ; 
each  belligerent  seeks  to  secure  goods  from  neutrals 
in  order  to  save  its  own  labour  for  war  purposes 
while  depriving  antagonists  of  a  like  advantage. 
The  war  becomes  a  war  for  the  trade,  labour,  sup- 
plies, capital  and  credit  of  neutrals. 

Here  geographical  position  plays  the  controlling 
role.  Denmark,  Sweden,  Holland  and  Switzerland 
may  love  Germany  or  hate  her,  but  cannot  in  the  cir- 
cumstances be  anything  but  her  partial  economic  al- 
lies, except  by  a  policy  which  would  make  them  ac- 
tual enemies.  Sweden  either  sends  Germany  iron  or 
does  not ;  if  she  does,  she  aids  Germany ;  if  she  does 
not,  she  injures  her  disastrously  and  invites  repris- 
als. A  belligerent  today  may  be  shattered  by  a  neu- 
tral's economic  action,  which  in  peace  time  might  be 
wholly  unobjectionable. 

Of  all  neutrals  America  was  incomparably  the 
most  important.  Indeed,  when  the  war  had  settled 
down  to  a  test  of  endurance,  American  influence  be- 
came decisive.  The  Allies,  controlling  the  sea,  could 
import  munitions  and  food  from  America,  and  as  a 
corollary  borrow  money.  In  other  words,  the  United 
States  automatically  became  the  economic  ally  of  the 
nations  opposed  to  Germany.  The  German-Ameri- 
can farmer  in  Illinois  freed  a  British  agricultural 
labourer  for  the  trenches;  the  Hungarian  labourer 
at  Wilkesbarre  or  Bridgeport  unintentionally  fought 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        69 

against  his  native  country.  To  Germany,  on  the 
other  hand,  no  imports,  and  therefore  no  direct  eco- 
nomic aid  could  come  from  America.  Even  had  our 
antagonism  to  Germany  been  less  strong,  that  coun- 
try would  have  borne  the  brunt  of  our  economic 
alliance  with  her  enemies. 

In  this  contingency  Germany's  policy  seemed  to 
her  obvious.  Either  she  must  secure  our  goods  or 
prevent  the  Allies  from  securing  them.  The  former 
result  she  could  accomplish  only  if  we  forced  Great 
Britain  to  mitigate  what  we  ourselves  had  declared 
to  be  an  illegal  blockade.  She  could  accomplish  the 
latter  either  by  persuading  us  not  to  ship  munitions 
or  by  means  of  submarine  warfare.  She  must  force 
us  either  to  put  pressure  upon  her  enemies  or  else 
to  permit  her  to  put  pressure  upon  them. 

In  both  efforts  she  failed.  True,  we  protested 
against  the  British  blockade,  but  as  we  did  nothing 
but  protest,  and  Great  Britain  was  convinced  that  we 
would  do  nothing,  the  effect  was  almost  nil.  Nor 
did  we  stop  our  shipments  of  munitions,  although  a 
threat  to  do  so  might  possibly  have  brought  Great 
Britain  to  terms.  On  the  other  hand,  not  only  did 
we  protest  against  the  submarine  blockade,  but  we 
threatened  war  unless  Germany  desisted.  Though 
technically,  we  were  not  really,  neutral;  ours  was  a 
** benevolent  neutrality,"  a  limited  and  uncon- 
scious belligerency.  We  threw  our  economic  weight 
against  Germany  because  our  economic  interests  lay 


60  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

witli  the  Allies,  and  because,  for  other  compelling 
reasons,  we  wished  the  Allies  to  win  or  at  least  not 
to  lose. 

Why  we  wished  thena  to  win  reveals  a  force,  at 
first  weak  but  constantly  growing,  which  in  the  end 
was  to  throw  us  into  the  battle  line  and  alter  our 
whole  relation  to  the  world.  That  force  was  a  new 
extension,  amplification  and  self-propagating  ten- 
dency of  American  democracy.  It  was  a  repercus- 
sion of  democracy.  So  long  as  we  had  to  take  sides, 
so  long  as  economically  we  were  forced  to  throw  our 
weight  on  one  scale  or  the  other,  we  determined  that 
America's  influence  should  be  in  favour  of  what  we 
considered  democracy  and  against  autocracy  and 
militarism. 

Through  all  our  decisions  during  the  period  of 
technical  neutrality  this  principle  may  be  observed 
to  run.  Ours,  it  is  believed,  was  an  excellent  legal 
case.  We  could  cite  precedents  for  what  we  did  and 
for  what  we  did  not  do.  To  threaten  Germany  with 
war  over  the  submarine  issue  was  within  our  rights ; 
it  was  doing  only  that  which  she  would  have  done 
to  us  in  reversed  circumstances.  On  the  other  hand, 
though  we  had  the  right  to  insist  that  England  ad- 
here to  the  old  rules  of  the  blockade,  we  also  had  the 
right  not  to  insist.  Actually,  what  determined  those 
of  our  actions  which  were  truly  decisive  was  not  a 
desire  to  defend  neutral  rights,  in  which  direction  we 
made  little  progress,  but  a  determination  to  prevent 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        61 

our  inevitable  and  rather  unwelcome  influence  from 
being  cast  against  the  Allies.  Who  was  justified  in 
any  particular  controversy,  Germany  or  the  Allies, 
was  not  the  momentous  factor;  in  the  aggregate  of 
her  policies  and  ideals  we  held  Germany  to  be  wrong, 
or  at  least  opposed  to  us. 

This  is  the  escape  from  the  seeming  dilemma  con- 
fronting our  entrance  into  the  war.  We  had  not  in- 
tended to  sacrifice  ourselves  in  order  to  secure  a  de- 
cision in  Europe  which  in  any  case  we  believed  would 
be  obscured  by  the  nationalistic  aims  of  the  Entente 
Powers.  Only  when  it  became  obvious  that  we  were 
already  in  the  war  and  that  we  were  forced  to  choose 
sides  did  we  issue  our  declaration.  We  could 
either  aid  the  Allies  to  defeat  Germany  or,  by  ac- 
cepting Germany's  ultimatum,  withhold  the  assist- 
ance without  which  the  Allies  would  have  been  de- 
feated. 

There  were  several  reasons  which  made  our  choice 
obvious.  In  the  first  place,  we  had  learned  much 
during  the  past  two  and  a  half  years,  and  our  early 
impressions  of  German  policy  derived  from  Liege, 
Louvain  and  Rheims  had  been  reinforced  by  the 
Lusitania  and  other  incidents.  We  began  to  dread 
the  power  and  ulterior  ambitions  of  a  greater  Ger- 
many. More  or  less  vaguely  we  realized  that  Eng- 
land stood  as  a  bulwark  between  us  and  this  great 
continental  military  power,  as  France  and  Belgium 
stood  between  her  and  England.    Our  commercial 


62  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

expansion  had  more  to  fear  from  a  successful  Ger- 
many than  from  a  successful  Britain  or  France. 
While  we  discovered  imperialistic  ambitions  on  both 
sides  we  believed  that  the  preponderance  of  respon- 
sibility, both  for  the  war  and  for  autocracy  and  mili- 
tarism, lay  with  Germany,  and  if  imperialism  were 
to  triumph,  we  preferred  a  British  to  a  German  im- 
perialism. We  felt  that  in  taking  our  stand  with 
the  Allies  we  were  contributing  upon  the  whole  to  the 
hope  of  democracy  and  international  peace,  and 
in  these  we  had  both  a  sentimental  and  a  material 
interest. 

There  is  another  theory  at  variance  with  that 
just  given  concerning  the  reasons  why  the  United 
States  intervened.  According  to  this  theory  large 
financial  interests  in  America  discovered  that  it 
would  be  profitable  to  have  the  United  States  enter 
the  war  and  through  their  control  of  the  press  were 
able  to  create  so  strong  a  sentiment  for  belliger- 
ency that  the  government  was  forced  to  intervene 
as  soon  as  Germany  gave  it  an  opportunity.  On 
this  hypothesis  all  our  desire  for  internationalism 
and  democracy  was  merely  the  sentimental  covering 
for  the  crude  economic  interests  of  our  unacknowl- 
edged but  omnipotent  financial  rulers. 

This  theory  errs  on  the  side  of  over-simplicity. 
It  assumes  an  overwhelming  preponderance  of 
power  on  the  part  of  our  financiers.  It  presupposes 
a  pure  passivity  on  the  part  of  the  nation. 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        63 

It  cannot,  of  course,  be  denied  that  the  economic 
forces  pushing  America  towards  war  were  less  weak 
in  1917  than  they  had  been  two  years  before.  A 
stupendous  exportation  from  the  United  States  to 
the  Allied  countries  had  created  in  this  country  an 
economic  condition  which  would  have  been  seriously 
damaged  by  a  cessaton  of  that  trade.  Had  we 
accepted  the  principle  of  the  German  blockade, 
which  was  our  only  alternative  to  war,  the  prices 
of  food  stuffs,  cotton,  steel  and  other  products  would 
have  fallen  and  the  result  might  have  been  a  disas- 
trous commercial  and  financial  crisis. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  most  of  our  American 
farmers,  tradesmen  and  wage-earners  ever  gave  this 
question  of  economic  advantages  an  hour's  steady 
thought.  Their  consciously  determining  motives 
were  of  quite  a  different  sort.  The  same  is  equally 
true  of  the  majority  of  our  financiers,  even  when  they 
believed,  rightly  or  wrongly,  that  their  interests  lay 
upon  the  side  of  war.  Yet  these  economic  interests 
were  not,  and  never  are,  without  their  influence. 
Conditions  had  changed  since  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium, and  indeed  since  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania. 
We  had  loaned  large  sums  to  the  belligerent  nations ; 
we  had  accumulated  an  exportable  surplus  of  capi- 
tal, and  had  begun  to  think  in  terms  of  foreign  trade 
and  foreign  investment. 

It  does  not  follow  that  this  is  a  "Wall  Street 
war  because  many  financiers  desired  it.    To  jump 


64  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

from  this  premise  to  that  conclusion  is  to  ignore 
manifold  non-economic  influences,  working  upon  our 
professional  and  other  classes,  the  nation's  idealism, 
the  pent-up  irritation  at  Germany's  brutalities,  the 
sympathies  and  antagonisms  and  fears  of  mil- 
lions of  citizens.  Yet  the  economic  interests  push- 
ing us  towards  the  struggle  have  a  direct  bearing 
on  the  future  conduct  of  the  war.  It  would  be 
stupid  in  us  not  to  recognize  that  mundane  and  cal- 
culable motives  merged  with  our  idealism  and  still 
form  a  part  of  our  war  motive.  If  by  victory  we 
are  to  gain  the  things  that  most  Americans  really 
desire,  if  we  are  to  know  how  to  fight  and  on  what 
terms  to  stop  fighting,  if  we  are  to  prevent  the  con- 
duct of  the  war  and  the  resulting  peace  negotiations 
from  being  wrenched  out  of  our  hands  by  men  with 
special  group  interests  to  serve,  we  must  recognize 
this  inmixture  of  the  economic  interests  of  financiers 
in  the  general  body  of  motives,  for  the  most  part 
idealistic,  with  which  we  entered  the  fight. 

What  specifically  did  our  financiers,  or  at  least 
certain  of  them,  hope  to  gain  from  our  participation? 

In  the  first  place  their  loans  to  the  Allies  had  al- 
most reached  the  maximum.  The  continuance  of 
our  profitable  trade  with  the  Allies  depended  upon 
England's  ability  to  finance  the  payments,  and  as 
that  nation  could  not  continue  to  export  gold,  and  as 
Americans  would  not  buy  many  more  European  se- 
curities, American  financiers  welcomed  any  arrange- 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        65 

ment  by  which  our  government  would  guarantee  fu- 
ture obligations.  If  the  United  States  loaned  money 
to  Russia  at  four  per  cent,  and  thereby  enabled  that 
country  to  place  profitable  orders  in  America,  the 
operation  benefited  the  vendors.  Moreover,  the 
huge  military  and  naval  expenditures  which  the 
American  government  would  be  compelled  to  make 
in  the  event  of  war  would  be  of  benefit  directly  to  cer- 
tain corporations  and  indirectly  to  others. 

There  were  still  other  interests  and  still  wider 
plans.  To  a  few  far-seeing  men  a  successful  par- 
ticipation seemed  to  offer  an  opportunity  to  extend 
American  trade  in  alliance  with  England  and  at  the 
expense  of  Germany.  An  even  greater  opportunity 
would  be  afforded  for  the  profitable  investment  of 
the  new  exportable  surplus  of  America,  then  already 
amounting  to  billions,  and  liable  to  be  vastly  in- 
creased in  the  future.  If  we  refrained  from  partici- 
pation, the  growing  enmity  and  envy  toward  Amer- 
ica, manifested  by  the  rival  belligerents,  might  end 
in  an  adverse  coalition  which  would  deprive  us  forci- 
bly of  all  future  investment  opportunities.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  aid  to  Great  Britain  in  her  extremity 
might  easily  lead  to  a  profitable  co-operation  with 
that  nation,  in  which  our  capital  and  her  knowl- 
edge, experience  and  prestige  would  be  united.  We 
could  lay  the  foundations  for  a  vast,  overpowering 
and  ostensibly  pacific  imperialism. 

It  would  be  idle  to  deny  that  such  an  imperialism 


66  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

would  benefit  our  American  financiers.  The  rise  in 
wages,  a  rise  likely  to  continue  as  a  result  of  lessened 
immigration,  tends  to  make  future  returns  on  Amer- 
ican capital  invested  at  home  somewhat  smaller  than 
in  the  past.  On  the  other  hand,  could  the  united 
British  and  American  financiers  find  a  non-competi- 
tive field  for  investment  in  Russia,  South  America, 
Africa  and  Asia,  where  wages  are  low,  the  advan- 
tages would  be  obvious.  Moreover,  the  mere  ac- 
quisition of  a  powerful  army  and  navy  would  not 
only  render  America  secure  from  invasion,  but 
would  enable  the  United  States  to  put  pressure  upon 
countries  like  Japan  and  thus  open  up  the  vast  in- 
vestment field  of  China.  Finally,  apart  from  any 
direct  advantage,  many  financiers  probably  desired 
a  large  army  as  a  bulwark  to  property  rights  in 
general.  An  army  was  necessary  for  the  war,  but 
a  war  was  equally  necessary  for  an  army. 

That  these  considerations  were  the  sole  determin- 
ing factor  in  deciding  the  belligerent  attitude  of  our 
financial  groups  is  improbable.  Idealistic  factors 
also  worked  upon  them,  such  as  patriotism,  the  de- 
sire for  prestige  abroad,  oppositon  to  the  German 
militaristic  system  and  morality.  Nor  did  the  war- 
like attitude  of  our  financiers  determine  the  Nation 's 
policy.  In  numerous  cases  the  Administration  had 
clearly  demonstrated  its  unwillingness  to  permit 
either  its  foreign  or  domestic  program  to  be  dictated 
by  financial  groups.     To  cite  only  a  few  cases,  Presi- 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        67 

dent  Wilson's  refusal  to  endorse  the  Six-Power 
agreement  with  China,  his  resolutely  pacific  attitude 
toward  Mexico,  his  treatment  of  the  Filipinos,  his 
consistent  antagonism  to  Dollar  Diplomacy,  his  atti- 
tude towards  the  LaFollette  Shipping  Bill,  and 
finally  his  action  in  the  threatened  railway  strike  of 
1916  indicated  anything  but  subservience  to  Wall 
Street  influences.  In  the  presidential  election  of 
1916  our  financial  interests  were  opposed  to  Mr. 
Wilson  and  there  was  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 
action  of  the  American  government  would  be  pri- 
marily influenced,  if  at  all,  by  a  conscious  effort  to 
do  what  the  financiers  desired. 

Motives  and  influences  of  a  different  sort  were 
decisive.  Our  declaration  of  war  was  due  upon 
the  whole  to  a  necessity,  imposed  upon  us  by  the 
general  situation,  to  take  sides  and  upon  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  fact  that  we  could  not  fight  with  Ger- 
many and  could  not  help  figliting  with  the  Allies. 
Whatever  Wall  Street  thought  the  average  Ameri- 
can on  the  farms  and  in  the  offices  and  factories  be- 
lieved that  if  we  entered  the  conflict  we  must  import 
into  it  the  firm  intention  to  aid  in  making  our  own 
democracy  safe  and  in  adding  to  the  democracy  of 
the  world. 

This  decision  was  enormously  accelerated  by  an 
event  which  took  place  between  the  demission  of  the 
German  Ambassador  in  February  and  the  Declara- 
tion of  War  in  April.     The  final  impelling  reason 


68  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

for  this  declaration  was  the  Russian  Revolution, 
which  cast  the  influence  of  a  great  nation  in  favour 
of  a  true  democratization  of  the  war,  and  against  a 
merely  imperialistic  use  of  victory.  We  could  stand 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  peasants  and  workmen 
of  Russia,  whereas  we  could  not  without  blushing 
have  accepted  the  leadership  of  Nicholas  Romanoff. 
The  change  in  Russia  gave  body  to  our  hope  that  we 
might  succeed  in  making  the  conflict  a  war  for  de- 
mocracy and  internationalism. 

For  us  today  this  ambition  is  still  the  overriding 
consideration.  We  must  gain  a  measure  of  democ- 
racy and  internationalism  or  go  down  to  moral  de- 
feat. 

Not  only  is  this  striving  for  internationalism 
necessary  to  the  attainment  of  a  moral  victory,  but 
it  is  actually  essential  to  the  winning  of  the  war. 
We  cannot  succeed  in  this  struggle  without  national 
unity  and  popular  enthusiasm,  and  we  cannot  secure 
this  unity  and  enthusiasm  except  upon  a  program 
of  internationalism. 

What  still  holds  many  Americans  from  an  enthu- 
siastic endorsement  of  our  participation  is  the  be- 
lief that  no  real  national  issue  is  involved,  that  the 
war  is  European  in  its  causes,  methods  and  ideals ; 
not  American.  Had  Germany  sent  an  army  to  Long 
Island,  had  she  owned  Canada  or  Mexico,  countries 
at  which  we  might  have  struck,  the  conflict  would 
have  gained  in  immediacy  and  proximateness.     The 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        69 

issues  could  not  possibly  appeal  to  the  Iowa  farmer, 
for  example,  as  they  appealed  to  the  Norman  peas- 
ant. The  latter,  born  in  the  shadow  of  1870,  grow- 
ing up  under  a  German  menace,  acutely  suffering 
from  each  of  the  calculated  atrocities  inflicted  on 
men  of  his  blood  in  Belgium  and  France,  met  the 
German  invasion  with  an  instant,  because  slowly 
prepared,  hatred.  But  all  these  interwoven  strands 
of  patriotic  antagonism,  found  in  the  Norman,  were 
necessarily  absent  from  the  lowan.  The  Iowa 
farmer  was  not  afraid  for  himself  or  his  country, 
and  would  hardly  have  believed  in  a  German  inva- 
sion had  it  occurred.  Though  he  condemned  Em- 
peror William  and  von  Tirpitz  as  he  disapproved 
of  Attila  and  Apollyon,  he  rather  liked  Karl 
Schmidt,  who  lived  unobtrusively  in  the  neighbour- 
ing township. 

Because  of  this  obsolescent  though  still  prevalent 
belief  that  we  have  little  concern  with  Europe,  it  was 
difficult,  even  with  the  frankest  discussion,  to  make 
the  war's  issues  as  clear  as  were  those,  for  example, 
of  1861.  The  Civil  War  was  patently  almost  tan- 
gibly American.  Deeply  rooted  in  a  complex  sec- 
tional antagonism,  it  sprang  out  of  very  intimate 
and  vital  repulsions.  That  war  was  long  in  prepa- 
ration and  slow  in  approach.  Therefore  the  cry, 
"The  Union  must  be  preserved,"  found  a  quite  dif- 
ferent audience  than  does  the  slogan  today  that  a 
world  democracy  is  assailed  by  an  East  Prussian 


70  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

group,  whose  name  we  have  not  yet  learned  to  pro- 
nounce. We  must  fight  as  best  we  can  with  this 
derived  and  relatively  distant  impulse. 

It  is  this  derived  impulse,  however,  that  forms, 
and  must  continue  to  form,  our  reason  for  fighting. 
We  cannot  secure  a  real  unity  by  an  appeal  to 
hatred.  To  create  a  sentiment  of  hate  against  the 
German  and  Austrian  is  far  more  difficult  in  the 
United  States,  and  far  more  ineffective  and  injuri- 
ous, than  it  would  be  in  England  or  France.  There 
are  too  many  people  of  these  nationalities  within 
the  nation,  people  upon  whose  assistance  or  qui- 
escence we  depend  for  victory.  Moreover,  an  attack 
upon  the  people  of  German  or  Austrian  birth  or 
descent  extends  insensibly  to  people  of  Bulgarian, 
Swedish,  Swiss  and  Dutch  origin;  it  extends  to  the 
Jews;  it  tends  to  develop  a  general  anti-alien  atti- 
tude, a  contempt  for  Hungarians,  Poles,  Slovaks, 
Italians  and  others.  The  appeal  to  hatred  breaks 
down  because  it  is  too  generalized  and  because  the 
assailed  groups  are  able  to  strike  back  in  the  polling 
booths.  Such  an  appeal  destroys  instead  of  creating 
unity.  To  maintain  a  united  front  in  this  w^ar  we 
must  refrain  from  race  hatred,  which  does  not  in  any 
case  correspond  with  our  traditions  and  instincts. 
We  must  justify  the  war  by  an  appeal  to  American 
idealism  and  American  traditions. 

This  President  Wilson  has  sought  to  do.  In  his 
war  message  he  attempted  to  show  that  his  proposal 


THE  CONVERSION  OF  AMERICA        71 

to  guarantee  a  European  treaty,  providing  for  a 
new  international  order,  is  not  "a  breach  in  either 
our  traditions  or  our  policy  as  a  nation,  but  a  fulfil- 
ment, rather,  of  all  that  we  have  professed  or  striven 
for."  The  freedom  of  the  nations  to  be  guaranteed 
is,  he  asserts,  but  the  promise  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, written  large ;  a  concert  of  democratic  nations 
is  no  ''entangling  alliance";  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
has  been  long  the  aim  of  American  diplomacy. 
**  These  are  American  principles,  American  poli- 
cies." In  other  words,  our  support,  even  by  force 
of  arms,  of  an  international  order  in  Europe  is  but 
an  extended  Americanism. 

It  is  in  some  such  spirit,  though  with  some  mis- 
givings, that  we  break  with  our  old  tradition  of 
aloofness  from  Europe  to  enter  upon  a  new  crusade. 
We  stand  like  the  emigrant  who  casts  a  last  longing 
glance  at  the  home  about  which  cluster  his  youthful 
memories  and  then  faces  forward  to  the  inconstant 
ocean  beyond  which  lies  the  new  hope.  But  each 
emigrant  no  doubt  pictures  his  new  home  as  merely 
the  old  home  glorified,  seeing  the  familiar  and  there- 
fore beautiful  surroundings  with  all  the  old  evils 
gone. 

Thus  we  leave  our  policy  of  isolation  for  a  new 
policy  of  intervention  in  Europe.  We  leave  behind 
our  old  Americanism  to  find  abroad  a  new  and 
broader  Americanism;  an  Internationalism.  Our 
most  sanguine  optimists  believe  that  we  are  to  repro- 


72  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

duce  our  Supreme  Court  in  a  Supreme  Court  of  the 
Nations ;  that  we  are  to  introduce  our  federal  system 
to  Europe,  establish  disarmament  among  nations  as 
among  our  States,  empty  European  frontiers  of 
troops  as  our  Canadian  frontier  is  empty.  We  are 
to  do  this  for  Europe  in  return  for  all  that  Europe 
has  done  for  us  and  in  obedience  to  the  same  spirit 
that  sends  out  our  missionaries  to  Asia.  We  are  to 
do  it  also  in  self-defence,  for  if  we  are  to  remain 
disarmed  we  must  disarm  Europe.  We  are  going 
abroad  to  protect  our  own  American  democracy,  as 
an  emigrant  may  fare  forth  to  new  lands  to  earn 
the  wherewithal  to  protect  his  own  home. 

Such  is  the  vision  of  idealists  who  have  accepted 
the  new  doctrine.  It  is  with  this  ideal  that  we  join 
hands  with  our  Allies  seeking  to  destroy  the  hostile 
spirit  of  Prussian  militarism,  and  to  evoke  the  new 
spirit,  by  which  the  world  is  henceforth  to  be  gov- 
erned. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   WAB  AGAINST    MILITARISM 

There  is  an  apparent  confusion  in  our  claim  that  we 
are  fighting  "to  make  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy. ' ' 

We  do  not  always  mean  the  same  thing  by  this 
luminous  phrase.  At  one  time  we  appear  to  be  at- 
tacking the  principle  of  autocracy  as  represented  by 
the  Kaiser  and  the  undemocratic  Prussian  constitu- 
tion; at  another  moment  we  assail  Prussia's  mili- 
tarism, her  insistence  upon  force,  her  policy  of  ter- 
rorization,  the  irresponsibility  of  her  military  or- 
ganization. From  the  charge  of  autocracy  and  mili- 
tarism the  accusation  shifts  to  a  claim  that  Germany 
is  quarrelsome  and  unreasonable,  demanding  vast 
rearrangements  both  in  the  colonial  and  the  Euro- 
pean world.  We  emphasize  the  quality  of  this  dan- 
ger, the  principle  of  militarism;  again  we  emphasize 
its  magnitude,  and  oppose  Germany  because  of  the 
size  and  power  she  seeks  to  attain.  We  declare,  for 
example,  that  the  Berlin-Bagdad  scheme  will  destroy 
Europe's  Balance  of  Power  and  that  Germany's 
neighbours  will  dwindle  in  the  shadow  of  her  vast 
empire  and  lose  their  initiative  and  independence. 

To  know  when  we  have  achieved  a  real  victory 

73 


74  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

in  this  war,  and  how  to  achieve  it,  we  must  define 
our  purpose  more  clearly.  We  fight  against  Prus- 
sian autocracy ;  are  we  then  to  continue  the  war  until 
Germany  completely  changes  her  political  system? 
Shall  we  reject  all  guarantees  from  her  present  gov- 
ernment? Will  Germany  consent  to  change  under 
pressure  or  retain  an  imposed  constitution  after  the 
pressure  has  been  removed?  Will  a  German  democ- 
racy refrain  from  militarism  and  aggression? 
What  are  we  attacking,  a  principle  or  a  power,  a 
political  institution  or  a  state  of  mind,  autocracy, 
militarism  or  world  dominion?  And  what  is  our 
aim?  Are  we  seeking  to  reform  Germany  or  protect 
ourselves  ? 

Such  a  definition  of  our  fundamental  policy  is 
peculiarly  important  because  there  exists  among 
many  Americans  a  vague,  half-formed  distrust  of 
the  formulae  *Ho  make  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy" and  "to  destroy  Prussian  militarism." 
Many  ask  themselves,  "What  is  German  militarism 
to  us?  Is  there  such  an  institution  except  as  a  part 
of  a  general  European  militarism? ' '  Others  believe 
that  it  is  necessary  to  Germany.  In  any  case  are 
we,  with  our  leaking  democracy,  fit  champions  of 
democracy?  They  even  predict  that,  in  seeking  to 
free  our  foe,  we  shall  fasten  militarism  upon  our- 
selves. These  doubts  are  dangerous.  They  impel 
us  to  accept  an  unripe  peace  in  order  to  escape  from 
an  impossible  war.    Moreover,  similar  doubts  are 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       75 

expressed  by  men  of  totally  different  temperament, 
who  wish  to  continue  the  war,  not  for  rainbows  and 
iridescent  bubbles  but  in  pursuit  of  concrete,  valu- 
able American  interests.^  They  are  willing  to  fight 
for  territory,  trade,  power  and  the  prestige  which 
leads  to  power,  but  not  for  democracy,  of  which  in 
their  opinion  we  already  have  too  much. 

To  meet  all  this  criticism,  much  of  it  unexpressed, 
is  difficult  and  tedious,  yet  it  is  essential  if  we  are 
to  maintain  our  war  solidarity.  We  must  not  only 
explain,  but  vivify  and  dramatize  our  real  conflict 
with  German  militarism.  Only  so  can  we  create  a 
conviction  that  America  has  a  substantial  and  per- 
manent interest  in  overcoming  this  institution,  that 
it  is  an  interest  worth  fighting  for  and  not  to  be 
attained  without  fighting;  that  we  are  waging  war 
for  this  purpose  and  no  other,  and  that  we  do  not 
intend  that  the  war  shall  be  diverted  to  any  other 
end. 

Our  vagueness  of  attack  upon  the  German  sys- 
tem is  met  by  an  equal  vagueness  in  the  defence. 
In  perfect  honesty,  though  with  a  misapprehension 
of  the  true  issue,  apologists  for  Germany  insist  that 

1  "Without  taking  too  seriously  the  fascinating  program  'of  mak- 
ing the  world  safe  for  democracy,'  "  writes  Dr.  H.  H.  Powers  in  an 
illuminating  and  candid  book,  "it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  war 
is  to  be  fought  on  Eurojican  soil  and  in  conjunction  with  nations 
having  possessions  in  every  part  of  the  world.  When  the  peace  con- 
ference meets  we  shall  hear  very  little  of  the  sonorous  slogans  which 
heralded  the  war's  beginning  and  much  of  the  concrete  problems  for 
which  these  phrases  suggest  no  very  tangible  solution."  "America 
Among  the  Nations,"  by  H.  H.  Powers,  New  York,  1917,  p.  160. 


76  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

there  is  no  Prussian  militarism,  except  as  there  is 
also  a  French,  Italian  and  Russian  militarism. 
They  prove  that  in  1913  Germany  had  fewer  sol- 
diers than  certain  of  her  opponents,  both  absolutely 
and  in  proportion  to  population,  and  that  her  per 
capita  military  and  naval  expenditures  were  con- 
siderably smaller  than  those  of  France  or  Great 
Britain.  But  all  this  is  beyond  the  point,  for  mili- 
tarism does  not  depend  exclusively  upon  the  size, 
cost,  efficiency  or  readiness  of  armies.  It  is  a  social, 
not  merely  a  military,  phenomenon,  a  form  of  social 
organization  and  a  state  of  mind. 

That  Russia  in  1914  was  more  autocratic  than 
Germany  and  in  some  respects  as  militaristic  was  a 
telling  argument  disquieting  to  liberals  in  England, 
France  and  America.  That  Japan  was  militaristic 
and  autocratic  was  equally  evident.  If  the  Allies, 
therefore,  had  designed  immediately  to  destroy  all 
militarism  they  should  logically  have  refused  the 
assistance  of  Russia  and  Japan  and  thus  added 
them  to  their  enemies.  Naturally  no  such  suicidal 
policy  was  considered.  To  England  and  France 
autocracy  and  militarism  presented  themselves  not 
as  abstract  principles,  but  as  part  of  a  vast  com- 
plex and  menacing  system,  and  the  war  appeared 
to  them  a  war  of  defence.  They  fought  German 
militarism,  not  because  opposed  to  its  principle  but 
because  endangered  by  its  power,  just  as  they  would 
have  fought  a  menacing  imperialistic  German  de- 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       77 

mocracy.  The  militaristic  nations,  Russia  and  Ger- 
many, being  mutually  antagonistic,  the  western  Al- 
lies enlisted  the  former  against  the  latter.  They  em- 
ployed a  future  against  a  present  foe,  following  not 
counsels  of  perfection  but  a  law  of  necessity. 

In  a  real  sense,  however,  Germany  was  a  more 
avowed  and  logical  representative  and  champion 
of  militarism  than  was  autocratic  Russia.  Su- 
premely capable  she  had  wedded  her  efficiency  to  the 
militaristic  principle.  She  had  harnessed  her  in- 
dustry, commerce  and  educational  system  to  a 
policy  hostile  to  the  democracy  of  the  Western 
World.  With  a  philosophy  .justifying  warfare  and 
aggression  she  had  indoctrinated  her  millions.  In- 
tellectually and  physically  she  was  a  gigantic  pro- 
tagonist. On  the  other  hand,  Russian  militarism 
was  uninspired,  inefficient  and  unoriginal;  the  sort 
of  thing  which  liad  once  been  and  now  no  longer  was 
in  Western  Europe.  German  militarism  was  based 
materially  on  a  rapidly  growing  wealtli  and  intellec- 
tually on  a  neo- Darwinism,  which  envisaged  all  his- 
tory as  a  biologic  struggle  between  growing  and  de- 
caying nations,  in  which  the  strong  destroj-ed  and 
devoured  the  weak.  It  was  a  very  old,  very  new  sys- 
tem, which  threatened  to  subvert  Europe. 

The  German  apologists,  even  when  they  admit  the 
existence  of  this  system,  deny  that  it  was  a  menace. 
It  was,  they  claim,  a  sort  of  Cinderella  militarism, 
modest,    stay-at-home,    pacific.     "German    militar- 


78  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ism,"  says  Dr.  Bernard  Dernburg,  ''has  kept  the 
peace  for  forty-four  years.  While  Russia  went  to 
war  with  Turkey  and  China  and,  after  having  pro- 
moted The  Hague  Conference,  battled  with  Japan 
and  'protected'  Persia,  conquering  territory  double 
the  size  of  the  United  States  on  the  might-is-right 
principle ;  while  England,  the  defender  of  the  rights 
of  the  small  states,  smashed  the  Boer  republics,  took 
Egypt,  Cyprus  and  South  Persia;  while  the  French 
Republic  conquered  the  Sudan,  Tunis,  Madagascar, 
Indo-China  and  Morocco ;  while  Italy  possessed  itself 
of  Tripoli  and  the  islands  in  the  ^gean  Sea ;  while 
Japan  fought  China,  took  Formosa,  Korea  and 
Southern  Manchuria  and  has  now,  with  the  aid  of 
her  allies,  invaded  China,  a  neutral  country;  there 
is  not  one  annexation  or  increase  of  territory  to  the 
charge  of  Germany.  She  has  waged  no  war  of  any 
kind  and  has  never  acquired  a  territory  in  all  her 
existence  except  by  treaty  and  with  the  consent  of  the 
rest  of  the  world."  * 

Disregarding  the  exaggeration  and  disingenuous- 
ness  of  this  statement,  which  gives  a  totally  false 
impression  of  recent  German  foreign  policy,  we 
might  accept  it  as  literally  true  and  still  find  in 
German  militarism  a  menace  more  ominous  than  the 
land-greed  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  Rus- 
sia.   Not  for  a  moment  may  we  compare  the  grav- 

1  "Germany  and  England.  The  Real  Issue,"  by  Dr.  Bernard  Dern- 
burg.    Chicago,  1914,  page  6. 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       79 

ity  of  invoking  the  present  European  condict  with 
that  of  the  conquest  of  Morocco,  the  "strangling"  of 
Persia  or  the  assault  on  the  Boer  republics.  War 
against  semi-civilized,  half-organized  collections  of 
tribes,  or  even  against  the  Boers,  whether  justifiable 
or  not,  is  on  a  different  plane  from  an  attempt  to 
overturn  and  subdue  long-established,  highly  organ- 
ized national  states  like  France  and  Belgium.  And 
this  many  Germans  believed  to  be  necessary.  It  had 
long  been  an  axiom  of  German  policy  that  colonial 
possessions  could  be  secured  only  by  direct  pressure 
upon  European  neighbours.  African  colonies  must 
be  won  by  invading  Belgium  and  Russia,  by  bleed- 
ing France  white,  by  destroying  British  sea-power. 
To  secure  what  she  wanted  and  believed  she  had  a 
right  to  possess,  Germany  conceived  that  she  was 
forced  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  enemies  who  blocked 
her  colonial  development.  Her  militarism,  there- 
fore, presented  itself  to  such  enemies  as  a  mortal 
peril. 

It  is  not  a  question  of  morals  that  is  involved  but 
of  necessity.  Germany  insists  that  even  if  she  began 
the  war  (which  she  denies)  she  was  justified  by  the 
selfish  policy  of  enemies  seeking  to  thwart  and 
strangle  her.  Were  this  true,  however,  the  mere 
fact  that  she  could  gain  what  she  wanted  only  by 
overcoming  those  established  nations  would  alone 
render  her  a  menace  to  the  world.  But  it  does  not 
appear  that  Germany  used  conciliatory  methods  to 


80  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

gain  her  place  in  the  sun.^  That  she  was  constricted 
in  her  colonial  expansion  is  true,  for  the  Allies  were 
neither  generous  nor  far-seeing.  But  such  halting 
advances  as  were  made  struck  against  an  arrogant 
and  irreconcilable  spirit  in  Germany.  Her  rulers 
were  victims  of  their  own  philosophy,  believing  in 
their  military  invincibility  and  in  the  doctrine  that 
only  by  threats  could  concessions  be  enforced. 
They  interpreted  peace  offers  therefore  as  weak- 
ness, and  entered  so  uncomprehendingly  into  nego- 
tiations as  to  make  favourable  results  impossible. 
Their  manners  were,  if  anything,  worse  than  their 
morals.  They  began  negotiations  by  pounding  the 
table,  by  an  imperial  visit  to  Tangier,  or  a  sudden 
spring  of  the  Panther  at  Agadir.  They  talked 
loud,  rattled  the  sabre,  appeared  in  the  council  cham- 
ber *4n  shining  armour."  And  back  of  the  equivo- 
cating diplomats  stood  the  mob  of  clumsy  pan-Ger- 
mans, shrieking  insults  at  France  and  England, 
proposing  gross  plans  of  conquest  to  Germany's 
rulers,  thus  reminding  the  world  that  whatever  was 
given  would  be  merely  an  occasion  for  new  de- 
mands. The  result  was  a  diplomatic  failure.  If 
concession  was  to  be  interpreted  as  weakness,  the 
neighbours  of  Germany  would  concede  nothing.     In 

1  On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  admitted  that  in  the  negotiations 
leading  up  to  the  attempted  settlement  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  ques- 
tion (1914)  Germany  showed  a  willingness  to  meet  England  half- 
way.    Nor  were  England,  France  and  Russia  always  conciliatory. 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       81 

the  years  during  which  France  deftly  secured  large 
additions  to  her  colonial  empire,  Germany's  blus- 
tering gained  nothing  but  disappointments  and  ill- 
will. 

At  bottom,  of  course,  the  question  whether  the 
one  group  or  the  other  or  both  were  at  fault  is  quite 
irrelevant.  What  was  revealed  by  the  impotent 
deliberations  between  Germany  and  her  present 
enemies  was  the  fact  that  tw^o  opposing  policies 
were  in  conflict  and  that  these  policies  gained  ad- 
herents because  they  represented  the  antagonistic 
interests  of  two  groups  of  nations.  Each  group 
believed  that  to  accept  its  opponent 's  principle  would 
be  fatal.  England's  international  theory  was  pre- 
dicated on  the  assumption  that  the  British  Empire 
must  increase  or  at  least  maintain  itself,  while  the 
theory  of  Germany  assumed  that  the  Fatherland 
must  grow.  The  new  German  Empire  (so,  at  least, 
it  appeared  to  Englishmen)  must  be  founded  upon 
the  ruins  of  the  British  Empire,  must  live  off  the 
lands  upon  which  Britain  had  lived,  must  break  Eng- 
land's  resistance  and  if  necessary  destroy  England's 
independence.  The  two  principles  had  impinged  be- 
cause the  two  nations  had  impinged.  The  menace  of 
militarism  became  for  Great  Britain  the  menace  of 
an  expanding  Germany. 

To  understand  what  this  peril  really  meant  to 
Western  Europe  we  must  consider  what  might  have 


82  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

occurred  had  Germany  succeeded  in  her  first  West- 
ern drive.  Belgium  would  have  gone  down  and 
France  been  crushed.  A  secure  Germany  army, 
occupying  Paris,  Calais,  Havre,  Verdun  could  have 
kept  the  dispirited  French  troops  beyond  the  Loire 
and  intercepted  any  effective  aid  from  England.  A 
treaty  with  France  might  have  given  Germany  large 
tracts  of  land,  immense  mineral  resources,  a  firm 
footing  on  the  English  Channel  and  a  stupendous  in- 
demnity, together  with  the  French  colonies  and  per- 
haps the  French  navy.  It  would  have  been  an  im- 
mense booty.  Belgian  independence  gone,  Holland, 
Denmark  and  Switzerland  would  have  become  vassal 
states.  In  the  Balkans,  on  the  road  to  Constanti- 
nople and  Bagdad,  no  power  could  have  resisted  a 
future  German  advance,  since  Russia,  without 
France's  support,  would  have  been  impotent.  Even 
Great  Britain  could  have  done  nothing.  ''When  the 
mighty  German  Empire,"  wrote  Mr.  Frederic  Har- 
rison, *'soon  to  be  increased  to  a  population  double 
our  own,  is  master  of  the  whole  seaboard  of  North 
Europe  from  Havre  to  Hamburg — a  coast  more 
fitted  for  navies  than  is  our  own  coast  between  Dover 
and  Aberdeen,  when  their  aeroplane  and  Zeppelin 
stations  look  across  the  Channel  from  a  dozen  head- 
lands, and  the  mouths  of  great  tidal  rivers  gape 
upon  our  shores,  and  behind  these  fortresses  and 
docks  there  lies  in  wait  a  mighty  nation  having  a 
fleet  then  larger  than  ours,  and  armies  of  three  or 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       83 

four  millions  of  men — would  the  flag  of  Britain  float 
quietly  at  ease ?' '  ^ 

Such  was  the  menace  of  German  militarism  as 
viewed  by  British  statesmen  in  August,  1914.  Eng- 
land's participation  was  not  decided  by  the  Belgian 
invasion  nor  by  the  Belgian  atrocities.  These  were 
mere  incidents.  Had  Germany  observed  all  the 
rules  of  war,  killed  with  punctilio,  conferred  warm 
soup  and  iron  crosses  on  enemy  non-combatants 
and  generally  behaved  like  a  twentieth-century  Ro- 
land, had  she  invaded  France  at  Verdun  and  not  at 
Namur,  the  result  of  her  victory  would  have  meant 
an  equal  disaster  to  England.  A  crushing  of  France 
meant  an  ultimate  crushing  of  Great  Britain.^ 

While  a  complete  German  victory  would  have  de- 
stroyed England,  even  the  danger  of  such  a  victory 
would  have  blasted  the  hope  of  a  British  democracy. 
Democracy  is  a  luxury.  It  can  be  developed  and 
maintained  only  in  a  moderately  secure  and  pacific 
world.  This  is  due  to  the  superior  fighting  efficiency 
of  militaristic  states.  In  a  war  between  nations  of 
equal  resources,  population  and  intelligence,  one  of 
which  is  devoting  its  energies  and  thought  to  social 
reconstruction  and  the  other  primarily  interested  in 

1  "The  Meaning  of  the  War,"  by  Frederic  Harrison,  London,  1915, 
p.  2. 

2  To  destroy  Britain  large  armies  would  not  have  been  necessary; 
she  could  have  been  starved  financially  ami  economically  by  depriv- 
ing her  of  markets,  raw  materials  and  food.  Without  a  German  sol- 
dier on  British  soil,  England  could  have  been  forced  to  surrender. 


84  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

preparing  for  war,  the  advantage  lies  enormously 
with  the  latter.  The  great  military  superiority  of 
Gennany  over  other  nations,  the  unlimited  devotion 
of  her  people  and  the  skill  and  foresight  with  which 
her  martial  operations  are  conceived  and  carried  out, 
reveal  an  alarming  military  advantage  of  the  auto- 
cratic state  over  the  democratic  nation.  The  dan- 
ger cast  its  shadow  far  during  the  ten  years  pre- 
ceding the  conflict.  The  fear  of  Germany  in  both 
England  and  France  was  one  of  the  greatest  ob- 
stacles to  democracy  and  social  reform.  In  England 
Lord  Roberts  urged  conscription  and  was  opposed 
by  the  great  masses  of  the  wage-earners.  In  France 
the  Socialists  vigorously  combated  the  reintroduc- 
tion  of  the  three  years'  military  service.  So  long  as 
one  nation  remained  supremely  efficient  in  its  mili- 
tarism and  ready  to  attack  at  any  moment,  the  other 
nations  were  hampered  in  their  efforts  to  achieve 
progress  toward  political,  industrial  or  social  de- 
mocracy. 

We  in  America  are  forced  to  view  the  menace 
of  German  militarism  in  the  same  light  as  do  the 
democrats  of  England  and  France.  If  we  are  to 
achieve  democracy,  or  even  to  maintain  such  democ- 
racy as  we  now  have,  conditions  must  be  established 
in  the  rest  of  the  world  which  will  render  us  safe. 

In  the  past  we  have  tacitly  assumed  that  our 
safety  would  be  permanent.  We  were  so  far  re- 
moved from  Europe  that  we  believed  that  no  great 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       85 

power  could  attack  us.  Isolation,  however,  is  meas- 
ured not  in  miles  of  distance  but  in  the  difficulty  and 
delay  of  transporting  troops,  and  in  this  respect  the 
technical  progress  of  the  last  thirty  years  has  vastly 
diminished  our  immunity.  Our  enemy  will  no 
longer  transport  his  troops  with  slow-sailing  vessels 
of  small  burden  as  during  our  wars  with  England, 
but  will  use  gigantic  and  rapid  steamships.  Our 
first  line  of  defence  is  almost  gone. 

Our  second  protection  from  the  superior  strength 
of  Europe  lay  in  her  balance  of  power.  No  nation 
wished  to  embroil  herself  with  America  so  long  as 
she  feared  enemies  nearer  home.  A  hostile  coalition 
of  states,  as  was  threatened  during  our  war  with 
Spain,  would  have  found  us  defenceless.  But  if 
Germany  were  to  succeed  in  crushing  France  and  in 
destroying  England,  the  balance  of  power  would 
come  to  an  end,  and  ultimately  the  victor  could  com- 
bine against  us  a  large  proportion  of  the  superior 
military  and  economic  resources  of  Europe.  In  such 
a  case  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  defend  the  in- 
tegrity of  our  territory  or  to  find  leisure  to  develop 
our  democracy.  We  should  have  had  other  preoccu- 
pations. 

This  brings  us  to  the  point  where  the  questions 
with  which  this  chapter  opened  can  be  answered. 
We  combat  German  autocracy  because  it  is  a  princi- 
ple adverse  to  the  democracy  for  which  we  strive. 
We  combat  German  militarism  because  it,  also,  rep- 


86  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

resents  an  antagonistic  principle.  But  against 
neither  of  these  should  we  have  gone  to  war  but  for 
the  fact  that  these  principles  so  present  themselves 
as  to  menace  our  democracy  and  our  safety.  We  are 
opposed  to  German  autocracy  because  it  aids  German 
militarism ;  to  German  militarism  because  it  leads  to 
German  aggression ;  to  German  aggression  because, 
owing  to  Germany's  strategic  position  and  her  im- 
mense strength,  owing  to  conditions  which  in  large 
measure  are  not  Germany's  fault,  her  aggression 
may  overturn  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  de- 
stroy our  security,  and  render  it  difficult  for  us  to 
develop  a  democracy  at  home,  or  even  to  maintain 
our  independence.  We  are  therefore  compelled  at 
the  worst  to  fight  for  a  return  to  the  Balance  of 
Power,  although  theoretically  we  are  opposed  to  this 
system,  or  at  the  best  for  an  internationalism,  in 
which  all  peril  will  disappear.  The  one  thing,  how- 
ever, which  we  cannot  view  with  equanimity  is  the 
marshalling  of  Europe's  strength  under  the  leader- 
ship of  a  single  mighty  state,  autocratic,  militaris- 
tic and  aggressive.  We  are  therefore  fighting  both 
a  principle  and  a  power;  we  are  opposed  to  Ger- 
many, not  only  because  of  the  quality  but  also  be- 
cause of  the  magnitude  of  her  menace. 

For  us  as  for  Britain  the  Mame  was  a  sav- 
ing victory,  at  least  temporarily.  It  is  true  that 
the  danger  to  us  from  a  defeat  at  the  Marne  would 
have  been  delayed,  for  between  us  and  Germany  lay 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       87 

Great  Britain,  as  between  her  and  Germany  lay 
France  and  Belgium.  When  we  contemplate,  how- 
ever, the  ravages  of  German  submarines  operating 
under  grave  difficulties  we  gain  some  conception  of 
what  a  Germany,  possessed  of  the  French  fleet  and 
a  part  of  the  French  coast,  could  eventually  have 
achieved  against  the  commerce  of  the  British  Isles. 
At  best  Great  Britain  could  only  have  maintained 
her  existence;  at  worst  she  might  have  been  con- 
quered and  her  navy  and  a  part  of  her  industrial 
power  annexed.  Against  such  a  combination  of 
navies  and  resources,  against  even  a  Franco-Ger- 
man navy  (Great  Britain  remaining  neutral)  the 
United  States  could  accomplish  little.  AVe  should 
face  a  hostile  combination  of  the  immensely  more 
powerful  and  better  organized  resources  of  Western 
Europe.  By  what  means  could  we  uphold  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  or  maintain  our  commerce?  Could  we 
even  be  sure  of  defending  our  o\\ti  soil? 

Had  Germany  won  that  battle,  we  should  instantly 
have  recognized  the  sinister  menace  of  her  militar- 
ism. With  her  defeat,  however,  we  again  breathed 
lightly,  for  in  due  course  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
would  break  down  the  Central  Empires.  We  there- 
fore composedly  returned  to  our  discussions  con- 
cerning White  Papers,  provocations,  counter-provo- 
cations, the  rights  of  neutrals,  the  wrongs  of  com- 
batants. Yet  though  the  danger  of  a  victory  for 
German  militarism  seemed  to  have  passed,  we  were 


88  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

gradual!}-  familiarizing  ourselves  with  the  quality  of 
that  institution. 

It  was  its  f  ormidableness  that  most  astounded  us. 
We  were  outraged  by  Louvain,  Rheims,  the  Zeppe- 
lin raids,  the  submarine  atrocities,  the  execution  of 
Edith  Cavell,  the  murder  of  Captain  Fryatt,  but 
what  brought  us  definitely  into  opposition  was  the 
sheer  power  and  viability  of  a  principle  which  we 
had  believed  to  be  half-dead.  Militarism  had  al- 
ways been  associated  in  our  minds  with  autocracy, 
and  that  we  had  conceived  as  a  weak-minded  and 
hoary  immigrant  from  an  outlived  age,  a  sort  of 
political  Fafner,  surviving  through  mere  inertia. 
It  was  preindustrial,  which  is  our  modern  and  secu- 
lar synonym  for  pre-Adamitic.  It  had  no  more 
raison  d'etre  than  the  fact  that  it  was  still  half- 
alive  and  not  worth  killing.  We  no  longer  had  any 
quarrel  with  kings  and  emperors,  who  had  had  their 
claws  cut  and  had  become  gracious  layers  of  corner- 
stones and  innocent  symbols  of  democratic  power. 
Autocracy,  we  believed,  would  disappear  gradually 
and  in  fractions,  tail,  body  and  head,  like  the  Chesh- 
ire cat,  until,  as  with  British  royalty,  nothing  re- 
mained but  the  smile. 

The  war  taught  us  that  autocracy  was  not  a  thing 
of  kings  and  crown-princes,  but  a  living  principle, 
an  efficient  form  of  social  organization.  Instead  of 
dying  decently  at  the  first  whiff  of  factory  smoke, 
instead  of  being  run  over  by  the  new  railroads  or 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       89 

crowded  to  death  in  our  modern  cities,  it  con- 
verted industrialism  to  its  own  uses  and  seated  it- 
self in  the  centre  of  the  economic  system.  It  did  not 
die  of  education,  but  made  of  the  school-teacher  one 
of  its  main  supports.  The  university  and  the  news- 
paper became,  not  its  executioners,  but  its  servile 
handmaidens.  Autocracy  was  efficient.  It  per- 
sisted in  living.     It  persisted  in  growing. 

Therein  lay  its  menace.  It  was  expansive,  nec- 
essarily expansive. 

It  was  expansive  because  of  its  origin  and  the  law 
of  its  being.  The  autocratic  principle  persisted  in 
modern  intelligent  Germany  because  it  grew  out  of 
foreign  relations,  was  born  of  danger  and  lived  on 
danger.  It  was  her  external  menace  that  fastened 
autocracy  and  militarism  on  Germany.  During  two 
long  centuries  her  invaders  (Swedes,  French,  Croats 
and  others),  by  keeping  the  nation  divided,  had  cre- 
ated German  autocracy  and  militarism  by  giving  the 
people  so  ardent  a  desire  for  security  that  they  wel- 
comed any  social  organization  by  which  it  could  be 
attained.  To  this  day  the  German  lives  under  the 
shadow  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  and  remembers 
Tilly,  Wallenstein  and  Gustavus  Adolphus,  as  he 
remembers  Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon.  Even  the 
liberal  German  tends  to  regard  an  autocratic  mili- 
tarism as  an  insurance  premium.  He  feels  toward 
it  as  we  toward  our  police;  we  may  not  love  the 
policeman  but  prefer  him  to  the  thief. 


90  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

The  power  to  defend,  however,  means  the  power 
as  well  as  the  temptation  to  attack,  and  Germany  like 
other  nations  is  not  beyond  such  temptation.  All 
the  European  peoples  were  menaced.  We  have  read 
recent  history  wrongly  if  we  conceive  of  it  in  terms 
of  an  aggressive  Germany  constantly  planning  to 
attack  nations  wholly  devoted  to  peace.  Both 
groups  of  allies  meditated  both  aggression  and  de- 
fence. Justified  or  not,  Serbian  ambitions  in  Aus- 
tria and  Russian  ambitions  in  the  Balkans  were 
aggressive,  as  were  also  Austria's  designs  on  Ser- 
bia. Because  Germany  needed  defence,  because  she 
wanted  to  aggress,  because  she  believed  that  only 
by  military  effort  could  she  achieve  her  ends,  and 
finally  because  she  was  in  a  geographical  situation 
in  which  a  successful  war  could  destroy  the  security 
of  other  great  nations,  German  imperialism  became 
a  deadly  menace. 

Thus  the  Western  World,  including  America, 
comes  into  conflict  with  a  nation,  representing  power, 
aggression,  and  an  alien  philosophy.  Of  these 
opposed  philosophies  one  is  based  on  an  autocratic, 
militaristic  foundation,  emphasizing  the  virtues 
of  order,  discipline,  endurance,  subordination,  pro- 
lificity,  stoicism,  and  laying  stress  on  loyalty 
and  a  traditional  personal  honour.  It  believes  in 
compulsion,  the  omnipotence  of  the  state,  the  empti- 
ness and  worthlessness  of  plans  to  avert  warfare. 
The  other  philosophy  is  more  democratic  and  pacifis- 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       91 

tic,  emphasizing  individual  freedom,  the  quest  of 
pleasure,  the  virtues  of  prosperity.  It  is  melioristic 
and  legalistic,  stressing  rights  and  privileges  and 
underemphasizing  duties.  It  is  progressive  and  con- 
fident. It  believes  in  a  low  birth  rate,  in  ease  and 
protection  from  danger.  It  is  optimistic  and 
money-making. 

Of  course  not  all  Germans  uphold  one  philosophy 
nor  all  British,  French  and  Americans  the  other; 
there  are  millions  of  exceptions  on  both  sides. 
Bemhardi  himself  is  our  witness  to  the  demoraliz- 
ing, by  which  he  means  demilitarizing,  influence  upon 
Germany  of  recent  wealth.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
are  always  a  few  American,  French  and  British  fire- 
breathers,  with  little  to  learn  from  their  more  nu- 
merous and  loquacious  German  compeers.  Not  the 
exception,  however,  but  the  rule  determines.  For 
reasons,  partly  beyond  its  own  control,  Germany  be- 
came the  exponent  and  protagonist  of  the  militarist 
philosophy,  and  sought  to  live  up  to  its  doctrines  in 
a  war,  which  had  she  been  victorious  would  for  a 
time  have  subverted  the  democratic  civilization  of 
the  West. 

It  is  of  course  not  to  be  assumed  that  of  these 
opposed  philosophies  autocracy  was  aggressive 
and  democracy  not;  both  principles  were,  and  are, 
aggressive  and  intensely  missionary.  The  very 
phrase  ''Making  the  world  safe  for  democracy" 
suggests  how  encroaching  was  our  own  principle. 


92  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

England,  France  and  the  United  States  had  hitherto 
prospered  because  of  historical  and  geographical 
reasons,  and  had  sanctified  their  gains  by  a  glori- 
fying possession.  The  course  of  historic  evolution 
in  its  larger  bearings  had  worked  for  them,  and  they, 
its  beneficiaries  and  disciples,  saw  everything  that 
it  had  made;  *'and  behold,  it  was  very  good."  On 
the  other  hand  the  German  principle  was  disturb- 
ing and  revolutionary  because  Germany  had  every- 
thing to  gain  from  a  change. 

The  indefatigable  traveller  from  Mars,  arriving 
at  this  green  earth  in  the  spring  of  1914,  might  have 
come  to  the  typically  Martian  conclusion  that  the 
Earth  was  most  unfortunately  divided,  that  an  in- 
efficient and  garrulous  democratic  spirit  had  con- 
quered the  greater  area  while  the  unique  and  saving 
principle,  an  efficient,  industrialized,  moral  autoc- 
racy was  dying  of  inanition  within  narrow  confines. 
With  all  of  which  many  Germans  would  agree. 
They  would  proudly  admit  that  militarism  is  pecul- 
iar to  Germany,  but  in  the  same  breath  they  would 
insist  that  it  is  excellent,  the  last  word  in  our  mod- 
ern development  towards  equality,  democracy  and 
subordination. 

When  a  new  recruit  enters  the  army,  says  N.  Gold- 
mann,  a  young  defender  of  the  principle  of  militar- 
ism,^ two  things  occur:  he  is  given  a  uniform  and 

1  Goldmann  (N.)  "Der  Geist  des  Militarismus."  ("Der  Deutsche 
Krieg.")      Borlin  and  Stuttgart,   1915. 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       93 

is  told  to  do  whatever  his  superiors  command. 
These  two  acts  typify  our  modern  civilization.  The 
uniform  is  the  expression  of  the  democratic  idea,  the 
suppression  for  the  time  being  of  all  differences 
among  men;  ''in  uniform  no  one  is  noble  or  com- 
moner, millionaire  or  beggar,  artist  or  philistine, 
orthodox  or  atheist,"  but  all  are  members  of  the 
army.  By  the  distinction  between  those  who  com- 
mand and  those  who  obey,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
** aristocratic  idea"  is  maintained.  Democracy  and 
subordination — the  union  of  these  two  creates  mili- 
tarism— and  civilization. 

Therefore,  writes  Goldmann,  *'the  battle  cry  of 
the  opponents  of  Germany  is  justified.  The  Ger- 
man spirit  may  be  called  the  militaristic  spirit." 
But  far  from  being  alien  to  modern  development  or 
opposed  to  West  European  civilization,  militarism 
is  their  distinguishing  characteristic.  The  great 
city,  the  factory  and  our  whole  industrial  system 
are  based  on  its  principles  of  uniformity  and 
subordination,  in  other  words,  on  regimentation. 
Therefore  we  speak  of  the  ''barracks"  of  the  work- 
ing-men and  of  the  industrial  "reserve  army."  The 
individual  workman,  technician,  engineer,  director 
counts  for  little;  the  enterprise  is  all-important.  So 
in  our  intellectual  life  militarism  is  supreme  and 
"the  German  spirit  rules  the  world."  The  opposi- 
tion to  militarism  comes  not  from  Western  civiliza- 
tion but  from  the  "atomism"  of  English  life,  from 


94  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

the  English  incapacity  to  generalize,  to  sacrifice  for 
the  common  good,  even  to  recognize  the  existence  of 
a  common  good.^ 

Germany  has  become  great,  continues  Goldmann, 
through  her  militarism,  just  as  Great  Britain  became 
great  through  "her  anti-militaristic,  individualistic 
spirit. ' '  In  the  world  struggle  between  the  two  prin- 
ciples militarism  must  be  victorious.  *' Germany 
will  conquer  and  the  world  will  be  ruled  by  the  mili- 
taristic spirit."  Only  such  a  victory  will  permit 
the  present  age  to  solve  its  problems. 

Despite  Mr.  Goldmann 's  prediction,  the  world,  in 
the  event  of  an  Allied  victory,  will  seek  to  solve  our 
modern  problems  without  the  assistance  either  of 
autocracy  or  of  militarism.  It  will  see  what  it  can 
do  with  democracy. 

But  the  democracy  which  can  be  utilized  in  such 
a  vast  reorganization  will  of  necessity  be  something 
different  from  the  lax,  inefficient  and  brutal  plutoc- 
racies which  we  find  in  several  of  the  nations 
opposed  to  Germany.    It  must  be  a  socialized  de- 

1  Militarism  is  not  identical  with  the  maintenance  of  an  army,  as 
the  Swiss  experience  proves.  In  a  recent  booklet  the  German  Social- 
ist, Karl  Kautsky,  clearly  makes  this  distinction.  "We  (the  Ger- 
man Socialists)  have  fought  against  the  military  system  not  to  make 
the  land  defenceless,  but  in  order  to  introduce  another  system  in  its 
place,  which  will  give  us  the  necessary  guarantees  that  the  army  will 
always  be  the  tool  of  the  civil  authorities  and  never  their  master. 
When  the  latter  is  the  case  we  call  such  a  condition  'militarism,'  and 
it  is  against  that  alone  that  we  fight."  "Die  Internationalitaet  und 
der  Krieg,"  Berlin,  1915,  p.  26.  quoted  by  Thomas  F.  A.  Smith, 
"What  Germany  Thinks,"  New  York,  1915,  p.  112. 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       95 

mocracy,  not  a  mere  popular  government  based  on 
money  and  on  the  exploitation  of  the  poor. 

It  is  sometimes  alleged  that,  because  we  in  Amer- 
ica have  not  attained  to  such  a  socialized  democracy, 
we  are  not  fit  to  become  the  champions  of  the  demo- 
cratic principle.  Critics  point  to  our  lynchings,  our 
political  corruption  and  ineptitudes  and  our  gross 
economic  inequalities.  They  point  out  that  it  is  our 
o^vn  Prussian-blue  reactionaries,  grown  fat  and  no- 
torious in  their  warfare  against  a  true  American 
freedom,  who  are  loudest  in  their  defence  of  our 
democracy.  But  what  else  could  be  expected? 
No  war  was  ever  won  by  the  virtuous  alone,  and  it 
is  inevitable  that  tax-dodgers,  union-smashers, 
monopolists,  cadets,  ward-politicians,  sweat-shop 
proprietors  and  desultory  burners  of  Negroes,  to 
say  nothing  of  criminals,  lunatics  and  aging  keepers 
of  houses  of  prostitution  should  be  enlisted  side  by 
side  with  other  elements  in  the  population.  We 
are  a  full  democracy  not  in  being  but  in  process. 
It  is  a  war  for  the  bases  of  democracy,  for  the  safety 
of  a  capitalistic  society  developing  rapidly  towards 
democracy.  Like  several  of  our  Allies,  we  are  fight- 
ing not  only  for  freedom  from  alarms  over  our  in- 
dependence but  also  for  a  chance  to  try  out  the 
Great  Experiment,  to  struggle  forward  towards  the 
ultimate  attainment  of  a  great  ideal.  And  in  this 
struggle  we  can  count  upon  the  willing  assistance  of 


96  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

men  who  do  not  grasp  the  implications  of  their 
adhesion. 

America  therefore  is  at  war  because  her  growing 
democracy  is  in  conflict  with  the  militaristic  insti- 
tutions and  philosophy  of  Germany,  and  because  her 
democracy  and  her  entire  national  development 
would  be  endangered  by  the  German  victory,  which 
would  have  been  probable  had  we  not  entered.  We 
thus  have  both  a  general  and  a  specific  interest;  a 
desire  to  promote  a  better  system  in  Europe  and 
a  wish  to  maintain  our  own  democracy  intact.  In 
a  sense  we  are  fighting  a  preventive  war,  seeking  to 
destroy  the  menace  of  German  militarism  before  it 
can  attack  us  in  our  own  home.  Just  as  we  sink 
submarines  at  sight,  rather  than  by  ''armed  neu- 
trality" limiting  ourselves  to  defence,  so  we  assail 
Germany  in  concert  with  her  present  enemies  rather 
than  attend  her  possible  attack  after  her  victory  in 
Europe. 

How  much  further  should  we  go?  Have  we  an 
interest,  and  has  the  world,  in  proceeding  beyond 
the  destruction  of  German  militarism  to  the  perma- 
nent building  up  of  a  British,  French,  Italian,  Rus- 
sian or  American  militarism? 

The  danger  is  not  fictitious.  Germany  developed 
her  militarism  out  of  a  sense  of  external  peril,  and 
if  the  war  goes  against  her,  and  the  old  European 
system  remains,  she  will  still  be  menaced  and  at 
least  potentially  militaristic.     Furthermore  if  we  en- 


THE  WAR  AGAINST  MILITARISM       97 

courage  Serbia  and  Italy,  Greece  and  France,  Brit- 
ain, Japan  and  Russia  to  develop  new  antagonisms, 
we  shall  be  planting  the  seeds  of  militarism  through- 
out the  world.  Germany  will  have  been  defeated, 
but  German  militarism  will  have  triumphed. 


CHAPTER  V 

SPOILING   THE   ENEMY 

Since  the  imperialism  of  the  Allies  in  the  present 
war  is  less  sweeping  and  drastic  than  that  of  Ger- 
many, we  are  sometimes  urged  to  close  an  eye  or  turn 
our  back.  When  we  are  trying  to  capture  an  armed 
burglar  we  do  not  inquire  too  curiously  into  the  ques- 
tion whether  a  few  of  the  posse  comitatus  are  modest 
confidence  men.  There  is  a  sense  of  proportion  in 
these  things,  and  there  are  diplomatic  convenances. 

Even  were  our  co-belligerents  twice  as  imperial- 
istic as  they  are,  we  should  still  be  compelled  to  make 
common  cause  with  them  against  the  still  more  men- 
acing German  aggression.  Our  secure  loyalty  to 
our  Allies  is  not  in  question.  But  to  make  common 
cause,  to  maintain  a  real  concert  of  action,  requires 
harmony  in  ideals  and  unity  of  aims.  It  is  for 
this  reason  that  we  are  forced  to  review  the  instincts, 
motives  and  demands  that  lie  behind  the  armies  of 
our  Allies.  When  we  are  united  we  shall  have  a 
chance  to  win  the  war.  Until  then  we  shall  drag 
along,  working  at  cross-purposes. 

The  truth  must  be  faced.  The  efforts  of  the  Allies 
to  gain  a  victory  for  democracy  and  internationalism 
have  everywhere  been  impeded  by  their  own  na- 

98 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  99 

tionalistic  ambitions.  It  is  trebly  unfortunate  that 
this  has  been  the  case.  Not  only  have  these  ambi- 
tions vitiated  their  good  faith  in  their  war  against 
German  autocracy,  not  only  have  they  made  the 
eventual  victory  far  less  valuable,  but  they  have 
delayed  and  jeopardized  that  victory.  Because  of 
their  clashing  territorial  ambitions  our  co-belliger- 
ents find  it  difficult  even  today  to  achieve  unity  of 
purpose  or  action,  and  as  their  plans  of  aggrandize- 
ment become  known  in  Germany  and  Austria,  and 
are  there  exaggerated,  they  tend  to  unify  the  entire 
population  of  the  Central  Powers,  reactionaries  and 
democrats,  conservatives  and  liberals,  Germans, 
Austrians,  Hungarians,  and  even  the  exploited  races 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  secret  treaties  into 
which  the  Allies  entered  make  the  whole  war  for 
democracy  appear  to  our  enemies  as  a  sham  and  as 
an  excuse  for  their  own  imperialism. 

To  many  it  will  seem  mal-a-propos  and  perhaps 
even  unpatriotic  to  state  these  facts.  Why  should 
we  injure  our  own  side  even  by  telling  the  truth? 
Will  not  a  revelation  of  these  covert  ambitions  of 
our  Allies  have  the  effect  of  demoralizing  the  En- 
tente Powers  and  of  destroying  their  solidarity? 
When  our  sons  and  brothers  are  risking  their  lives 
on  the  battle  front  is  it  time  for  academic  discussions 
of  past  events,  discussions  which  cannot  but  give  aid 
and  comfort  to  the  enemy? 

But  what  if  the  enemy  already  knows  ?     The  news- 


100  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

papers  in  the  hostile  countries  have  printed  long  ac- 
counts, true  and  false,  of  the  designs  of  each  of  the 
Allied  nations.  By  suppressing  such  facts  we  do 
not  prevent  Germany's  knowing  them.  Today  we 
of  the  Allied  countries  by  reason  of  a  supposedly 
patriotic  silence  are  fighting  in  the  dark  and  risking 
lives  that  might  be  saved.  We  are  standing  in  the 
way  of  our  own  solidarity,  and  are  making  our  task 
harder  and  more  dangerous  than  it  need  be.  Be- 
cause we  do  not  properly  consider  and  duly  assess 
facts  which  are  important  elements  in  our  war  prob- 
lem, we  weaken  our  morale  and  strengthen  that  of 
the  Imperial  German  Government.  If  we  face  the 
truth  and  intelligently  guide  our  action  by  the  con- 
clusions we  reach,  our  enemy  will  be  welcome  to  any 
comfort  he  may  derive  from  the  result. 

There  is  an  even  more  important  reason  for  dis- 
cussing this  question.  When  we  entered  the  war  we 
already  had  an  inkling  of  the  imperialistic  aims  of 
several  of  our  Allies.  If,  notwithstanding  this 
knowledge,  we  took  sides  with  them,  we  did  so  be- 
cause we  vaguely  felt  that  this  imperialism  was  not  a 
necessary  and  inevitable  part  of  the  allied  program, 
that  by  our  concert  with  these  nations  we  might  aid 
in  the  democratization  of  their  peace  terms,  that  we 
might  raise  a  standard  about  which  the  more  demo- 
cratic of  our  Allies  and  the  more  democratic  classes 
within  these  Allied  nations  could  rally.  Unless  we 
can  do  this  we  can  gain  no  moral  victory.    And  we 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  101 

can  make  no  progress  in  this  direction  so  long  as  we 
seek  to  remain  silent  on  this  delicate  question. 

It  is  not  necessary  in  discussing  the  territorial  am- 
bitions of  our  Allies  to  pass  a  moral  judgment  or  to 
assume  an  ethical  superiority  on  our  own  part.  No 
demand  by  any  of  our  Allies  has  been  more  flagrant  a 
breach  of  international  morality  than  were  the  claims 
which  led  to  our  war  with  Mexico.  It  is  superla^ 
tively  easy  to  indict  nations  for  concealing  selfish  am- 
bitions under  protestations  of  international  recti- 
tude. But  such  an  indictment  does  not  help  us,  for 
our  problem  is  not  to  distribute  praise  or  blame  but 
to  seek  a  true  basis  for  an  international  civilization 
and  thus  secure  a  real  victory.  It  is  far  more  impor- 
tant to  understand  these  nationalistic  ambitious,  to 
recognize  how  deeply  they  are  rooted  in  the  whole 
history  of  modern  Europe  and  to  acknowledge  their 
inevitableness  in  the  circumstances  than  to  appraise 
and  judge. 

What  was  the  diplomatic  state  of  Europe  out  of 
which  grew  these  demands  of  our  Allies?  What 
chance  was  there  for  any  nation  following  the  even 
path  of  rectitude  and  abnegation? 

In  his  defence  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  foreign  pol- 
icy, Sir  Gilbert  Murray  deplores  the  fact  that  the 
diplomacy  of  the  nations  has  been  frankly  egoistic, 
cruel  nnd  dishonest.  "There  is,"  he  says,  about  the 
ordinary  processes  of  Foreign  Policy,  "a  constant 
suspicion  of  intrigue,  a  constant  assertion  of  'inter- 


102  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ests,'  a  dangerous  familiarity  with  thoughts  of  force 
or  fraud,  and  a  habit  of  using  silken  phrases  as  a 
cover  for  very  brutal  facts.  .  .  .  Foreign  Politics  are 
the  relations  between  so  many  bands  of  outlaws. ' '  ^ 
As  a  consequence  even  the  nations  with  high  ideals 
must  go  into  international  conferences  with  a  big 
knife,  ready  to  carve  out  a  slice  of  territory  or  carve 
up  the  plausive  foe. 

In  1914  therefore  the  enemies  of  Germany,  though 
fighting  a  war  for  their  very  existence,  were  nei- 
ther more  nor  less  scrupulous  than  they  had  been 
in  former  years.  These  Western  and  Eastern  Allies, 
defending  themselves  against  Germany,  conceived 
the  problem  of  the  division  of  the  world  somewhat 
as  did  Germany,  simply  because  it  was  the  only  con- 
ception then  admitted  in  diplomatic  Europe.  Ac- 
cording to  this  conception  each  nation  was  bound  to 
grow,  expand,  get  what  it  could,  make  the  best  bar- 
gain with  enemy  and  ally.  To  take,  was  not  only 
directly  advantageous  but  also  had  the  merit  of  pre- 
venting the  enemy  from  taking. 

Of  all  the  original  allies  in  the  struggle  against 
German  aggression,  Imperial  Russia  was  probably 
the  most  avid  of  territory  and  the  least  concerned 
with  the  ideals  that  inspired  many  Englishmen, 
Frenchmen  and  Belgians.  From  the  Czar's  point 
of  view  the  war  was  not  a  struggle  of  democracy 

1  "The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,"  by  Sir  Gilbert  Mur- 
ray, Oxford,  1915,  p.  41. 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  103 

against  militarism  but  a  contest  for  supremacy  in 
the  Balkans  and  for  domination  of  the  Straits.  The 
Imperial  Russian  Government  wanted  no  barren  vic- 
tory but  a  visible  expansion.  To  meet  these  large 
demands  France  and  Great  Britain  presented 
counter-demands,  and  from  that  moment  the  war 
became  a  feverish  scramble  for  spoils.  Arising  thus 
out  of  national  struggles  for  territory  and  military 
prestige,  the  contest  was  carried  on  by  the  enticement 
of  new  Allies  through  promises  of  material  reward. 
It  was  fought  not  only  for  democracy  but  for  lands, 
indemnities  and  trade  privileges.  With  many  peo- 
ple in  the  Allied  nations  the  purpose  of  the  war  was 
to  discredit  "the  aggressive  objects  and  the  unscru- 
pulous methods  of  the  Central  Powers";  with  others 
the  purpose  was  to  secure  definite  material  national- 
istic aims. 

These  aims  were  not  new ;  they  have  always  existed 
and  are  indeed  inseparable  from  the  long  struggle 
for  power  in  Europe  and  for  dominion  beyond  Eu- 
rope. No  one  can  study  the  devious  course  of  in- 
ternational politics  since  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
(and  before)  without  recognizing  that  European  na- 
tions have  long  carried  on  a  ruthless,  aggressive 
policy  both  within  Europe  and  in  Asia  and  Africa. 
To  take  a  single  example;  there  was  little  concern 
for  internationalism  in  the  attitude  of  any  of  the 
European  Powers  towards  Turkey,  the  Balkan 
States,  Persia,  Morocco  or  China.     "The  history  of 


104  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

international  diplomacy  in  the  Islamic  world," 
writes  Professor  Gibbons/  "is  an  unbroken  record 
of  bullying  and  blundering  on  the  part  of  all  the 
Powers.  In  governmental  policies  one  searches  in 
vain  for  more  than  an  occasional  ray  of  chivalry, 
uprightness,  altruism,  for  a  consistent  line  of  ac- 
tion in  attempting  to  solve  the  problems  that  were 
leading  Europe  from  one  war  to  another,  for  con- 
structive statesmanship."  ''The  indictment  of  Eu- 
ropean diplomacy  in  the  Near  East  is  terrible."  ^ 

It  would  be  profitless  to  cite  further  instances  of 
the  callousness  and  blindness  of  the  past  foreign 
policies  of  all  the  great  European  nations.  Though 
in  Great  Britain,  France  and  several  other  coun- 
tries, many  high-minded  men  strove  for  interna- 
tional concord  and  not  for  nationalistic  gain,  foreign 
policy  was  determined  not  by  the  ideals  of  these  lib- 
erals and  democrats,  but  by  necessities  imposed  by 
a  dangerous  and  thoroughly  anarchic  condition  of 
the  world.  Europe  was  a  trembling  balance  of  hos- 
tile powers,  and  each  state  stood  by  its  allies,  right 
or  wrong,  in  order  that  they,  in  turn,  might  come 

1  "The  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East,"  by  Herbert 
Adams  Gibbons,  New  York,  1917,  pp.   115,  116,  117. 

2  "The  evolution  of  Serbia,  of  Roumania,  of  Bulgaria,  of  Greece, 
of  Crete ;  the  suflFerings  of  Armenia  and  Syria ;  the  anarchy  of 
Arabia;  the  vacillating  policy  in  Egypt  and  Northern  Africa;  the 
intrigues  at  Constantinople;  the  handling  of  Persia  and  Afghanistan, 
give  us  the  formula  of  European  diplomacy.  It  is  this:  selfish 
national  interest  end.eavouring  to  thicart  other  selfish  national  tn- 
interests."     Gibbons  op.  cit,  pp.  118,  119.      (My  italics.) 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  105 

to  its  aid  in  time  of  trial.  From  1870  to  1905  Ger- 
many, by  means  of  her  alliances,  maintained  a  cer- 
tain supremacy  on  the  Continent,  while  Great  Britain 
held  first  place  in  colonial  development.  From  1905 
to  1914,  however,  there  was  waged  an  embittered, 
secret  and  desperate  contest  between  Germany,  seek- 
ing to  dominate,  and  France,  Russia  and  Britain  de- 
termined to  break  her  hegemony.  The  struggle  for 
control  in  Europe  merged  with  a  conflict  of  rival 
imperialisms  in  which  there  was  little  pretence  of 
disinterestedness.  Among  all  these  nations  there 
was  not  much  to  choose  in  the  matter  of  comparative 
international  morality.  Germany's  Chinese  policy 
was  brutal  and  hypocritical,  but  no  worse  than  the 
corrupt  and  ruthless  policy  of  Russia.  As  for  the 
long  struggle  between  Austria  and  Russia  for  dom- 
ination of  the  Balkans,  neither  nation  was  squeam- 
ishly virtuous.^  Had  the  Allies  in  this  war  abjured 
all  hopes  of  aggrandizement  and  limited  themselves 
to  an  idealistic  sacrifice  for  small  nationalities,  the 
step  would  have  marked  a  complete  moral  revolution, 
a  religious  conversion  hitherto  unknown  in  European 
diplomacy. 

They  had  not  abjured  such  hopes.  It  is  true  that 
progress  has  been  made  towards  a  liberalization  of 
allied  war-aims,  partly  as  a  result  of  Russian  and 

1  For  a  partisan  history  of  this  confliot,  from  the  Austrian  point 
of  view,  see  "Der  Gegennatz  zwischcn  Oe8terre[ch-Un{;arn  und  Russ- 
land,"  by  Dr.  Alexander  Redlich,  Stuttgart  and  Berlin  ("Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt")    1915. 


106  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

American  influence  and  partly  because  of  untoward 
events  upon  tlie  battle-field.  The  January  (1918) 
speech  of  Lloyd  George  marks  a  recession  from 
a  former  imperialistic  position,  and  a  similar  at- 
titude is  being  crystallized  all  over  Europe.  Even 
today,  however,  the  Allies  are  inspired  by  motives 
of  national  gain  as  well  as  by  a  sincere  reprobation 
of  Germany's  crimes;  the  idealistic  motive  is  still 
weighed  to  earth  by  a  thousand  gross  desires  and 
an  inveterate  predatory  habit.  A  new  and  better 
spirit,  though  seeking  expression,  fails  completely 
to  inspire  the  vigorous,  short-sighted  men  who  con- 
duct national  policy.  These  diplomats  of  the  old 
school  want  from  this  war  something  concrete  and 
tangible,  that  they  can  tack  on  to  their  kingdom  or 
empire,  and  that  will  show  on  the  map  and  in  the 
balance  sheet.  They  want  all  they  can  get,  even  if 
they  pay  for  it  by  future  wars. 

Thus  in  every  country,  not  even  excluding  the 
United  States,  two  motives  enter  into  the  war  spirit. 
One  is  the  ambition  to  end  war,  to  promote  interna- 
tionalism, to  destroy  militarism ;  the  other  is  a  desire 
for  concrete  imperialistic  gains.  Upon  the  whole, 
the  average  soldier  and  the  average  citizen  are  more 
aware  of  the  first  than  of  the  second  motive.  Of 
the  British  volunteers  hundreds  of  thousands  would 
never  have  enlisted  save  for  Belgium;  you  could  not 
have  bribed  these  men  by  any  hope  of  trade  advan- 
tage or  other  aggrandizement.     In  France  also,  as 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  107 

in  Italy,  Belgium  and  Russia,  millions  wanted  noth- 
ing but  justice  and  international  peace.  Yet,  as 
matters  then  stood,  these  millions  did  not  decide 
the  joint  policy  of  the  Alliance.  That  Alliance, 
growing  out  of  the  former  European  anarchy,  was 
held  together  by  greed,  revenge  and  the  lust  for  con- 
quered territory.  From  the  Allied  point  of  view 
the  war  threatened  to  become,  what  from  the  Ger- 
man side  it  had  largely  been  from  the  beginning,  a 
war  of  national  aggression,  a  war  for  booty.^ 

That  booty  took  three  forms:  money,  trade  ad- 
vantages, territory.  The  money  was  to  be  secured 
by  the  levy  of  crushing  indemnities;  the  trade  ad- 
vantages by  a  commercial  war  after  the  war;  the 
territory  desired  was  to  be  taken  from  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Turkey,  from  Germany,  and  possibly 
Bulgaria.^ 

A  demand  for  indemnities  lay  on  the  surface.  It 
sought  justification  in  the  desire  to  be  recompensed 
for  actual  losses  incurred,  in  a  wish  to  punish  Ger- 
many and  finally  in  the  theory  that  a  Germany  weak- 

1  It  may  perhaps  be  urged  that  not  only  are  many  of  the  terri- 
torial demands  of  the  Allies  reasonable  and  just  (which  claim  of 
course  would  be  readily  granted)  but  that  it  is  better  to  concede 
even  an  unjust  and  exorbitant  demand  of  a  potential  ally  than,  by 
alienating  him,  permit  the  victory  of  the  enemy.  There  is  of  course 
no  hard  and  fast  line  to  be  drawn  here.  \\*hat  seems  actually  to 
have  Iiappened,  however,  is  that  the  Allies  have  really  weakened 
their  morale,  and  with  it  their  military  power,  with  every  new 
engagement,  violative  of  internationalism,  into  which  tliey  have  en- 
tered. 

-  To  say  nothing  of  Persia,  Albania,  Abyssinia  and  China. 


108  THE  END  OP  THE  WAR 

ened  by  such  exactions  would  be  unable  to  renew  the 
attack  upon  the  Allies. 

To  begin  with  the  more  extreme  advocates  of  in- 
demnities, let  us  quote  Mr.  L.  J.  Maxse,  editor  of  the 
National  Review.  ''The  main  object  of  peace,"  he 
contended,  "should  be  to  crush  and  permanently 
cripple  Prussia.  .  .  .  Surely  if  the  Prussians  lose  it 
is  for  them  to  pay  and  for  the  Allies  to  receive  the 
milliards.  If  the  process  of  payment  reduces  Ger- 
man Kultur  to  be  a  hewer  of  wood  and  drawer  of 
water  for  the  rest  of  the  century  for  European  civil- 
ization, so  much  the  better  for  the  world. ' '  ^ 

From  France  one  heard  the  same  cry.  Here  is 
how  M.  Stephen  Pichon  of  the  (Paris)  Petit  Journal 
addressed  Germany.  "You  will  have  to  reimburse 
the  Allies  for  all  the  costs  of  the  w^ar,  and  this  will 
be  an  enormous  sum.  But  this  is  not  all.  You  will 
have  to  pay  for  the  cathedrals,  the  museums,  the 
palaces,  the  huts,  you  bombarded  and  burned,  the 
butcheries  you  committed,  for  the  widows  and 
orphans  you  have  made.  That  will  make  billions 
and  billions  that  you  will  have  to  pay  us.  0  no! 
Not  at  once,  for  you  could  not  do  that.  ...  It  will 

1  Cited  by  Stoddard,  op.  cit.  p.  30.  Mr.  Maxse,  who  may  be  pre- 
sumed to  know  England,  obviously  feared,  however,  that  many  Eng- 
lishmen would  desire  to  be  lenient  towards  a  defeated  Germany. 
"We  know  the  Rt.  Hon.  Faintheart  and  the  Rt.  Hon.  Feebleguts  too 
well  to  suppose  that  the  (present  stern)  mood  will  last  and  that 
he  will  remain  robust  when  the  Rhino  Whine  sets  in.  Then  our 
bleaters  will  give  tongue  and  our  'blighters'  will  chip  in.  We  shall 
see  the  old  Potsdam  Press  in  full  working  order,  devoted  by  day 
and  by  night  to  the  sacred  cause  of  'letting  off  the  Boche.' " 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  109 

take  you  a  long  time — ten  years,  twenty  years,  thirty 
years.  .  .  .  Until  Germany  has  paid  this  off,  Rus- 
sian garrisons  will  occupy  Breslau  and  Dresden, 
English  garrisons  Hamburg  and  Frankfort,  a  Bel- 
gian garrison  shall  occupy  Cologne,  a  French  one 
Coblenz  and  IMainz.  Only  after  tlie  last  penny  has 
been  paid  will  the  Allies  withdraw,  and  even  then 
not  until  after  they  have  blown  up  the  last  German 
fortress."  ^ 

In  similar  vein,  M.  Onesime  Reclus:  *'The  stink- 
ing beast  is  down!  We  are  going  to  divide  up  its 
flesh  and  its  bones.  We  will  make  of  it  (Germany) 
an  insolvent  debtor."-  Other  writers  desire  to  an- 
nex the  great  coal  and  iron  deposits  of  Western 
Germany  as  part  of  a  readily  collected  indemnity. 

The  argument  against  punitive  indemnities  levied 
upon  Germany  does  not  rest  upon  any  assumption 
of  her  innocence  or  modest}'.  Germany  has  de- 
prived herself  of  the  right  to  protest.  No  one  can 
read  the  terrifying  anthology  of  her  imperialistic 
literature,  collected  by  S.  Grumbach,^  without  con- 
stantly encountering  the  most  brutal  plans  for  mulct- 
ing her  victims.  Her  record  in  1871  and  in  the  illegal 
and  extortionate  requisitions  upon  Belgium  since 

1  Stoddard,  op  cit.  pp.  51,  52. 

2Publishod  in  "Tx-  Rhin  Fraiicais"  in  the  summer  of  1015;  quoted 
by  Stoddard,  op  cit.  pp.  53.  54 

^  Das  annexionistischc  Dcutschland,  Einc  Sammhing  von  Dokumen- 
tev,  die  scit  dem  .},  August.  /.''/},  i»i  Dtuischland  orffnttlich  oder 
geheim  verbreitet  umrden,  by  S.  Grumbach,  Laueanne,  i917. 


110  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

1914  is  irredeemably  bad.  Yet  a  similar  attitude  on 
the  part  of  Germany's  enemies  is  irreconcilable  with 
the  higher  principles  they  profess.  Moreover  ade- 
quate compensation  is  utterly  impossible.  The  al- 
lied losses  incurred  in  this  War  will  by  August,  1918 
far  exceed  a  hundred  billion  dollars,  a  sum  in  excess 
of  the  total  national  wealth  of  the  Central  Powers. 
The  indemnity  is  uncollectible.  Even  an  attempt 
to  collect  would  reduce  Germany  to  starvation  by 
annihilating  her  industry.  Facing  such  terms  any 
nation  would  fight  until  her  entire  wealth,  to  be  used 
for  an  eventual  indemnity,  was  spent  in  killing  her 
enemies.  To  occupy  Germany  until  the  Allied  de- 
mands were  met  would  be  to  occupy  her  for  ever. 
It  cannot  be  done.  *' Non-German  Europe,"  says 
Mr.  Bernard  Shaw,  "is  not  going  to  spend  the  re- 
mainder of  the  duration  of  this  planet  sitting  on  Ger- 
many's  head.  A  head  with  the  brains  of  sixty  mil- 
lions of  people  in  it  takes  more  sitting  on  than  we 
shall  have  time  for. ' '  ^ 

Even  a  lesser  indemnity,  an  infliction  of  a  few 
tens  of  billions,  would  meet  with  insuperable  diffi- 
culties. Experience  teaches  that  punitive  imposi- 
tions are  likely  to  reach  enormous  proportions,  when 
each  of  a  group  of  Powers  seeks  to  secure  the  largest 
share.  The  Boxer  indemnities  are  a  case  in  point. 
Here  exorbitant  demands  were  made  on  China  by 
six  nations,  especially  by  Germany,  France  and  Rus- 

iThe  New  Republic,  Vol.  9;  Jan.  6,  1917. 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  111 

sia.  Similarly  an  attempt  by  a  group  of  exigent 
victors  to  levy  indemnities  upon  a  prostrate  Ger- 
many might  cause  dangerous  dissensions.^ 

There  remains  one  form  of  indemnification  which 
would  bring  in  large  sums,  what  we  may  perhaps 
call  the  indemnity  by  evacuation.  It  is  a  device  by 
which  the  inhabitants  of  a  conquered  territory,  such 
as  French  Lorraine  or  Westphalia,  are  to  be  driven 
from  the  land,  and  their  property  seized,  with  an 
amiable  recommendation  to  their  own  government 
to  reimburse  them.  Such  a  savage  proposal  has 
actually  been  made  by  the  cartell  magnates  of  Ger- 
many. It  is  difficult  to  believe,  however,  that  a  plan, 
so  abhorrent  to  our  fundamental  conceptions  of  in- 
ternational morality  will  be  adopted  by  the  Allies. 

The  demand  for  trade  discrimination  after  the 
war  is  in  accord  with  the  same  principle  of  seeking 
to  punish  the  German  people.  Its  central  idea  is 
the  permanent  crushing  of  Germany.  She  is  to  be 
denied  access  to  foreign  markets,  refused  raw  ma- 
terials, slowly  throttled  by  an  economic  constriction. 
If  the  military  war  were  nothing  but  an  incident  in 
an  abiding  struggle,  such  a  commercial  policy  would 
be  a  legitimate  act  of  defence  and  aggression,  since 
a  nation  may  be  wounded  and  destroyed  economically 

1  Against  an  indemnification  by  Germany  of  Belgium  alone,  or  of 
a  rebuilding  of  devastated  portions  of  Europe  at  the  joint  expense 
of  all  Powers,  the  same  objections  do  not  apply.  Such  costs  could 
be  assessed  by  a  Board  of  Arbitration  working  under  rules  agrcH>d 
to  at  the  Peace  Conference. 


112  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

as  effectively  as  by  arms.  If  Germany  were  to  re- 
main bellicose  and  were  to  continue  the  contest  in 
the  shape  of  an  intensified  military  preparation, 
ivJiich  is  war,  the  Allies  would  be  justified  in  using 
their  deadliest  economic  weapons.  Today  this  Al- 
lied threat  of  a  war  after  the  war  merely  emphasizes 
the  fact  that  though  Germany  holds  certain  terri- 
tory of  the  Allies,  they  in  turii  hold  the  key  to  her 
economic  life.  It  is  a  conclusive  answer  to  her  tri- 
umphant demand  that  we  look  *'at  the  war  map." 
As  an  enduring  institution,  however,  in  a  world  look- 
ing to  peace,  such  a  boycotting  of  the  victim  is  utterly 
destructive  and  reactionary.  Its  adoption  would  set 
back  the  world  many  decades.  It  would  injure  both 
the  boycotted  and  the  boycotters.  It  would  be  a  con- 
tinuation of  war,  a  new  incentive  to  war.^ 

1  The  economic  war  after  the  war  is  not  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
mere  continuation  of  the  old  protectionist  policy  of  the  nations.  The 
primary  aim  of  that  policy  was  to  benefit  the  home  industry  whereas 
the  avowed  object  of  the  economic  war  is  to  injure  the  enemy. 
What  the  effect  would  be  upon  the  home  industry  has  been  described 
by  several  free  traders.  "French  protectionists  demand  the  repeal 
of  Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  which  assured  most  favoured- 
nation  treatment  to  France  and  the  German  Empire.  Many  who  are 
most  anxious  to  annihilate  German  trade  propose  to  keep  out  Ger- 
man <joods  by  means  of  more  or  less  prohibitive  customs  duties. 
They  forget,  in  their  simplicity,  that  customs  duties  are  paid  by  the 
consumers,  not  the  producers.  Suppose  they  treble  the  duty  on 
coal  coming  from  Germany.  It  is  the  French  metallurgical  industry 
which  suffers.  If  they  increase  the  duties  on  dyes  they  injure  the 
French  textile  industries.  If  they  want  to  make  at  home  the  ma- 
chinery which  France  imported  to  the  value  of  £5,000,000  in  1913, 
they  adversely  affect  all  French  industries  dependent  on  it."  'The 
Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  War,"  by  Yves  Guyot.  Translated 
by  F.  Appleby  Holt,  London,  1916,  p.  325. 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  113 

The  demands  for  new  territorial  possessions  is 
the  greatest  obstacle  of  all,  both  to  a  peace  based  on 
internationalism  and  to  the  winning  of  the  war. 
Serbia,  Roumania,  Italy  and  Russia  have  staked  out 
claims  in  Austria-Hungary ;  Greece,  Italy,  England, 
France,  and  Russia  have  wished  to  divide  the  Turk- 
ish Empire,  while  the  former  German  Colonies  were 
destined  to  be  delivered  to  various  new  owners. 
The  demands  of  the  extremists  went  very  far  in- 
deed. The  imperialists  suddenly  awakened  and  de- 
manded that  their  dreams  be  realized. 

Ignoring  all  extremists,  however,  what  were  the 
official  demands  of  the  Allied  governments? 

On  January  10,  1917,  the  Allied  governments  ad- 
dressed a  note  to  President  Wilson  in  reply  to  his 
request  that  they  definitely  state  terms.  It  was  a 
cleverly  written  note,  designed  to  unite  all  the  na- 
tions opposed  to  Germany  by  giving  to  each  what 
each  demanded.  It  was  a  glorified  Rivers  and  Har- 
bours Bill. 

Today  (February,  1918),  this  note  is  out  of  date 
and  without  further  sanction.  Yet  it  has  not  been 
withdrawn,  nor  has  it  been  superseded  by  a  subse- 
quent joint  statement  of  Allied  terms.  For  this 
reason  and  because  of  the  expression  that  it  gives  to 
the  former  hopes  of  Allied  imperialists,  the  note 
is  still  worthy  of  quotation.  Their  ''objects" 
in  this  war,  the  Allies  explained,  ''will  not  be 
made  known  in  detail  with  all  the  equitable  com- 


114  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

pensation  and  indemnities  for  damages  suffered 
until  the  hour  of  negotiations.  But  the  civilized 
world  knows  that  they  imply,  in  all  necessity  and 
in  the  first  instance,  the  restoration  of  Belgium,  of 
Serbia  and  of  Montenegro,  and  the  indemnities  which 
are  due  them;  the  evacuation  of  the  invaded  terri- 
tories of  France,  of  Eussia  and  of  Rumania,  with 
just  reparation ;  the  reorganization  df  Europe,  guar- 
anteed by  a  stable  regime  and  founded  as  much  upon 
respect  of  nationalities  and  full  security  and  liberty 
of  economic  development,  which  all  nations,  great  or 
small,  possess,  as  upon  territorial  conventions  and 
international  agreements,  suitable  to  guarantee  ter- 
ritorial and  maritime  frontiers  against  unjustified 
attacks;  the  restitution  of  provinces  or  territories 
wrested  in  the  past  from  the  Allies  by  force  or 
against  the  will  of  their  populations ;  the  liberation 
of  Italians,  of  Slavs,  of  Rumanians,  and  of  Tcheco- 
Slovaques  from  foreign  domination;  the  enfran- 
chisement of  populations  subject  to  the  bloody 
tyranny  of  the  Turks;  the  expulsion  from  Europe 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  .  .  .  The  intentions  of  His 
Majesty,  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  regarding  Poland 
have  been  clearly  indicated  in  the  proclamation 
which  he  has  just  addressed  to  his  armies." 

Upon  investigation  this  Allied  statement  proved  to 
be  intentionally  ambiguous.  Designed  to  hold  to- 
gether both  liberals  and  imperialists,  it  might  be  in- 
terpreted as  a  minimum  and  as  a  maximum  pro- 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  115 

gram.  What,  however,  it  was  obviously  intended 
to  mean  to  the  interested  parties,  was  that  their  in- 
terests would  be  maintained.  All  past  promises, 
however  dubious,  were  to  be  fulfilled.  Into  the 
moral  system  of  the  Allies,  into  a  demand  for 
"Restitution,  Reparation  and  Guarantee"  the 
rights  of  small  nations  and  the  destruction  of  Prus- 
sian militarism,  there  was  to  be  woven  a  fabric  of 
specific  national  demands,  in  real  opposition  to  the 
idealistic  program.  To  defeat  Prussian  Militar- 
ism, Japan  was  to  keep  Chinese  territory,  while  Rus- 
sia was  to  be  given  Constantinople,  Roumania  the 
sovereignty  of  territories  in  which  were  few  of  her 
nationals,  and  Italy  lands  to  which  she  had  no  just 
claim. 

What  these  dubious  statements  really  meant  to 
the  imperialists  was  later  revealed.  ''The  secret 
agreements  entered  into  by  the  Allies,"  says  a 
writer  in  The  New  Europe  in  July,  1917,  "are  not 
consistent  with  the  ideals  of  their  populations.  The 
secret  Convention  of  April  27,  (26),  1915,  with  Italy, 
the  treaty  with  Roumania  are  both  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  grab."  "The  arrangement  concluded  with 
Roumania  last  year,  after  much  bargaining,  as- 
signed to  Roumania  regions  outside  her  ethnograph- 
ical limits,  to  which  she  has  no  publicly  defensible 
moral  claim.  For  those  arrangements  the  respon- 
sibility belongs  chiefly  to  the  pre-Revolutionary 
Government  of  Russia  and  to  the  Roumanian  Pre- 


1X6  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

mier,  Mr.  Bratianu.  While  upholding  to  the  full  the 
claims  of  Roumania  to  national  unity,  the  Allied 
peoples  cannot  in  conscience  sanction  the  allotment 
to  Roumania  of  districts  in  the  Banat  and  the  Cen- 
tral Hungarian  plain  where  the  Roumanian  popula- 
tion is  either  non-existent  or  is  vastly  outnumbered 
by  Serbs  and  Magyars."  ^ 

Nor  were  the  Italian  and  Roumanian  agreements 
unique  in  violating  the  spirit  of  internationalism. 
On  November  22nd,  1914,  Russia,  England  and 
France  offered  to  Greece  the  southern  portion  of 
Albania,  with  the  exception  of  Valona,  in  the  event 
of  her  immediate  entry  in  aid  of  Serbia,  and  on  Jan- 
uary 12th,  1915,  important  territorial  acquisitions  on 
the  coast  of  Asia  Minor.^  As  a  result  of  negotia- 
tions in  London  and  Petrograd  in  the  spring  of  1916 
the  British,  French  and  Russian  governments  agreed 
with  regard  to  the  future  distribution  not  only  of 

1  The  New  Europe,  7/19/17,  An  interesting  revelation  of  the  state 
of  mind  produced  among  the  Allied  diplomats  by  all  this  haggling 
over  territories  is  revealed  by  a  report  of  General  Polivanoflf  on 
November  7-20,  1916,  suggesting  a  revision  of  the  terms  of  territorial 
compensations  to  Roumania.  This  Russian  General  seems  not  at  all 
disconcerted  by  the  Roumanian  defeat.  "If,"  he  says,  "things  had 
developed  in  such  a  way  that  the  military  and  political  agreement 
of  1916  with  Roumania  had  been  fully  realized,  then  a  very  strong 
State  would  have  arisen  in  the  Balkans  .  .  .  with  a  population  of 
about  13,000,000.  In  the  future  this  State  could  hardly  have  been 
friendly  disposed  towards  Russia."  "Consequently  the  collapse  of 
Roumanians  plans  as  a  Great  Power  is  not  particularly  opposed  to 
Russia's  interests  " 

2  See  the  confidential  memorandum  (exact  source  not  indicated) 
made  public  by  the  Bolsheviki  at  Petrograd  and  republished  with  the 
secret  treaties  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post. 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  117 

their  territorial  acquisitions,  but  also  of  their  zones 
of  influence  in  Asiatic  Turkey.  The  agreement, 
which  is  detailed,  provides  that  these  powers  ''as- 
sume a  proportionate  share  of  the  Ottoman  debt 
equivalent  to  their  respective  acquisitions."^ 

These  plans  of  conquest  were  far-reaching,  and  no 
attempt  was  made  to  bring  them  into  harmony  with 
the  aspirations  of  the  Entente  peoples.  In  a  secret 
telegram  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  dated 
February  24,  1916,  the  Russian  Foreign  Secretary 
reveals  the  policy  and  spirit  of  these  governments 
and  their  future  attitude  toward  a  defeated  Ger- 
many. ''Political  agreements,"  he  says,  "entered 
into  among  the  Allies  during  the  war  should 
remain  unalterable  and  are  not  subject  to  revision. 
This  refers  to  our  agreement  with  France  and  Eng- 
land about  Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  Syria 
and  Asia  Minor,  and  also  to  the  London  agreement 
with  Italy.  All  propositions  as  to  future  boundaries 
as  to  Central  Europe  are  at  this  moment  premature, 
but  at  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  we 
are  ready  to  grant  to  France  and  England  complete 
freedom  in  fixing  the  limitations  of  the  western 
German  boundary,  depending  that  the  Allies  in  their 
turn  will  grant  to  us  freedom  in  fixing  our  boundar- 
ies with  Germany  and  Austria.  It  is  important  to 
insist  on  the  exclusion  of  the  Polish  question  as  a 

1  Information  on  the  question  of  Aaia  Minor  February  21,  11)18, 
included  in  the  statements  given  out  bv  the  BolBheviki. 


118  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

subject  matter  for  international  discussion,  and  on 
elimination  of  all  attempts  to  place  the  future  of 
Poland  under  the  guarantee  and  control  of  the 
powers." 

Just  what  territorial  claims  Russia  would  have 
made  had  Germany  been  completely  defeated  can- 
not yet  be  known  in  detail,  but  the  French  claims  are 
revealed  in  a  note  of  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  French  Ambassador  in  Petrograd  un- 
der date  of  February  1st,  1917. 

"In  your  note  of  this  date,"  writes  the  Foreign 
Minister,  ''your  Excellency  was  good  enough  to 
communicate  to  the  Imperial  Government,  that  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  intended  to  include 
among  the  terms  of  peace  which  will  be  offered  to 
Germany  the  following  demands  and  guarantees  of 
territorial  character: 

*'l.  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  be  returned  to  France. 

*'2.  The  boundaries  will  be  extended  at  least  to 
the  limits  of  the  former  principality  of  Lorraine, 
and  will  be  fixed  under  the  direction  of  the  French 
Government.  At  the  same  time  strategic  demands 
must  be  taken  into  consideration,  so  as  to  include 
within  the  French  territory  the  whole  of  the  indus- 
trial iron  basin  of  Lorraine  and  the  whole  of  the 
industrial  coal-basin  of  the  Valley  of  the  Saar. 

*'3.  Other  territories  located  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine,  and  not  included  in  the  composition  of 
the  German  Empire,  will  be  completely  separated 


SPOILING  THE  ENEMY  119 

from  Germany  and  shall  be  freed  from  all  political 
and  economic  dependence  on  her. 

*'4.  The  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine 
not  included  in  the  composition  of  French  territory, 
shall  form  an  autonomous  and  neutral  government, 
and  shall  be  occupied  by  French  armies  until  such 
time  as  the  enemy  governments  completely  fulfil  all 
the  conditions  and  guarantees  mentioned  in  the 
treaty  of  peace. 

"Your  Excellency  stated  that  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  shall  be  happy  to  have  the  opportunity 
of  counting  upon  the  support  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment in  order  to  bring  its  intentions  to  accom- 
plishment. In  accordance  with  the  order  of  his  Im- 
perial Majesty,  my  august  sovereign,  I  have  the 
honour  to  communicate  in  this  note  in  the  name  of 
the  Russian  Government,  to  your  Excellency  that 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  may  count  on  the 
support  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  bring  to  ful- 
filment of  its  aforementioned  intentions." 

What  is  most  highly  objectionable  in  all  these 
treaties  is  that  they  constitute  a  program,  not  dic- 
tated by  a  sense  of  international  justice,  nor  by  a 
desire  to  produce  a  better  international  order,  but 
by  self-interest.  Moreover  that  self-interest  is  not 
of  the  Allies  as  a  whole  but  of  each  individual  Ally. 
In  this  war  the  aid  of  nations  has  been  bargained 
for  in  much  the  spirit  in  which  George  the  Tliird 
bargained  for  his  Hessians.     Herein  lies  a  manifold 


120  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

danger.  Not  only  is  it  likely  to  prolong  the  war 
beyond  the  time  when  a  real  victory  for  internation- 
alism has  been  secured,  not  only  may  it  make  the 
issue  itself  dubious,  but  it  is  exactly  the  sort  of 
situation  out  of  which  arose  the  Second  Balkan  War 
and  many  other  wars  in  history.  Even  the  pre- 
sumed beneficiaries  of  these  arrangements  may  ul- 
timately regret  their  having  been  made.  A  promise 
to  Italy  of  the  East  Adriatic  might  be  pleasing  to 
Italians  today  but  in  the  end  might  prove  a  fatal 
gift. 


CHAPTEE  VI 

SACRED   EGOISM 

In  this  war  Italy  has  suffered  at  the  hands  of  her 
friends.  It  is  her  own  statesmen  as  well  as  many 
of  her  oflScious  apologists  in  foreign  countries  who 
have  lauded  her  policy  as  one  of  naked  egoism,  un- 
ashamed and  boastful.  Yet  there  is  another  Italy, 
fine-spirited  and  generous,  which  fights  for  as  high 
ideals  and  as  noble  purposes  as  in  the  days  of  the 
Risorgimiento  and  is  heavens  above  the  chaffering 
group  of  politicians  and  journalists  who  have  ac- 
tually controlled  her  policy  in  this  war.  When, 
therefore,  in  this  chapter  I  speak  of  Italy  I  have  in 
mind  not  the  whole  population,  and  not  at  all  her 
ardent  democrats  and  liberals,  but  a  little  band  of 
ultra-nationalists,  who  at  a  critical  moment  caught 
the  common  imagination  and  confidently  and  igno- 
rantly  led  the  people  to  disaster. 

Italy,  declare  her  apologists,  "is  waging  above  all 
a  war  of  expansion  and  conquest."  The  Italian 
population  ''set  out  for  this  war,  for  *its  war,'  with 
the  most  definite  idea  of  its  interests.  It  was  in- 
formed, and  it  perfectly  understood,  that  it  was  not 
waging  a  war  for  the  sake  of  magnificence  nor  for 
the  sake  of  principles;  that  it  was  fighting  for  it- 

121 


122  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

self,  but  not  for  its  neighbours."  Italy  ''does  not 
care  to  be  generous  and  to  lose  thereby.  She 
strongly  objects  to  sacrifice;  so  that  this  State, 
founded  on  the  principle  of  nationalities,  which  has 
benefitted  in  the  past  by  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by 
the  cause  of  the  peoples,  refuses — and  quite  frankly 
— to  obey  this  principle  blindly,  unreservedly  to 
champion  this  cause. ' '  ^  Italy  has  no  patience,  with 
what  Benedetto  Croce  calls,  ** hollow  theories  con- 
cerning the  democratic  ideal  and  the  reign  of  peace 
and  justice. ' '  -  Italy  is  no  sentimental  ideologist, 
but  is  realistic,  as  Germany  is.  She  sees  her  in- 
terests and  pursues  them,  as  Germany  pursues  her 
interests.  She  knows  what  she  wants  and  how  to 
get  what  she  wants.  At  least  she  thinks  she  knows. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  war  Italy  made  her 
national  interest  the  controlling  factor  in  her  policy. 
Although  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  she 
promptly — and  properly — refused  to  march  with 
Austria.  This  decision  was  of  immense  value  to 
the  Allies,  for  had  she  invaded  France  in  August, 
1914  the  Marne  would  have  been  lost  and  a  perma- 
nent German  victory  assured.  Many  reasons  jus- 
tified Italy's  rupture  of  her  union  with  Austria. 
She  had  been  ignored  by  her  titular  allies;  neither 
her  interests  nor  her  ideals  had  been  considered. 

1  "Italy  and  the  War,"  by  Jacques  Bainville;  translated  by  Bernard 
Miall,  London,  New  York  and  Toronto,  1916,  pp.  237-238. 

2  Benedetto  Croce,   in  the  Critica ;  quoted  by   Bainville,  op.   cit., 
p.  123. 


SACRED  EGOISM  123 

Her  world  position  would  have  been  made  worse, 
not  better,  by  a  German- Austrian  victory. 

For  nine  months  thereafter,  Italy  preserved  a 
neutral  attitude.  She  was  internally  divided.  The 
majority  of  Italians,  especially  the  Republicans, 
Radicals  and  Syndicalists  sympathized  with  the  Al- 
lies, while  many  of  her  Catholics  and  Conservatives 
favoured  the  Teutonic  Powers.  As  time  passed, 
however,  as  the  early  expectations  of  a  rapid  Ger- 
man victory  were  extinguished  and  as  news  came  of 
German  brutalities,  a  somewhat  inconstant  enthusi- 
asm for  France,  heroically  bearing  the  brunt  of  in- 
vasion, spread  through  the  peninsula. 

Nevertheless  potent  reasons  inclined  the  nation 
to  neutrality.  Italy  is  desperately  poor.  She  has 
neither  the  fertile  lands  nor  the  rich  mineral  wealth 
of  her  great  neighbours,  and  her  increasing  popula- 
tion, despite  an  immense  emigration,  presses  heavily 
upon  her  resources.  Politically  she  is  unstable. 
The  roseate  dreams  of  a  healthy  national  Italian 
development,  which  filled  the  minds  of  idealists  a 
generation  ago,  have  not  been  realized.  Until  1913 
the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  a  selfish,  narrow 
group,  recruited  from  the  upper  and  middle  classes, 
and  maintained  in  power  by  a  limited  parliamentary 
franchise.  Political  corruption  flourished  under  the 
system  of  trasformismo  and  a  government  by  *' po- 
litical war-horses"  evoked  bitter  reactionary  and 
revolutionary  opposition,  and  promoted  a  danger- 


124  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ous  anti-parliamentarism.  Social  conditions  were 
bad;  illiteracy  was  common;  and  enlightened  pa- 
triotism, rising  above  factional  and  personal  inter- 
ests, rare.  The  need  of  the  nation  was  peace  and 
a  steady  economic  development. 

But  peace  was  impossible  for  the  very  reasons 
which  made  it  imperatively  necessary.  The  fragil- 
ity and  disequilibrium  of  the  social  structure  cre- 
ated an  unrest,  which  among  many  Italians  found  ex- 
pression in  a  crude,  pretentiously  realistic,  but,  in 
any  true  sense,  completely  unrealistic,  Imperialism. 
Though  urged  to  remain  neutral  by  its  unprepared- 
ness,  its  internal  divisions  and  by  the  economic  ad- 
vantages of  peace  the  nation  was  forced,  partly  by 
its  idealists  but  chiefly  by  its  vaulting  imperialists 
into  a  policy  of  war  and  conquest. 

To  analyse  the  motives  of  a  government  with 
which  we  are  acting  in  concert  is  a  thankless  task. 
It  is  impossible,  however,  properly  to  prepare  for 
the  difficult  problem  of  working  out  a  peace  policy 
without  understanding  the  curiously  dual  nature  of 
this  war,  and  in  no  instance  is  that  duality  so  il- 
luminating as  in  the  Italian  intervention.  For  while 
not  a  few  Italians  urged  participation  because  de- 
sirous of  ending  German  militarism,  the  main  cur- 
rent bearing  the  nation  into  war  was  avowedly 
egoistic,  nationalistic  and  imperialistic.  Italy, 
weak,  ignorant,  distracted,  sought  to  become  a  World 
Power,  to  revive  the  glories  of  Venice,  to  restore  in 


SACRED  EGOISM  125 

some  part  the  vast  Mediterranean  Empire  of  An- 
cient Rome.^ 

All  through  the  recent  Italian  nationalistic  litera- 
ture runs  this  disconcerting  parallel  between  the 
new  Kingdom  and  the  Ancient  Empire.  The  poet 
d'Annunzio,  to  take  but  a  single  example,  is  for  ever 
recalling  the  glory  of  Rome,  the  deeds  of  Rome,  the 
heritage  of  Rome.  What  Rome  accomplished  in  the 
days  of  the  Caesars,  Italy  in  her  narrow  peninsula, 
surrounded  by  more  powerful  nations,  must  aspire 
to  achieve  in  these  days  of  steam,  electricity  and 
cartells.  Admitting  the  virility  and  sheer  propul- 
sive force  of  the  Italian  population,  the  ambition 
still  remains  grotesque.  Under  the  most  favourable 
circumstances,  Italy's  future  role  in  the  economic 
and  political  world  must  necessarily  be  secondary. 
Compared  to  Russia,  the  British  Empire,  the  United 
States  or  Germany,  Italy  is  small  and  will  remain 

1  "As  in  all  great  moments  of  national  decision,  the  motives  which 
inspired  Italy  were  mixed;  being  compounded  of  every  shade  of  opin- 
ion, from  the  purest  Mazzinian  idealism  to  the  sacro  er/oismo  of  cer- 
tain government  circles  and  the  naked  and  unashamed  Jingoism  of 
the  so-called  Nationalists.  \Miile  the  latter  were  never  tired  of 
pouring  ridicule  on  the  assumption  that  the  great  struggle  is  one 
between  Imperialism  and  Democracy,  and  insisted  on  regarding  it  as 
an  open  hid  by  rival  forces  for  the  mastery  of  Kurope,  even  the  Cor- 
rierc  deU<i  Hera,  whose  immense  influence  in  Italy  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  it  voices  the  opinion  of  the  more  sober  and  constructive  elements 
in  the  country,  justified  action  as  follows:  'Politics  are  the  quint- 
essence of  egoism,  and  we  are  egoists  Let  us  simplj"  reckon  up  our 
rights  and  our  aspirations  in  relation  to  our  forces  '  "  Review  of 
L'ltalie  et  le  Conflit  Europ4en  (1D1J,-16):  Jean  Alazard.  Paris,  1916, 
by  R.  W.  S.  W.  The  Xew  Europe,  Vol.  IV,  September  20,  1917, 
p.  317. 


126  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

small,  yiie  has  no  more  chance  of  emulating  Home 
than  has  Greece  of  becoming  a  second  Byzantium 
or  Spain  of  restoring  the  empire  of  Philip  the  Sec- 
ond. She  may  possibly  succeed  in  a  policy  of  timid 
imperialism,  in  getting  and  holding  the  East  Adri- 
atic and  a  part  of  Asia  Minor.  To  dream  of  a  vast 
Empire,  however,  to  dissipate  her  energies  in  the 
ambitious  project  of  resurrecting  Ancient  Rome  is 
not  only  a  perilous  task,  ludicrously  beyond  her  ca- 
pacity, but  a  menace  to  Italy's  neighbours  only  less 
serious  than  to  Italy  herself. 

Today  this  imperialistic  ambition  overwhelms  mil- 
lions of  Italians.  The  words  Per  la  piu  grande 
Italia  are  scribbled  on  blank  walls  and  on  infinite 
reams  of  patient  paper.  This  conception  of  a 
Greater  Italy  is  an  ideal  of  a  sort,  and,  as  Mr.  Syd- 
ney Low  approvingly  remarks  in  a  fawning  book, 
which  one  wonders  how  he  could  have  written,  ''The 
ideal  is  to  be  attained  by  the  highly  practical  method 
of  seizing  territory,  ports,  islands,  railways,  strips 
of  coast-line,  naval  bases."  These  imperialists 
"are  dreamers  whose  heads  are  not  in  the  clouds, 
poets  who  will  not  be  content  with  a  diet  of  the  most 
inspiring  phrases,  enthusiasts  who  mean  busi- 
ness." ^ 

Some  of  the  business,  upon  which  these  Italian  im- 
perialists are  engaged,  is  legitimate  and  proper. 
Italy  was  not  without  justification  for  her  hatred  of 

1  "Italy  in  the  War,"  by  Sydney  Low,  New  York,  1916,  p.  238. 


SACRED  EGOISM  127 

Austria,  whose  long  persecution  might  in  time  have 
been  forgotten  had  not  the  stupid  government  of 
Francis  Joseph  persisted  in  petty  persecution  of 
the  Italians  in  Trieste,  and  had  not  Austria  long  in- 
sisted upon  retaining  the  Trentino,  which  geograph- 
ically, ethnologically  and  economically  belongs  to 
Italy.  Much  of  the  territory  to  which  Italy  has  a 
real  right  had  indeed  been  promised  by  Austria  as 
the  price  of  neutrality,  but  whether  Austria  could 
have  been  trusted  to  keep  her  promises,  or  whether 
she  might  not  have  taken  away  what  she  had  given 
under  duress,  was  a  serious  question.^ 

The  demands  of  the  extreme  Imperialists  of  Italy, 
however,  went  much  furtlier.  Several  of  them  de- 
sired not  only  the  Trentino,  Istria  and  Dalmatia  but 
had  lingering  hopes  of  eventually  securing  Corsica, 
Savoy,  Nice  and  Tunis  from  France,  Malta  from 
England,  and  the  Ticino  from  Switzerland.  Natur- 
ally these  latter  desires  were  inopportune,  but  in 
their  stead,  other  lands  lay  at  the  disposal  of  the 
victorious  Allies.  There  was  Rhodes  lying  off  the 
coast  of  Asia  Minor,  there  were  several  ^gean 
islands  and  there  was  a  large  tract  of  Asiatic 
Turkey,  which  might  properly  fall  to  Italy.  **We 
trust,"  said  the  Rassenna  Nazionale,  in  the  spring 
of  1915,  ''that  there  will  be  reserved  for  us,  in  the 

1  "Austria  had  indeed  just  offered  Italy  the  Trentino,  the  west 
bank  of  the  Isonzo,  special  privilejies  and  full  cultural  puaranteee 
for  all  Italians  left  under  Austrian  rule,  and  a  free  hand  for  Italy 
in   Albania"     Stoddard,   p.    108. 


128  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Mediterranean,  in  the  ^gean,  and  in  Asia  Minor,  a 
share  proportionate  to  the  requirements  of  our  posi- 
tion. "  ^  It  was  obvious  that  Italy  was  still  un- 
satisfied with  vast  desert  Tripoli,  which  she  had 
recently  conquered.  She  wanted  more  fertile  soils. 
** There  is  only  one  land,"  said  an  Italian  writer  in 
the  Edinburgh  Review,  ''wherein  Italy  can  still  hope 
to  found  colonies  of  Italian  laborers,  and  that  is 
Asiatic  Turkey.  "^ 

In  the  end  these  Italian  imperialists  captured  the 
government.  A  protracted  bargaining  with  Aus- 
tria raised  the  price  which  the  importunate  Allies 
were  willing  to  pay.^  Finally  the  terms  were  ac- 
cepted and  Italy  declared  war. 

Since  the  bargain  was  struck,  hardly  a  month  has 
passed  that  the  Allies  have  not  been  disagreeably 
reminded  of  these  pledges.^     Uncomfortable  indeed 

1  Stoddard,  165. 

2  Stoddard,   165. 

3  "When  we  review  such  semi-official  press  utterances  .  .  .,  together 
with  the  numberless  imperialistic  incitements  to  war  .  .  .,  it  is 
difficult  not  to  believe  that  the  Salandra  Cabinet  had  already  made 
up  its  mind  on  intervention,  and  that  it  was  using  the  negotiations 
with  the  Teutonic  Powers,  as  part  of  a  clever  combinazione  to  extract 
the  largest  possible  concessions  from  the  Allied  Powers,  with  whom 
parallel  negotiations  were  going  on  at  the  same  time."  "Present- 
Day  Europe.  Its  National  States  of  Mind,"  by  T.  Lathrop  Stoddard, 
New  York,  1917,  p.  166. 

*  According  to  a  telegram  from  Petrograd  to  the  Manchester 
Guardian.  December  1,  1017.  "A  treaty  between  the  Allies  and 
Italy  is  published  today  (November  28)  according  to  which  Italy 
receives  the  Trentino,  Soutli  Tyrol,  Trieste,  Istria,  Dalmatia,  with 
the  neutral  zone  between  the  latter  region  and  Serbia.  In  the  south 
the  Adriatic  region  from  the  river  Planka  to  the  Drina  goes  to 
Serbia.     Italy  receives  Vallona  and  the  hinterland.     Italy  agrees  not 


SACRED  EGOISM  129 

are  some  of  the  implications  of  this  solemn  covenant 
between  the  nations  fighting  for  democracy  and  the 
Italian  Royal  Government  inspired  by  sacred  ego- 
ism. Were  Austria  willing  to  make  a  separate 
peace,  acceptable  to  England,  France  and  the  United 
States,  would  Italy  consent?  Would  she  not  de- 
mand a  full  liquidation  of  her  bond,  Istria,  Dalmatia 
and  the  rest?  And  if  the  Allies  agree  to  a  partial 
dismemberment  in  the  interest  of  Italy,  can  they 
refuse  the  less  shadowy  claims  of  Serbia  and 
Roumania?  Is  any  separate  peace  with  Turkey 
possible  which  takes  from  the  Turks  a  part  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  subjects  to  Italian  domination  a  territory 
in  which  there  is  not  even  a  trace  of  Italian  blood  or 
culture?     That  way  Italy  blocks. 

Again,  take  the  Balkan  situation.  Though  the 
question  is  too  complicated  to  be  put  into  a  para- 
graph, yet  according  to  experts  it  is  believed  to  have 
been  possible  to  discover  a  reasonably  satisfactory 
solution  of  the  problem  and  to  have  settled  the  rival 
claims  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  Greece  along  approx- 

to  oppose  England,  France,  and  Russia  in  the  partition  of  Albania 
between  Montenegro  and  Serbia,  if  such  be  deemed  desirable  Italy 
receives  Dodecanese  and  Adalia  in  Asiatic  Turkey.  In  the  event  of 
British-French  colonial  expansion  in  Africa  at  the  expense  of  Ger- 
many, Italy  receives  compensation  in  the  right  to  expand  the  terri- 
tory of  Eritrea,  Somaliland,  Livia,  into  the  hinterland.  England, 
France,  and  Russia  undertake  to  support  Italy  against  the  Holy  See 
if  the  latter  attempts  to  take  steps  toward  peace  "  The  full  text  of 
this  treaty,  which  was  signed  on  April  2(».  1015,  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  Cambon,  Marquis  Iraperiali,  and  Count  Benckendorf,  is  pub- 
lished in  full  (in  English)  by  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  January 
25,  1918. 


130  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

imately  nationalistic  lines.  Such  a  settlement  would 
not  have  been  perfect  but  might  at  least  have  pro- 
moted peace  in  that  distracted  quarter.^  Had  some 
such  arrangement  been  possible  in  1915,  the  Balkan 
Confederation  might  have  been  restored,  the 
Balkan  corridor  closed,  Turkey  isolated,  and  the 
war  brought  a  year  or  more  nearer  to  a  conclu- 
sion. But  against  such  a  solution  the  claims  of  the 
Italian  government  proved  an  insuperable  obstacle. 
Italy  stood  opposed  to  any  solution  which  would  rob 
her  of  her  desired  control  of  the  East  Adriatic.^ 

Among  the  Allies  there  are  many  eloquent  and 
sincere  defenders  of  this  narrow  policy  of  Italy. 
''Egoism,"  insists  M.  Bainville,  "when  it  is  the  ego- 
ism of  a  nation,  becomes  a  duty  and  a  virtue.  It  be- 
comes purified.  Does  it  not  affect  the  fate  of  mil- 
lions of  living  creatures,  millions  of  millions  of  men 

1  See  for  the  general  outline  of  such  a  plan  "The  Reconstruction 
of  Poland  and  the  Near  East,"  by  Herbert  Adams  Gibbons,  N.  Y., 
1917,  pp.  194-202. 

2  "The  contemporary  school  of  Italian  imperialists  have  lost  their 
heads  entirely.  If  the  statesmen  of  the  Entente  Powers  had 
studied  closely  the  literature  and  the  programs  of  the  Dante  Ali- 
ghieri  Society  and  the  Dalmatian  League,  and  followed  the  develop- 
ment of  the  colonial  and  irredentist  propagandas  during  the  last 
decade,  they  would  have  supported  with  all  their  power  Signor  Gio- 
litti  and  the  non-intervention  elements  in  the  spring  of  1915."  Italy's 
"active  participation  in  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Entente  has  been 
benelicial  neither  to  the  Entente  nor  to  Italy.  The  statesmen  of 
France,  Great  Britain  and  Russia  have  come  to  realize  that  Italian 
irredentists  and  imperialists  are  without  shame  or  limit  in  their 
ambitions  and  are  incapable  of  constructive  political  vision.  They 
have  had  to  yield  to  Italian  demands,  though,  in  order  to  keep  the 
coalition  intact.  The  result  has  been  the  sacrifice  of  the  Serbians 
and  the  loss  of  Greek  aid."    Gibbons,  op  cit.,  pp.  181,  182,  183. 


SACRED  EGOISM  131 

yet  to  be  bom?  Those  Governments  which  have  not 
this  sense  of  egoism  arc  guilty;  they  are  danger- 
ously mischievous." 

National  egoism  may  be  good  or  bad,  wise  or  fool- 
ish, according  to  the  circumstances,  though  it  be- 
comes neither  good  nor  wise  by  being  called  sacred. 
It  is,  however,  an  interesting  question  in  interna- 
tional morality  at  exactly  what  point  the  interest  of 
these  "millions  of  living  creatures"  should  be  ac- 
commodated to  the  interests  of  other  millions  living 
across  the  border.  To  be  guided  by  national  egoism 
alone  is  to  justify  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  the  sub- 
jection of  minor  nationalities,  and  other  acts  which 
nations  as  egoistic  but  less  frank  than  Italy  have 
repeatedly  committed.  It  is  not  for  us  to  pass  judg- 
ment. We  need  not  answer  the  question  whether 
Italy  was  justified  in  standing  upon  the  side-lines 
and  offering  her  army  and  navy  at  a  price.  Nor  is  it 
our  special  concern  whether  in  their  extremity  the 
Allies,  to  gain  an  ally,  were  justified  in  making  con- 
cessions which  violated  their  principles.  What 
does  seem  evident,  however,  is  that  we  who  were  not 
consulted  in  all  this  grandiose  huckstering,  are  not 
bound  by  the  bargain.  We  accepted  no  responsibil- 
ity. We  are  fighting  for  democracy  and  interna- 
tionalism and  against  militarism.  We  are  fighting 
for  the  freedom  of  the  Italians  of  the  Trentino  and 
Trieste,  as  for  other  oppressed  peoples,  but  we  are 
not  fighting  for  Italian  imperialism.    We  will  not 


132  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

send  our  young  men  to  die  that  Italy  may  rule  over 

the  Slavs  and  Dalmatia. 

And  this  for  four  reasons.  The  Italian  scheme  of 
conquest  is  not  in  the  true  and  permanent  interest  of 
Italy  herself.  A  giving  to  Italy  of  all  that  has  been 
promised  would  mean  new  wars.  The  program  for 
which  Italy  fights  is  opposed  to  the  ideals  for  which 
we  fight.  Finally  to  continue  the  war  until  Italy 
gets  what  she  wants  is  to  prolong  the  contest,  to 
make  victory  dubious  and  peace  dangerous. 

Not  that  Italy  should  be  content  with  the  ante- 
bellum conditions.  Wlien  we  consider  the  mag- 
nitude of  her  emigration  we  cannot  but  sjnnpathize 
with  her  desire  for  lands  under  her  own  flag  to  which 
these  emigrants  might  go.  The  need  of  Italy  in  this 
respect  is  far  greater  than  that  of  Germany.  Today 
there  are  some  six  million  Italians  under  foreign 
flags,  or  one  seventh  of  the  entire  Italian  people.  On 
the  other  hand,  no  one  can  study  contemporary 
Italian  conditions  without  realizing  how  immature, 
politically  and  economically,  the  nation  is,  and  there- 
fore how  ill-equipped  for  a  stem  imperialistic  strug- 
gle. 

The  facts,  upon  which  this  conclusion  is  based, 
lie  upon  the  surface.  Italy's  excessive  death  rate, 
her  high,  though  decreasing,  illiteracy  rate,  the  rudi- 
mentary character  of  her  national  education,  the  vast 
amount  of  her  semi-pauperism,  her  low  standards  of 
living,  her  heavy  taxes,  her  unstable  and  low-grade 


SACRED  EGOISM  133 

political  life,  her  lack  of  great  resources — all  these 
indicate  an  internal  weakness,  as  compared  with  her 
great  imperialistic  competitors,  a  weakness  which 
almost  hopelessly  handicaps  her  in  her  ambitious 
projects.  For  Italy  to  be  awarded  the  East  Adriatic 
might  be  a  curse  instead  of  a  blessing.  It  would 
create  for  her  what  Giolitti  called  "an  inverse  irre- 
dentism,"  forcing  her  to  maintain  great  armies  in 
order  to  suppress  unruly  Slavs.  It  would  mean  op- 
pression abroad  and  reaction  at  home.  It  would 
bring  her  into  eventual  conflict  with  Serbia,  with 
Greece,  possibly  with  greater  nations.  It  might 
mean  defeat,  it  might  even  mean  catastrophe. 

That  such  a  victory  would  render  new  wars  prob- 
able is  made  evident  by  present  currents  of  opinion 
in  the  peninsula.  Italy  today  hates  Serbia  more 
than  Germany,  and  Greece  more  than  Serbia.  She 
distrusts  Russia.  Her  attitude  towards  the  Adri- 
atic Slavs  can  be  read  in  d'Annunzio's  speeches. 
Dalmatia,  he  asserts,  "belongs  to  Italy  by  human 
law  and  divine.  Under  the  Latin  rule  of  Rome,  of 
the  Popes  and  of  Venice,  as  under  the  barbarian  rule 
of  the  Goths,  the  Lombards,  the  Franks,  the  Ger- 
manic Othos,  the  Byzantines,  the  Hungarians,  tlie 
Austrians,  the  civil  life  of  yonder  shores,  like  the 
civil  life  of  our  own,  has  always  been  Italian  in 
essence  and  origin.  It  has  been;  it  is;  it  will  bo. 
Neither  the  German,  coming  from  the  Alps,  nor  the 
Slovenian  of  the  Carso,  nor  the  Magyar  of  La  Putza, 


134  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

nor  the  Croat,  who  ignores  or  falsifies  history,  nor 
the  Turk,  who  disguises  himself  as  an  Albanian — no 
one,  I  say,  will  succeed  in  arresting  the  inevitable 
rhythm  of  accomplishment,  the  Roman  rhythm. ' '  ^ 
Of  this  Dalmatian  population,  so  confidently  an- 
nexed, only  three  per  cent  is  Italian ;  yet  millions  of 
Slavs  are  to  be  shut  off  from  the  sea  in  order  not  to 
arrest  the  Roman  rhythm.  Out  of  this  same  fear  of 
a  future  Slav  and  Greek  opposition,  Italy  seems  to 
desire  that  Austria,  after  being  weakened  by  her, 
shall  be  kept  strong  enough  to  hold  the  Balkan  peo- 
ples in  check.  She  apparently  does  not  desire  a  dis- 
solution of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  She  wishes  to  rest 
upon  the  *' Austrian  cushion"  after  abstracting  as 
many  feathers  as  she  pleases. 

The  Italian  imperialists  frankly  avow  that  their 
demands  are  opposed  to  the  policies  of  internation- 
alism, in  defence  of  which  we  are  fighting.  Influ- 
ential elements  in  the  population  are  strongly  in 
sympathy  with  German  militarism  and  envy  Ger- 
many's army  and  the  power  which  brought  her  great 
plans  of  expansion  within  the  expectation  of  suc- 
cess. The  Italian  program  is  like  the  German;  it 
takes  no  account  of  the  rights  of  lesser  nationali- 
ties, or  of  the  economic  demands  of  German  and 
Slavic  Einterlaender  which  it  would  deprive  of  their 
outlet  by  an  occupation  of  Trieste  and  the  East 
Adriatic. 

1  Bainville,  op.  cit.,  pp.  254-5. 


SACRED  EGOISM  135 

Finally  to  satisfy  Italy's  ambitions  means  to  pro- 
long the  war.  Nothing  has  so  strengthened  the  re- 
sistance of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  as  the 
unjust  and  unreasonable  Italian  demand  for  the 
cession  to  her  of  territories  inhabited  by  Slavs.  ''In- 
stead of  coming  into  the  war  as  the  open  friend  of 
aU  oppressed  Habsburg  peoples,  Italy  allowed  it  to 
appear  that  for  some  of  them  her  victory  would 
mean  not  freedom  but  merely  a  change  of  masters ; 
and  that  others  who  might  escape  her  rule — a  rule 
as  alien  to  them  as  that  of  Austria — would  find  her 
opposed  to  a  realization  of  their  national  ideal  of 
independence  and  union  with  their  kith  and  kin. 
Every  attack  in  the  Italian  press  upon  the  Southern 
Slavs,  every  allusion  to  'the  Croats,  the  Cossacks  of 
Austria, '  every  denunciation  of  Southern  Slav  exiles 
as  'the  paid  agents  of  Austria,'  has,  under  skilful 
Austrian  manipulation,  reacted  to  the  military  dis- 
advantage of  Italy."  ^  These  ambitions  mean  a 
more  desperate  Austrian  resistance,  a  longer  war, 
and  as  a  consequence  greater  sacrifices  from  Amer- 
ica and  the  Allies.  But  on  what  principle  can  Italy 
appeal  to  us  to  make  sacrifices  for  her  imperialism? 
How  can  she  demand  from  us  an  ungrudging  gen- 
erosity to  further  her  ovm  sacred  egoism? 

There  are  men  in  Italy  of  exactly  the  same  opinion. 
The  opposition  to  imperialism,  strong  in  1915,  still 
exists.     It  has  even  been  increased  by  the  events  of 

1  The  New  Europe,  Vol.  IV,  July  19,  1917. 


136  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

the  war.  There  have  been  no  great  victories  and 
there  have  been  disastrous  defeats.  The  economic 
conditions  are  bad.  Food  is  dear  and  coal  scarce, 
while  the  small  success  of  the  domestic  war  loans 
reveals  a  disquieting  lack  of  confidence.  Imperial- 
ism is  on  trial,  as  in  Germany.  Indeed  the  situation 
of  the  government  is  similar  to  that  of  the  German 
government,  and  in  either  country  a  complete  vic- 
tory might  prove  a  menace  to  a  healthy  democratic 
development.  To  save  itself  the  Government  must 
win.  Otherwise  it  goes  down  in  disgrace,  and  even 
the  Monarchy  might  not  survive.  The  government 
is  therefore  desperate.  It  opposes  any  Anglo- 
French  leaning  towards  a  Greater  Serbia,  which 
would  lessen  Italy's  gains;  it  attacks  any  co-opera- 
tion with  Greece  which  would  give  that  country  lands 
that  Italy  covets;  it  protests;  it  threatens.  It  has 
chosen  the  imperialistic  path  and  dares  not  wander 
from  that  path.  It  fears  to  disappoint  the  ardent 
hopes  it  has  itself  evoked. 

The  American  people,  like  all  other  nations,  owe 
infinitely  much  to  Italy,  to  her  art,  her  literature,  her 
culture,  to  the  hardiness  of  her  adventurers,  from 
the  days  of  Columbus  to  the  day  before  yesterday 
when  millions  of  Italians  came  to  build  our  railroads, 
work  our  mines,  and  enter  and  enrich  our  civiliza- 
tion. We  have  only  admiration  and  affection  for 
the  Italian  people,  so  lately  emerged  from  foreign 
subjection  and  political  oppression.    We  sympathize 


SACRED  EGOISM  137 

with  Italy's  heroic  effort  to  achieve  her  independ- 
ence, to  educate  her  people  and  take  her  true  place 
among  the  civilizing  peoples.  But  Italy's  imperial- 
ism is  nothing  to  us.  We  do  not  desire  her  do- 
minion of  the  Adriatic  or  of  the  Mediterranean.^ 
We  could  not  if  we  wished  revive  the  dominion  of 
Venice  which  ended  when  the  Byzantine  Empire  was 
destroyed  and  America  discovered.  The  Republic  of 
Venice  is  dead,  and  the  Italians  of  the  Twentieth 
Century  have  quite  other  tasks  than  to  resurrect  it, 
and  should  have  other  preoccupations. 

Italy  is  a  case  in  point.  Italian  imperialism  is 
much  less  menacing  than  is  that  of  Germany,  but  it 
is  also  a  menace,  and  spiritually  of  the  same  quality. 
It  is  one  of  the  things  to  which  we  are,  or  should  be, 
opposed.  To  fight  for  Italian  imperialism,  or  for 
Russian,  French,  British  or  American  imperialism, 
is  to  fight  against  internationalism.  To  fight  in 
order  that  Italy  may  obtain  Dalmatia  and  Asia 
Minor,  to  rule  over  Slavs  and  Austrians,  to  main- 
her  imperiuyn  by  means  of  the  sword  is  no  way  in 
which  to  make  the  world  safe  for  democracy. 

Italy  has  sought  to  bargain  away  her  future  secur- 

1  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  to  Italy  a  domination  of  the 
Adriatic  by  any  foreign  power  would  be  a  menace  in  exactly  the 
Bamo  manner  (and  to  an  even  preat  extent)  as  the  control  of  the 
Caribbean  by  Germany  would  be  a  menace  to  the  United  States. 
But  a  domination  by  Italy  of  tin-  Adriatic  would  be  equally  intoler- 
able to  her  neighbours.  Until  some  international  system  can  be 
created  that  will  adequately  [irotect  the  interests  of  all  adjacent 
nations  no  solution  of  the  Adriatic  problem  is  at  all  possible. 


138  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ity  for  an  imperialistic  mess,  which  she  cannot  hope 
to  digest.  It  would  be  better  for  her  and  better  for 
the  world  if  she  returned  to  her  sanity,  if  she  sur- 
rendered her  extreme  pretensions  and  made  a  renun- 
ciation, while  there  is  still  virtue  in  it.  The  true 
interest  of  Italy,  as  of  other  states,  lies  in  an  interna- 
tionalism which  will  safeguard  her  and  us  and  all 
nations,  and  not  in  an  imperialism,  doomed  to  ex- 
haust her  strength  and  destroy  her  idealism  and  to 
end  in  wars  in  which  her  feebleness  wiU  fare  hard  in 
a  life  and  death  contest  with  stronger  powers.  The 
earthen  pot  has  no  place  among  these  crushing  iron 
vessels. 


CHAPTER  VII 

AMERICA   AS   AEBITEB 

In  one  of  the  ablest  books  that  have  appeared 
during  the  war  the  English  internationalist,  Mr. 
Henry  Noel  Brailsford,  speaks  as  follows  concerning 
the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  world 
conflict:  "It  may  be  said  that  America  is  no  longer 
the  impartial  and  uncommitted  Power,  which  might, 
by  its  balancLQg  weight,  render  a  League  of  Nations 
workable  during  the  first  difficult  years.  The  loss 
is  only  apparent,  for  the  neutrality  of  America  was 
always  differential.  On  the  other  hand,  though  her 
view  on  the  broad  issues  of  the  war  is  decided  and 
clear,  she  is  not,  nor  will  she  become,  an  interested 
partisan,  enmeshed  in  the  territorial  questions  and 
the  military  issues  of  the  European  Balance  of 
Power.  Her  influence  as  a  moderating  force  re- 
mains uncompromised. "  * 

Since  Mr.  Brailsford  wrote  his  book.  President 
Wilson  has  taken  several  long  steps  towards  acting 
as  moderator  or  arbitrator  between  the  more  ad- 
vanced claims  of  our  Allies  and  our  enemies.  From 
tlie  beginning  America  refrained  from  entering  a 
formal  alliance  with  our  co-belligerents.     We  were 

1  "The  League  of  Nations,"  by  Henry  Noel  Brailsford,  London, 
1917,  p.  vi. 

139 


140  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

willing  to  concert  our  military  efforts  and  to  adjust 
the  distribution  of  our  capital,  food  and  military 
supplies,  but  we  refused  to  tie  our  hands  by  agree- 
ments already  made  with  regard  to  the  individual 
ambitions  of  these  Powers.  We  retained  our  liberty 
of  action.  Furthermore,  in  his  Reply  to  the  Pope 
Mr.  Wilson  differentiated  our  American  war  pur- 
poses from  those  of  other  enemies  of  Germany.  He 
declared  himself  against  '' political  or  economic  re- 
strictions meant  to  benefit  some  nations  and  cripple 
or  embarrass  others."  He  opposed  "vindictive  ac- 
tion of  any  sort  or  any  kind  of  revenge  or  deliberate 
injury,"  as  well  as  any  ''reprisal  upon  the  German 
people."  He  set  his  face  against  "punitive  dam- 
ages, the  dismemberment  of  empires,  the  establish- 
ment of  selfish  and  exclusive  leagues."  Speaking 
for  the  United  States,  Mr.  Wilson  agreed  to  enter 
into  peace  negotiations  upon  generous  terms  with 
a  democratized  and  responsible  German  govern- 
ment. 

The  Reply  to  the  Pope  was  only  the  beginning 
of  this  form  of  negotiation  between  the  United  States 
and  Germany  and  between  the  United  States  and  her 
co-belligerents.  In  a  series  of  messages  the  Presi- 
dent, despite  a  few  regressions,  moved  towards  an 
outlining  in  concrete  terms  of  a  moderate  and  liberal 
peace,  not  based  upon  conquest  or  even  upon  the 
assertion  of  military  superiority,  but  upon  a  state  of 
Europe  and  the  world,  in  which  internationalism 


AMERICA  AS  AEBTTER  141 

and  progress  towards  democracy  would  be  possible. 
Finally  on  January  8th,  1918,  he  outlined  the  Amer- 
ican demands  in  terms  more  definite  and  language 
more  explicit  than  had  yet  been  used  by  any  re- 
sponsible head  of  a  government.  Those  terms  pro- 
vided for  open  diplomacy,  the  freedom  of  the  seas, 
the  establishment  of  trade  equality,  the  reduction  of 
armaments,  the  adjustment  of  colonial  claims  with 
regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants,  the  indem- 
nification of  Belgium,  a  league  of  nations  to  enforce 
specific  agreements,  autonomy  for  oppressed  nation- 
alities, as  well  as  changes  in  national  frontiers  along 
approximately  nationalistic  lines.  It  is  true  that 
this  public  statement  of  President  Wilson,  like  all 
statements  of  terms,  retains  a  certain  nimbus  of 
ambiguity,  and  has  been  variously  interpreted.  But 
no  one  can  escape  its  conciliatory  spirit.  A  truly 
democratic  Germany  might  find  these  terms  accept- 
able or  unacceptable,  but  could  not  discern  in  them 
any  desire  to  crush  or  humiliate.  The  note  is  a  test 
of  the  repeated  protestations  of  pacific  intent  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government.^ 

To  what  extent  we  have  as  yet  advanced  in  the  sev- 
eral countries  toward  a  composition  of  differences 
it  is  difficult  to  determine.  What  informal  and  un- 
official negotiations  or  interrogatories,  if  any,  are  in 
progress  we  cannot  pretend  to  know.     The  casual 

1  See  also  President  Wilson's  Fobruary  notr,  outlining  tho  four 
principles  of  settlement. 


142  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

colloquies  between  unacknowledged  representatives 
of  the  belligerent  powers  are  not  made  public  and 
we  never  see  the  successive  steps  but  only  the  end. 
Nor  is  a  real  advance  towards  a  mutual  understand- 
ing always  recognized  as  such,  for  every  statement 
issued  by  each  belligerent  is  capable  of  a  wide  range 
of  possible  interpretation  and  a  promise  is  often 
couched  in  the  form  of  a  threat. 

It  is  a  rarefied  atmosphere  in  which  we  here  move 
and  one  in  which  it  is  difficult  to  measure  progress 
or  note  direction.  Yet  the  essential  fact  remains 
that  one  nation,  the  United  States,  preserves  its  lib- 
erty of  negotiation.  By  this  it  is  not  meant  that  we 
alone  have  been  the  moderators  of  this  war.  A  far 
stronger  impulse  to  a  liberalization  of  the  war  came 
from  Russia,  and  a  statement,  quite  as  clear  as  any 
that  we  have  made,  and  equally  liberal  in  spirit,  is- 
sued from  the  British  Labour  Party.  But  there  is 
a  vast  distinction  between  a  Labour  Party,  however 
powerful,  and  the  government  of  a  sovereign  nation 
of  one  hundred  millions,  and  there  is  an  equally  wide 
gulf  between  the  Russian  influence,  as  it  was  exerted 
in  January,  1918,  and  that  of  the  United  States.  To 
a  considerable  degree  Russia's  influence,  like  ours 
before  we  entered  the  war,  was  moral,  her  military 
weakness  robbing  her  decisions  of  all  physical  sanc- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  America  has  both  a  moral 
and  a  physical  influence,  the  latter  being  enforced  by 
economic  and  military  weapons.    The  nation  is  un- 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  143 

bound,  disinterested,  powerful,  and  free  to  deal  dip- 
lomatically with  both  sides.^ 

Had  it  been  Japan,  Roumania  or  Italy  which  had 
preserved  such  an  independence,  the  influence  upon  a 
future  peace  would  have  been  less  potent  and  less 
salutary.  None  of  these  nations  can  effect  a  de- 
cision in  this  war,  which  would  go  on  despite  their 
defection. 2  Moreover,  none  of  these  Powers  would 
have  used  its  freedom  to  seek  a  permanent  and 
universal  peace.  America  is  in  different  case.  She 
can  exert  a  powerful  influence  upon  the  whole  course 
of  peace  negotiations  because  of  her  unexcelled 
strategic  position. 

That  position  results  from  several  factors,  the 
greatest  of  which  is  our  relative  security.  Of  all 
belligerents  we  are  the  most  immune  from  serious 
German  attack,  since  Germany  cannot  assail  us 
except  after  the  overthrow  of  the  other  Powers. 
In  that  sense,  though  not  intentionally,  the  Allies, 

1  As  this  book  goes  to  press  (March  9,  1918)  the  strategic  posi- 
tion in  the  war  held  by  the  United  States  from  April  to  October, 
1917  (and,  in  some  sense,  even  up  to  the  Ix'frinning  of  February, 
1918),  has  been  temporarily,  and,  perhaps,  permanently  destroyed. 
So  long  as  Russia  remained  an  ally,  America  occupied  a  middle 
ground.  She  could  act  with  democratic  Russia  and  use  the  joint 
influence  of  the  two  nations  to  compel  a  re-statement  of  Allied  peace 
terms  and  a  liberalization  of  the  war.  She  could  appeal  to  demo- 
cratic sentiment  both  in  Allied  and  in  enemy  lands.  With  the  loss  of 
Russia  and,  as  a  consequence  of  Roumania,  the  (ierman  government 
is  strengthened,  the  German  liberal  sentiment  is  weakened,  and  the 
former  advantageous  position  of  the  I'nited  States  is  lost.  America 
is  far  less  able  to  make  up  for  a  possible  new  defection  of  an  ally 
than  she  was  during  the  period  in  which  Russia  was  in  the  war. 

2  See  note  above. 


144  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

before  the  period  of  our  neutrality,  were  fighting 
our  battle.  Nor  do  we  enter  into  German  animosi- 
ties and  plans  of  conquest  to  the  same  degree  or  with 
the  same  immediacy  as  do  England,  France  and  Rus- 
sia. We  still  preserve  a  remnant  of  our  former  phy- 
sical and  moral  isolation. 

Moreover,  America  is  the  least  exhausted  of  the 
belligerent  nations.  Having  just  begun  to  fight,  our 
military  strength  is  on  a  sharply  ascending  curve. 
With  our  surplus  food,  war  materials  and  money, 
we  are  more  indispensable  to  our  Allies  than  they 
to  us.  We  could  better  survive  a  drawn  battle  or 
even  a  German  victory  than  could  France,  Great 
Britain  or  Italy. 

Finally,  our  strategic  position  is  enhanced  by  our 
having  no  obvious,  direct,  material  interest  in  the 
war.  We  have  the  freedom  of  wanting  nothing. 
Undoubtedly  certain  individuals  and  groups  in 
America  do  profit  by  the  conflict,  but  as  affecting 
the  nation's  present  determination  to  fight,  these 
profits  are  incidental  and  are  largely  to  be  diverted 
to  meet  war  expenses.  Our  true  interests  in  the 
war  are  broader  and  less  tangible  than  those  im- 
puted. We  have  in  internationalism  and  peace  a 
valuable,  substantial  and  permanent  interest,  and 
we  cannot  afford  to  have  that  interest  destroyed  by 
a  militaristic  Germany.  But  we  have  no  ax  to 
grind,  no  special  national  interest  to  subserve  as 
opposed  to  the  common  interest.     We  are  therefore 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  145 

in  a  better  position  to  represent  and  pursue  that 
common  interest. 

It  follows  that  our  American  policy  should  be  so 
to  moderate  and  transform  the  war  aims  of  our 
Allies,  so  to  revise  the  terms  upon  which  they  will 
cease  from  fighting  that  we  may  win  over  the  demo- 
cratic elements  in  Germany  and  thus  aid  them  to 
overcome  their  militarist  groups.  Upon  a  peace  so 
obtained  we  may  lay  the  foundations  of  a  new  inter- 
national order.  We  are  seeking  the  higher  path  for 
the  nations  by  attempting  to  block  the  lower  paths. 

But  we  can  accomplish  this,  as  our  past  efforts 
have  shown,  only  against  the  will  not  only  of  our 
enemies  but  of  influential  groups  among  our  Allies. 

In  eveiy  alliance,  as  in  each  individual  nation,  we 
discover  a  conflict  of  aims.  In  England  there  are 
democrats  and  internationalists  on  one  side  and  im- 
perialists on  the  other,  and  France,  Italy,  Russia, 
the  United  States,  as  well  as  Germany  and  Austria, 
reveal  similar  cleavages.  Within  every  country  the 
relative  strength  of  the  two  groups  varies.  In 
Japan,  for  example,  the  preponderance  of  power  lies 
in  the  hands  of  men  who  seek  purely  nationalistic 
aims,  whereas  in  America  the  weight  of  influence  lies 
with  the  opposite  group.  The  main  cleavage  in  the 
struggle  for  internationalism  and  democracy  is  not 
between  nations.  Men  find  their  natural  allies 
among  the  populations  against  whom  tliey  fight. 

A  war  policy,  inspired  by  internationalism,  there- 


146  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

fore,  should  seek  to  enlist  behind  its  program  all 
the  progressive  forces  on  both  sides  of  the  fighting 
line. 

It  will  doubtless  be  urged  against  such  a  policy 
that  it  is  impossible  within  the  frame-work  of  an 
alliance.  It  will  be  urged  that  our  concert  with  our 
co-belligerents,  the  very  instrument  by  which  we  are 
to  accomplish  our  purpose,  will  be  destroyed  if  we 
in  America  insist  upon  plans  antagonistic  to  those 
of  our  Allies.  Without  unity  of  conception  and  pur- 
pose among  its  members  no  coalition  can  endure. 
Thus  in  1914  the  union  between  Austria  and  Italy 
broke  down  utterly  because  in  a  matter  vital  to  both 
the  two  allies  were  fundamentally  opposed.  There- 
fore caution  must  be  exercised  in  every  league,  all 
useless  recriminations  avoided,  and  even  fair  criti- 
cism on  points  not  essential  minimized.  If  Allies 
are  to  pull  together,  good  nature,  generosity,  a  will- 
ingness to  forego  minor  rights  and  unimportant 
precedences,  a  greater  readiness  to  praise  than 
blame,  are  indispensable.  Each  ally  must  be  ex- 
pected to  *' swallow"  a  good  deal. 

This  very  care,  however,  with  which  we  must  re- 
spect the  rights  and  susceptibilities  of  our  Allies 
reveals  more  than  do  the  terms  of  any  treaty  the  real 
nature  and  essential  weakness  of  the  bonds  that 
unite.  An  alliance  is  a  compromise.  It  is  a  union 
of  nations  with  diverse  and  even  opposed  interests  on 
the  assumption  that  larger  interests  will  be  con- 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  147 

served  or  gained  by  the  union  than  will  be  lost.  The 
more  accurately  these  rival  interests  are  adjusted  the 
more  effective  the  alliance. 

Almost  every  coalition,  however,  develops  a  tend- 
ency towards  internal  strain  and  fissure.  Though 
in  the  First  Balkan  "War  Greece,  Bulgaria  and  Serbia 
were  able  to  agree  upon  a  common  policy;  the  real 
opposition  of  their  ambitions  was  tragically  revealed 
in  the  Second  Balkan  War.  Today  a  similar  conflict 
of  interest  lies  hidden  in  both  alliances.  Bulgaria 
and  Austria  have  interests  not  identical  with  those 
of  Germany.  France  has  no  interest  in  Italian 
claims  in  Dalmatia,  and  Serbia  is  bitterly  opposed 
to  them.  Russia  and  Roumania  have  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  agree.  None  of  the  Allies  is  over-anxious  to 
keep  Japan  in  Shantung.  The  whole  alliance  is  an 
unstable  equilibrium,  maintained  only  by  fear  of  a 
formidable  enemy. 

When  we  reflect  that  almost  every  coalition  is 
thus  a  log-rolling  arrangement,  insecure  in  direct 
proportion  to  its  freedom  from  outside  pressure,  we 
are  forced  to  recognize  that  any  reform  in  an  entente 
can  be  secured  only  at  the  cost  of  internal  fric- 
tion. The  cost  and  danger  of  this  friction  must  be 
set  against  the  value  of  the  object  sought.  We  have 
no  right  to  jeopardize  harmony  for  any  trivial  gain. 
We  must  not  use  our  freedom  of  action  to  injure 
our  co-belligerents,  to  aid  the  enemy,  to  disrupt  the 
Alliance.    In  honour  and  decency  we  are  bound  not 


148  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

to  make  sudden  and  unheralded  decisions,  but  must 
enforce  our  policy  with  forewarning  and  tact.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  dare  not  surrender  the  real  pur- 
poses for  which  we  entered  the  war  in  order  to 
maintain  the  adhesion  of  nations  and  groups  op- 
posed to  those  purposes. 

What,  then,  concretely,  is  the  method  which 
America  should  pursue?  How  are  we  to  further 
clear  up  the  issues  ?  How  remove  or  lessen  the  war 's 
aggressive,  imperialistic  features  and  make  the  con- 
flict in  fact  a  war  for  democracy,  internationalism 
and  peace? 

Our  first  great  opportunity  to  secure  an  assimila- 
tion of  the  aims  of  our  Allies  to  our  own  principles 
arose  before  we  declared  war.  If  in  March,  1917,  we 
had  made  our  entrance  into  the  struggle  upon  the 
side  of  the  Allies  contingent  upon  their  agreeing  with 
us  upon  a  set  of  war  aims,  which  would  really  lead  to 
a  peace  based  upon  internationalism,  we  should  have 
been  in  a  far  better  position  to  carry  our  point  than 
we  have  been  at  any  subsequent  time.  The  Allies' 
needed  our  aid  far  more  than  we  ourselves  knew,  and 
doubtless  they  would  have  been  willing  to  make  terms 
with  us  as  they  made  terms  (of  quite  a  different 
character)  with  Italy  and  Roumania.  Until  they 
agreed  to  our  conditions,  at  least  in  principle,  we 
might  have  armed  and  prepared  for  war  without  any 
actual  declaration.  Entering  the  war  on  these  terms 
we  should  have  been  able  to  prove  to  Russia  that  the 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  149 

Alliance  was  not  imperialistic  and  to  German  demo- 
crats that  the  Alliance  had  no  intention  of  crushing 
Germany.  The  Allies  might  well  have  granted  to 
us  as  the  price  of  our  adhesion  what  they  were  un- 
willing to  concede  once  we  had  declared  war  without 
conditions. 

Having  missed  this  opportunity  we  cannot  do  bet- 
ter than  to  continue  in  the  path  we  have  already 
chosen  of  defining  our  owti  national  policy  in  detail 
and  seeking  to  win  over  our  co-belligerents  to  the 
same  general  program. 

We  may  do  this  in  several  ways.  A  convention 
of  the  Allied  Powers  may  be  called  to  revise  war 
aims,  or  there  may  be  an  exchange  of  notes  with 
those  Powers  for  the  elimination  of  extreme  de- 
mands. Finally  we  may  publicly  set  forth  our  o\vti 
policy  towards  the  war,  a  precise,  emphatic  and  un- 
ambiguous statement  of  the  things  for  which  Amer- 
ica will  fight  and  of  the  things  for  which  she  wiU 
not  fight,  leaving  perhaps  certain  matters  to  future 
negotiation. 

The  first  and  second  plans  are  more  desirable  than 
the  third,  since  they  constitute  an  action  within  the 
cadre  of  the  Alliance.  The  third  should  not  be  tried 
if  it  can  be  avoided.  The  more  our  policy  is  one 
of  persuasion  and  not  of  coercion  the  better. 

Is  any  coercion,  resulting  from  a  limitation  of 
our  war  aims,  moral?  And  can  we  carry  out  such 
a  program?    Will  the  mere  attempt  split  up  the 


150  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Alliance,  assure  a  German  victory,  and  defeat  the 
purposes  for  which  we  entered  the  war! 

Not  only  is  such  a  policy  not  immoral,  but  no 
other  policy  is  moral.  Though  the  Allies  may  use 
our  armies  and  navy  and  draw  upon  our  food,  muni- 
tions and  credit,  they  may  not  control  our  funda- 
mental purposes.  It  would  be  unworthy  of  us  not 
to  take  our  full  share  in  the  struggle,  to  fight  with 
one  hand,  to  save  our  own  men  and  let  our  Allies 
be  killed  in  their  stead.  It  would  be  immoral,  as 
well  as  unwise,  to  escape  our  burden  or  postpone  our 
assistance.  But  we  are  neither  obliged  to  fight,  nor 
justified  in  fighting,  for  things  to  which  we  are 
actually  opposed.  Nor  is  such  refusal  a  disadvan- 
tage to  our  Allies ;  in  the  long  run  it  is  in  their  own 
interest.  Peace  and  security  are  better  for  them 
than  an  increase  of  territory  or  pa\Tnents  of  money. 

Whether  such  a  policy  is  in  itself  dangerous  to 
the  Alliance  and  to  our  own  purposes  is  a  question 
requiring  consideration.  Clearly  tact,  caution  and 
candour  are  necessary,  since  any  mistake  would  be 
exploited  by  a  resourceful  enemy.  Time  and  oc- 
casion are  of  the  essence  of  the  problem.  Much 
depends  upon  the  forces  in  control  of  the  Central 
Alliance  and  also  upon  the  internal  Balance  of 
Power  within  our  own  group.  Had  the  Allies  in 
January,  1917,  declared  that  they  would  not  insist 
upon  Russian  conquests  in  the  Turkish  Empire,  the 
Czar  might  have  concluded  a  separate  peace.    At 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  151 

that  time,  when  the  Entente  could  be  maintained 
only  by  the  assistance  of  land-hungry  Powers,  and 
a  triumphant  and  unregenerate  Germany  was  striv- 
ing to  disintegrate  the  alliance  against  her,  any 
revision  of  terms  likely  to  disappoint  any  ally  might 
have  spelled  disruption  and  defeat.  Because  it  was 
inopportune.  President  Wilson's  December  request 
that  the  Allies  state  their  terms  resulted  in  only  an 
exaggeration  of  their  demands.  But  after  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution  the  situation  changed.  The  New 
Russia  was  opposed  to  conquest,  and  the  adhesion  of 
America  to  the  Alliance  tended  to  make  the  defection 
of  one  or  more  of  the  smaller  powers  less  dangerous. 

The  conditions  for  an  explicit  and  detailed  state- 
ment of  liberal  terms,  not  only  by  the  United  States 
but  by  all  the  Allies  jointly,  are  already  present.  In 
the  first  place,  the  desire  for  peace  seems  to  be  grow- 
ing in  Germany,  and  is  especially  insistent  in 
Austria.  The  Revolution  in  Russia  has  introduced 
a  new  factor  making  for  internationalism,  and  Amer- 
ica's entry  into  the  war  contributes  to  the  same  re- 
sult. We  are  today  in  a  position  to  urge  upon  the 
world  a  peace  of  internationalism.  The  Alliance 
will  bear  the  strain.^ 

For  the  morality  of  any  alliance  is  that  of  the 
least  moral  (or  most  necessitous)  nation  essential 
to  the  alliance  and  capable  of  deserting.  If  today 
Japan  could  safely   and  profitably  withdraw,  and 

1  See,  however,  note  on  page  143. 


152  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

leave  her  Allies  to  the  certainty  of  defeat,  it  might 
be  incumbent  upon  them  to  make  all  possible  con- 
cessions to  her  to  prevent  this  catastrophe.  H,  how- 
ever, as  a  result  of  changed  conditions,  Japan  were 
no  longer  indispensable,  if  she  were  unable  to  cause 
the  Allies  greater  damage  by  withdrawal  than  she 
caused  herself,  her  bargaining  power  would  be  less. 
The  importance  of  this  point  cannot  be  over-empha- 
sized; the  elTective  resistance  of  any  one  ally  to  a 
policy  which  threatens  to  deprive  it  of  anticipated 
war  gains  is  measured  exactly  by  that  nation's  nui- 
sance value,  by  the  amount  of  injury  it  can  safely 
inflict  by  defection  or  by  an  actual  union  with  an 
enemy  bent  on  conquest.  In  other  words,  each  na- 
tion relies  upon  its  irreplaceability  to  extort  the  sort 
of  peace  it  desires. 

It  will  be  urged  that  it  also  relies  upon  solemn 
agreements  entered  into  by  the  Allies  among  them- 
selves. Italy  and  Roumania  have  sacrificed  much; 
can  England  and  France  treat  their  promises  to 
these  Allies  as  "scraps  of  paper"?  But  if  the 
United  States,  which  w^as  not  a  party,  refuses  to  fight 
for  the  fulfilment  of  those  secret  engagements,  and 
if  without  her  assistance  England  and  France  cannot 
bring  about  conditions  under  which  the  promises  can 
be  redeemed,  what  is  to  be  done?  They  are  offers, 
like  Germany's  offer  of  Arizona  to  Mexico,  worthless 
unless  fulfilled.  Assuming  that  Germany  docs  not 
suddenly  collapse,  Italy  can  hardly  hope  to  gain  all 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITEE  153 

that  has  been  promised  her  without  America's  aid. 
We  will  not  accept  this  burden.  We  are  more  likely 
to  end  the  war  when  the  international  purposes  for 
which  we  entered  it  are  achieved.  As  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  the  general  nature  of  the  peace  we  desire 
has  been  outlined  by  Mr.  W^ilson  in  his  January 
and  Februar}^  (1918)  notes.  AVhether  in  the  near 
future  we  can  impose  these  general  principles  upon 
the  Allies  will  depend,  first,  upon  Germany's  atti- 
tude, and,  secondly,  upon  the  nuisance  value  of  vari- 
ous imperialistic  groups  controlling  national  policies 
within  the  Alliance  itself.  Which  of  these  Allies,  by 
making  peace  with  Germany,  or  even  aiding  that  na- 
tion, can  prohibit  the  adoption  of  such  a  program? 

Clearly  Great  Britain  cannot  make  a  separate 
peace,  and  would  not  if  she  could.  A  victory  for 
Germany  would  mean  for  her  a  partial  eclipse. 
France  cannot  make  a  separate  treaty  more  valuable 
to  her  than  the  peace  that  we  seek.  Belgium  has 
nothing  with  which  to  make  terms,  and  in  any  case 
would  gain  all  that  she  wants  from  a  peace  for  which 
America  is  wiUing  to  fight.  Serbia,  Montenegro  and 
Portugal  are  negligible,  as  far  as  discretion  in  peace 
making  goes.  Democratic  Russia  may  make  a  sep- 
arate peace,  but  not  because  of  any  refusal  on  our 
part  to  fight  for  imperialistic  aims.  There  remain 
Italy  and  Japan.  It  is  possible  that  Italian  im- 
perialists are  already  reconciling  themselves  to  a 
limitation  of  nationalistic  aims  (with  which  Italian 


154  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

democrats  have  never  been  in  sympathy),  and  even 
if  an  imperialistic  government  were  tempted  to  make 
a  separate  peace  rather  than  surrender  promised 
territories,  it  would  hesitate.  By  ceasing  hostilities 
Italy  would  release  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Aus- 
trian troops.  But  in  the  long  run  she  would  lose. 
Better  for  her  to  gain  little  from  an  Allied  victory 
than  eventually  to  lose  all,  since  if  Germany  wins 
Italy  becomes  little  better  than  a  vassal  state.^ 

The  situation  of  Japan  is  anomalous.  The  Island 
Empire  has  been  taught  imperialism  in  the  bitter  and 
unscrupulous  conflict  of  Europe  in  the  Far  East,  and 
she  has  learned  not  to  be  too  magnanimous.  Her 
own  necessities  and  the  aggressions  of  the  European 
nations  have  forced  her  also  to  be  aggressive.  She 
hurriedly  entered  the  war  for  very  concrete  national 
purposes,  and  in  the  apparent  belief  that  the  contest 
would  be  short  and  that  the  Central  Empires  would 
soon  collapse.    When  Germany  proved  stronger  than 

1  As  yet  (March  9,  1918)  no  revision  of  the  Italian  treaty  has 
been  made.  "Lord  R.  Cecil,  speaking  on  the  subject  of  secret 
treaties,  contended  that  they  were  thoroughly  justifiable  in  the 
circumstances,  and  that  so  long  as  they  exist  we  are  bound  by  them. 
It  seemed  to  him,  when  asked  to  repudiate  them,  that  the  pacifists 
did  not  understand  the  elements  of  their  own  creed,  for  how  should 
we  make  any  progress  in  international  affairs  unless  we  regarded 
such  obligations  as  sacred?  (Cheers.)  These  treaties  were  entered 
into  for  obvious  reasons.  ("Annexation.")  Not  at  all;  they  were 
undertaken  as  part  of  the  war  measures  of  this  coimtry.  He  knew 
how  much  these  treaties  lent  themselves  to  misrepresentation,  and 
that  tliey  were  not  popular,  but  a  Government  which  for  that  reason 
would  not  do  what  they  thought  right  was  unfit  to  hold  office." 
^lanohester  Guardian,  February  14,   1918. 


AMERICA  AS  ARBITER  155 

had  been  expected,  Japan  hesitated.  She  remained 
technically  an  ally  but  morally  she  became  an  in- 
terested neutral.  Today,  having  no  international 
purposes  to  serve  in  the  war,  her  interest  would 
seem  to  lie  in  a  long  and  indecisive  conflict,  in  a 
permanent  balancing  of  opposed  European  forces, 
which  would  give  her  a  free  hand  in  Asia.  Condi- 
tions determine  her  policy.  Fortunately  for  the  Al- 
lies, however,  Japan's  power  depends  upon  her  com- 
merce and  navy,  and  the  vast  preponderance  of  naval 
power  lies  with  the  enemies  of  Germany.  Japan, 
even  though  she  wished  to  do  so,  and  that  itself  is  ex- 
tremely doubtful,  would  hesitate  to  change  sides, 
wliatever  the  provocation,  so  long  as  Russia  held  and 
the  Allies  maintained  control  of  the  sea  and  of  the 
world's  markets.  Though  a  disappointed  Japan 
might  damage  the  Allies,  it  would  be  only  at  an 
excessive  cost  to  herself.  She  can  gain  more  from 
the  grudging  generosity  of  the  sea  powers  than  from 
any  promise  of  eventual  benefit  from  the  enemy. 
Even  if  her  defection  threw  the  war  to  Germany, 
she  herself  would  suffer  too  much  from  the  hostiUty 
of  nearer  neighbours  to  render  such  a  venture  wise.^ 

1  Today  (March  9,  1918)  this  situation  has  lar^'ely  cnanged  be- 
cause Russia  has  not  "held."  Japan's  strategic  position,  weakened 
by  America's  entrance  into  the  war,  has  been  enormously  strength- 
ened by  the  dissolution  of  Russia.  As  a  consequence  we  find  Japan 
proposing  an  invasion  of  Siberia,  and  England,  France  and  Italy 
vociferously  applamiing.  Whether  the  assent  of  these  Powers  to 
Japan's  proposal  resulted  from  fear  we  are  in  no  position  to  state. 
It  seems  probable,  however,  that  only  dire  necessity  reconciled  the 


156  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Thus  the  situation  so  shapes  itself  as  to  open  up 
the  possibility  of  America's  further  carrying  out  a 
policy  of  destroying  the  imperialistic  character  of 
the  war  and  of  converting  it  into  a  real  war  for 
democracy  and  internationalism. 

West-European  Powers  to  this  proposed  invasion  of  Siberia,  which 
is  likely  to  alienate  Russia,  deflect  Japanese  shipping  from  the  inter- 
national trade  and,  perhaps,  in  the  end,  to  lead  to  a  community  of 
interests  between  Japan  and  Germany. 


CHAPTER  Vm 

THE   TRUE  ALIGNMENT 

''In  the  peace  to  be  concluded  we  demand  an  inter- 
national arrangement  for  general  disarmament,  as 
being  the  chief  means  of  strengthening  the  debili- 
tated states.  General  disarmament  is  the  only  way 
to  break  any  militarist  supremacy  and  to  secure  a 
lasting  and  peaceful  understanding  between  the  na- 
tions. 

**We  demand  the  fullest  freedom  for  international 
trade  and  intercourse,  as  well  as  an  unlimited  right 
of  migration.  We  condemn  any  economic  barriers 
or  any  economic  struggle  between  states. 

*'A11  disputes  between  states  must  be  settled  by 
compulsory  international  arbitration. 

''Equal  rights  should  be  granted  for  all  the  inhab- 
itants of  any  country  without  regard  to  tongue,  race 
or  religion.  This  would  also  mean  the  securing  to 
national  minorities  the  right  to  develop  their  national 
life. 

"With  all  firmness  we  object  to  the  violation  in 
any  form  of  any  nation. 

"The  re-establishment  of  Serbia  as  a  self-govern- 
ing, independent  state  is  our  absolute  demand. 

"We  understand  the  deep  feeling  of  the  Poles 

157 


158  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

for  national  unity.  To  admit  the  right  of  Russian 
Poland  to  national  independence  but  to  deny  that 
same  right  to  Prussian  and  Austrian  Poland  is  con- 
tradictory. 

''The  full  independence  and  economic  self-depend- 
ence (i.  e.,  freedom  from  economic  interference)  of 
Belgium  is  inevitable.  In  fulfilment  of  the  German 
government's  promise  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
the  Belgian  nation  has  to  be  compensated  for  the 
damage  caused  by  the  war,  and  especially  for  the 
economic  values  that  have  been  taken  way.  Such  a 
repayment  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  various  kinds 
of  indemnities,  which  simply  mean  the  plundering 
of  the  vanquished  by  the  victor,  and  which  we  there- 
fore reject."  ^ 

The  memorandum  from  which  the  above  is  quoted 
is  not  a  British,  French,  Russian  or  American  mani- 
festo, but  was  written  and  endorsed  by  Germans. 
It  is  the  deliberate  statement  of  principles  and  aims 
by  the  German  Minority  Socialists,  and  it  represents 
the  views  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  workers  in 

1  Extract  from  the  Memorandum  of  the  German  Minority  Social- 
ists in  reply  to  the  questionnaire  of  the  Dutch  Scandinavian  Com- 
mittee. This  memorandum,  which  was  not  allowed  to  be  circulated 
in  Germany,  can  be  read  in  full  (in  English)  in  the  New  York 
Tribune,  Aug.  12,  1917.  See  also  the  Statement  of  the  Austrian  So- 
cialist Delegates,  as  well  as  the  Statement  of  the  Hungarian  Socialist 
Delegates  (to  the  Dutch-Scandinavian  Socialist  Committee),  trans- 
lated from  the  Holland  Neics,  Review  of  the  Nederlandsche  Anti- 
Oorlag  Raad  (June  20.  Ifll7)  and  published  in  Approaches  to  the 
Groat  Settlement  by  Professor  Emily  Balch,  New  York,  1918,  pp. 
1S6  to  193  conclusive.  Through  the  courtesy  of  Professor  Balch  the 
present  author  was  permitted  to  read  her  book  in  proof. 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  159 

Leipzig  and  Chemnitz,  in  Berlin  and  Jena  and  in 
all  the  great  industrial  centres  of  the  Empire.  De- 
manding that  Belgium  be  evacuated  and  indemnified, 
that  Prussian  Poland  be  turned  over  to  an  inde- 
pendent Polish  Commonwealth,  that  Germany  (as 
well  as  her  allies  and  enemies)  refrain  from  making 
conquests  and  exacting  indemnities,  insisting,  finally, 
on  the  establishment  of  a  democratic  international 
system,  this  memorandum  stands  on  a  complete 
parity  with  the  declarations  of  the  most  liberal  and 
progressive  elements  in  the  Allied  nations.  Between 
the  Junkers  and  the  German  Minority  Socialists 
there  is  as  wide  a  gulf  as  between  any  two  groups  in 
Europe.  They  are  both  German,  but  are  at  opposite 
poles. 

We  are  likely  to  ignore  the  obvious  fact  that  not 
all  Germans  are  alike,  that  a  nation  is  a  very  com- 
posite and  heterogeneous  thing,  a  vast  agglomera- 
tion of  unlike  and  even  antagonistic  groups. 

In  war  times  especially  we  tend  to  think  of  a  nation 
as  a  unit  for  the  reason  that  it  fights  as  a  unit.  A 
new  solidarity  springs  up.  Eich  man,  poor  man, 
beggar-man,  thief;  philanthropist  and  pickpocket, 
society  lady  and  kitchen  maid,  banker  and  janitor, 
seem  to  be  fused  by  compulsion,  conviction  and  mob 
psychology.  The  nation  becomes  a  regimented  thing 
and  the  most  unlike  citizens  are  apparently  reduced 
to  a  common  denominator.  It  is  a  Procrustean 
process  by  which  those  who  stand  too  high  above 


160  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

the  crowd  have  their  feet  or  heads  cut  off  and  those 
who  are  too  small  for  the  general  patriotic  sentiment 
are  painfully  stretched.  By  one  means  or  another, 
however,  the  society  achieves,  if  not  an  intellectual 
uniformity,  at  least  a  unanimity  of  response  to  a 
few  simple  appeals. 

In  countries  with  astute  and  powerful  autocracies 
this  process  of  intellectual  regimentation  usually 
takes  place  more  completely  than  in  democratic 
countries.  The  pacifist,  the  conscientious  objector 
and  the  protestants  of  all  sorts  disappear  beneath 
the  surface  of  the  national  consciousness.  Rapidly 
the  nation  becomes  intolerant  and  united.  This 
more  rapid  cohesion  of  divergent  groups  constitutes 
a  great  advantage  for  a  nation  like  Germany,  and, 
parenthetically,  a  corresponding  menace  to  neigh- 
bouring democracies.  For  the  true  progress  of 
democracy  depends  upon  the  maintenance  of  an 
intellectual  independence  among  its  groups,  and  this 
becomes  an  obstacle  to  the  instantaneous  mobiliza- 
tion of  public  opinion,  to  that  concentration  and  in- 
tensification of  the  general  mind,  which  accompanies 
every  great  war,  just  or  unjust.  If  the  democratic 
nations  are  to  live  within  the  constant  menace  of 
sudden  war,  they  must  either  adapt  themselves  to 
the  German  system  or  prevent  Germany  from  main- 
taining conditions  which  permit  so  instantaneous  a 
mobilization. 

Yet  in  all  countries,  democratic  and  autocratic,  we 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  161 

find  dissent,  and,  as  the  German  Minority  Socialist 
memorandum  and  many  other  facts  prove,  the  regi- 
mentation of  thought  turns  out  to  be  in  part  a  sup- 
pression rather  than  a  destruction  of  differences. 
Latent,  these  differences  reappear  when  a  crucial 
issue  is  raised.  On  the  question  of  repelling  in- 
vaders, all  Frenchmen  stand  united,  but  on  whether 
France  should  fight  for  an  indemnity,  or  even  to 
reconquer  Alsace-Lorraine,  divergences  appear. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  public  opinion  of  Great 
Britain,  Russia,  Italy,  the  United  States,  Germany 
and  Austria.  All  Germans  are  determined  that  their 
country  shall  not  be  crushed,  but  over  the  issue 
whether  Germany  should  war  for  conquests  there  is 
the  gravest  conflict. 

The  issue  of  internationalism  versus  militarism 
uncovers,  therefore,  a  new  cleavage,  cutting  athwart 
the  alignment  between  the  hostile  nations.  Upon 
this  issue  British  Liberals  and  German  Liberals 
stand  closer  together  than  do  British  Liberals  and 
Conservatives  or  German  Liberals  and  Conserva- 
tives. So  long  as  the  war  remains  a  war  for  national 
security  each  nation  is  compacted  and  indivisible. 
As  soon,  however,  as  men  fight  for  principles,  those 
of  one  type,  irrespective  of  nationality,  range  them- 
selves against  those  of  another,  for  opinions,  beliefs, 
and  traditions  are  partly  independent  of  frontiers. 

This  fact  influences  the  relations  of  American  lib- 
erals to  all  the  peoples  at  war.     In  actual  fighting 


162  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

our  Allies  are  certain  nations  with  definite  geo- 
graphical boundaries.  These  nations  may  be  demo- 
cratic, semi-democratic  or  undemocratic.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  our  effort  to  achieve  our  ultimate 
purposes  in  the  war,  our  Allies  are  found  among  the 
democratic  elements  in  all  countries. 

Not  all  the  tories  are  in  Germany.  They  abound 
and  multiply  in  every  country  where  conditions  are 
favourable  to  their  survival,  and  they  are  found  in 
democratic  nations  as  well  as  in  those  ruled  by  auto- 
crats. When,  for  example,  in  August,  1917,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  demanded  democratization  in  Germany 
and  promised  a  non-punitive  peace,  he  proposed  a 
general  test  of  liberalism.  Immediately  the  major- 
ity of  German  papers  described  his  message  as  in- 
solent, stupid,  "grotesque  nonsense,"  but  the  Social- 
journal  Vorwdrts  gave  its  immediate  adhesion.  It 
insisted  that  "it  would  be  unworthy"  of  Germany 
"to  refuse  to  give  the  guarantees  demanded  by  Mr. 
Wilson."  In  other  words,  certain  groups  in  Ger- 
many vaguely  recognized  that  American  democrats 
were  fighting  for  principles  by  which  they  themselves 
had  long  been  inspired.  Similarly,  a  few  isolated 
Hungarian  journals  praised  the  note,  which  also 
found  wide  favour  with  British  and  French  liberal 
journals.  On  the  other  hand,  certain  Tory  papers  of 
London  found  this  democratic  message  less  to  their 
taste.  Said  the  Saturday  Revieiv:  "No  punitive 
damages,  no  dismemberment  of  empires,  no  eco- 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  163 

nomic  boycott,  these  three  negatives  are  an  epitome 
of  what  the  representative  of  the  United  States  will 
say  when  peace  comes  to  be  seriously  discussed. 
But  these  three  negatives  bar  the  war  aims  of  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Italy,  as  up  to  date  they  have  been 
formulated  by  their  statesmen."  ^ 

The  issue  is  not  yet  clearly  drawn,  but  as  it  be- 
comes sharper  it  will  be  obvious  that  although  we 
are  fighting  Germany  and  aiding  Great  Britain,  we 
are  in  our  final  policy  in  closer  union  with  the  Vor- 
wdrts  of  Berlin  than  with  the  Saturday  Review  of 
London. 

Our  policy,  therefore,  aims  at  the  ultimate  union 
of  all  the  democratic  groups.  Unfortunately  these 
groups,  upon  which  we  must  build  in  formulating 
a  peace  based  upon  internationalism,  are  not  clearly 
defined.  Men  are  not  militarists  or  pacifists  through 
and  through,  but  in  tens  of  millions  of  cases  the  same 
man  is  one  or  the  other,  according  to  changing  con- 
ditions. The  ordinary  man  who  has  boasted  of  his 
pacifism  will  fight  on  occasion,  and  if  the  fighting 
goes  well  may  not  even  be  averse  to  his  country's 
gaining  something  from  the  war.  On  the  other  hand, 
in  certain  circumstances  the  militarists,  the  instinct- 
ive fighters  and  the  whole  little  world  of  "bloody- 
minded  Sir  Lucius  0 'Triggers"  are  now  and  again 
anxious  for  peace.  Millions  of  men  swing  from  one 
attitude  to  the  other.     Still,  certain  economic  and 

"i^  Saturday  Remew,  Vol.  124,  September  8,  1017,  p.  177. 


164  THE  END  OP  THE  AVAR 

intellectual  groups  in  each  nation  incline  to  a  policy 
of  conquest,  imperialism  and  aggression,  while  other 
groups  incline  to  one  of  internationalism  and  peace. 
What  is  needed  for  an  international  policy  is  the 
unification  and  crystallization  of  a  mass  of  diverse 
elements  in  the  various  countries. 

The  adhesion  of  many  differing  groups  in  coun- 
tries at  war  with  each  other,  however,  is  not  easy 
to  compass.  For  a  policy  of  conquest  nothing  is 
needed  but  the  unity  of  a  single  nation,  and  this  can 
be  secured  by  a  stirring  appeal  to  tradition  and 
patriotism.  Each  nation  has  long  been  taught  to 
hold  itself  intellectually  apart  from  other  nations, 
and  the  war  instinct  is  not  only  ancient  and  powerful, 
but  is  cultivated  by  strong  class  interests  and  is 
stimulated  by  a  government,  expressing  the  national 
unity  and  controlling  the  sources  of  information 
upon  which  public  opinion  is  based.  International 
jealousy,  malice,  misrepresentation,  all  of  which 
flourish  luxuriantly  in  wartime,  work  in  favour  of  a 
policy  of  national  aggression.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  desire  for  internationalism,  a  new  and  weak  desire 
at  best,  cannot  become  effective  until  it  brings  about 
a  coalition  of  groups  in  hostile  countries,  groups 
which  do  not  always  understand  each  other,  do  not 
speak  the  same  language  and  are  not,  in  war  time, 
permitted  to  come  together  to  discuss  issues  or  seek 
an  international  solidarity. 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  165 

Moreover,  in  very  few  countries  are  these  groups 
given  as  full  freedom  of  expression  as  are  those 
which  are  frankly  imperialistic.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment suppresses  the  memorandum  of  the  Minor- 
ity Socialists,  censors  liberal  papers  and  incarcerates 
men  like  Liebknecht,  while  rabid  annexationists  are 
permitted  the  utmost  freedom  of  speech.  Nor  have 
the  Allied  states  always  encouraged  those  of  their 
citizens  who  seek  to  meet  the  enemy  and  by  discus- 
sion to  arrive  at  a  common  basis,  whereas  they  have 
given  full  sway  to  those  who  threaten  and  endeavour 
to  terrify  the  enemy.  The  Daily  Mail  and  the  Morn- 
ing Post  of  London  have  always  been  permitted  to 
be  sent  abroad,  although  it  is  by  quoting  from  jour- 
nals like  these  that  German  imperialists  attempt  to 
prove  to  their  people  that  the  Allies  wish  to  crush 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  liberal  papers  like  The 
Nation  (of  London)  are  often  considered  too  dan- 
gerous to  export.  *'One  might  assume,"  remarks 
Mr.  Norman  Angell  .  .  .  ''that  tlie  foreign  circula- 
tion of  this  latter  group — Socialist  papers,  or  Liberal 
journals  in  favor  of  a  moderate  settlement — would 
be  encouraged.  In  every  case,  however,  it  is  these 
papers  that  the  various  Ccnsorsliips  prevent  from 
going  abroad,  that  they  sometimes  suppress  at  home 
and  always  discourage.  It  is  the  former  group," 
(journals  favouring  a  punitive  and  severe  settle- 
ment with  Germany),  it  is  these  journals  that  are 


166  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

''used  by  the  enemy  governments,  that  are  immune 
from  such  prohibition  or  embarrassment. ' '  ^ 

Perhaps  we  should  not  blame  the  poor  censor  too 
harshly.  After  all,  he  is  only  expressing  the  gen- 
eral intolerance  and  nervous  irritability  of  the  war 
temper.  Like  the  common  run  of  men,  the  censor, 
even  though  he  be  a  mild-mannered  man,  cannot  con- 
ceive of  a  nation  at  once  energized  for  war  and  recep- 
tive to  proposals  of  peace.  To  think  of  peace,  to 
think  even  of  the  true  objects  of  the  war,  seem  to  him 
relaxing  and  weakening.  Let  jingoes  and  imperial- 
ists, the  men  who  love  war  or  the  profits  of  war,  whip 
us  into  a  frenzy,  but  let  those  who  think  in  terms  of 
ultimate  reconciliation  and  world-reorganization  be 
shamed  and  silenced. 

Fortunately,  however,  the  mere  instinctive  fighting 
temper  is  mortal,  and  as  this  first  mood  passes 
serious  men  begin  to  reflect  upon  the  war,  and  to  en- 
visage it  in  a  larger  way  than  is  at  first  possible. 
The  sheer  duration  of  the  conflict  makes  for  a  re- 
vision of  judgments.  Thus  it  happens  that  powerful 
forces  in  all  belligerent  countries  tend  to  create  a 
union  of  like-minded  groups  disposed  toward  the 
attainment  of  a  permanent  international  organiza- 
tion. One  of  these  forces  is  war-weariness.  To 
disgust  with  the  slaughter,  waste  and  brutal- 
ity  of   the    war,    there   is    added   a    sense    of   its 

1  Norman  Angell.  Introduction  to  "Approaches  to  the  Great  Set- 
tlement," by  Emily  Greene  Balch,  New  York,  1918,  p.  7. 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  167 

futility,  its  essential  indecisiveness,  its  moral 
ineffectiveness.  The  feeling  is  gaining  ground, 
moreover,  that  whatever  the  war's  immediate  occa- 
sion, its  ultimate  cause — the  outstanding  fact  which 
made  it  sooner  or  later  inevitable — was  the  interna- 
tional anarchy  in  which  the  nations  have  so  long 
lived.  There  is  no  desire  among  democrats  to  re- 
peat the  ghastly  struggle,  to  begin  other  wars  when 
this  war  is  ended.  And  such  new  conflicts  must 
inevitably  occur  unless  a  real  solution  is  found  for 
our  international  problems.  Not  alone  and  not  au- 
tomatically will  the  war  bring  internationalism  and 
peace.  "War  can  do  many  things,"  says  Bernard 
Shaw,  "but  it  cannot  end  war."  Only  a  peace,  in- 
formed by  a  spirit  of  internationalism,  can  lead  to 
this  result.  If  we  leave  the  making  and  keeping  of 
peace  to  the  ultra-nationalists  we  shall  have  had  the 
war  for  our  pains. 

When  we  look  about  the  world  for  the  allies  of 
internationalism,  therefore,  we  find  them  in  the 
democratic,  liberal  and  socialistic  groups  of  all 
nations.  These  groups  desire  a  fair  peace,  though 
they  differ  as  to  what  the  words  mean.  In  prin- 
ciple and  from  interest  these  groujDS  are  opposed 
to  the  militaristic  classes  in  their  own  nations.  They 
are  interested  in  economic  development,  social  bet- 
terment, progress  through  free  international  inter- 
course, and  are  of  necessity  opposed  to  a  destruction 
of  their  industrial  and  social  life  by  war,  though 


168  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

they  are  not  opposed  to  every  war.  Politically  they 
are  the  enemies  of  those  exploitative  groups  which 
maintain  power  by  an  appeal  to  the  war  spirit  and 
to  international  jealousy.  The  democratic  classes 
were  forced  into  the  present  war  through  the  break- 
down of  the  old  industrial  system  under  which  they 
lived.  That  system  was  excessively  nationalistic, 
was  based  on  an  economic  competition  between 
nations,  which  inevitably  led  to  war.  So  long  as 
there  existed  a  cut-throat  competition  in  trade  and 
armaments,  each  group  of  producers,  however  nat- 
urally pacific,  was  pushed  towards  war.  But  even 
while  going  to  war  all  these  groups  vaguely  appre- 
hended the  possibility  of  a  better  system,  in  which 
industry  could  develop,  nations  expand  and  democ- 
racy live  without  incessant  conflict. 

The  intellectual  chasm  between  these  groups  of 
democrats  and  the  opposed  groups  of  militarists  and 
reactionaries  is  wide  and  deep.  * '  The  difference  be- 
tween those  who  believe  and  those  who  disbelieve  in 
the  Stockholm  idea,"  says  a  writer  in  the  (London) 
Nation  Supplement  of  October,  1917,  *4s  so  tre- 
mendous that  one  fears  to  appear  exaggerated  and 
hysterical  by  stating  it.  If  one  begins  by  saying  that 
it  is  the  difference  between  'open  diplomacy*  and 
'secret  diplomacy'  one  has  only  touched  the  fringe 
of  the  truth;  it  is  the  difference  between  a  secret 
peace,  between  an  armed  peace  and  a  people's  peace, 
between  the  dry  bones  of  the  eighteenth  century  and 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  169 

the  fresh  hopes  of  a  new  generation,  between  *The 
Prince'  of  Machiavelli  and  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount. 
There  are,  in  fact,  two  irreconcilable  worlds — the 
world  of  Willy  and  Nicky,  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna, 
the  Congress  of  Paris,  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  the 
Triple  Alliance,  the  Dual  Alliance,  the  Triple  En- 
tente, the  Congress  of  Algeciras,  and  the  world  still 
struggling  to  be  born  in  the  Conference  which  never 
met  at  Stockholm.  Sweep  away  all  the  deadwood 
of  political  phrases,  and  you  find  that  the  two  worlds 
are  based  on  two  irreconcilable  ideals — the  ideal  of 
international  competition  and  the  ideal  of  interna- 
tional co-operation.  Therefore,  the  question  as  to 
which  ideal  and  which  world  will  issue  victorious  out 
of  the  war  depends  simply  on  the  question  what  it  is 
that  we  believe  and  what  it  is  that  we  want. ' '  ^ 

In  Germany  we  find  this  cleavage  between  the 
groups  extremely  sharp.  On  the  one  hand  we  have 
the  left  wing  of  the  socialists  who  desire  a  peace 
without  annexations  or  indemnities  and  are  striv- 
ing to  attain  an  international  organization.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  no  other  country  have  we  so  strong 
and  violent  a  group  of  expansionists  and  imperial- 
ists. Between  these  extremes  we  find  the  Majority 
Socialists,  the  Radicals  and  Liberals  and  a  large 
section  of  the  Catliolics,  all  of  which  groups  united 
in  the  adoption  of  the  Reichstag  declaration  of  July 
19,  1917.     In  Austria  and  even  in  Hungary,  as  also 

1  "\\  ar  and  Peace,"  The  \ation  Supplement,  October,  1917. 


170  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

in  France,  Italy,  England  and  America,  we  find  tbc 
same  general  cleavage. 

In  this  alignment  we  often  find  men  of  different 
social  classes  united  and  men  of  the  same  social 
class  disunited.  Of  two  brothers,  both  carpenters 
or  peasants,  one  may  be  an  imperialist  and  the  other 
an  internationalist.  Upon  the  whole,  however,  the 
centre  and  core  of  the  democratic  international 
movement  in  each  country  lies  in  the  labour  group. 

During  the  last  forty  years  these  labour  groups 
have  developed  a  strong  interest  in  international- 
ism, due  in  part  to  economic  conditions.  Long  be- 
fore Karl  Marx  urged  proletarians  of  all  lands  to 
unite,  and  ever  since,  the  wage-earners  of  each  coun- 
try, recognizing  their  similarity  of  position  with 
wage-earners  in  other  lands,  have  developed  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  international  consciousness.  They 
have  discovered  that  the  workers  in  one  land 
are  affected  favourably  or  unfavourably  by  the  same 
circumstances  that  affect  their  fellows  in  foreign 
lands.  A  rise  of  wages  in  Germany  accrues  in- 
directly to  the  benefit  of  the  British  workman,  and 
vice  versa,  and  many  have  been  the  attempts  made 
to  secure  a  co-operation  between  British,  French 
and  German  workmen,  in  the  matter  of  wages,  hours 
of  labour,  factory  protection,  social  legislation  and 
other  conditions.  There  has  steadily  gro^vn  up  an 
international  labour  legislation  which  has  had  the 
indirect  effect  of  increasing  the  number  of  those 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  171 

wage-earners  in  various  countries  who  perceived  that 
they  had  interests  in  common.  It  is,  of  course,  not 
to  be  denied  that  the  wage-earners  of  one  nation 
may  benefit  at  the  expense  of  those  of  another,  as 
when  by  means  of  a  protective  tariff  a  given  industry 
is  destroyed  in  Austria  or  Switzerland  and  is  re- 
established in  the  United  States.  On  the  whole, 
however,  the  wage-earners  have  more  to  gain  and 
less  to  lose  from  international  peace  than  have  their 
employers.  As  a  consequence  we  find  in  the  labour 
programs  of  all  nations  this  common  ideal  of  the 
internationalism  of  the  workers.  This  is  especially 
true  in  the  socialist  movement  where,  although  in 
recent  years  there  has  been  a  recrudescence  of 
labour  nationalism,  the  international  spirit  still 
holds  sway. 

One  of  the  firmest  hopes  of  a  democratic  peace, 
therefore,  and  of  the  laying  of  a  solid  foundation 
for  internationalism,  lies  in  an  increasing  influence 
of  the  labour  element  in  all  countries  upon  the  course 
of  the  war.  The  war  has  moved  in  this  direction. 
True,  like  other  conflicts,  this  war  has  also  led  to  an 
initial  restriction  of  individual  rights,  especially  of 
wage-earners.  The  trade  unions  were  obliged  to 
surrender  many  of  their  old  restrictions  and  privi- 
leges and  the  principle  of  conscription  was  applied 
to  a  considerable  extent  to  industrial  life.  But  for 
even  these  developments  there  have  been  offsets. 
The  surrender  of  trade  union  privileges  has  tended 


172  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

to  break  down  barriers  within  the  labour  ranks  and 
thus  to  unite  workers,  and  the  common  pressure  laid 
upon  all  wage-earners  by  conscription  not  only  in- 
creased their  solidarity,  but  also  educated  them  in 
the  facts  of  the  war.  The  wage-earners  are  willing 
to  accept  sacrifices  so  long  as  they  believe  that  they 
are  fighting  for  a  principle.  But  they  will  not  make 
them  for  the  sake  of  conquests  or  indemnities.  They 
will  not  sell  their  lives  or  their  liberties  for  money  or 
national  prestige. 

What  gives  the  wage-earners,  however,  their 
greatest  influence  in  this  war  is  the  old  law  of  supply 
and  demand  which,  for  once,  works  in  their  favour. 
Theirs  is  a  scarcity  value,  as  it  was  in  England  after 
the  Black  Death.  So  great  is  the  demand  for  labour- 
ers, not  only  on  the  battle  line  and  in  the  war  indus- 
tries but  also  for  the  task  of  keeping  the  civil  popula- 
tion alive,  that  there  are  not  enough  men  and  women 
to  go  around.  The  industrial  reserve  army  van- 
ishes ;  each  worker  becomes  a  marginal  man,  essen- 
tial to  the  welfare  of  society.  Their  scarcity  enables 
the  workers  not  only  to  secure  better  conditions,  but 
also  greater  political  influence.  They  are  far 
stronger,  however,  than  their  votes.  Today  no  na- 
tion can  win  the  war  unless  it  has  the  enthusiastic 
support  of  the  men  indispensable  to  the  maintenance 
of  production. 

If,  therefore,  the  wage-earners  of  all  the  countries 
refuse  to  fight  except  for  terms  which  come  within 


THE  TRUE  ALIGNMENT  173 

the  meaning  of  their  principles,  the  imperialistic  ele- 
ments in  the  war  will  be  swept  away.  This  process 
has  already  begun  and  is  making  rapid  headway. 
In  England  we  find  the  Premier  giving  heed  to  the 
trade  unions  and  assimiliating  his  peace  terms  to 
those  that  they  have  formulated.  In  France  and 
Italy  the  same  tendency  is  at  work,  though  it  mani- 
fests itself  somewhat  differently.  We  know  less 
about  Germany  and  Austria,  although  there,  too,  the 
governments  seem  increasingly  concerned  over  the 
wage-earners'  reaction  towards  the  war,^  We  are 
still  only  in  the  beginnings  of  the  movement.  How 
far  the  nations  may  go  in  this  direction  under  the 
impetus  of  the  workers  is  indicated  by  the  change 
which  has  come  over  Russia  since  the  old  bureau- 
cratic government  gave  way  to  a  democratic  gov- 
ernment, proletarian  and  socialistic  in  character. 
What  has  happened  in  Russia  foreshadows  changes, 
not  necessarily  similar,  in  other  countries,  in  which, 
the  working  classes  are  forced  up  to  a  position  of 
influence  and  domination. 

1  Since  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  between  the  Central  Powers  on 
the  one  side  and  th«>  T'krainc  and  Russia  on  <hf  other,  the  labour  un- 
rest in  Germany  and  Austria  has  probably  been  lessened,  although 
we  have  no  accurate  information  on  the  subject. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   WAE   BENEATH   THE   WAE 

There  was  little  chance  of  any  peace  based  on  in- 
ternationalism so  long  as  Eussia  was  ruled  by  its 
old  reactionary  government.  The  Czardom  was  per- 
haps the  lowest  form  of  political  organization  under 
which  any  great  people  lived,  and  to  the  Russian 
bureaucracy  our  Western  ideals  were  simply  a 
weapon  to  be  used  against  the  rival  bureaucracy  of 
Prussia.  The  Revolution,  however,  brought  the 
working  classes  into  control  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment and  for  the  first  time  we  had  one  of  the  great 
belligerents  dominated  by  a  proletarian,  socialistic 
group.  It  was  from  this  group,  saturated  with  Marx 
and  Engels  and  the  whole  literature  of  social  revolu- 
tion, that  there  issued  an  appeal  for  a  settlement  of 
the  war  based  not  on  conquest  but  on  international- 
ism. The  Russian  Democracy  demanded  peace 
without  punitive  indemnities  or  forced  annexations. 
For  this  utterance  the  allies  of  New  Russia  w^ere 
unprepared.  Suddenly  out  came  this  blunt  pro- 
posal, and  decorous  diplomats  shuddered  at  its  crud- 
ity. In  polite  circles  one  does  not  do  such  tilings. 
Besides,  the  plan  had  not  been  thought  out.  Indem- 
nities— there  are  many  kinds  of  indemnities;  and  as 
for  annexations  and  qua  si-annexations  and  the  innu- 

174 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       175 

merable  adumbrations  of  annexation,  they  may  be 
for  the  lasting  good  of  the  people  annexed.  It  was 
with  neat  rapier-like  thrusts  that  the  spokesmen  of 
the  Allies  punctured  this  preposterous  pacifism  of  the 
Russians,  this  absurd  generosity,  which  offered  to 
forgo  Constantinople  and  other  valuable  considera- 
tions in  return  for  a  just  peace.  Yet  all  this  criti- 
cism fell  short  in  that  it  failed  to  grasp  the  situation 
emotionally.  The  arguments  were  good  enough,  but 
more  than  arguments  are  needed  to  sway  a  big  cub  of 
a  republic  like  Russia. 

It  was  a  crude  republic — in  those  far-away  days 
of  Kerensky — crude,  ear-splitting  and  hobble-de-hoy. 
It  was  a  pathetic  republic,  rent  by  dissensions  and 
lacerated  by  endless  talk.  It  was  a  republic  con- 
ceived in  the  spiritual  and  physical  hunger  of  gaunt, 
big-boned  men,  a  republic  bom  in  the  mud  and 
blood  of  the  trenches,  and  reeking  of  its  birth-place. 
The  government  of  New  Russia  was  too  jammed 
with  intellectuals  to  be  superlatively  wise,  and  doubt- 
less it  said  and  did  things  which  to  the  sophisticated 
seemed  ridiculous.  For  all  tliat,  however,  it  was  a 
government  with  a  certain  half-blind  sense  of  reali- 
ties, a  government  that  felt  with  the  common  people 
of  the  world,  and,  feeling,  understood.  It  was  a 
young,  impulsive,  aspiring  republic,  not  pre- 
tentiously wise,  not  blase,  not  middle-aged.  Yet  it 
was  wiser  than  the  democratic  governments  of 
Britain,  France,  Italy  and  America. 


176  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Herein  lay  its  wisdom;  it  dealt  with  men  and  not 
with  diplomats ;  it  dealt  with  hunger,  cold,  wretched- 
ness, ^vith  death  on  the  battle-field  and  with  the 
aspirations  of  the  unlettered,  and  not  with  musty- 
formulas,  diplomatic  traditions  and  arid  abstrac- 
tions. It  knew  that  the  dull  millions  of  Russia  de- 
sired peace  and  it  believed  that  if  the  Allies  could  be 
brought  to  a  renunciation  of  their  own  secret  im- 
perialistic designs,  they  could  force  the  German  Gov- 
ernment to  recede  from  its  false  position,  or  failing 
to  do  this  could  incite  the  German  people  to  revolt. 
The  heady  Russian  democrats  had  a  supreme  faith  in 
revolutions — even  in  a  German  revolution. 

Whether  they  were  right  or  wrong,  who  can  tell? 
For  my  part  I  believe  that  President  Wilson  was 
clear-sighted  when  in  December,  1917,  he  placed  him- 
self— perhaps  too  late — in  a  sympathetic  attitude  to- 
wards the  Russian  position.^  At  the  time,  however, 
the  Russians  found  scant  sympathy  in  the  British, 
French  and  Italian  Foreign  Offices.  They  were  told 
to  hold  their  tongues  and  fight.  They  were  willing 
to  fight ;  this  pleading  Russian  republic  was  patheti- 

1  "All  these  things  have  been  true  from  the  very  beginning  of 
this  stupendous  war;  and  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  if  they  had 
been  made  plain  at  the  very  outset  the  sympathy  and  enthusiasm  of 
the  Russian  people  might  have  been  once  for  all  enlisted  on  the  side 
of  the  Alli(^s,  suspicion  and  distrust  swept  away,  and  a  real  and 
lasting  union  of  purpose  effected.  Had  they  believed  these  things 
at  the  very  moment  of  their  revolution  and  had  they  been  confirmed 
in  that  belief  since,  the  sad  reverses  which  have  recently  marked  the 
progress  of  their  affairs  toward  an  ordered  and  stable  government  of 
free  men  might  have  been  avoided." 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAE       177 

cally  loyal  to  the  Alliance.  Though  Russia  had  lost 
far  more  heavily  than  any  other  nation,  though  its 
unshod  half-armed  soldiers  had  been  killed  by  the 
millions,  it  was  still  willing  to  keep  on  with  the  drag- 
ging, disastrous  battle,  if  only  the  Allies  would  con- 
tribute their  share  towards  bringing  on  a  democratic 
peace.  Russia  asked  for  a  restatement  of  terms, 
eliminating  all  imperialistic  plans.  The  Allies 
evaded,  delayed,  talked.  And  by  evading,  delaying 
and  talking  they  killed  or  at  least  helped  to  kill  the 
Kerensky  government.  They  did  what  Germany 
alone  could  never  have  accomplished — made  way  for 
a  Bolshevik  government,  willing  to  sign  an  armistice 
with  Germany,  willing,  perhaps,  even  to  sign  a  sep- 
arate peace. 

Russia  is  utterly  weary  of  war.  Not  only  of  this 
war,  but  of  the  war  which  is  to  come  out  of  this  war, 
and  of  wars  and  wars  to  follow.  She  knows  in  her 
own  person,  what  we  in  America  do  not  yet  truly 
know,  that  war  is  the  negation  of  civilization.  To 
the  Russian,  war  is  a  familiar  and  odious  companion. 
He  has  seen  the  death,  disease  and  maiming  of  mil- 
lions; the  hunger,  the  sorrow,  the  weakening  dread; 
the  brutalization  of  soldiers;  the  bestiality  of  life 
and  death  in  the  trenches.  He  knows  of  the  graft 
of  contractors  and  camp-followers;  of  the  poor,  dis- 
eased women  who  accompany  the  soldiers;  of  the 
rape,  mutilation,  wilful  murder,  that  occur  even  in 
the  best  regulated  armies.     They  are  philosophers 


178  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

in  their  way,  these  Russians,  university  graduates 
and  peasants  alike.  They  believe  that  under  all  the 
rank  phrases  of  humanity  and  whatnot  there  lies  in 
the  warring  nations  the  serpent  of  self-justification 
for  brutal  instincts,  for  the  raw,  blatant  desire  of 
national  prestige  and  aggrandizement,  for  the  in- 
dividual's secret  will  to  hate  and  slay.  They  look 
out  upon  the  carnage,  which  to  them  seems  avoid- 
able, and  sadly  repeat,  ''With  how  little  wisdom  is 
the  world  governed ! ' '  They  see  through  their  own 
pretensions  to  their  own  raw  appetites  and  passions 
beneath. 

They  see  more.  The  Russian  Revolutionists 
opened  not  only  the  prisons  but  the  Imperial  ar- 
chives, wherein  political  secrets  are  condemned  to  lie 
for  a  century  and  more.  In  cubbyholes  in  formal 
offices  within  the  Petrograd  palace  they  found  solemn 
compacts,  sealed  no  doubt  with  hard  red  wax,  con- 
cerning the  "equitable  indemnities"  and  "valuable 
compensations"  which  were  to  accrue  to  Nicholas 
and  his  bureaucrats  in  consideration  for  the  mute 
mujiks  to  be  butchered  on  the  Vistula.  These  docu- 
ments revealed  a  devious  diplomacy.  Having  seen 
these  papers,  though  they  had  already  suspected 
their  existence,  how  could  the  Russians  place  faith 
in  their  own  justification  for  the  war?  Who  was  to 
blame?  Was  the  militarism  of  Germany  unique  in 
the  world?  Had  Imperial  Russia  been  faultless? 
Would  war  be  for  ever  banished  when  some  victori- 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       179 

ous  Russian  general  rode  home  triumphantly  from 
Berlin  as  Bonaparte  returned  to  Paris  from  Italy? 
To  the  Russian  the  analogy  was  uncomfortable. 

Russia  wanted  peace.  The  Revolution  was  over; 
the  Little  Father  had  crumpled  up  into  a  wealthy* 
and  innocuous  citoyen  and  the  whole  imperialistic 
system  in  all  its  loud  and  pretentious  emptiness  had 
burst.  But  everything  remained  to  be  done.  There 
were  lands  to  be  divided  and  ploughed;  factories  to 
be  built,  a  new  government  and  a  new  polity  to  be 
created.  To  the  peasant  a  tight  little  farm  seemed 
more  attractive  than  a  damp  grave  in  the  marshes, 
and  to  Russia  as  a  whole  the  chance  for  a  peaceful 
economic  development  more  worth  than  dominion 
in  Asia  Minor.  And  in  choosing  the  right  to  develop 
its  own  resources  rather  than  secure  Constantinople, 
the  nation  showed  a  sure  instinct  and  a  sense  of 
its  larger  national  interests.  Time  works  on  the 
side  of  Russia,  and  the  Revolution  gives  it  time. 
If  Russia  could  secure  a  fair  peace  for  herself,  her 
allies  and  her  enemies,  a  peace  without  annexations 
and  without  indemnities,  she  could  afford  to  give  up 
her  imperialistic  dreams.  Like  the  United  States, 
Russia  is  one  of  the  big,  uncrowded,  and  eventually 
secure  nations. 

What  Russia  offered  therefore  was  a  common 
peace  and  a  mutual  forgiveness.  To  the  mujik,  with 
his  deep  sense  of  a  primitive  Christianity,  with  his 
good  nature  and  his  unwillingness  to  make  fine  dis- 


180  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tinctions,  all  nations  and  peoples  were  alike  sinners, 
responsible  for  this  war.  "We  are  all  so  much  at 
fault, ' '  he  might  have  said, '  *  that  who  struck  the  first 
blow  or  struck  foul  is  less  important  than  how  we 
can  once  more  be  brothers.  We  peoples  of  Europe 
are  not  enemies  but  common  victims  of  a  single 
tragedy.  Let  there  be  no  punishment  or  even  as- 
sessment of  blame,  for  all  have  been  punished 
enough.  Let  us  not  ask  what  lands  belong  to  what 
people  by  evil  right  and  usage,  but  only  'What 
sovereignty  does  each  of  these  free  peoples  wish  to 
acknowledge?'  Let  Alsace  go  wherever  Alsatians 
freely  choose.  Let  there  be  no  compulsion,  for  com- 
pulsion is  evil,  no  revenge,  for  revenge  is  evil,  and  let 
there  be  peace." 

Considering  the  nation  as  a  continuous  historical 
entity,  the  change  from  Imperial  to  Democratic  Rus- 
sia was  in  the  nature  of  a  conversion,  a  deep  re- 
ligious houleversement.  And  it  was  with  the  en- 
thusiasm of  a  new  convert  that  Russia  appealed  to 
the  world  to  end  the  war.  It  was  at  this  moment  that 
one  of  the  greatest  opportunities  presented  itself  for 
a  truly  international  peace.  Had  the  United  States 
at  that  time  endorsed  the  proposals  of  the  Kerensky 
government,  or  had  she  later  attempted  to  come  to 
an  understanding  with  the  Bolsheviks,  the  two  na- 
tions, Russia  and  America,  might  have  forced  their 
Allies  to  agree  upon  a  reasonable  peace  and  have 
compelled  the   German  ruling  classes  to   come  to 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       181 

terms.  Unfortunately,  President  Wilson  did  not  rise 
to  the  unique  ojjportunity,  and  the  Allies  presented  a 
solid  opposition  to  Russia's  request.  **To  end  the 
war  now,"  they  replied,  "is  to  play  into  the  enemy's 
hands,  to  allow  her  to  prepare  for  a  new  attack." 
As  for  the  German  Government,  it  saw  in  Russia's 
generous  proposals  merely  a  chance  for  a  subtle 
diplomatic  chicanery.  It  made  overtures.  It  filled 
the  land  with  its  emissaries,  to  whom  Russia, 
anxious  for  peace,  listened  patiently.  But  it  soon 
appeared  that  what  Germany  wanted  was  not  what 
Russia  wanted,  a  universal  peace  based  on  justice, 
but  a  separate  peace  and  a  free  hand  against  her 
Western  enemies.  Germany's  ideals  and  ambitions 
were  those  of  the  parchments  in  the  Russian  ar- 
chives. What  Russia  had  been  Germany  still  was. 
Therefore  Russia  fought  on  as  she  was  compelled 
to  do.  She  fought  because  she  desired  to  retain  her 
democracy  and  believed  that  she  could  not  retain  it 
unless  Germany  secured  hers.  But  her  metliod  of 
fighting  was  different  from  any  the  war  had  yet 
seen.  She  used  intellectual  and  moral  rather  than 
physical  weapons.  Unable  to  invade  Germany,  or 
even  to  resist  invasion,  finding  it  impossible  to  feed 
her  immense  army,  she  changed  her  tactics.  As  she 
grew  weaker  she  became  more  assertive.  She  felt 
no  respect  for  iho  Kaiser  and  his  bemodalled  Gen- 
erals and  Gcheimrafp  and  did  not  pretend  to  respect 
them.    She    treated    these    worthy    dignitaries    as 


182  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

though  she  and  not  Germany  were  the  conqueror. 

This  was  a  new  and  maddening  diplomacy ;  a  novel 
defiance  in  the  name  not  of  intrinsic  power  and 
formidableness  but  of  the  better  nature  of  the  very 
people  defied.  The  Russian  democracy  had  a  vast 
moral  asset,  a  vast  moral  resource.  It  knew  that 
it  stood  for  progress,  and  for  enlightened  and  pacific 
international  relations.  It  enjoyed  the  prestige  of 
standing  for  the  democracies  of  the  world,  that  of 
Germany  included.  The  Russian  delegates  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  were  constantly  threatening  the  dignified 
German  plenipotentiaries  with  the  displeasure  of 
the  German  working  classes;  they  talked  over  the 
heads  of  these  generals  to  the  German  people  be- 
yond. They  made  no  pretence  of  military  strength, 
relying  not  upon  their  own  soldiers  but  upon  the 
mere  physical  difficulty  of  overrunning  Russia  and 
the  moral  reluctance  of  the  German  people  to  attempt 
the  task.  Take  Petrograd  if  you  wish,  they  prac- 
tically said;  take  Moscow,  Irkutsk,  Vladivostok.  It 
will  merely  mean  that  you  have  more  people  to  feed 
and  keep  in  order,  more  territory  to  cover.  Conquer 
us  by  all  means.  It  was  passive  resistance  carried 
to  its  logical  conclusion. 

The  real  strength  of  the  Bolsheviki,  however,  lay 
in  the  fact  that  they  represented  the  working  classes 
of  the  world.  The  war  is  approaching  a  stage 
where  the  workers  in  all  the  countries  are  rapidly 
gaining  in  power  and  influence.    And  what  they  de- 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       183 

sire  is  something  deeper  than  the  democracy  which 
prevailed  in  Europe  and  America  in  1914;  they  de- 
mand economic  and  social,  as  well  as  political  de- 
mocracy. They  do  not  wish  the  world  to  be  made 
safe  for  societies  ruled  by  trust  magnates  and  lesser 
capitalists,  with  all  their  sinuous  retainers  and  wrig- 
gling hangers-on.  They  have  nothing  to  do  with  a 
democracy  based  upon  the  exploitation  of  the  poor. 
Here  we  have  a  new  variant  of  the  theory  of  a 
democratic  war.  No  longer  does  the  issue  hinge 
chiefly  upon  the  relations  between  states  but  be- 
tween social  classes.  The  doctrine  is  obviously  early 
socialist,  before  socialism  had  been  toned  down  by 
half  a  century  of  parliamentarianism  and  com- 
promise, and  before  it  had  become  realistic  or 
learned  to  make  distinctions.  This  proletarian  de- 
mocracy is  different,  in  aspiration  at  least,  from  any 
other  that  we  know.  Its  temper  bears  the  same  rela- 
tion to  that  of  the  channelled  democracies  of  West- 
em  Europe  as  did  Primitive  Christianity  to  some  of 
our  well-starched  faiths  of  today.  It  is  violent,  ex- 
treme, vaguely  generous,  vaguely  denunciatory,  car- 
ing more  for  the  idea  than  for  the  narrow  reality, 
preferring  a  large  failure  to  a  little  victory.  It  is  a 
Democracy  with  more  faith  than  knowledge,  bound 
to  be  disappointed,  and  prepared  for  disappoint- 
ment.^    It  is  a  Democracy  which  opposes  not  only 

I  Today  (March  0,  lOlS)  the  Holsheviki  seem  to  have  failed  com- 
pletely either  to  make  a  reasonnMe  peace,  to  ofTer  passive  resistance, 
or  to  awaken  the  German  proletariat  to  revolt. 


184  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Militarism,  Autocracy  and  Conquest  but  also  such 
cherished  institutions  as  Private  Property  and 
Privilege. 

To  us  this  sudden  jump  of  the  Bolsheviki  into  the 
saddle  is  not  only  of  intrinsic  interest  but  is  of  even 
greater  importance  as  a  symptom  of  a  world-wide 
revelation,  and  of  a  coming  world-wide  revolution. 
This  Democracy  of  the  Proletariat  or  Dictatorship 
of  the  Proletariat — whichever  it  is — will  not  guide 
Russia  permanently,  for  it  will  either  go  down  or 
change.  Yet  it  is  not  only  the  father  to  more  stable 
democracies  to  follow  but  is  above  all  else  the  de- 
tached interpreter  of  the  war.  To  these  Bolshe\'iki, 
this  portentous  war  of  ours  is  not  the  true  war,  but 
a  superficial  conflict.  There  is  a  tear  beneath,  the 
war,  a  war  of  the  poor  and  exploited  of  all  the  world 
against  all  exploiters,  big  and  little,  respectable  and 
disreputable.  The  goal  to  which  the  Bolsheviki  look 
is  a  society  in  which  all  shall  have  an  equal  opportun- 
ity to  develop  latent  faculties,  where  every  child  born 
of  woman  is  to  have  his  place  in  the  sun.  Compared 
to  this  projected  revolution  of  the  entire  world  what 
matter  whether  the  poor  of  Trieste  are  exploited  by 
Austrian  or  Italian  capitalists'? 

All  through  the  dualized  world  this  conception 
of  the  war  beneath  the  war  appears  in  one  form  or 
another.  In  Italy,  France,  England,  Germany,  the 
United  States  there  runs  a  current,  weak  or  strong, 
against   class    domination.     The   victory    is    to    be 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       185 

gained  by  and  for  the  only  class  that  has  never  been 
victorious.  Already  labour  has  to  be  placated. 
What  labour  thinks,  what  labour  will  do  in  a  given 
contingency,  is  the  overriding  problem.  This  pro- 
letarian impulse,  which  may  be  traced  in  its  growth 
and  its  growing  severance  from  the  governments, 
was  obvious  even  before  the  war.  The  Russian 
revolt es  welcomed  the  world  conflict  because  they 
hoped  that  it  would  precipitate  the  social  revolution, 
as  the  Crimean  War  had  emancipated  the  serfs  and 
the  Japanese  War  inaugurated  the  constitutional 
system.  So,  too,  in  Italy,  syndicalists  hoped  that  the 
war  would  disrupt  their  own  inefficient  capitalistic 
system.  Today  similar  ideas  reveal  themselves  else- 
where. To  what  was  Lord  Lansdowne's  appeal  at- 
tributed, rightly  or  wrongly,  except  to  the  fear  that 
the  war,  if  continued,  would  bring  to  the  surface 
the  greater  war  beneath  the  war,  and  this  social 
upheaval  would  consign  all  lords,  spiritual  and 
temporal,  as  well  as  lords  by  the  grace  of  financial 
accumulation,  to  one  indiscriminate  scrap  heap?  If 
that  were  democracy,  and  it  were  to  leave  the  mas- 
ters of  the  world  penniless,  might  they  not  fight  too 
long  for  it? 

Such  is  the  meaning  of  the  Russian  propaganda 
as  it  has  culminated  in  the  activities  of  the  Bolshe- 
viki.  It  is  tlie  impulse  and  sentiment  behind  this 
movement,  not  its  specific  manifestations,  that  are 
significant.     Undoubtedly  these  Russian  revolution- 


186  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ists  have  committed  absurdities  because  they  are  an 
unbelievably  literal  folk,  taking  their  religion  and 
economics  so  textually  that  we  temporizing  people, 
who  like  even  our  virtues  in  decent  moderation,  are 
bewildered  and  repelled.  But  absurdities,  excesses 
and  boundless  inefficiencies  do  not  count  in  the  long 
run,  and  what  remains  is  an  essential  truth  hidden 
under  grotesque  exaggerations,  a  real  fidelity  to  a 
crude  force  working  for  a  true  socialized  democracy. 
And  all  this  is  not  a  Russian,  but  a  world  phenome- 
non. The  Russian  Revolution  is  merely  the  visible 
part  of  the  iceberg. 

Some  of  the  actions  of  these  wild  Bolsheviki  have 
been  wise.  We  have  long  talked  about  open  diplo- 
macy but  no  government  ever  before  picked  up  an 
armful  of  secret  treaties  and  threw  them  out  of  the 
window  to  the  journalists  below.  By  so  doing  the 
Russians  cleared  the  atmosphere  astonishingly. 
They  were  also  able  to  achieve  what  the  Allied 
diplomats  had  failed  to  accomplish — to  reveal  the 
German  Government's  plans  of  conquest.  It  would 
be  a  world  tragedy,  however,  if  the  Bolsheviki  were 
to  be  induced  to  sign  a  permanent  treaty  with  Ger- 
many. An  exploitation  of  Russian  socialism  by 
German  imperialists  would  be  a  disastrous  blow 
against  world  democracy. 

What  eventual  success  the  Bolsheviki  will  have, 
even  if  they  secure  a  long  lease  of  political  control, 
is  problematical.    They  are  attempting  in  the  face  of 


THE  WAR  BENEATH  THE  WAR       187 

opposition  at  home  and  abroad  to  perform  a  difficult, 
perhaps  an  intrinsically  impossible  task.  They  are 
seeking  to  erect  a  full-fledged  socialistic  state  upon  a 
society  which  has  not  gone  through  the  long  dis- 
cipline of  capitalism.  They  are  dealing  with  un- 
educated people,  who  have  not  yet  made  themselves 
into  the  acquisitive,  short-sighted  but  clear-viewed 
men  and  women  who  constitute  the  population  of 
capitalistic  countries.  They  are  working  with  a  so- 
ciety in  which  resources  are  undeveloped  and  eco- 
nomic organization  is  primitive,  in  competition 
with  higlily  organized  and  efficient  capitalistic  so- 
cieties. Can  they  hold  together?  Can  they  bind 
into  some  sort  of  union  the  miscellaneous  artisans, 
peasants  and  shopkeepers  of  the  vast  Russian  re- 
public? Can  tliey  enthuse  with  a  common  inspira- 
tion millions  of  different  race  and  language  \sithin 
their  country?  Or  will  they  not  break  down  through 
a  lack  of  internal  cohesion  and  be  forced  to  take  up 
again  the  long  march  toward  social  co-operation 
through  a  gradually  enfolding  capitalistic  develop- 
ment? 

If  they  do  fail,  they  will  still  have  succeeded. 
Though  the  Russian  socialistic  democracy  prove 
blind,  unripe  and  incapable  of  immediate  sun-ival,  it 
will  have  spoken  a  word  that  has  appealed  to  mil- 
lions, not  only  in  Russia  but  in  other  lands.  What 
the  Bolsheviki  do,  even  though  they  end  ingloriously 
in  some  morass,  will  break  the  spell  of  centuries  and 


188  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

give  a  new  hope  to  men  who  have  always  devoutly 
believed  that  only  those  who  were  born  with  spurs 
could  ride,  and  all  others  must  look  up  to  the  riders 
reverently.  They  have  given  birth  to  the  hope  that 
the  time  is  not  far  off  when  the  common  people  of  the 
world  will  be  wise  enough  to  rule.  In  the  long,  slow- 
moving  history  of  democracy  the  Bolsheviki,  what- 
ever their  disasters,  will  take  their  place.  For  to 
these  unlettered  workmen  the  war  has  become,  in  a 
sense  which  we  in  America  can  hardly  comprehend,  a 
war  for  democracy.  The  War  Beneath  the  War 
stands  revealed. 

Yet  war  is  not  won  by  inspiration  alone,  nor  by 
a  vision  of  a  beautiful  society  to  come.  It  is  won 
in  the  present  against  present  obdurate  enemies,  and 
those  who  do  not  see  quite  so  far  into  the  future  have 
often  an  advantage  over  those  who  look  a  century 
ahead.  Whatever  the  ultimate  hope  of  the  great 
ascension  of  the  working  classes  of  the  world,  there 
lies  today  athwart  the  path  of  these  workers  a  power- 
ful and  aggressive  nation  in  which  the  wage-earners, 
though  class-conscious,  are  held  down  by  force  and 
prestige.  Whether  we  seek  the  democracy  that 
Earl  Grey  and  Lloyd  George  seek  or  the  broader 
democracy  demanded  by  the  Bolsheviki,  we  must 
sooner  or  later  obtain  the  adhesion  of  our  last  aUy, 
the  democratic  masses  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER  X 

IS   GERMANY    INCORRIGIBLE  t 

Much  ink  has  been  spilled  over  the  question  whether 
the  German  people — as  distinguished  from  its  Gov- 
ernment— is  responsible  for  this  war.  Some  writers 
attach  blame  to  the  Emperor  alone,  to  the  Crown 
Prince,  to  a  few  military  chiefs  and  Hotspur  profes- 
sors; others  accuse  the  clamorous  sect  of  Pan-Ger- 
mans; still  others  widen  the  charge  to  include  the 
whole  aristocratic  brood  of  Junker  landlords  and  the 
big,  upstart  industrialists  of  the  Khine,  with  their 
pliant  accomplices  in  the  banks,  government  offices 
and  newspapers  of  Berlin.  Finally  the  German 
people  as  a  whole — the  sixty-seven  millions  of  it — is 
indicted.  By  sins  of  commission  and  omission,  by 
truculence,  moral  insensibility  or  sheer  lamblike  obe- 
dience, the  whole  German  population — officials, 
wage-earners,  artists,  musicians;  the  quaint  toy- 
makers  of  Niirnberg,  the  half-fed  mill-girls  of  Chem- 
nitz; hotel-keepers,  pawnbrokers,  insurance  agents, 
hucksters,  peasants,  philanthropists,  prostitutes  and 
poets,  all  of  the  vast  German  people  in  its  complete 
integrity  has,  it  is  claimed,  brought  upon  itself  this 
sin.  It  has  at  least  a  secondary  guilt  as  an  accom- 
plice after  the  fact. 

Our  official  theory  absolves  the  German  people. 

189 


190  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

We,  the  American  nation,  are  alleged  to  be  fighting 
against  an  autocratic  government  but  are  on  terms 
of  friendship  and  amity  with  the  excellent  German 
people.  "We  have  no  quarrel,"  said  President 
Wilson  in  his  war  message  of  April  2, 1917,  "with  the 
German  people.  We  have  no  feeling  towards  them 
but  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship.  It  was  not 
upon  their  impulse  that  their  Government  acted  in 
entering  this  war.  It  was  not  with  their  previous 
knowledge  or  approval." 

Obviously  this  theory  cannot  be  carried  over  into 
the  actual  conduct  of  the  war.  We  speak  of  "alien 
enemies"  and  place  moderate  restrictions  upon  the 
Germans  within  our  midst.  It  is  the  German  peo- 
ple, not  the  Kaiser  alone,  against  whom  we  shoot 
our  guns  and  whom  we  seek  to  starve.  We  fight  not 
only  against  Germany's  armed  forces  but  as  far  as 
necessary  against  her  whole  population.  Nor  can 
we  assume  that  the  German  people  is  out  of  sym- 
pathy with  its  government.  Though  there  was  a 
German  peace  party  in  1914,  it  was  less  strong  than 
similar  peace  groups  in  England  and  America.  We 
cannot  honestly  claim  that  in  joining  the  Alliance 
we  are  meeting  the  wishes  of  the  German  rank  and 
file.  The  most  we  can  assert  is  that  this  deluded 
people  will  eventually  recognize  that  we,  its  apparent 
enemies,  are  forwarding  its  cause.  We  are  fighting, 
says  Mr.  Wilson,  for  the  liberation  of  the  world's 
peoples,  ^ '  the  German  peoples  included, ' ' 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?         191 

To  Germans  who  are  making  the  last  sacrifice 
for  their  Government  this  large  assumption  of  ours 
seems  insolent  and  hypocritical,  a  calculated  appeal 
to  our  own  citizens  of  German  birth.  Yet  in  the 
past  similar  claims  have  often  been  validated.  In 
our  Revolutionary  War  Americans  did  fight  the 
battle  of  British  Liberals  against  George  the  Third, 
and  in  the  Civil  War  the  victory  of  the  North  proved 
in  the  end  a  benefit  to  the  white  majority  of  the 
South.  The  very  fact  that  the  claim  can  be  honestly 
advanced  is  an  indictment  against  a  semi-autocratic 
government.  Because  the  German  political  system 
is  so  largely  unrepresentative,  the  charge  that  its 
government  may  be  fought  by  a  nation  friendly  to  its 
people  is  likely  to  be  made. 

The  question  whether  government  or  people  is 
our  enemy  is  not  purely  academic,  since  upon  its 
answer  depend  the  terms  of  peace  which,  in  the 
event  of  victory,  we  can  safely  propose.  We  are  en- 
deavouring to  base  peace  upon  a  new  state  of  world 
society,  in  which  all  the  nations  will  live  together 
under  a  common  international  morality  and  a  com- 
mon international  law.  But  such  a  system  is  impos- 
sible if  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  world's  peoples  is 
hopelessly  militaristic  and  aggressive  and  cannot  be 
trusted.  We  are  not  soon  likely  to  place  our  faith 
in  the  German  Government.  Wo  fear  the  over-might 
and  irresponsibility  of  the  ruling  class.  The  mili- 
tarists are  too  powerful,  and  their  minds  too  set 


192  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

upon  adventure  and  dominion.  They  can  evoke  war 
too  suddenly.  Under  such  a  government,  says  Mr. 
Wilson,  ''cunningly  contrived  plans  of  deception  or 
aggression,  carried,  it  may  be  from  generation  to 
generation,  can  be  worked  out  and  kept  from  the  light 
— within  the  privacy  of  courts  or  behind  the  carefully 
guarded  confidences  of  a  narrow  and  privileged 
class. ' '  With  a  republic  in  Germany  we  should  feel 
more  secure  if  the  nation  as  a  whole  were  fair-minded 
and  pacific. 

Since  our  actual  entrance  into  the  war,  however, 
a  change  in  our  mood  has  come  about  in  our  attitude 
towards  the  German  people  similar  to  that  which 
took  place  in  England  after  1914.  At  first  the 
British  leaders,  hoping  for  a  German  revolution, 
made  much  of  this  distinction  between  government 
and  people,  but  when  the  anticipated  revolt  did  not 
occur,  the  German  people  were  harshly  condemned. 
They  were  described  as  docile,  brutal,  scientifically- 
barbarous  state-worshippers  and  self-worshippers. 
The  Germans,  wrote  Professor  Sayce,  "are  still  what 
they  were  fifteen  centuries  ago,  the  barbarians  who 
raided  our  ancestors  ( !)  and  destroyed  the  civiliza- 
tion of  the  Roman  Empire. "  "No  terms, ' '  wrote  Sir 
Alfred  E.  Turner,  "can  safely  be  made  with  such  a 
people  of  outsiders,  to  whom  the  quality  of  mercy 
is  not  known,  and  who,  like  all  other  savages,  regard 
generosity  and  forbearance  as  signs  of  weakness."  * 

1  Saturday  Review,  Vol.  120,  Sept.  18,  1915. 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?  193 

The  German  nation,  said  Major  General  C.  E.  Call- 
well,  is  "a  nation  of  barbarians,  a  nation  without 
honour,  without  chivalry,  and  without  shame, ' '  a  na- 
tion from  whom  "paper  guarantees  are  worse  than 
worthless,"  ^  a  nation  that  must  be  crushed  and  per- 
manently held  down  by  force. 

Today  many  Americans  think  likewise.  It  is 
claimed  that  the  whole  present  generation  of  Ger- 
mans is  so  inoculated  with  the  vices  of  submissive- 
ness,  militarism  and  regimentation  that  there  re- 
mains no  hope  for  them  except  killing.  No  one  is 
quite  logical  enough  to  advocate  the  surgical  ster- 
ilization of  sixty-seven  millions  or  their  wholesale 
slaughter  in  cold  blood,  but  one  encounters  here  and 
there  the  more  modest  program  of  killing  and  maim- 
ing a  dozen  million  Germans  to  encourage  the  others 
to  a  peace-loving  life. 

"Without  quite  this  amiable  ferocity  other  Amer- 
icans permit  themselves  to  be  guided  by  conceptions 
equally  rigid.  They  despair  of  Germany  ever  en- 
tering into  a  better  state  of  mind.  Tliey  pretend  to 
believe  that  Germans  are  universally  and  inerad- 
icably  bi-utal,  aggressive  and  militaristic,  without 
honour  or  compunction,  the  mad  dogs  of  the  world, 
to  be  shot  at  sight.  They  ridicule  the  clumsy  dis- 
tinction between  Prussians  and  non-Prussians,  be- 
tween militarists  and  gentle,  beer-drinking  idealists, 
since  not  every  one  who  lives  in  Prussia  is  in  this 

i  Blackwood's  Magazine,  Vol.  200,  Aug.,  li)16,  p.  283. 


194  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

sense  a  Prussian  and  many  Saxons,  Bavarians  and 
Hessians  are  more  Prussian  than  the  Junker.  Some 
Americans  even  claim  that  all  Germans  are  respon- 
sible specifically,  for  all  the  outrages  committed  by 
the  German  armies,  since  at  no  time  has  an  effective 
protest  been  levelled  despite  numberless  atrocities. 
There  is  unfortunately  much  truth  in  this  charge. 
Admitting  that  Germans  receive  a  false  account  of  all 
happenings,  there  still  remain  a  popular  insensibility 
and  an  unwillingness  to  express  even  disapproval, 
which  are  discouraging  features  of  a  lack  of  a  revo- 
lutionary sense. 

To  some  extent,  however,  war  brutalizes  all  na- 
tions. But  for  the  passions  evoked  by  war,  the 
Allied  nations  could  not  view  with  their  present 
peace  of  mind  the  tragedy  of  the  slow  starvation  of 
the  German  people,  the  death  of  babies  and  of 
the  aged  and  the  fearful  ravages  of  tuberculosis.  I 
do  not  claim  that  this  starvation  policy  is  unjustified, 
but  only  that  it  is  tragic.  Similarly  we  in  the  Allied 
countries  have  read  with  pain  of  Russian  atrocities 
against  Polish  Jews  and  did  not  protest.  Instead  we 
passed  over  hastily  to  the  story  of  Belgium,  where 
our  pity  and  horror  might  find  free  vent.  "War  de- 
grades and  solidifies  nations.  Primitive  passions 
rise  to  the  surface,  and  remorse  and  justice  are  re- 
pressed. If  in  the  future  all  the  peoples  of  the  world 
were  to  remain  what  they  are  in  war  time,  cruel, 
mendacious  and  crassly  unfair,  little  hope  could  be 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?         195 

found  for  international  life.  Even  though  we  indict 
the  whole  German  people  of  today,  we  should  not 
carry  over  our  conclusions  into  the  future.  Our  re- 
liance upon  the  German  people  must  depend  pri- 
marily upon  what  it  will  prove  to  be  in  1930,  not  on 
what  it  is  today  under  the  stress  of  war. 

In  seeking  to  look  into  this  future  we  are  met  by 
the  disconcerting  fact  that  in  the  past  Germans,  as 
compared  with  English,  French,  Italians  and  Rus- 
sians, have  been  afflicted  by  an  extraordinary  sub- 
servience and  political  servility.  Though  not  true 
of  all  Germans  this  quality  is  characteristic  of  the 
traditional  and  admired  type.  Such  men  place  an 
exaggerated  value  on  duty,  especially  to  superiors. 
They  worship  law  and  order,  as  though  these  were 
the  supreme  good  instead  of  a  mere  means.  Though 
they  possess  initiative,  it  lies  too  narrowly  within 
prescribed  bounds.  They  live  too  much  by  order; 
accept  too  willingly  their  place  in  a  scheme  of  things, 
which  is  not  an  entirely  bad  scheme,  but  which  leans 
to  an  excess  of  rigidity.  The  average  German  is  too 
philosophical  and  above  all  too  subjective  concerning 
political  arrangements.  He  believes  that  freedom 
lies  in  one's  own  soul,  that  a  man  is  free  if  his  mind 
travels  at  ease  over  all  the  facts  of  life,  though  a 
police  official  stand  outside  his  study  door.  At  once 
constrained  and  protected,  he  is  not  at  liberty  to 
indulge  wayward  impulses  though  he  is  safe  from 
the  wayward  impulses  of  neighbours.     He  has  gro^\^l 


196  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

to  love  his  neat  routine,  his  clean  streets,  his  Sunday 
music,  his  ordered  life,  in  which  many  things  which 
more  restless  peoples  lose  are  conserved  for  him. 
The  vice  of  the  German,  in  other  words,  is  that 
he  has  too  many  virtues;  he  is  too  disciplined, 
contented,  submissive,  unrevolutionary.  Long  and 
loudly  have  we  praised  this  modest,  dutiful  and  self- 
abnegating  German,  who  meddles  with  no  man. 
Possibly,  however,  it  is  this  very  man  who  is  most  to 
blame  for  Germany's  aggressive  policy,  if  indeed  we 
can  speak  in  terms  of  praise  or  blame  on  this  high 
level,  where  opposing  nations,  institutions  and  prin- 
ciples clash. 

Fortunately,  however,  this  docile  and  dutiful  subr 
ject  does  not  constitute  the  whole  German  popula- 
tion. A  new  man  comes  to  the  fore,  more  nervous, 
mobile  and  discontented.  One  finds  him  among  the 
pushing  business  organizers,  among  wage-earners, 
schooled  in  the  trade  union  and  the  Socialist  party; 
one  finds  him  even  among  peasants.  This  new  Ger- 
man holds  but  weakly  to  the  traditions  of  subservi- 
ence and  to  love  of  dynasty.  He  is  more  likely  to 
fight  for  democracy  and  liberty.  Such  men  have  not 
yet  been  willing  to  die  by  thousands  for  their  new 
ideal,  and  on  the  contrary  they  have  died  by  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  for  the  things  against  which  they 
strive.  Yet  here  a  leaven  works.  Here  is  a  growing 
force,  opposed  to  the  prevailing  submissiveness. 

When,  therefore,  we  inquire  whether  after  the  war 


IS  GERMANY  IXCOP.RIGIBLE?         197 

the  German  people  will  be  strongly  militaristic  we 
are  met  by  perplexing  difficulties.  There  are  three 
general  theories  supporting  the  prophecy  of  a  per- 
manent German  militarism.  The  first  is  that  Ger- 
mans are  by  heredity  submissive  and  militaristic ;  the 
second,  that  they  are  so  by  reason  of  a  thousand- 
year-long  discipline,  during  which  these  qualities 
have  become  fixed  mental  habits,  in  harmony  with 
their  whole  body  of  habits,  and,  therefore,  not  to  be 
uprooted  in  a  few  generations.  The  third  theory  is 
more  optimistic.  It  asserts  that  the  submissive  and 
militaristic  quality  of  the  Germans  has  been  bred  by 
an  intensive  education  lasting  forty  years,  and  that 
at  best  we  must  wait  for  a  new  generation  before  we 
may  expect  a  reassuring  change. 

All  of  these  theories  seem  exaggerated.  The  last 
thousand  years  have  doubtless  tended  to  produce 
habits  of  submissiveness  in  Germans,  and  popular 
education  since  1870  has  more  obviously  worked  in 
this  direction  than  in  other  countries.  We  have, 
therefore,  to  deal  not  only  with  conviction  but  habit. 
In  these  days,  however,  habits  are  easily  broken. 
Five  years  of  city  life  so  completely  transform  the 
young  peasant,  despite  a  thousand  years  of  rural 
habituation,  tliat  lie  can  never  return  to  his  country- 
life.  Ancient  loyalties  vanish  swiftly;  Russia 
changes  overnight  and  China  itself  accepts  now  val- 
uations of  life.  And  even  as  early  as  1914  the  Ger- 
innri"  -^^oro  not  mere  tools.     They  read  newspapers. 


198  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

and  even  a  government-controlled  press  cannot  in 
peace  time  keep  out  all  the  news.  The  Germans 
amused  themselves  with  all  sorts  of  mild  insubordi- 
nations and  gently  insurrectionary  ideas.  There 
were  millions  who  were  not  submissive  and  not  mil- 
itaristic. 

So  real  was  this  latent  refractoriness  of  certain 
elements  of  the  German  population  that  the  Gov- 
ernment was  forced  to  resort  to  falsehood  to  secure 
a  united  public  opinion.  It  alleged  that  the  Cos- 
sacks had  already  invaded  Prussia,  that  the  French 
had  bombarded  German  cities,  that  a  league  of  na- 
tions had  plotted  against  the  Fatherland,  and  that 
the  Kaiser  had  done  all  he  could  to  avert  the  conflict. 
Upon  this  distortion  of  facts  it  was  difficult  for  a 
patriotic  German,  however  democratically  and  inter- 
nationally inclined,  to  refuse  to  defend  his  country. 
Moreover,  following  the  war's  outbreak  the  entire 
history  of  forty  years  was  reinterpreted  to  make 
Germany  appear  the  attacked  party.  The  theory  of 
encirclement,  the  theory  of  Russian  ambition,  French 
revenge  and  British  envy,  united  against  a  pious 
and  contented  German  people,  the  theory  of  a  crafty 
world-destroyer  in  the  person  of  Edward  the  Sev- 
enth, were  resurrected  and  revamped.  Unfortu- 
nately there  was  just  enough  in  the  past  actions  of 
Russia,  France  and  England  to  give  a  measure  of 
plausibility  to  these  charges.  Further,  a  deep-lying 
economic  unrest  and  an  uncertainty  concerning  Ger- 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?         199 

many's  economic  future  rendered  the  Germans  more 
than  usually  credulous.  The  Slav  invasion  seemed 
a  real  peril;  the  attempted  forcible  dissolution  of 
Austria-Hungary  could  not  but  be  envisaged  as  a 
menace  to  Germany's  safety.  Moreover  certain 
groups,  far  from  following  a  mere  instinct  of  loy- 
alty, confidently  expected  a  concrete  economic  gain 
from  the  war.  Not  sheer  love  of  dominion  recon- 
ciled the  Germans  to  this  conflict  but  an  intricate 
complex  of  ideas  and  emotions  of  which  greed,  fear, 
and  a  desire  to  preserve  class  prestige  and  power 
formed  a  part.  Finally  stupidity  and  bad-faith  on 
the  part  of  Germany's  neighbours  rendered  the 
growth  of  a  war-spirit,  once  war  began,  absolutely 
certain. 

With  the  early  German  victories  a  sinister  change 
came  over  the  population.  Even  before  the  war 
there  had  been  manifested  an  insolent  and  pedantic 
self-exaltation,  accompanied  by  an  immoderate  de- 
preciation of  other  nations.  German  faith,  German 
virtue,  das  deutsche  Wesen  were  fulsomely  praised, 
and  the  real  successes  of  Germany  in  science,  music, 
business  and  government  were  grossly  exaggerated. 
A  febrile  chauvinism,  due  to  Germany's  rapid  prog- 
ress, was  exploited,  and  plans  of  conquest  were  read 
by  millions  of  once  placid  people,  devoutly  believing 
that  Germany  should  have  its  wide  place  in  the  sun. 
Finally  this  self-exaltation  became  monstrous.  De- 
rided by  all  other  cultural  nations,  Germany  fell  back 


200  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

upon  herself,  appealing  from  the  adverse  judgment 
of  the  civilized  world  to  fantastic  self-laudation. 
**If  God  is  for  us,"  said  Pastor  Walter  Lehmann, 
**who  can  be  against  us?  It  is  enough  for  us  to  be  a 
part  of  God."  ''Germany  is  the  centre  of  God's 
plans  for  the  world,"  we  are  "a  nation  which  is 
God's  seed-corn  for  the  future."  "Germany  is  the 
future  of  humanity."  ^ 

To  those  who  wish  to  observe  how  abruptly  Ger- 
many's critical  spirit  crumbled  under  the  stress  of 
war,  hundreds  of  pamphlets  and  books  are  now  avail- 
able. ^  They  show  a  dismal  mental  degeneration,  an 
illimitable  self-praise  bordering  on  insanity,  and  to- 
wards foreign  nations  a  fury  of  vindictive  hatred 
which  must  have  left  the  intellectual  gutter-snipes  of 
other  lands  speechless  with  envy.  This  violent  self- 
laudation,  moreover,  was  but  the  floral  decoration 
for  a  mania  for  conquest,  which  spread  like  fire  over 
the  country.  It  was  held  that  Germany,  having  been 
successful  in  her  defensive  war,  was  justified  in 
utilizing  the  chance  of  a  thousand  years  to  redress 
the  injustices  of  geography  and  history.  The  wild- 
est programs  of  annexation  were  boldly  announced. 

This  is  the  case  against  the  German  people.  They 
are  still  at  a  comparatively  low  stage  in  democratic 

iBang  (J.  P.)  "Hurrah  and  Hallelujah,"  p.  75 

2  Of  these  perhaps  the  best  compilation  is  the  heavily  documented 
little  book  of  Dr.  J.  P.  Bang,  Professor  of  Theolosry  at  the  University 
of  Copenhagen,  entitled  "Hurrah  and  Hallelujah,  The  Teaching  of 
Gernjany's  Poets,  Prophets,  Professors  and  Preachers." 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?  201 

evolution,  enduring  an  unrepresentative  govern- 
ment and  displaying  as  yet  little  talent  for  revolu- 
tion; they  were,  before  1914,  in  a  mood  of  self- 
exaltation  ;  they  made  few  and  weak  protests  against 
the  barbaric  conduct  of  their  war;  finally  they  con- 
curred, to  a  surprising  extent,  in  plans  of  aggression 
and  conquest. 

The  admission  of  every  count  of  this  indictment, 
however,  does  not  leave  us  hopeless  for  the  future. 
These  German  failures  are  accounted  for  by  the 
events  of  the  last  half-century.  The  success  of  Bis- 
marck's diplomacy,  the  easy  victories  over  Austria 
and  France,  a  rapidly  growing  sea-power,  an  ex- 
panding German  industry',  the  ultra-sudden  trans- 
lation of  the  peasant  to  new  industrial  cities — in 
short  an  astounding  revolution  in  German  life,  both 
in  external  and  internal  aspects,  sufTicos  to  explain 
this  change  in  mentality.  Yet  what  has  been  altered 
can  be  altered  again,  and  what  destroyed  restored. 
The  popular  German  conceptions  of  1914  have  been 
vastly  changed.  Unless  Germany  wins  this  war,  as 
a  result  of  the  blunders  and  short-sightedness  of  the 
Allies,  the  Germans  will  never  again  believe  that 
France  is  decadent,  Russia  barbarous,  Great  Britain 
incapable.  Never  again  will  they  believe  that  Ger- 
many is  the  only  land  of  Kultur.  Nor,  barring  such 
a  victory,  will  it  longer  seem  wise  to  entrust  tlioir 
affairs  to  a  fist-banging  Junkertum,  efficient  in  war- 
fare but  bungling  in  the  large  diplomacy  without 


202  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

which  war  plans  are  like  playing  with  tin  soldiers. 
The  Germans  have  been  on  an  emotional  debauch. 
They  have  refused  to  be  sobered.  Yet  sober,  never- 
theless, they  must  inevitably  become.  As  nation 
after  nation  enters  the  war,  registering  its  protest 
against  German  polity,  as  these  external  admoni- 
tions become  reinforced  by  the  tedium  of  a  war, 
which  persists  tragically  despite  German  conquests, 
the  mood  in  Germany  changes.  A  spirit  of  ques- 
tioning begins  to  manifest  itself. 

The  beginnings  of  this  change  in  mood  are  already 
discernible  although  they  are  obscured  by  the  strict 
and  subtle  German  censorship  which  tells  the  news- 
papers not  only  what  not  to  say  but  also  what  to 
say.  The  courageous  action  of  Karl  Liebknecht, 
the  strong  protests  of  the  Minority  Socialists,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  famous  Reichstag  Majority  program, 
(in  which  Socialists,  Clericals  and  other  parties 
joined),  indicate,  as  do  also  the  frequent  suppres- 
sions of  the  Vorwdrts  and  other  journals,  that  there 
is  a  real  sentiment  in  Germany  for  a  constructive 
peace  making  for  internationalism.  In  Austria  this 
sentiment  appears  to  be  even  stronger.  It  is  easy  to 
belittle  this  underground  movement  and  to  deride 
it  because  it  is  suppressed.  But  for  twelve  years 
(from  1878  to  1890),  the  German  Socialist  Party  was 
itself  suppressed,  and  yet  grew  rapidly  under  the 
clamped  lid.  When  the  official  pressure  relaxes  a 
little  we  may  be  surprised  at  the  rapidity  with  which 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?         203 

liberalism,  democracy  and  revolt  against  autocracy 
have  been  swelling  under  the  heel  of  the  militarists.' 

From  the  mass  of  evidence  on  both  sides,  there- 
fore, it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  the  Germans  are  not 
by  race  or  heredity  militaristic,  and  that  their  tra- 
ditions and  education,  which  incline  them  in  that 
direction,  are  being  negated  by  powerful  influences, 
springing  out  of  new  industrial  conditions  and  out 
of  contact  with  foreign  nations.  The  discipline  of 
the  great  city,  factory,  trade  union,  co-operative  so- 
ciety, is  relentlessly  opposed  to  submissiveness. 
This  new  discipline,  although  unfavourably  influ- 
enced by  the  barracks,  tends  to  become  stronger. 
The  will  to  revolt  grows,  even  though  the  revolt 
seems  superficially  to  be  a  very  German,  slow  and 
scientifically  predetermined  and  bloodless  revolt,^ 

On  the  other  hand  the  revolt,  when  it  comes,  if  it 

1  It  is  not  improbable,  however,  that  this  very  frrowth  of  liberal 
sentiment,  to  which  President  Wilson  has  repeat(Hily  appealed,  will 
be  a  factor  in  postponint;  the  end  of  the  war.  The  more  insecure 
the  German  autocracy  feels  itself  the  harder  and  longer  will  it  fight 
in  the  hope  of  a  saving  victory. 

2  Even  Professor  Vcblen,  who  believes  that  Germany,  like  Japan,  is 
relatively  unchangeable,  and  must  be  "eliminated,'"  is  not  hopeless 
concerning  the  ultimate  growth  of  parliamentary  discretion  in  Ger- 
many. "It  may  be  true  that,  for  the  present,  on  critical  or  weighty 
measures  the  parliamentary  discretion  extends  no  farther  than  re- 
spectfully to  say  '•/«  ivnhl.'  But  then,  Ja  wohl  is  also  something; 
and  there  is  no  telling  where  it  may  all  lead  to  in  the  long  course 
of  years.  One  has  a  vague  appreliension  that  this  'Ja  uohV  may 
some  day  come  to  be  a  customarily  necessary  form  for  authentication, 
so  that  withholding  it  (fichiit  ea  (lottj  may  even  come  to  count 
an  an  effectual  veto  on  measures  so  pointedly  neglected. "  The 
Nature  of  Peace,  by  Thorstein  Veblen,  New  York,  1917,  pp.  191-92. 


204  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

does  come,  may  not  be  at  all  slow  or  bloodless.  It 
is  true  that  we  are  here  trenching  upon  the  field  of 
speculation,  where  we  must  trust  to  insecure  esti- 
mates of  vague  facts.  What  is  clear,  however,  is 
that  the  much  derided  submissiveness  of  the  Ger- 
mans finds  its  cause,  not  only  in  an  unfortunate  his- 
torical development,  but  equally  in  the  fact  that  the 
government  against  which  the  German  people  woul^ 
have  to  revolt  is  in  the  highest  degree  both  capable 
and  ruthless.  To  overthrow  the  Russian  bureau- 
cracy required  many  decades  of  propaganda  and 
preparation,  and  yet  that  task  was  child's  play  com- 
pared to  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  immensely  com- 
petent, long-headed,  and  heavy-fisted  Prussian  oli- 
garchy. Prestige,  wealth,  science,  organizing  ability, 
as  well  as  a  remarkable  capacity  for  tempering  au- 
tocracy to  the  governed,  all  work  in  favour  of  the 
German  ruling  classes  and  against  any  overt  revolu- 
tionary act.  To  assail  with  bare  hands  the  effi- 
cient German  government,  propped  up  by  a  million 
loyal  civil  servants  and  a  million  bayonets,  is  a  task 
likely  to  appeal  to  none  but  a  desperate  man. 

At  the  end  of  this  war,  however,  assuming  that 
Germany  does  not  win  the  war,  there  are  likely  to 
be  many  such  desperate  men  in  Germany.  The 
war  has  taught  the  soldier  not  to  over-value  life, 
not  to  care  overmuch  whether  he  is  shot  in  the 
trenches,  starved  in  his  home,  or  garroted  by  the 
public  executioner.    There  will  be  many  who  will 


IS  GERMANY  INCORRIGIBLE?         205 

not  hold  their  life  at  a  high  price.  If  then,  by  any- 
chance,  a  stray  shot  starts  a  popular  uprising,  and  if, 
as  is  not  inconceivable,  the  army  itself  proves  to  be 
infected  with  revolutionary  ideas,  the  change  that 
will  come  over  the  spirit  of  German  life  may  be  as 
complete  and  startling  as  any  in  human  history. 
The  millions  of  intelligent  German  workers,  who 
have  so  wonderfully  managed  their  trade  unions, 
their  co-operative  stores  and  their  Socialist  Party 
would  be  able  to  organize  a  revolution  quite  as  thor- 
oughly. Of  course  they  will  not  rebel  while  they 
believe  that  a  collapse  of  Germany  would  mean  her 
spoliation  by  enemies  at  the  frontier.  They  may 
not  even  rebel  after  the  war.  And  yet  they  may. 
Only  a  rash  prophet  would  predict  tliat  German  so- 
ciety and  the  German  state  of  mind  will  be  the  same, 
ten,  five  or  even  two  years  hence  as  they  are  today. 

Even  before  the  war  the  prestige  of  the  German 
ruling  classes  was  gradually  sinking,  and  a  few 
more  decades  of  peace  might  easily  have  brought  it 
to  an  end.  Nothing  but  a  complete  German  victory 
can  now  make  the  war  worth  its  cost,  and  even  a 
complete  victory  may  fail  to  do  so.  Defeated,  or 
merely  frustrated,  Germany's  rulers  would  have  to 
go  back  to  their  people  comparatively  em-pty-handed. 
It  would  be  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  her  militar- 
ism. 

The  education  of  the  German  people  during  the 
war  will  be  continued  in  peace.     They  will  then  have 


206  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ample  time  to  count  their  dead  and  maimed,  cast  up 
their  losses,  and  apportion  the  blame — and  the  taxes. 
They  will  not  be  entirely  proud  of  their  record.  The 
German  commercial  traveller  in  foreign  lands  will 
hear  many  unpleasant  truths,  and  what  is  told  him  he 
will  tell  again.  Credulity,  prejudice,  passion  will  in 
a  measure  pass.  The  judgment  of  the  outside  world, 
tempered  by  the  calmness  of  peace,  will  have  its  ap- 
peal. The  foreign  arraignment  of  their  ruling 
classes  will  eventually  be  accepted  as  true  by  those 
Germans  who  for  political  reasons  desire  to  attack 
their  government. 

A  frustration  of  Germany  thus  means  a  growth  of 
democracy,  a  change  in  her  political  balance  of 
power  and  a  revolution  in  her  opinions  and  pre- 
possessions, which  will  cause  submissiveness  to  de- 
cline and  render  improbable  a  new  attack. 


CHAPTER  XI 

A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE 

In  a  speech  delivered  in  January,  1918,  former  Pres- 
ident Koosevelt  said:  ''We  must  accept  no  peace  ex- 
cept the  peace  of  overwhelming  victory.  To  accept 
an  inconclusive  peace  would  mean  that  the  whole  war 
would  have  to  be  fought  over  again  by  ourselves  or 
our  children.  To  accept  an  inconclusive  peace  would 
really  mean  to  work  for  a  German  victory." 

According  to  Mr.  Roosevelt  there  is  no  ''half  way 
ground."  "Either  we  are  fighting  to  give  liberty  to 
the  subject  races  in  Austria  and  Turkey,  either  we 
are  fighting  for  the  complete  independence  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks,  the  Jugo-Slavs,  the  Poles,  the 
Rumanians,  and  Italians  under  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  yoke,  and  the  Armenians  and  Jews  and  Syr- 
ian Christians  and  Arabs  under  the  Turkish  yoke, 
or  else  we  were  guilty  of  hypocrisy  when  we  an- 
nounced that  our  purpose  was  to  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy.  Unless  Belgium  is  restored  and 
indemnified  and  France  restored  and  indemnified 
justice  will  not  have  prevailed."  ' 

The  fundamental  assumptions  in  this  vigorous 
speech  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  are  that  no  peace  can  be 

»  New  York  Times,  January  13,  1918. 

207 


208  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

conclusive  unless  the  victory  is  overwhelming,  and 
that  such  a  conclusive  victory  can  be  rendered  more 
secure  by  the  imposition  of  drastic  terms.  In  mak- 
ing these  assumptions,  Mr.  Roosevelt  has  gone  back 
to  the  methods  of  thought  which  prevailed  on  both 
sides  in  the  early  part  of  the  war.  First  victory, 
then  onerous  terms  imposed  upon  the  defeated 
enemy,  and  finally  the  furtherance  of  such  aims  as 
the  victors  consider  essential.  That  some  of  those 
aims  may  be  imperialistic,  and  may  have  the  effect  of 
undermining  any  international  basis  for  the  peace 
proposed  does  not  seem  to  enter  into  his  serious  con- 
sideration. The  internationalism  which  is  associ- 
ated with  this  method  of  thought  is  not  in  any 
sense  unforced,  but  rather  the  imposition  upon  the 
law-breaking  nations  of  an  international  law  in 
the  interests  of  the  victors.  That  in  each  country 
the  law-breaking  nation  is  assumed  to  be  the  enemy 
goes  without  saying. 

The  remainder  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  speech  indicates 
clearly  the  state  of  international  relations  which  he 
anticipates  in  the  event  of  his  overwhelming  victory. 
After,  as  before,  we  shall  be  required  to  arm  to  the 
teeth  in  order  permanently  *Ho  guarantee  future 
peaceful  and  just  development  at  home,  and  future 
immunity  from  attacks  by  outside  nations."  Mr. 
Roosevelt's  overwhelming  victory  does  not  lead  to 
peace,  but  merely  to  a  permanent  military  prepared- 
ness and  a  permanent  liability  to  attack. 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  209 

Even  though  we  hoped  for  nothing  but  this  in- 
definite perpetuation  of  latent  hostilities,  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  Mr.  Roosevelt's  overwhelming  victory 
would  be  efficacious.  Its  effect,  of  course,  would  be 
to  annihilate  the  military  strength  of  Germany, 
which  might  or  might  not  be  a  permanent  advantage. 
Assuming  a  continuance  of  hostile  international  re- 
lations, it  does  not  follow  that  our  next  enemy  will 
surely  be  Germany.  But  the  chief  argument  against 
the  presumed  necessity  of  a  conclusive  victory  is 
that  such  a  victory  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  a 
conclusive  peace,  but  may  have  an  exactly  opposite 
effect. 

In  1866,  when  Prussia  won  a  decisive  victory  over 
Austria,  the  peace  was  conclusive  not  because  the 
victory  was  overwhelming,  but  because  the  natural 
evolution  of  the  German  nation  made  impossible  a 
leadership  by  Austria,  a  preponderatingly  non-Ger- 
man state.  On  the  other  hand,  the  German  \^ctory 
over  France  in  1870  was  crushing,  but  the  peace 
was  inconclusive.  It  was  a  punitive  peace,  based  on 
outlived  conceptions  of  international  life,  and  did 
not,  in  effect,  solve  the  outstanding  problems  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  The  result  was  that  for  al- 
most half  a  century  the  war  between  France  and  Ger- 
many continued  under  a  different  form.  Similarly  a 
nonconclusive  war  may  lead  to  a  conclusive  peace. 
In  1812  the  United  States  fought  a  somewhat  inglo- 
rious war  with  Great  Britain,  which  ended  in  no  vie- 


210  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tory,  but  with  both  countries,  and  especially  the 
United  States,  anxious  to  make  peace.  The  issues 
which  led  to  the  struggle  were  not  even  mentioned 
in  the  resulting  treaty,  for  during  the  war  the  con- 
ditions leading  to  the  raising  of  those  issues  had 
ended.  The  inconclusive  war  was  followed  by  a  hun- 
dred years  of  peace,  whereas  had  a  completely  vic- 
torious England  imposed  punitive  terms,  the  peace 
would  have  been  inconclusive. 

Nor  to  be  conclusive  must  a  peace  be  onerous  or 
vindictive.  It  is  a  common  feeling  that  no  settle- 
ment is  conclusive  unless  the  enemy  is  so  weakened 
that  he  will  not  again  dare  to  resort  to  arms.  ''It  is 
all  very  well  to  forgive,"  say  many  of  our  spokes- 
men, 'Ho  look  ahead,  to  seek  to  promote  a  distant 
internationalism,  but  in  the  meanwhile  we  must  live, 
and  we  cannot  live  under  the  menace  of  a  new  Ger- 
man attack.  With  Germany  permanently  weak- 
ened, we  are  safe  for  a  generation  or  two,  but  if 
remaining  strong  she  returns  to  her  militarism,  our 
last  case  will  be  worse  than  the  first." 

The  argument  deserves  consideration.  However 
much  we  desire  internationalism,  we  can  accept  it 
only  on  the  condition  of  security.  Safety  comes 
first.  Therefore  we  cannot  permit  Germany  to  palm 
off  upon  us  a  false  and  specious  internationalism, 
and  we  cannot  accept  a  truce  which  will  give  an  un- 
regenerate  enemy  time  to  recover.  All  proposals 
must  be  examined  with  care  and  even  a  shade  of 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  211 

suspicion  and  we  must  insist  that  the  international- 
ism secured  be  more  than  a  matter  of  words. 

But  the  policy  of  weakening  the  enemy,  which  is 
offered  as  a  real  security  against  the  war's  renewal 
is,  as  has  often  been  proved,  no  security  at  all.  The 
difficulty  lies  not  in  downing  a  nation  but  in  keeping 
it  down.  The  Treaty  of  Frankfort  again  illustrates 
the  point.  In  1871  the  German  generals,  believing 
that  France  would  begin  a  war  of  revenge  at  the 
earliest  moment,  sought  to  weaken  her  by  levying 
a  heavy  indemnity  and  annexing  territories  of  eco- 
nomic and  strategic  value.  This,  however,  far  from 
ending,  merely  increased  the  French  menace. 
France  became  irreconcilable;  thenceforth  she  was 
the  perpetual  enemy,  the  centre  of  every  antag- 
onistic alliance.  The  resulting  fear  dictated  the 
entire  foreign  policy  of  Bismarck;  all  his  alliances 
were  an  attempt  to  isolate  this  ancient  enemy  and 
keep  her  helpless.  But  year  by  year  "the  French 
mortgage,"  incurred  or  at  least  enhanced  by  the 
harsh  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  weighed  heavier.  Ger- 
many could  not  compete  with  Great  Britain,  could 
not  enter  into  vast  colonial  enterprises  without  rec- 
ognizing that  in  whatever  war  she  engaged  France, 
weakened  in  1871,  would  be  her  powerful  enemy. 
Germany  would  probably  have  been  stronger  during 
the  last  forty  years  had  she  trusted  to  a  future  recon- 
ciliation with  France,  as  Prussia  trusted  Austria  in 
the  years  following  1866. 


212  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Crush  Germany  today,  if  that  indeed  is  possible, 
and  one  of  two  things  will  happen :  Either  she  will 
recover  and  fight  again,  or  she  will  seek  safety  and 
power  in  new  and  hostile  alliances.  To  place  a  re- 
vengeful, even  though  a  weakened,  Germany  in  the 
middle  of  Europe  is  to  lay  a  train  which  will  blow 
up  the  peace  of  the  world.  No  controversy  there- 
after can  arise  between  any  of  the  nations  now  in 
concert  but  Germany  will  seek  to  fan  the  flame  and 
offer  aid  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  combatants.  A 
debilitated  Germany  suffering  under  a  sense  of  per- 
secution and  injustice  would  be  only  a  little  less  dan- 
gerous than  a  strong  Germany  in  like  mood,  and 
would  be  far  more  dangerous  than  would  be  a  strong 
nation  permitted  to  develop  and  interested  in  main- 
taining the  peace. 

Neither  by  an  overwhelming  victory,  nor  by  a 
crushing  or  weakening  of  the  enemy,  nor  by  any 
form  of  negotiated  peace  which  does  not  recognize 
new  principles  of  international  relationship,  can  se- 
curity be  maintained.  All  these  suffer  from  the 
cardinal  defect  that  they  leave  nations  at  enmity  and 
the  peoples  of  the  world  insecure. 

This  fact  becomes  apparent  on  considering  the 
possible  terms  of  peace  between  the  two  coalitions 
in  the  conflict  that  now  rages.  Theoretically  there 
are  five  general  forms  which  peace  might  take. 
These  are,  an  Overwhelming  German  Peace,  a  Par- 
tial German  Victory,  the  Peace  of  the  Drawn  Game, 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  213 

a  Negotiated  Allied  Peace,  and  a  Dictated  Allied 
Peace.  These  five  forms  run  the  full  gamut  from 
a  crushing  German  victory  to  a  crushing  Allied  vic- 
tory. 

From  every  point  of  view  a  complete  German  vic- 
tory, followed  by  a  dictated  German  peace,  would 
be  the  worst  conceivable  result  of  the  war.  A  new 
Eoman  Empire,  more  powerful  than  any  that  has 
existed  in  the  world,  would  be  set  up  in  the  middle 
of  Europe.  It  would  be  for  decades  a  bulwark  of 
autocracy  and  militarism,  and  the  teacher  of  these 
social  forms  to  vassal  and  outside  nations.  The 
world  would  either  be  one  great  empire  with  de- 
pendencies and  intimidated  outlying  states,  or  it 
would  be  an  armed  camp.  Against  such  a  German 
victory,  liberals  the  world  over  must  fight  to  the  last 
ditch. 

Even  a  partial  German  victory  would  be  exces- 
sively dangerous.  What  Germany  seeks  today  is  a 
peace  of  give  and  take,  of  Ver  standi  gun  g  und  Aus- 
gleich,  as  former  Chancellor  Michaelis  styled  it. 
She  seeks  a  ''cashing  in"  on  her  "paper  profits." 
So  far  she  has  won  the  war  on  land  but  as  against 
her  conquests  the  Allies  possess  an  ultimate  superi- 
ority in  men,  money  and  munitions,  a  superiority, 
however,  which  depends  upon  their  ability  to  bring 
America's  full  force  to  boar  upon  the  Western  front. 
The  joint  resources  of  tlio  Allies  are  still  increasing 
while  those  of  Germany  diminish.     Like  Japan  in 


214  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

1905,  Germany  today  has  won  battles  but  runs  the 
danger  of  losing  if  the  war  continues.  Having  what 
she  wants  she  sees  no  further  reason  for  fighting. 

The  present  conquests  of  the  Central  Powers  are 
in  the  West  (Belgium  and  France),  the  East  (Rus- 
sia), in  the  Southeast  (Serbia,  Montenegro  and  Rou- 
mania)  and  the  Southwest  (Italy).  They  are  ap- 
parently willing  to  give  up  one  or  two  of  these 
conquests  to  preserve  the  rest.  It  is  a  wise  modera- 
tion. But  for  us  such  a  peace  is  difficult  to  accept. 
To  allow  an  unregenerate  Germany  to  emerge  from 
this  war  with  immense  visible  territorial  gains 
would  be  not  only  to  give  her  an  enormous  over- 
weight in  Europe  but  to  strengthen  the  power  of 
her  imperialistic  group.  The  Junker  might  then 
abandon  his  pretence  of  a  defensive  war  and  openly 
boast  of  his  conquests.  The  world  contest  of  1914 
might  even  be  proclaimed  as  a  continuation  of  the 
succession  of  "glorious"  wars  which  made  Ger- 
many a  World  Power.  Renewed  in  their  prestige, 
the  feudal  rulers  might  snap  their  fingers  at  radi- 
cals, liberals  and  socialists,  repeating  what  Bis- 
marck wrote  to  von  Biilow:  *' Germany  does  not 
look  for  her  salvation  to  Prussia's  liberalism  but  to 
Prussia's  power."  Therefore  any  German  victory, 
either  partial  or  complete,  is  dangerous.^ 

1  "The  German  sword  is  our  best  protection."  Telegram  of  Kaiser 
Wilhelm  II,  reproduced  in  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  8, 
1918. 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  215 

It  is  through  fear  of  this  partial  German  victory 
that  the  Allied  nations  have  wisely  refused  to  enter 
into  an  unlimited  conference  with  the  enemy.  To  do 
so  without  a  definite  statement  in  advance  of  Ger- 
many's demands  and  concessions  would  be  to  deliver 
themselves  unreservedly  into  hostile  hands.  In  such 
a  blind  conference  Germany  might  break  up  the  alli- 
ance by  playing  off  one  Ally  against  the  otlier.  The 
Allies  dare  not  even  consider  terms  unless  in  ad- 
vance Germany  contents  herself  with  the  status 
quo  ante. 

Can  they,  however,  accept  even  these  terms  ? 

Quite  apart  from  other  objections,  the  status  quo 
is  difficult,  perhaps  even  impossible,  to  establish. 
It  would  be  a  delicate  task  to  return  to  Germany  her 
colonies  without  enraging  Australians,  South  Afri- 
cans and  Japanese,  though,  of  course,  it  would  be 
feasible  to  give  her  equivalent  rights  in  otlier  parts 
of  the  world.  But  the  main  objection  to  the  status 
quo  ante  is  that  it  is  more  than  a  mere  territorial 
arrangement.  It  is  a  state  of  world  society  and  a 
state  of  mind.  To  re-establish  it  means  to  return  to 
the  execrable  conditions  existing  in  Austria-Hungary 
and  Turkey  before  the  war.  It  means  a  recrudes- 
cence of  ancient  embittered  hostilities  in  the  Balkans 
and  an  accentuation  of  the  old  colonial  strife  between 
imperialistic  powers.  It  would  reawaken  old  jeal- 
ousies and  hatreds  and  revive  the  old  insecurity. 

Moreover,  if  Germany  remains  militaristic,  im- 


216  THE  END  UE  THE  WAR 

perialistic  and  aggressive,  the  restoration  of  the 
status  quo  ante,  without  any  provision  for  a  system 
based  upon  internationalism,  would  constitute,  if  not 
a  victory  for  her,  at  least  a  defeat  for  her  enemies. 
Whatever  lands  she  gave  back,  she  would  still  hold 
Austria-Hungary.  Her  officers  now  control  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops;  her  railway  managers  Austro- 
Hungarian  railways;  her  influence  at  Vienna  and 
Budapest  is  overwhelming.  The  same  rule  extends 
to  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  united  with  Germany,  and 
exultant  over  their  victories.  End  the  war  on  the 
basis  of  the  status  quo  ante,  and  a  militaristic  auto- 
cratic Mittel-Europa  stretching  from  Hamburg  to 
Bagdad  is  a  reality,  except  for  a  small  strip  of  Ser- 
bian territory. 

Nor  would  Serbia  again  resist.  We  have  read 
much  of  the  futility  of  German  terrorism  and  ulti- 
mately it  was,  doubtless,  as  stupid  as  brutal.  But  in 
its  effect  upon  the  populations  afflicted  it  proved  a 
definite  asset  to  the  German  militarist.  If,  after 
the  war,  Austria  and  Bulgaria  were  to  make  sudden 
demands  upon  Serbia,  where  would  that  nation  find 
the  courage  to  oppose?  She  knows  the  heavy  Ger- 
man fist ;  she  knows  that  she  could  be  destroyed  be- 
fore help  came  from  the  Allies,  if  it  came  at  all. 
Even  more  difficult  to  resist  would  be  a  gradual, 
thumb-screw  pressure,  by  which  Austria  might 
make  successive  inroads  upon  Serbian  independence. 
Greece  too  would  be  quiescent ;  Roumania  also.     Hoi- 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  217 

land,  Belgium,  Scandinavia  and  Switzerland,  while 
they  might  preserve  their  dignity  and  independence, 
would  never  forget  Germany's  terrible  attack  upon 
Belgium  and  the  incompleteness  of  the  reparation. 
Germany  has  secured  the  prestige  of  terror;  in 
terms  of  the  old  diplomacy  it  is  a  valuable  prestige. 

Further,  if  the  status  quo  ante  is  re-established  and 
the  war  in  peace  continues  after  the  war,  Germany 
will  have  gained  relatively  by  the  fact  that  she  has 
fought  her  battles  upon  the  soil  of  her  enemies. 
Who  under  such  an  arrangement  would  rebuild 
French,  Serbian,  Roumanian  and  Russian  villages? 
The  losses  of  the  Allies  from  such  depredations  are 
many  billions  of  dollars,  and  if  each  nation  pays  for 
its  own  broken  windows  the  Allies  suffer  far  more 
grievously  than  does  Germany.  Because  of  this 
smaller  loss,  because  of  her  prestige  of  terror  in 
neighbouring  countries,  and  because  of  the  cement- 
ing of  a  stronger  union  among  the  four  central  pow- 
ers, Germany  might  claim  to  have  gained  something 
from  the  war,  or  at  least  to  have  lost  less  than  her 
opponents.  Her  Junkers,  decimated  and  impover- 
ished though  they  might  be,  would  still  claim  a  quasi- 
victory. 

The  final  objection  to  the  status  quo  ante,  how- 
ever, is  that  it  is  utterly  impossible.  Even  though 
we  keep  former  boundaries,  we  can  no  longer  ])lace 
the  old  Humpty-Dumpty  of  Russian  imperialism 
back  upon  his  throne,  nor  can  we  change  back  Brit- 


218  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ish  and  American  sentiment  to  what  they  were  be- 
fore the  war. 

Had  Russia  not  collapsed,  a  peace,  which  though 
inconclusive,  would  have  at  least  rendered  a  new 
assault  by  Germany  improbable,  might  have  been 
easily  possible,  owing  to  the  fact  that  by  its  very 
momentum  the  war  has  called  into  being  forces  that 
did  not  exist  in  1914.  The  very  strength  of  the  at- 
tack has  evoked  a  defence  equally  strong.  The 
probability  that  Germany  would  not  again  lightly 
assail  Serbia,  Belgium  or  France,  would  have  lain, 
even  more  in  the  forces  called  forth  in  this  war  than 
in  the  specific  guarantees  which  it  might  be  hoped  to 
embody  in  a  treaty  of  peace. 

War  today  is  a  deliberate  operation,  planned,  pre- 
pared, and  at  a  favourable  moment,  launched.  The 
determination  to  wage  war  is  an  intellectual  process. 
When  on  a  certain  day  Germany's  leaders  agreed  on 
a  policy  of  war,  their  decision  was  based  upon  a 
multitude  of  convictions,  opinions  and  guesses,  some 
true,  others  false.  They  probably  believed,  rightly, 
that  their  big  guns  could  smash  the  French  for- 
tresses; otherwise  they  might  not  have  declared  for 
war.  They  probably  believed  that  an  early  decision 
could  be  obtained  against  France,  and  that  Russia 
could  be  defeated  at  leisure;  had  they  not  thought 
so  they  might  have  hesitated.  They  seemed  to  have 
believed  that  Belgian  resistance  would  be  negligible; 
that  England  would  be  disinclined  to  intervene,  and 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  219 

would  probably  hesitate  until  her  intervention  was 
ineffective.  If  she  did  intervene,  troubles  in  Ire- 
land and  her  colonies  might  hamper  her  movements. 
The  leaders  of  Germany  apparently  counted  upon 
no  assistance  from  Italy  but  they  hardly  anticipated 
an  alliance  of  Italy  with  France  and  Britain.  What- 
ever they  thought,  however,  it  is  clear  that  consid- 
erations of  this  general  nature  did  enter  into  their 
calculations,  and  these  considerations  were  not  ab- 
surd and  unreal,  but  were  based  upon  such  knowl- 
edge as  they  had  and  could  grasp.  Weighing  the 
ponderables  and  ignoring  the  imponderables,  as 
militarists  are  likely  to  do,  the  German  leaders  con- 
cluded that  a  speedy  victory  was  probable.  The 
chances  were  in  their  favour. 

After  this  war  what  would  have  been  the  chances 
in  favour  of  a  second  attack  by  Germany  had  Russia 
maintained  her  military  strength?  Obviously  Ger- 
many's formidableness  would  have  increased,  since 
from  the  beginning  her  leaders  could  count  on  the  ac- 
tive co-operation  of  four  nations  and  upon  the  qui- 
escence of  Serbia.  But  the  defensive  forces  would 
be  seen  to  have  growTi  even  more  largely.  The  war 
has  established  the  fact  that  the  British  Empire  (or 
at  least  its  self-governing  colonies)  is  a  unit.  The 
immediate  military  strength  of  Groat  Britain  is 
increased  ten  to  twenty  times.  No  longer  would 
France  and  Belgium  alone  be  forced  to  bear  the  brunt 
of   the    attack,    since    Great   Britain   and   possibly 


220  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Italy  could  immediately  range  themselves  behind 
France,  and  behind  these  would  be  an  American 
army,  and  the  resources  of  a  country  richer  than 
Germany  and  Austria  combined.  Moreover  the  in- 
troduction of  trench  warfare  has  rendered  it  more 
difficult  than  four  years  ago  to  gain,  by  an  initial 
superiority  in  numbers,  a  rapid  decisive  victory. 
Germany  could  no  longer  overrun  France  in  a  month, 
and  almost  from  the  beginning  she  would  fight 
against  superior  forces  on  her  Western  front. 

But  the  collapse  of  Russia  changes  all  this.  Ger- 
many's eastern  barriers  are  now  broken  down,  and 
if  her  present  ruling  classes  remain  in  power  she 
will,  in  the  event  of  a  re-established  status  quo,  be 
able  to  exert  a  preponderating  military  influence  on 
Russia.  She  can  keep  her  eastern  neighbour  dis- 
tracted, intimidated,  weak.  She  can  bribe  her  offi- 
cials, secure  political  and  economic  concessions,  per- 
haps even  dictate  her  form  of  government.  Able  to 
defend  herself,  at  least  temporarily,  on  the  west,  she 
will  have  an  almost  free  hand  on  the  east.  It  will 
be  extremely  difficult  for  the  Allies,  even  with  their 
control  of  the  sea,  to  interfere  with  German  plans  in 
Russia. 

The  inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  status  quo 
ante,  like  a  German  victory,  offers  no  satisfactory 
solution  to  internationalists  and  no  security  to  the 
nations.^ 

1  Today    (March   1918)    such  a  solution  seems  even  more  imde- 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  221 

Nor  does  a  mere  victory,  either  partial  or  com- 
plete, for  the  Allies  necessarily  mean  a  satisfactory 
state  of  the  world.  A  victory  may  lead  to  a  retribu- 
tive peace,  to  a  vindictive  policy,  or  to  a  mere  bar- 
gaining and  haggling,  out  of  which  the  nations  may 
gain  territory  but  no  real  advantage.  Such  a  vic- 
tory does  not  automatically  solve  the  infinitely  com- 
plex questions  of  Poland,  Alsace-Lorraine,  Istria, 
Dalmatia,  Asia  Minor,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
Macedonia.  Distribution  of  these  by  mere  force  will 
leave  many  injustices. 

It  follows  that  there  can  be  no  conclusive  peace 
that  is  not  based  upon  internationalism  and  jus- 
tice. The  peace  that  democrats  should  desire  is  not 
retributive,  but  preventive  and  curative,  a  peace 
not  productive  of  future  wars;  a  peace  based  pri- 
marily not  on  historical  precedents,  or  historical 
claims,  or  the  status  quo  ante,  but  on  a  reorganiza- 
tion and  democratization  of  Europe  and  the  world. 
It  must  be  a  peace  that  aims  at  the  establishment 
and  steady  evolution  of  a  new  world  allegiance  and 
of  a  new  democratic  world  society.  It  must  be  a 
constructive  peace,  a  peace  based  on  principle,  not 
a  mere  patchwork.    We  should  desire  a  moderate 

sirable.  Russia  has  now  been  divided  into  a  group  of  new  states, 
most  of  which,  even  if  unannoxcd,  will  be  under  the  inducnce  of 
whatever  groups  rule  CJermany  Tf  we  are  to  have  new  wars  after 
this  war,  a  Cermany.  permitted  to  dismember  Russia,  would  be 
equipped  and  fortified  for  these  struggles  as  never  before.  The 
m<'nace  of  1914  would  be  increased  ten-fold. 


222  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

peace  permitting  the  future  healthful  development 
of  all  nations,  our  enemies  included.  We  must  base 
our  peace,  not  on  temporary,  but  on  permanent  eco- 
nomic processes.^ 

Only  so  can  we  hope  to  gain  any  measure  of  se- 
curity. It  is  not  by  victory  alone,  though  a  victory 
may  or  may  not  be  essential,  but  by  the  fixing  of 
just  terms,  that  we  make  progress.  We  may  drive 
the  Germans  back  to  the  Rhine  and  still  not  be  se- 
cure, and  we  may  not  completely  defeat  them  and  yet 
gain  full  security.  A  revolution  in  Germany  would 
be  more  advantageous  to  our  safety  and  to  the 
progress  of  the  world  than  a  dozen  Jenas.  We  can- 
not live  for  another  generation  under  the  old  ten- 
sion from  which  this  war  came  almost  as  a  relief. 
We  cannot  for  ever  remain  on  our  guard  against  a 
nervous,  frightened  and  threatening  Germany  seek- 
ing to  win  away  our  allies,  as  we  should  be  seeking 
to  seduce  hers.  We  do  not  desire  an  economic  war 
after  the  war,  which  will  be  inevitable  if  the  po- 
litical tension  remains.  Finally  we  do  not  wish  to 
hand  over  Russia  to  the  machinations  of  German 
imperialists,  nor  to  create  in  that  country  a  state 

1  What  made  the  victories  of  the  North  in  the  Civil  War  and  of 
Great  Britain  in  the  Boer  War  conclusive  was  that  the  resulting 
peace  and  the  legislation  thereafter  furnished  a  permanent  base  for 
the  defeated  peoples.  As  Mr.  A.  F.  Whyte  says,  "Victory  to  be  com- 
plete must  be  more  than  the  defeat  of  the  enemy.  It  must  provide 
a  foundation  on  which  the  security  and  peace  of  Europe  can  be  built, 
for  only  then  can  we  say  that  our  ends  have  been  secured  "  La 
Victoire  Int^grale,  The  New  Europe,  Vol.  IV,  September  6,  1917. 


A  CONCLUSIVE  PEACE  223 

of  mind  which  will  develop  a  Muscovite  imperi- 
alism, determined  to  destroy  the  '' effete  and  rot- 
ten" civilization  of  the  West.  All  these  possibil- 
ities, and  many  more,  lie  hidden  in  the  old  concep- 
tions of  our  international  life.  All  these  dangers 
are  those  which  have  come  again  and  again  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  despite  overwhelming  ''vic- 
tories" and  innumerable  reversions  to  the  status 
quo. 

There  can  be  no  conclusive  peace  following  a  war 
based  on  greed  and  ending  in  aggrandizement.  The 
only  conclusive  peace  is  a  peace  that  concludes,  a 
peace  that  foreshadows  the  end  of  an  era,  a  peace 
that  is  in  harmony,  not  only  with  the  coming  eco- 
nomic development  of  the  world,  but  with  the  polit- 
ical aspirations  of  millions  of  men  whose  allegiance 
today  transcends  national  boundaries  and  reaches 
out  feebly  towards  an  international  loyalty. 


CHAPTER  XII 

GUAEANTEES 

All  the  nations  now  at  war  protest  that  they  desire 
peace  but  all  insist  upon  guarantees  against  a  re- 
newal of  the  struggle.  Germany  demands  security 
against  any  recurrence  of  what  she  calls  the  unpro- 
voked war  against  her;  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia  demand  like  guarantees  against  Germany. 
Each  group  of  belligerents  wishes  to  bind  over  the 
other  to  keep  the  peace. 

This  demand  for  specific  guarantees  appears  and 
reappears  in  all  official  utterances.  In  the  German 
Peace  Note  of  December  12,  1916,  neutrals  are  as- 
sured that  'Hhe  propositions"  which  the  Central 
Powers  will  bring  forward  "have  for  their  object 
a  guarantee  of  the  existence,  of  the  honour  and  lib- 
erty of  evolution  for  their  nations."  The  Allies, 
insists  Lord  Curzon,  are  fighting  for  '' security  that 
those  [German]  crimes  shall  not  be  repeated,  and 
that  those  sacrifices  shall  not  have  been  made  in 
vain."  The  peace  must  "give  guarantees  for  the 
future."  "The  war  would  be  vain  if  we  had  no 
guarantees  and  securities  against  a  repetition  of 
Germany's  offence."  "Restitution,  reparation, 
guarantee  against  repetition"  is  the  phrase  accepted 

224 


GUARANTEES  225 

by  Lloyd  George;  "reparation  for  the  past  and 
security  for  the  future"  echoes  Mr.  Asquith.  "We 
are  fighting  for  peace  now,"  says  Mr.  Bonar  Law, 
"but  we  are  also  fighting  for  security  for  peace  in 
the  time  to  come."  No  peace  is  possible,  says  the 
Reply  of  the  Allied  Governments  to  Germany's  Note, 
which  is  not  calculated  in  some  way  to  afford  "ef- 
fective guarantees  for  the  future  security  of  the 
world." 

Undoubtedly  guarantees  in  some  form  are  nec- 
essary. To  end  the  war  without  security  to  the 
belligerent  nations  is  not  to  end  it  at  all ;  a  peace  that 
fails  to  give  this  sense  of  safety  will  soon  be  broken. 

There  is  much  virtue,  therefore,  in  this  word 
"guarantee"  and  like  all  virtuous  things  it  is 
dearly  loved  by  diplomatists.  But  it  is  an  ambig- 
uous word  covering  not  only  the  most  universal  and 
most  primitive  desire  of  all  nations,  that  of  safety, 
but  very  much  more.  Under  the  demand  for  guar- 
antees lurk  all  sorts  of  gross,  staring,  brazen  cupid- 
ities, the  grinning  hypocrisy  of  the  predator}'  state, 
the  sleek  rapacity  of  acquisitive  classes,  to  whom 
peace  and  war,  international  law  and  international 
discord  are  all  "business."  We  must  distinguish 
clearly  among  all  these  honest  guarantees. 

As  an  illustration,  consider  again  the  German 
formula  of  December,  1916.  This  seeming  virtuous 
manifesto  demands  a  gunrantee  of  existence,  hon- 
our and  "liberty  of  evolution,"  a  perilously  elastic 


226  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

phrase  which  may  mean  little  or  everything.  Under 
this  modest  title  deed  Germany  might  logically  claim 
all  Europe,  Asia  and  Africa  as  well  as  the  Islands 
of  the  Sea.  A  guarantee  of  "liberty  of  evolution" 
is  an  oceanic  phrase,  a  demand  carte  blanche.  Sim- 
ilarly the  guarantees  demanded  by  the  Allies  are 
susceptible  of  an  interpretation  requiring  many 
changes  of  frontiers  and  many  acts  of  spoliation. 

The  basic  difficulty  with  these  current  demands  is 
that  the  thing  really  desired  is  the  relative  weak- 
ening of  the  opponent.  The  nations  seem  to  have 
lost  all  faith  in  treaties,  conventions  and  solemn 
agreements  to  keep  the  peace.  Disbelieving  in  all 
moral  sanctions,  they  have  reverted  to  the  doctrine 
of  self-help.  Each  believes  that  it  must  defend  it- 
self by  its  own  strength  and  that  of  its  allies ;  it  must, 
therefore,  be  stronger  than  its  foe.  Its  security 
must  consist  in  a  condition  which  renders  its  antag- 
onist insecure. 

All  of  which  doctrine  sounds  both  familiar  and 
plausible. 

Yet  if  the  war  and  the  antecedent  history  of 
European  diplomacy  prove  anything,  they  demon- 
strate that  no  lasting  security  lies  in  this  process  of 
debilitating  the  enemy.  If  we  might  follow  the 
ancient  policy  of  completely  annihilating  the  foe, 
something  might  possibly  be  accomplished.  Today, 
however,  it  would  be  repugnant  to  cultivated  people 
to  assassinate  all  men  and  women  and  all  male  and 


GUARANTEES  227 

female  children  of  the  hostile  population.  Yet  short 
of  such  extermination  nothing  permanent  is  attained. 
The  spirit  of  nationality,  crushed  to  earth,  arises 
with  new  vigour,  and  the  weakened  nation,  gaining 
in  resolution  what  it  loses  in  material  strength,  be- 
comes the  centre  of  new  hostile  coalitions.  In  our 
unstable  and  eternally  transient  European  balance 
there  is  no  sucli  thing  as  permanent  debilitation. 

Were  the  Allies  to  be  completely  successful  and 
were  they  to  seek  to  destroy  the  Central  Powers,  it 
would  be  possible  to  crush  Germany  and  dismember 
Austria.  But  the  national  groups  represented  by 
these  nations  would  remain  and  would  form  a  po- 
tential centre  of  resistance.  The  veiy  superiority 
in  strength  of  the  Allies  would  develop  among  them 
differences  of  policy  on  matters  of  secondary  in- 
terest, while  the  insecurity  of  the  Central  Powers 
would  lead  to  an  enforced  cohesion.  The  smaller 
group  would  create  dissension  in  tlie  larger,  and 
in  the  end  the  unsteady  balancing  of  eiiual  coali- 
tions would  be  restored.  The  whole  principle  is 
vicious.  A  security  gained  at  the  expense  of  an 
opponent  results  in  the  insecurity  of  that  opponent, 
which  in  turn  makes  the  first  nation  insecure.  In 
such  arrangements  no  guarantee  of  peace  can  be 
found. 

In  these  matters  we  have  been  more  fortunate  in 
America.  After  this  war  Canada  will  lie  exposed  to 
attack  by  a  nation  of  fully  ten  times  its  strength,  and 


228  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

will  be  unable  to  resist.  She  will  have  no  guaran- 
tees, in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  used  in  dip- 
lomatic negotiations.  Nevertheless  Canada  will  be 
unafraid,  as  she  would  be  though  our  two  nations 
stood  alone  in  the  world.  She  will  know  that  the 
United  States  does  not  wish  to  attack  her.  She  finds 
a  greater  security  in  our  friendliness  than  in  any 
possible  defensive  measures. 

It  is  of  course  not  assumed  that  conditions  in 
Europe  are  the  same  as  in  America  or  the  relations 
between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  or  France  and  Ger- 
many, identical  with  those  between  Canada  and 
the  United  States.  What  is  clear,  however,  is  that 
not  only  does  a  weakening  of  one's  neighbour  not 
constitute  a  real  guarantee  against  attack,  but  that 
such  guarantees  may  conceivably  be  found  by  ways 
other  than  those  approved  upon  the  balance  of 
power  theory. 

Apart  from  the  theory  of  guarantee  by  debilita- 
tion there  are  two  methods  by  which  it  is  sought  to 
make  a  nation  secure  against  attack.  These  are  in- 
ternational in  scope.  They  are  the  method  of  the 
covenant  and  the  method  of  the  destruction  of  mo- 
tive. 

Since  the  invasion  of  Belgium  we  have  tended  to 
regard  all  covenants  between  nations  as  of  dubious 
value.  If  Germany  could  violate  a  treaty  to  which 
she  had  attached  her  signature,  what  reason  have  we 
for  supposing  that  she,  or  any  nation,  would  scru- 


GUARANTEES  229 

pulously  observe  future  obligations?  Today  there 
is  no  longer  any  supernatural  sanction  to  the  King's 
oath,  and  if  he  swear  to  his  hurt,  he  will  break  his 
word.  The  history  of  dijolomacy  is  filled  with  scraps 
of  paper.  Moreover  a  solemn  treaty  once  broken 
is  worse  than  if  it  had  never  been  made.  Had  there 
been  no  guarantee  of  Belgian  neutrality,  France 
could  better  have  defended  her  own  frontier. 

Nevertheless,  future  treaties,  agreements  and 
covenants  between  nations  are  absolutely  essential 
to  the  maintenance  of  a  world  civilization.  If 
treaties  have  been  broken  in  the  past  we  must  seek 
to  arrange  matters  so  that  they  shall  be  less  likely 
to  be  broken  hereafter.  We  must  study  the  pathol- 
ogy of  solemn  treaties,  discover  the  diseases  of 
which  they  died,  and  seek  by  all  means  to  prevent 
these  diseases. 

That  treaties  have  been  violated  in  the  past  has 
been  due  to  two  main  causes,  the  insecurity  of  the 
nation  violating  them,  and  the  absence  of  a  real 
international  sanction.  No  nation  can  be  secure  un- 
less all  nations  are  secure.  Belgium  was  invaded 
and  Holland,  Switzerland,  Denmark  and  Greece  felt 
insecure,  because  Germany,  France,  Russia  and 
England  were  insecure.  Moreover,  the  treaties 
which  have  been  violated  might  have  been  respected 
had  they  been  more  definite  in  their  terms  and  more 
explicit  in  the  penalties  for  tlieir  infraction.  Had 
England  and  the  United  States,  prior  to  1914,  def- 


230  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

initely  agreed  to  declare  war  against  any  invader 
of  Belgium,  and  had  they  in  the  past  by  force  of 
arms  maintained  similar  treaties,  Germany  might 
not  have  dared  invade  Belgium. 

The  guarantees  that  we  seek,  therefore,  must  be 
secured  in  two  ways — by  making  the  cost  of  aggres- 
sion greater,  and  by  making  the  temptation  to  be  ag- 
gressive less.  We  may  accomplish  this  in  two  ways, 
by  international  leagues  to  prevent  aggression,  and 
by  a  series  of  economic,  political  and  socio-psycho- 
logical  transformations  changing  the  direction  of 
thought  of  the  nations.  If  we  can  secure  conditions 
among  nations  analogous  to  those  which  prevent  the 
United  States  from  attacking  Canada  we  shall  have 
gone  far  in  the  direction  of  providing  guarantees 
for  all  peoples. 

This  policy  of  effecting  economic  changes  making 
for  peace  may  lead  to  startling  results.  It  may,  in 
given  circumstances,  prove  desirable  actually  to  rec- 
ompense the  enemy  instead  of  punishing  him,  just 
as  we  find  jobs  for  convicted  criminals,  not  as  a  re- 
ward for  their  crime  but  as  a  means  of  preventing 
their  again  being  tempted.  This  method  is  not  the 
same  as  that  of  buying  off  an  antagonist,  which,  be- 
cause it  places  a  premium  on  lawlessness  becomes  the 
worst  guarantee  of  peace.  The  idea  underlying  the 
policy  is  that  those  nations  are  normally  aggressive 
which  do  not  find  vent  for  their  activities  in  peace- 
ful pursuits,  and  are  therefore  forced  outwards. 


GUARANTEES  231 

The  most  effective  prophylactic  against  crime,  in- 
dividual or  national,  is  prosperity  and  content. 

We  have  seen  that  a  crushing  of  the  enemy  and 
still  less  his  humiliation  will  not  have  the  effect  of 
guaranteeing  the  security  of  the  victorious  nations. 
In  only  one  way  can  that  security  be  obtained,  by 
strengthening  international  law  (by  providing  it 
with  a  sanction)  and  by  reversing  the  current  of 
thought  and  changing  the  needs  of  the  Gorman  peo- 
ple. If  Germany  has  no  more  desire  to  attack  her 
neighbours  than  the  United  States  has  of  attacking 
Canada,  France  and  Belgium  need  no  better  guar- 
antee. If,  moreover,  to  this  absence  of  motive  there 
is  added  a  series  of  treaties,  underwritten  by  a 
League  of  Nations  pledged  to  fight  for  their  main- 
tenance, and  securing  France  and  Belgium  against 
attack,  the  guarantee  is  as  strong  as  it  can  be  made. 
But  this  security  of  France  and  Belgium  presup- 
poses that  of  all  other  nations,  including  Germany. 
It  presupposes  a  new  international  organization, 
new  international  concepts,  a  new  allegiance  and  an 
end  to  the  anarchy  between  states  which  has  existed 
for  so  many  centuries. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE   GRAND   ALLIANCE 

If  we  are  to  realize  the  ideal  of  an  international  or- 
ganization, such  as  that  for  which  the  liberals  of 
America  and  other  nations  are  striving,  we  may  find 
in  the  present  alliance  opposed  to  Germany  and  in 
the  economic  and  political  concert  which  that  alli- 
ance has  been  forced  to  adopt,  an  embryonic  form, 
which  in  the  years  after  the  war  may  develop  a  rela- 
tively permanent  and  more  or  less  complete  unity. 

There  have  been  other  Grand  Alliances,  preten- 
tious and  feeble,  but  being  mere  accumulations  of 
soldiers,  they  have  meant  nothing.  This  Alliance  is 
a  totally  new  thing.  It  is  a  union,  at  least  in  aspira- 
tion, of  peoples  and  not  of  kings.  It  is  a  coalition, 
economic  and  political,  of  states  that  had  formerly 
lived  an  independent  life. 

To  gauge  this  Alliance  properly  we  must  look  at 
it  from  a  distance.  There  are  innumerable  seams 
and  crevices  in  it  and  unlike  things  are  joined  incon- 
tinently instead  of  being  fused.  But  these  short- 
comings are  inevitable.^  The  marvellous  thing  is 
that  there  should  be  an  alliance  at  all. 

1  "Napoleon  was  not  so  great  as  we  all  thought.  After  all  he  only 
fought  coalitions."  Premier  Clemenceau,  quoted  by  Paul  U.  Kellogg, 
TA«  Survey,  New  York,  March  19,  1918 

232 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  233 

An  Alliance  of  a  billion  people — at  least  of  a  few 
hundred  millions  who  rule  a  billion,  extending  its 
sway  over  twenty  million  square  miles  which  is  many 
times  the  maximum  extent  of  the  Roman  Empire. 
Look  at  the  map,  as  our  German  opponents  insist, 
and  we  shall  see  that  the  territory  belonging  to  it 
covers  three-fourths  the  earth's  land  surface.  Add 
to  this  other  nations  which  are  in  sympathy  and  we 
almost  literally  have  a  world  in  arms,  and,  what  is 
more  important,  a  world  in  concert.  We  are  wit- 
nessing a  spectacle  in  which  the  most  unlikely  hu- 
man beings  are  in  surprised  co-operation. 

All  this,  if  impermanent,  is  highly  unimportant; 
its  mere  grandiose  magnitude  will  not  save  the  oc- 
currence from  being  episodical.  But  what  if  this 
gigantic  coming  together  is  the  sign  and  seal  of 
a  New  Order?  What  if  we  are  witnessing  the  convo- 
cation of  a  vast  kindergarten  of  Internationalism? 

If  it  is  so,  will  not  the  event  be  the  greatest  in 
the  War,  greater  even  than  the  stupendous  Russian 
Revolution?  The  war  will  then  be  remembered  not 
by  German  ambitions  nor  by  Ilindenburg  or  Joffro 
victories  but  by  the  fact  of  this  concert  alone. 
We  shall  be  at  the  beginning  of  a  New  Stage  in  His- 
tory. 

Let  us,  however,  not  be  precipitate  nor  over-opti- 
mistic, judging  those  events  in  years  and  imagining 
that  our  Grand  Alliance  will  immediately  succeed 
in  securing  a  permanent  peace.     We  dare  not  expect 


234  THE  END  OP  THE  WAR 

a  juggler 's  trick  that  will  bring  a  newly  painted,  cast- 
iron  international  system  out  of  the  bag.  What  we 
must  strive  and  hope  for  is  something  less  palpable, 
a  new  allegiance  to  a  slowly  forming  World  Society. 
This  new  allegiance,  at  first  unconscious,  then  con- 
scious, at  first  unwilling,  then  willing,  will  be  a  con- 
tinuation and  fortification  of  habits  of  mind  and 
action  that  spring  out  of  the  temporary  needs  of  the 
present  Alliance.  A  war  that  produces  this — or  even 
advances  it  in  time — will  have  more  than  paid  for 
its  tremendous  cost. 

The  great  hope  then  is  that  the  ranging  of  the 
world  against  Germany  has  made  possible  a  nearer 
approach  to  Internationalism.  A  union  caused  by 
temporary  opposition  may  be  made  permanent.  A 
union  for  defence  and  destruction  may  be  used  after 
the  war  for  vast  constructive  purposes. 

The  hope  of  a  degree  of  permanency  lies  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  Alliance.  It  is  more  than  a  mere  dip- 
lomatic union.  Money,  food  and  men  have  been 
held  in  common  and  an  international  organization, 
admittedly  primitive  and  very  defective,  has  been 
created  in  which  all  the  nations  have  worked  for  one 
common  aim. 

It  is  in  some  respects  an  astounding  union.  There 
has  been  a  unification  of  classes  within  each  nation 
as  well  as  a  unification  of  nations.  There  has  been 
a  merging  of  groups  hitherto  hostile  and  an  attenua- 
tion of  separating  interests.    Nothing  before  has 


THE  GEAND  ALLIANCE  235 

ever  revealed  so  great  a  capacity  of  the  infinitely  di- 
vided nation  to  prove  its  essential  unity.  We  had 
come  to  doubt  the  strength  of  this  unity,  cemented, 
and  at  the  same  time  sharply  limited,  by  the  desire 
for  individual  gain.  In  the  economic  system  of  all 
great  industrial  nations  men  worked  to  feed,  clothe 
and  comfort  other  men  they  had  never  seen  but 
each  man  worked  for  his  own  wages  and  his  own 
profits.  We  did  not  recognize  how  tough  and  re- 
sistant were  the  loose  fibres  of  this  fragile  organ- 
ism, in  which,  it  seemed  to  us,  half  the  people 
devoted  their  sedulous  lives  to  obstructing  con- 
scientiously the  efforts  of  the  other  half.  In  all 
countries  the  Government  was  over-manned  and  un- 
der-minded. Class  distinctions  were  strong  and 
class  prejudices  bitter.  And  here  out  of  this  an- 
archic mass  there  appeared  suddenly  in  the  hour  of 
threatened  destruction  and  at  its  behest  a  startling 
unity.  Not  that  the  unity  was  complete.  Ver>^, 
very  far  from  it.  Even  during  the  war  countries  like 
England  and  the  United  States  suffered  tremend- 
ously from  their  ingrained  economic  individualism. 
Yet  there  was  at  least  some  progress  towards  unifi- 
cation. 

For  the  first  time  each  nation's  full  productive 
capacity  stood  revealed.  It  was  like  the  sudden  dis- 
covery of  eoncoalod  faculties  when  other  faculties 
are  destroyed ;  like  the  delicate  sense  of  touch  which 
comes  to  the  blinded  man.     There  was  also  revealed 


236  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

in  all  the  nations  the  immense  increase  in  power 
which  has  been  slowly  accreted  during  several  gen- 
erations of  popular  education. 

What  was  true  of  the  nation  was  also  true,  though, 
of  course,  to  an  even  less  extent,  of  the  larger  unit, 
the  group  of  nations.  Almost  unconsciously  there 
was  formed,  or  revealed,  a  vague  super-organization, 
a  partial  fellowship  of  nations  united  by  the  same 
sort  of  compulsions  and  attractions  as  those  which 
cement  a  nation.  As  a  result  of  new  necessities 
states  hitherto  seemingly  autonomous  and  self-cen- 
tred learned  to  co-ordinate  and  to  sacrifice  certain 
special  national  interests  to  the  larger  group  inter- 
ests of  the  Alliance. 

This  co-operation  was  partly  military  but  above 
all  economic.  It  was  found  necessary  to  apportion 
the  shipping  under  the  control  of  the  Allied  Powers 
to  the  needs  of  the  several  nations.  England  could 
not  benefit  by  diverting  shipping  from  Italy  to  her- 
self if  as  a  result  Italy's  army  was  insufficiently 
supplied  or  the  morale  of  her  population  menaced. 
It  was  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  export 
wheat  and  meat  in  order  that  the  resistance  of  her 
Allies  should  not  break  down  through  actual  hunger. 
In  the  same  way  coal  was  distributed  as  well  as  cop- 
per, iron,  wool  and  other  materials. 

All  this  has  not  yet  been  fully  developed,  and 
many  inequalities  remain.  Certain  of  the  Allied  na- 
tions have  suffered  an  excessive  strain  as  the  result 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  237 

of  an  insufficient  supply  of  commodities,  of  which  in 
other  Allied  nations  there  has  been  a  sufficiency  or 
even  an  abundance.  But  the  underlying  theory  is 
obvious.  It  was  acknowledged  in  principle  that  the 
welfare  of  the  group  took  precedence  over  that  of 
any  one  nation  and  therefore  that  it  had  become  es- 
sential to  pool  the  supplies  of  all  commodities  nec- 
essary to  the  winning  of  the  war.  England  no 
longer  pursued  an  industrial  or  a  commercial  policy 
dictated  by  English  needs  alone,  but  subordinated 
her  own  interests  to  the  larger  economic  and  military 
necessities  of  all  the  Allies.  The  same  was  true  in 
greater  or  less  degree  of  the  United  States,  France 
and  Italy.  Unless  all  the  nations  combating  Ger- 
many could  draw  upon  a  common  source  the  danger 
of  defeat  was  imminent. 

This  close  co-operation  of  the  Allies  in  times  of 
war  sharply  accentuates  a  development  which  has 
long  been  in  process,  the  loss  by  the  several  na- 
tions of  their  full  economic  independence.  Before 
the  war  a  country  like  Holland  or  Greece  believed 
that  it  was  self-sufficient,  in  the  sense  that  it 
could  get  what  it  wanted  and  sell  what  it  had  for 
sale ;  its  custom  was  competed  for  by  other  nations. 
So  accustomed  were  the  Dutch  and  Greeks  to  the 
siglit  of  foreign  vessels  thronging  their  ports  and 
bringing  them  the  produce  of  the  world  that  they 
did  not  recognize  the  precariousness  of  this  trade. 
The  actual  though  concealed  dependence  of  the  na- 


238  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tion,  while  recognized  by  economists,  was  for  the 
mass  of  the  people  a  vague  and  unreal  thing.  It 
did  not  affect  a  man's  action  today  or  tomorrow. 
The  cord  is  now  snapped  and  the  economic  inde- 
pendence of  the  nations,  and  not  only  of  the  small  na- 
tions, is  perceived  to  be  gone.  We  are  in  an  era  of 
obvious  and  perilous  interdependence.  Even  the 
strong  state,  though  conscious  of  a  greater  strength 
than  ever,  has  become  easily  vulnerable.  It  may  die 
of  a  mere  blockade.  As  in  a  military  sense,  so  also 
economically  a  state  can  no  longer  stand  alone. 
To  stand  alone  is  to  be  a  shadow  of  a  nation,  an 
outcast  from  the  close  family  of  nations. 

At  the  present  time  all  this  is  a  curious  revela- 
tion. For  forty  years  there  had  been  a  definite  or- 
ganization of  industry  along  national  lines,  a  promo- 
tion of  the  ''national  economy"  and  a  rapid  national- 
ization of  industry  as  of  other  phases  of  life.  On 
the  one  hand  we  had  protective  tariffs,  export  boun- 
ties and  transportation  rebates  in  the  interest  of  the 
home  industry  and  at  the  expense  of  foreigners ;  on 
the  other  a  national  competition  for  colonies  and 
exclusive  spheres  of  interest.  We  had  witnessed  an 
intensification  of  the  national  interest  in  industry, 
similar  in  kind  (though  vastly  greater  in  extent)  to 
that  adopted  in  France  two  hundred  years  ago. 
What  Colbert  and  the  Mercantilists  did  in  a  small 
way,  all  nations  were  now  doing  on  a  vast  scale. 
The  result  was  that  merchants  and  manufacturers 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  239 

of  different  countries  no  longer  competed  as  indi- 
viduals, but  the  whole  industry  of  one  nation  com- 
bated the  whole  industry  of  another.  It  was  the 
German  steel  industry  as  a  unit  against  the  French 
industry,  not  Schulz  &  Co.  against  the  firm  of 
Machaud  or  Le  Brun.  This  nationalism  of  industry 
has  by  no  means  reached  the  limits  of  its  develop- 
ment. It  is  still  in  its  beginnings  and  in  the  future 
we  may  expect  to  see  business  in  the  various  coun- 
tries organized  on  a  far  more  closely  co-ordinated 
national  basis.  The  improvement  of  transportation, 
the  wide  extension  of  advertising,  the  increasing 
standardization  of  industries,  the  successes  of  trusts 
and  cartels  have  put  an  end  to  industrial  organiza- 
tion on  a  smaller  scale.  The  increasing  interest  of 
states  in  the  promotion  of  the  economic  welfare  of 
their  citizens  renders  the  success  of  economic  na- 
tionalism assured. 

While  industry,  however,  has  now  compassed  the 
nation  it  begins  to  stretch  forth  beyond  the  frontiers, 
and  the  same  impulse  which  made  it  national  is  lead- 
ing it  to  become  supra-national  or  international.  It 
seems  likely  therefore  that  the  growing  economic 
nationalism  will  be  infused  with  a  super-nationalism 
as  a  result  of  the  growing  dependence  of  the  nations 
and  of  their  industrial  systems  upon  one  another. 
National  economic  warfare,  like  military  warfare,  is 
too  dangerous  a  conflict  to  permit  of  its  indefinite 
continuance. 


240  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

It  may  perhaps  be  urged  that  with  the  resumption 
of  peace  the  economic  self-sufficiency  of  nations  will 
immediately  return,  and  as  a  consequence  the  grand 
economic  alliance  of  the  Allied  nations  will  suddenly 
cease.  Actually,  however,  the  conditions  created 
during  the  war  are  likely  to  last  at  least  for  several 
years  after  the  war.  The  withdrawal  of  millions  of 
men  from  industry  has  caused  an  enormous  reduc- 
tion in  the  available  stocks  of  many  important  com- 
modities. There  is  not  enough  food  in  the  world 
adequately  to  feed  the  world  population.  Nor  is 
there  enough  copper,  steel,  coal,  cotton  and  wool. 
There  is  a  startling  lack  of  essential  raw  materials. 
The  available  supplies  can  be  distributed  fairly  only 
by  a  recognized  international  organization. 

Moreover,  the  power  of  any  one  nation  to  harm 
its  neighbours  economically  by  the  withdrawal  of 
raw  materials  is  likely  to  be  greater  after  the  war 
than  it  has  ever  been  before.  If  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  refuse  to  export  raw  cotton,  the 
textile  industries  of  other  countries  will  break  down 
completely.  The  same  would  be  true  of  w^ool  and 
of  several  other  commodities.  For  England  and 
the  United  States,  or  either  of  them,  however,  to 
adopt  such  a  selfish  and  monopolistic  policy  would 
be  to  alienate  all  other  nations.  In  such  circum- 
stances there  could  be  no  peace.  The  various  Al- 
lied nations  therefore  will  be  obliged  to  pool  all  re- 
sources and  distribute  the  product  in  proportion  to 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  241 

the  estimated  needs  of  the  nations  within  the  Alli- 
ance. For  several  years  after  the  war  Italy,  France, 
England,  the  United  States,  as  well  as  other  nations, 
will  probably  receive  such  amounts  of  the  food,  tex- 
tiles and  minerals  of  the  world,  at  a  fixed  price  and 
under  agreed  conditions,  as  shall  be  determined  upon 
in  the  permanent  international  economic  conference 
having  the  disposal  of  these  materials. 

The  economic  co-operation  of  the  present  Grand 
Alliance  is  likely  to  become  more  definite  and 
thorough  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  will  not  only  con- 
stitute an  effective  weapon  against  Germany  during 
the  war  and,  perhaps,  a  means  of  securing  a  just 
peace,  but  also,  for  some  time  after  the  war,  a  regu- 
lator of  German  trade  and  of  German  competition. 
Germany  is  beginning  to  recognize  the  enormous  in- 
fluence of  the  economic  factors  in  the  decision  of  this 
war.  In  the  beginning,  slie  hoped  for  a  speedy  vic- 
tory which  would  lessen  the  economic  strain.  When 
that  victory  failed  and  when  the  British  block- 
ade became  more  effective,  the  pressure  increased 
painfully.  With  this  increasing  pressure  came  an 
enormously  increased  fear  of  an  economic  boycott. 
So  long  as  the  United  States  and  Latin  America  re- 
mained out  of  the  war,  Germany  had  comparatively 
little  to  fear  from  such  an  attack,  since  she  could 
always  play  off  these  great  neutrals,  with  their  re- 
sources in  raw  materials  and  their  markets  for  fin- 
ished products,  against  her  great  European  enemies. 


242  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

With  the  entrance  of  the  United  States,  however, 
followed  by  that  of  China  and  Brazil,  the  situation 
changed  for  her  alarmingly.  It  is  this  which  ex- 
plains the  emphasis  which  Germany  has  ever  since 
laid  upon  the  necessity  of  the  Allies  not  using  against 
her  their  economic  weapons. 

The  present  situation  is  that  if  Germany  fails  to 
gain  a  complete  military  victory  she  can  be  compelled 
to  accept  reasonable  terms  by  force  of  the  enormous 
economic  superiority  of  the  Allies.  The  Central 
Empires  have  almost  completely  used  up  their  sup- 
plies of  raw  material.  Their  factories,  railroads 
and  other  instruments  of  production  have  been  in- 
jured by  the  strain  of  a  three-and-a-half  years '  war. 
What  they  require  is  not  alone  the  repair  of  the 
military  machine  and  the  storage  of  a  surplus  of 
goods  for  the  future,  but  also  a  supply  of  commodi- 
ties for  the  satisfaction  of  their  daily  needs.  They 
cannot  secure  all  these  goods  except  by  drawing  upon 
the  Allies  or  upon  countries  completely  or  partially 
dominated  by  the  Allies.^ 

It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  urgency  of  this 
need.  Unless  Germany  can  make  satisfactory  treaty 
arrangements  she  cannot  buy  the  goods  she  requires, 
and  in  return  for  those  that  she  can  buy,  she  must 
export  gold,  of  which  she  has  not  enough  today  to 
maintain  her  paper  currency.     Failing  to  solve  this 

1  Since  the  dissolution  of  Russia  and  the  signing  of  a  separate 
peace  with  the  Ukraine  the  situation  of  Germany  in  this  respect 
has  vastly  improved. 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  243 

problem,  her  export  trade  cannot  be  re-established, 
her  wages  will  fall  while  her  prices  rise,  and  the 
resulting  unemployment  and  discontent  may  bring 
the  nation  to  the  verge  of  revolution.  Not  to  get  raw 
materials  means  decivilization.  As  one  writer  has 
said:  ''The  Germans  have  discovered  by  painful 
experience  .  .  .  that  life  in  a  community  without  an 
adequate  supply  of  cotton,  wool,  silk,  leather,  and 
jute,  of  animal  and  vegetable  fats,  of  lubricating  oil, 
of  tea,  coffee,  and  cocoa,  of  copper,  tin,  nickel,  and 
other  even  more  indispensable  metals,  not  to  speak 
of  foodstuffs,  is  so  squalid  and  lowering  as  to  be  al- 
most unendurable."  To  obtain  these  materials  Ger- 
many, unless  she  obtains  her  decisive  military  vic- 
torj^  wnll  be  obliged  to  make  concessions. 

And  the  chance  of  a  real  military  decision  becomes 
less  every  day.  Even  General  von  Freytag-Loring- 
hoven  admits  (in  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung)  that 
**the  power  of  a  radical  decision  of  a  world-war  has 
slipped  away  from  the  armies  and  that  the  strategi- 
cal situation  is  conditioned  by  the  world-economic 
situation."  "It  is  owing  to  Germany's  unfavour- 
able position  in  this  regard,"  he  continues,  that  ''vic- 
tories which  once  would  have  been  absolutely  deci- 
sive, and  the  conquest  of  whole  Kingdoms,  have  not 
brought  us  nearer  to  peace."  ' 

It  is  quite  possible  tlierefore  that  the  very  element 

1  See  also  "Deductions  from  the  (^.reat  War"  hv  T-ieiitenant-gen- 
eral  Baron  von  Freytag-Loringhoven,  New  York,  lOlS,  p.  10. 


244  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

which  has  created  a  partial  economic  unity  among 
tlie  Allies  will  be  effective  in  establishing,  at  least 
temporarily,  an  internationalism  broader  than  the 
present  alliance.  In  all  probability  it  will  be  the 
dread  of  a  throttling  by  the  Allied  nations,  and  this 
dread  alone,  which  will  compel  the  Central  Powers 
to  accede  to  some  measure  of  joint  action  with  the 
present  Allies.  The  economic  weapon  is  likely  to 
prove  decisive.  It  is  that  which,  aided  by  the  mili- 
tary weapon,  will  enable  the  Allies  to  put  enough 
pressure  upon  the  German  ruling  classes  and  to  ap- 
peal to  the  industrial  and  commercial  classes  of  Ger- 
many, as  well  as  to  its  proletariat,  to  bring  the  war 
to  a  reasonable  end. 

That  end  cannot  be  a  mere  resumption  of  the  eco- 
nomic war  which  preceded  the  war. 

What  may  eventually  result  we  cannot  yet  foresee, 
but  for  a  period  of,  let  us  say,  at  least  five  years, 
Germany  will  be  able  to  receive  her  raw  materials 
and  her  full  access  to  foreign  markets  only  on  con- 
dition that  she  applies  to  her  own  industries  the  same 
rules  and  limitations  as  do  the  Allies. 

In  return  for  such  a  reopening  of  trade,  and  for 
the  resulting  economic  security,  Germany  may  well 
be  willing  to  accept  a  peace  which  she  might  other- 
wise reject.  There  is  no  advantage  to  her  in  holding 
territories  if  she  cannot  feed  her  people  and  can- 
not maintain  their  standard  of  living.^ 

1  Today    (March   9,    1918)    Germany's  situation   in   respect   to  her 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  245 

Tt  is  also  quite  possible  that  the  economic  superi- 
ority of  the  world  opposed  to  Germany  will  be  a 
factor  not  only  in  ending  the  war,  but  in  creating  a 
new  international  system. 

Into  this  international  system  Germany  would 
have  to  be  admitted  on  equal  terms.  Not  to  admit 
her  into  the  new  economic  league  would  be  to  make 
her  an  enemy  and  to  force  her  again  to  resort  to  mili- 
tary action  at  the  earliest  advantageous  moment. 
The  Allies  can  afford  to  be  generous  even  beyond  the 
point  of  Germany's  ability  to  extort  terms.  They 
will  be  wise  if  they  see  in  their  own  temporary  eco- 
nomic union  the  hope  of  a  vast  future  international 
system  which  in  the  end  will  determine  problems 
other  than  economic.  For  if  the  nations  can  learn 
to  agree  on  the  disposition  of  the  available  raw  ma- 
terials of  the  world  and  on  the  opening  of  markets, 
they  should  also  be  able  in  time  to  agree  upon  the 
question  of  the  distribution  of  trade  and  investment 
opportunities  in  all  colonies  old  and  new.  If  they 
can  learn  to  agree  on  these  subjects  it  should  not 
be  impossible  for  them  to  find  some  sort  of  an  ap- 
proach to  an  understanding  on  such  intricate  inter- 
national questions  as  the  freedom  of  the  sea  and 
rules  for  the  regulation  and  limitation  of  armaments. 
If  they  can  agree  upon  so  complicated  a  question  as 
the  internationalization  of  the  Straits,  will  it  prove 

food  and  raw  material  supply  has  hcen  vastly  improved  by  arrange- 
ments with  Russia,  Rumania  and  the  Ukraine. 


246  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

impossible  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  conclusion  con- 
cerning the  status  of  the  Balkan  States?  The  na- 
tions, temporarily  at  least,  are  forced  to  come  to  an 
arrangement  concerning  the  distribution  of  the  avail- 
able raw  material  in  the  world.  It  is  a  necessity 
which  will  be  universally  acknowledged.  Will  it  be 
impossible  to  use  this  temporary  and  partial  neces- 
sity for  co-operative  effort  between  the  nations  to 
form  the  beginnings  of  a  new  and  larger  co-ordina- 
tion, not  only  specifically  economic,  but  also  polit- 
ical? 

If  this  turns  out  to  be  the  case,  not  immediately 
but  in  the  course  of  years,  the  present  Grand  Alliance 
may  be  converted  into  a  limited  economic  union  of  all 
the  nations,  and  eventually  into  a  new  system  of  in- 
ternationalism in  which  there  will  be  room  for  the 
gradual  growth  of  an  allegiance  wider  than  the  pres- 
ent allegiance  to  the  state. 

What  the  present  economic  concert  among  the 
Allies  offers  is  perhaps  only  a  vague  hope,  only  the 
beginning  of  a  beginning  of  a  really  effective  and 
plenary  international  system.  The  Alliance  may  not 
even  outlast  the  war.  It  may  show  signs  of  inter- 
nal strain  and  its  component  states  may  revert  to 
their  former  cut  throat  competition.  The  essential 
and  encouraging  element  in  the  situation,  however, 
is  that  we  shall  be  faced  after  the  war  with  a  strong, 
though  temporary,  economic  pressure,  which  is  not 
unlikely  to  force  states,  enemy  and  allied,  to  act  in 


THE  GRAND  ALLIANCE  247 

concert.  Lideed  this  economic  co-operation  may  be 
presented  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  treaty  of 
peace.  If  these  specific  and  transient  problems  can 
be  solved  temporarily,  a  basis  will  possibly  be  laid 
for  a  wider  and  more  permanent  international  co-op- 
eration, such  as  President  Wilson  has  in  mind  in  his 
prophecies  of  a  concert  of  the  peoples. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

OBSTACLES   TO    INTERNATIONALISM 

Nothing  is  more  enticing  than  a  large  word  which 
idealizes  our  ambitions  and  justifies  our  hopes. 
Once  we  discover  this  all-solving  word  we  embrace 
it  eagerly  and  never  seek  to  ask  whether  to  others 
it  means  the  same  wide  salvation  as  to  us.  If  it  un- 
locks our  doors,  if  it  opens  our  windows  upon  a 
glorious  vista  of  liberty,  we  cannot  conceive  that 
it  may  not  unlock  all  other  doors  and  open  all  other 
windows.  We  assume  a  universal  validity  for  any 
theory,  premise  or  ideal  which  suits  our  circum- 
stances. 

In  the  past  the  nations  have  had  many  of  these 
all-embracing  words.  Authority,  Conformity, 
Faith,  Liberty,  Equality,  Democracy,  Nationalism 
— one  after  another  these  keywords  came  to  the  peo- 
ples and  were  adopted  and  fought  for,  though  to 
some  of  the  peoples  they  meant  release  and  to  others 
tears  and  chains. 

It  is  indeed  when  a  word,  phrase  or  slogan  com- 
pletely epitomizes  the  desires  of  a  nation  or  a  class 
and  arouses  the  greatest  enthusiasm  that  it  becomes 
most  cruel.  The  noblest  aspirations  translate  them- 
selves somewhere  into  misery  and  pain.     There  were 

248 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     249 

no  better  intentioned  men  in  the  world  than  many 
who  inspired  the  soul-saving  Inquisition.  The  wars 
of  religion  were  in  part  fought  for  high  ideals, 
which  seemed  to  the  fighting  nations  of  universal 
validity.  The  democratic  crusade  of  the  French 
Revolution,  which  sought  to  make  the  world  ripe  for 
democracy  (and  in  the  end  contributed  to  that  re- 
sult), brought  to  some  peoples  a  useless  and  heavy- 
burden.  So  too,  the  Holy  Alliance  was  animated 
by  a  belief  which  seemed  to  the  believers  incontest- 
able and  yet  met  opposition.  In  the  middle  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century  many  nations  clamoured  for 
an  era  of  peace,  but  for  others  peace  would  have 
meant  disaster,  for  it  would  have  left  their  problems 
unsolved,  their  democracy  depressed,  and  their  peo- 
ple disunited.  It  was  not  because  these  ideals  were 
bad  that  they  bore  so  hardly  upon  certain  peoples, 
but  usually  because  they  were  envisaged  too  nar- 
rowly. Altruistic  ideals  were  tinged  with  the  self- 
ish interests  of  their  protagonists. 

Today  we  are  standing  behind  another  world-em- 
bracing word,  internationalism.  In  one  sense  it  is 
a  very  old  conception  since  its  roots  run  far  back  into 
the  past.  But  never  before  has  this  ideal  seemed  so 
near  fruition,  never  before  has  it  been  so  rich  in  con- 
tent, and  never  has  it  stirred  so  many  millions  to 
such  depths.  It  is  a  noble  and  a  generous  ideal,  a 
gracious  conception  of  peoples  big  and  little  living 
together  in  harmony,  each  developing  its  separate 


250  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

abilities  and  characteristics,  yet  all  united  by  a  com- 
mon humanity.  Above  all,  it  is  an  ultimately  prac- 
ticable ideal. 

Does  this  noble  idea,  however,  in  its  usual  in- 
terpretation, make  for  the  freedom  and  full  evolu- 
tion of  all  nations  or  does  it  benefit  some  and  in- 
jure others?  If  it  does  injure  some,  can  they  be 
reconciled  to  or  dragooned  into  internationalism? 
And  if  they  are  dragooned,  does  that  fact  impair 
the  spirit  of  internationalism  and  defeat  its  pur- 
poses? 

There  are  many  variants  of  internationalism. 
Under  this  one  word  are  included  plans,  simple  and 
complex,  definite  and  indefinite,  practicable,  imprac- 
ticable, impossible,  ranging  from  the  first  halting 
step  toward  a  co-operation  between  states  to  w^hole- 
sale  programs  for  wiping  out  all  nations,  and  con- 
verting humanity  into  one  inseparable  people.  Yet 
as  we  view  this  theory  in  the  light  of  its  interpreta- 
tion by  the  average  thinker  in  Western  Europe  we 
find  certain  rather  clearly  defined  elements.  These 
are  disarmament,  international  arbitration  and 
mediation,  the  reinforcement  of  treaties,  especially 
of  treaties  of  neutralization,  and  finally  the  grant- 
ing of  the  right  of  self-determination  to  each  con- 
scious nationality.  While  other  elements  are  some- 
times comprised  and  sometimes  excluded,  these  five 
constitute  the  core  of  international  thought  as  de- 
veloped in  the  United  States,  England  and  France. 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     251 

It  is  essentially  this  internationalism  for  whicli 
we  believe  that  we  are  fighting. 

Unfortunately  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  form 
of  internationalism  is  one  which  will  be  acceptable 
to  our  present  enemies  or  to  all  of  our  allies.  To 
our  enemies  it  seems  a  cramping,  one-sided,  selfish 
proposal,  not  a  cure  for  present-day  evils  but  a 
sword,  the  hilt  of  which  lies  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies 
while  the  blade  points  at  the  heart  of  the  Central 
Powers.  It  seems  to  them  a  glittering  mask,  cov- 
ering the  grim  reality  of  a  group  of  prosperous,  self- 
ish nations  seeking  to  injure  others ;  a  weapon,  not 
a  cure. 

What  truth  is  there  in  this  point  of  view?  Are 
there  interests  in  the  world  worthy  of  conservation 
which  would  be  destroyed  by  any  such  application 
of  internationalism?  Why  have  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria so  long  antagonized  the  proposals  of  the  West- 
ern democracies  to  replace  an  international  anarchy 
with  a  responsible  international  government? 

The  essence  of  this  antagonism  is  to  be  seen  in 
the  clash  between  the  State  Idea  {Staatsidee),  as 
strikingly  represented  by  Germany,  and  an  Inter- 
nationalism represented  by  Germany's  enemies. 
Month  by  month  it  becomes  more  apparent  that  Ger- 
man policies  are  closely  associated  with  a  new,  or 
at  least  a  newly  emphasized  conception  of  an  omnip- 
otent state,  largely  free  from  international  restraints 
and    consideration    for    subject    nationalities,    and 


252  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

with  the  right  to  impress  into  its  service  the  lives, 
goods  and  opinions  of  its  subjects.  As  opposed  to 
this  conception  stands  that  of  Internationalism, 
which  subordinates  state  policy  to  the  larger  inter- 
ests of  the  whole  family  of  nations,  which  empha- 
sizes the  right  of  nationalistic  self-determination, 
and  the  desirability  of  peace. 

In  democratic  countries  liberals  have  long  believed 
that  the  ultimate  triumph  of  this  Internationalism 
was  assured.  All  considerations  of  wisdom,  justice 
and  moderation,  all  the  common  sense  and  common 
morality  of  the  world  were  to  lead  to  an  easy,  al- 
most automatic,  victory  for  the  international  prin- 
ciple. As  peoples  became  educated,  intelligent  and 
free,  they  would  recognize  that  the  exacerbated  na- 
tionalism of  today  was  an  absurdity.  Men  would 
see  that  they  were  brothers,  that  their  interests 
were  identical,  that  they  could  not  strike  blows  with- 
out hitting  themselves.  Under  the  banner  of  In- 
ternationalism mankind  would  move  steadily  for- 
wards towards  civilization,  democracy  and  peace. 

For  the  moment  at  least  the  war  has  stripped  us 
of  this  smiling  illusion.  It  has  revealed  to  us  how 
for  forty  years  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  in- 
telligent of  nations,  one  which  by  most  criteria  must 
be  adjudged  highly  civilized,  has  been  wedded  to 
an  exactly  opposite  doctrine.  Germany  has  devel- 
oped an  allegiance  to  the  state  beyond  anything 
known  in  modern  times.     This  German  state  is  a 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     253 

jealous  god,  visiting  the  iniquities  of  the  disloyal 
most  heavily,  and  tolerating  no  other  allegiance. 
The  state  is  an  end  in  itself,  not  a  means  to  the 
happiness  of  its  subjects.  Its  first  law  is  not  serv- 
ice but  survival  and  power.^  Therefore  Interna- 
tional Law  is  valid  only  in  so  far  as  it  lies  within 
the  interests  of  the  state.  Within  the  state  minor 
nationalities,  minor  economic  groups,  minor  organ- 
izations of  all  kinds  possess  only  such  rights  as  the 
state  in  its  own  interest  chooses  to  accord,  and  rights 
so  accorded  may  be  withdrawn.  The  state  is  su- 
preme ;  the  individual  within  the  state  and  the  great 
inchoate  world  on  the  outside  are  subordinate. 

It  was  commonly  believed  that  this  formidable 
doctrine,  the  outcroppings  of  which  we  have  dis- 
covered in  recent  grim  events,  was  an  anachronism, 
like  the  belief  in  witches,  and  that  it  must  give  way 
before  the  more  modern  conceptions  of  the  demo- 
cratic nations.  Yet  this  State  Idea,  or,  as  we  may 
call  it,  this  Neo-Nationalism,  far  from  dying  as  a 
result  of  external  intellectual  pressure,  has  actually 
grown  with  the  growth  in  literacy  and  education. 
The  Germans  today  read  more  widely  than  in  the 
idealistic  period  of  Schiller  and  Kant,  and  they  dis- 
cuss political  questions,  not  always  wisely  perhaps 

1  There  is  today  a  new  type  of  German  imperialist  who  would  insist 
that  the  first  law  of  the  state  is  survival  for  aorviot-.  CuTman  im- 
perialists of  this  type  have  absorbed  mtu-h  of  the  British  imporialistin 
spirit,  and  men  like  Rohrbach  read  occasionally  like  prosy  transla- 
tions of  Kipling. 


254  THE  END  OF  THE  WAE 

but  interminably.  And  out  of  this  discussion  has 
come  a  fortification  of  Neo-Nationalism.  Even  the 
peasant  on  liis  five-acre  farm,  or  the  hod-carrier  on 
a  Berlin  tenement  is  more  or  less  in  agreement  with 
the  current  doctrine  of  a  strong,  highly  organized, 
centralized  state,  for  which  an  almost  exclusive  al- 
legiance may  be  demanded.  He  may  perhaps  ex- 
press the  doctrine  sentimentally;  at  bottom,  how- 
ever, he  vaguely  believes  in  the  sort  of  national  and 
international  organization  in  which  his  rulers  be- 
lieve. 

At  first  glance  the  German  socialists  seem  to  form 
an  exception.  Despite  their  internationalism,  how- 
ever, their  conception  of  the  state  bears  a  certain 
likeness  to  that  of  the  professors.  Their  co-opera- 
tive commonwealth  reproduces  much  of  the  method, 
philosophy  and  morale  of  the  German  state.  The 
Socialist  party  itself,  despite  its  democratic  basis, 
is  unitary,  centralized,  all-powerful,  and  toward 
minorities  not  a  little  intolerant.  It  is  regimented 
and  over-disciplined.  The  trend  of  the  German 
revolutionary  and  semi-revolutionary  movement  is 
not  only  national — in  its  decisive  relations — but 
overwhelmingly  political.*  Her  Socialists  do  not 
aim  at  a  limitation  of  the  immense  authority  of  the 
state,  let  alone  at  its  destruction,  but  at  its  conver- 

1  Unlike  France,  Italy  and  the  United  States,  Germany  has  little 
anti-political  or  syndicalist  sentiment. 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     255 

sion  into  a  centralized,  omnipotent,  socialistic  organ- 
ization. 

Nor  has  this  weighty  emphasis  upon  the  state 
idea,  this  subordination  of  individuals,  classes  and 
interests  to  a  unitary  and  internationally  irrespon- 
sible state  resulted  in  any  decline  in  national  effi- 
ciency. Rather  it  seems  to  have  had  the  opposite 
effect.  Both  in  peace  and  war  Germany  has  been 
singularly  successful.  The  tight  national  cohesion 
has  not  destroyed  private  initiative  nor  prevented 
a  growth  of  effective  group  action.  The  German 
conception  of  the  state  has  not  been  discredited  by 
any  marked  inefficiency. 

What  then  will  be  the  war's  result  in  destroying 
or  propagating  this  doctrine  of  Neo-Nationalism? 
Will  Italy,  Japan,  Serbia,  Roumania,  and  perhaps 
England,  France  and  the  United  States  embrace  the 
doctrine  which  Germany  has  upheld?  Will  a  feeble 
and  languidly-aspiring  Internationalism  be  wor- 
shipped in  our  studies  while  in  actual  life  we  go  over 
to  a  strenuous  and  powerful,  if  narrow  Neo-Nation- 
alism? It  is  conceivable  that  the  war  will  end  with 
a  stronger  assertion  of  the  omnipotence  and  irre- 
sponsibility of  the  state,  with  a  naked  Neo-Nation- 
alism covering  itself  pro  forma  with  a  few  inter- 
nationalist phrases.  The  New  Nationalism  may 
triumph  even  although  its  titular  champions  be  de- 
feated. 


256  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

This  is  one  of  the  deepest  issues  of  the  war.  The 
outcome  of  this  contest  between  the  New  National- 
ism, aggressive,  and  confident  and  an  International- 
ism, as  yet  unsure  of  itself  or  its  purpose,  will  vitally 
affect  the  coming  generations. 

Historically  these  two  opposed  doctrines,  Neo- 
Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  are  twin  daugh- 
ters of  a  single  development.  Whether  in  any  given 
case  the  one  or  the  other  has  taken  root  has  depended 
upon  the  conditions  surrounding  the  community  dur- 
ing the  period  in  which  it  attained  to  nationhood. 

Of  our  present-day  nations,  England,  France, 
Spain,  Portugal  and  others,  reached  nationhood  cen- 
turies ago,  while  Italy,  Germany,  Hungary,  Serbia, 
Bulgaria  and  Roumania  did  not  become  independent 
full-fledged  nations  until  recently.  All  these  na- 
tions desire  approximately  the  same  things;  a  nu- 
merous homogeneous  population  permanently  inhab- 
iting a  coherent  territory;  a  well-defined  and  easily 
defended  frontier ;  a  population  with  a  common  lan- 
guage, literature  and  institutions ;  a  unitary  govern- 
ment and  an  organic,  intellectual  and  political 
solidarity;  a  population  composed,  if  possible,  of 
only  one  nationality.^  If  these  elements  are  essen- 
tial to  full  nationhood,  then  France  and  Spain  are 
nations  in  a  fuller  sense  than  Austria,  Hungary  or 

1  See  definition  of  nation  by  F.  Lieber,  "Fragments  of  Political 
Science  on  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,"  New  York,  1868; 
quoted  by  Krehbiel  (Edward),  "War  and  Society,"  New  York, 
1916,  p.  1. 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     257 

Russia.  The  latter  are  impeded  by  conflicts  between 
the  state  and  the  nationalities  within  their  borders. 

What  nationalities  are  is  easier  to  sense  than  to 
define.  Broadly  speaking  a  nationality  is  ^'a  race 
which  possesses  its  own  language,  customs  and  cul- 
ture, and  enough  self-consciousness  to  preserve 
them"  ^  even  though  it  does  not  possess  its  own 
government,  as  does  a  nation.  Serbia  is  a  nation; 
the  Serbs  of  Austria  are  only  a  nationality.  Flem- 
ings, Walloons,  Alsatians,  Poles  and  Italian  Swiss 
all  form  nationalities.  In  a  nation  comprised  of 
various  nationalities  there  is  usually,  but  not  always, 
an  antagonism  between  the  state  and  the  national- 
istic spirit.  The  Roumanians  of  Hungary  are  not 
a  loyal  part  of  the  Magyar  state;  their  sympathies 
are  nationalistic  and  cross  the  boundary  into 
Roumania.  The  same  conditions  exist  everyu^here 
in  the  more  or  less  coherent  states  of  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe.  The  resulting  conflict  between 
state  and  nationality  is  a  grave  danger  to  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

This  antagonism  did  not  always  exist.  Two  cen- 
turies ago  the  various  language  groups  vegetated 
together  harmoniously,  because  not  shai*ply  con- 
scious of  their  nationality.  The  state  in  those  days 
was  a  loosely-integrated  thing,  amorphous  and  com- 
fortably inefficient.     Czech  and  German,  Hungarian 

1  "The  War  and  Democracy,"  by  J.  Dover  Wilson  and  others,  Lon- 
don, 1915,  p.  19. 


258  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

and  Slovak  lived  under  one  distant  Emperor,  whom 
they  never  saw.  There  was  not  much  more  friction 
than  today  between  the  various  national  groups  com- 
prised within  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  But  all 
this  comfortable  co-habitation  of  dormant  nationali- 
ties has  been  ended  by  a  series  of  economic,  political, 
social  and  psychological  changes,  which  have  oc- 
curred during  the  last  few  centuries.  A  new  sense 
has  been  given  to  nationality  and  a  new  vigour  to  the 
nationalistic  principle. 

The  internal  and  external  difficulties  in  which  this 
growth  of  nationalistic  ambitions  has  placed  states 
composed  of  several  nationalities  are  immensely  in- 
creased by  the  fact  that  these  groups  are  perma- 
nent, unabsorbable  and  almost  impenetrable  bodies. 
It  is  often  asked  why  Germany  cannot  absorb  its  few 
Danes  or  Poles  as  we  in  America  our  millions  of 
aliens.  The  answer  is  that  in  Europe  these  nation- 
alities are  growing  things,  whereas  what  we  in 
America  have  are  but  up-rooted  fragments  of  na- 
tionalities, that  cannot  again  take  root. 

It  is  this  conflict  of  growing  nations  with  minor 
nationalities,  either  within  or  without  their  borders, 
that  largely  inclines  such  nations  either  towards 
the  New  Nationalism  or  towards  Internationalism. 
Those  nations  whose  extension  strikes  against  small 
but  stubborn  nationalities  incline  to  a  policy  of  Xeo- 
Nationalism,  while  those  whose  expansion  is  free 
tend  on  the  whole  to  a  policy  of  Internationalism. 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     259 

The  United  States  is  a  case  of  a  nation  freely- 
developing  without  the  restraint  of  hostile  nationali- 
ties. The  same  freedom  to  expand  without  striking 
against  a  nationalistic  opposition  has  also  been  true, 
though  in  a  less  degree,  of  Great  Britain  and  of 
France.  The  Boer  War  was  an  apparent  excep- 
tion to  the  rule.  But  the  conquered  Dutch  burghers 
lay  six  thousand  miles  from  London ;  they  were  not 
in  a  vital  part  of  the  Empire ;  and  they  could  be  ab- 
sorbed linguistically  if  not  racially.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  expansion  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary was  halted  on  every  side  by  small  nationali- 
ties, within  and  without  the  Empires.  The  Dutch 
and  Belgians  hemmed  in  Germany  on  the  west.  Li 
the  south-east,  Serbia  stood  solidly  opposed,  while 
within  the  Dual  Monarchy,  the  Southern  Slavs  were 
large  disaffected.  The  Central  Empires  could  not 
make  gains  in  Europe  without  trenching  on  the  spirit 
of  nationality.  They  could  not  even  maintain  their 
actual  frontiers  without  violating  the  nationalistic 
principle.* 

It  is  self-evident  that  nations  so  situated  find  it 
difficult  under  present  conceptions  of  national  strug- 
gle to  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  of  the  self-deter- 
mination of  nationalities.^    To  them,  the  principle 

1  The  problem  for  Germany  would  have  been  less  difficult  had  she 
been  able  to  expand  colonially  as  frwly  as  Britain  and  France.  Un- 
fortunately for  her  she  entered  too  late  upon  the  colonial  competition. 

2  It  is  obvious  that  Austria  is  willing  to  have  tiie  principle  of  self- 
determination  applied  in  Russia  but  not  in  her  own  dominions. 


260  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

seems  destructive.  If  it  were  to  be  rigorously  ap- 
plied, Austria-Hungary  would  break  to  pieces,  Swit- 
zerland would  disappear,  Germany  would  lose  many 
of  her  subjects  (perhajjs  advantageously),  Britain 
might  lose  Ireland,  and  Ireland  Ulster,  and  Ulster 
perhaps  a  part  of  its  territory.  Turkey  would  be 
pared  down  to  a  fragment  of  its  present  territory. 
Self-determination  is  a  principle  which  we  in  the 
United  States  did  not  admit  in  the  case  of  the  South- 
ern Confederacy.  We  insisted  that  the  seceding 
states  should  remain  within  the  Union,  whatever 
their  desire  or  interests.  So  far  as  inclination  went, 
the  Southern  States  were  no  more  a  part  of  the 
nation  in  1861  than  was  Canada. 

Against  this  principle  of  self-determination  the 
Austrians  and  Germans  oppose  a  rival  conception, 
the  State  Idea.  It  is  upon  this  fundamental  theory, 
that  the  state  is  a  larger  concept  than  nationality, 
that  Austria-Hungary,  Switzerland,  and  Belgium 
are  built. 

Which  of  these  two  principles  is  to  prevail?  If 
the  State  Idea,  then  to  a  certain  extent  we  suppress 
nationalities;  if  the  Nationality  Idea,  then  to  an 
equal  extent  we  dissolve  states. 

The  question  is  not  one  of  mere  logic.  Behind 
the  State  Idea  there  lies  a  powerful  economic  pur- 
pose. The  tendency  of  modern  times  is  for  the 
economic  unit  to  grow  until  it  transcends  the  bounds 
of  nationality. 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTEKX.VTIONALTSM     261 

Herein  lies  the  deep  antagonism  between  the 
Mittel-Enropa  idea  and  the  unrestricted  recogni- 
tion of  the  rights  of  nationalities.  Mittel-Europa 
contravenes  many  of  the  ideals  of  internationalism. 
It  is  based  on  the  Staatsidee  and  is  a  political  equiv- 
alent for  a  closed  economic  unity  much  larger  than 
the  nationality.  Its  principle  is  not  only  not  inter- 
national but  not  even  democratic.  Actually  Mittel- 
Europa  would  work  out  along  the  lines  of  a  de- 
crease in  parliamentarism.  The  greater  part  of  the 
administration  of  this  vast  federation  would  be  in 
the  hands  of  experts,  military,  financial  and  eco- 
nomic, and  the  control  which  could  be  exerted  by 
the  legislative  bodies  of  the  several  states  composing 
the  union  would  be  slight  indeed.  A  Bohemian 
legislature  would  not  be  permitted  to  veto  a  law, 
agreed  upon  by  the  experts  of  Mittel-Europa.  Un- 
der such  a  system  the  subject  nationalities  would  be 
still  further  dwarfed. 

Why  then  does  Germany  desire  Mittel-Europa 
while  the  Allies  want  the  self-determination  of  na- 
tionalities— or  at  least  of  certain  nationalities? 
Fundamentally,  the  Germans  by  means  of  tliis  fed- 
eration are  seeking  to  secure  for  themselves  what  the 
Allies  wish  to  secure  by  their  internationalism, 
namely  growth,  extension  and  a  political  and  eco- 
nomic security.  The  creation  of  a  Mittel-Europa 
may  or  may  not  be  a  prelude  to  new  German  ag- 
gression.   It  may  prove  to  be  merely  an  effort  to  de- 


262  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

velop  a  state  upon  so  large  a  basis  that  it  will  be 
economically  self-supporting  and  politically  without 
fear  of  attack.  To  the  Germans  this  coalition  seems 
the  easiest  and  perhaps  the  only  path  to  security. 
The  forces,  therefore,  which  cause  men  in  the  West- 
ern nations  to  demand  internationalism  make  Ger- 
many and  Austria  sceptical  of  it  and  desirous  of 
Mittel-Europa.  The  same  motives  work  on  the  two 
groups  of  nations  variously,  because  their  basic  con- 
ditions are  different. 

This  different  working  out  of  similar  motives 
causes  the  widest  possible  divergences  and  the 
strongest  antagonisms.  One  of  the  obvious  implica- 
tions of  Neo-Nationalism  is  militarism.  The  theory 
of  the  subordination  of  minor  racial  groups  to  a 
theoretically  omnipotent  state  might  have  some- 
thing to  commend  it  if  the  state  were  always  the 
true  and  equal  representative  of  the  constituent  na- 
tionalities. As  a  rule,  however,  the  formula  is  used 
as  a  cover  for  the  suppression  of  one  nationality 
by  another.  In  Austria- Hungary  the  state  is  Ger- 
man-Magyar, and  minor  nationalities  acquire  at  best 
a  subordinate  position  or  are  ruthlessly  exploited. 
To  hold  these  minor  nations  down  military  power  is 
necessary. 

For  the  same  reasons  the  Neo-Nationalist  states 
are  likely  to  oppose  other  parts  of  a  program  of  in- 
ternationalism. Being  hemmed  in  by  minor  nation- 
alities, they  can  upset  the  status  quo  with  which  they 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     263 

are  dissatisfied  only  by  force  of  arms.  Therefore 
they  usually  oppose  disarmament,  which  they  be- 
lieve to  be  to  their  own  disadvantage  and  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  favourably  situated  states.  Similarly 
they  oppose  arbitration,  since  it  would  apply  to 
problems,  which  to  them  are  vital,  the  current  public 
law  of  nations,  which  law,  they  feel,  presses  unduly 
hard  upon  them.  They  are  against  any  interna- 
tional law,  which  is  based  upon  the  equal  right  of 
small  nations,  hemming  in  the  growing  nations. 
They  believe  that  these  small  nations  must  always 
and  inevitably  become  the  allies  and  bulwarks  of  the 
larger  homogeneous  states.' 

As  opposed  to  these  Neo-Nationalist  states,  the 
more  favourably  located  states  tend  to  be  in  favour 
of  internationalism,  public  law  and  peace,  because 
of  the  advantages  to  them  of  such  a  policy. 

They  can  usually  afford  peace,  since  they  have 
what  is  desired  and  what  the  war-like,  ill-placed  na- 
tions lack.  If  these  favourably  placed  nations  fight 
at  all,  it  is  in  outlying  semicivilized  districts  against 
unorganized  bodies  of  men,  to  whom  the  rules  of 
civilization  and  internationalism  need  not  apply. 

1  To  this  Neo-Nationalism,  also,  there  are  many  minor  Implications. 
Because  of  their  careful  military  organization  and  their  supposed 
need  of  repressing  minor  nationalities,  especially  if  these  are  frap- 
ments  or  fringes  of  independent  neighbouring  states  of  like  national- 
ity, neo-nationalist  states  are  usually  ruled  by  politically  conserva- 
tive governing  classes  and  an-  nifhless  in  diplomacy  and  war.  The 
ruling  nationality  is  as  a  rule  more  cohesive  than  in  nations  more 
favourably  situated. 


264  THE  END  OP  THE  WAR 

They  favour  arbitration,  because,  in  its  usual  in- 
terpretation, it  is  based  on  the  principle  of  the  status 
quo.  They  favour  mediation  because,  being  less 
military  than  their  neighbours,  they  gain  by  delay. 
They  favour  peace  because  they  (usually)  gain  in 
strength  with  each  decade  and  are  frequently,  though 
not  always,  pre-eminent  in  the  economic  competition 
which  goes  on  in  time  of  peace.  They  want  peace 
because  Time  is  their  ally. 

Above  all  they  desire  justice  for  oppressed  na- 
tionalities. Not  all  oppressed  nationalities  but  only, 
or  at  least  chiefly,  those  in  potentially  hostile  coun- 
tries. By  thus  agitating  and  fighting  for  the  op- 
pressed nationalities  under  enemy  rule  they  make 
for  themselves  new  allies  not  only  of  these  minor  na- 
tionalistic groups  but  also  of  the  adjoining  nations 
to  which  by  nationalistic  claims  these  fragments 
belong.  The  enemies  of  Germany  and  Austria  can 
always  win  the  sympathies  of  the  Poles,  Danes, 
Serbs  and  Roumanians  within  those  Empires. 

Like  the  well-placed  and  compactly  organized 
states,  so  also  the  neutral  and  neutralized  small 
states  advocate  the  cause  of  internationalism.  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  Scandinavia  and  Switzerland  have  a 
vital  interest  in  an  internationalism  which  preserves 
them  from  attack.  Even  where  they  block  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  progress  of  the  large  constricted 
nations,  internationalism  renders  them  secure 
Their  neutralization,  and  their  separate  sovereignty, 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     265 

are  based  upon  international  law  and  upon  the  sup- 
port of  nations  willing  to  fight  for  internationalism. 

From  all  of  which  it  appears  that  international- 
ism, according  to  its  interpretation,  may  be  a  weapon 
or  a  cure.  It  may  be  used  by  certain  nations  to  bat- 
ter down  others.  It  may  conceal  national  greed  and 
national  aggression. 

To  take  a  hypothetical  and  exaggerated  case,  what 
remedy  under  existing  theories  of  international  re- 
lations could  a  future  democratic  Germany  have 
against  a  Belgium  which  in  the  fixing  of  its  tariffs, 
practically  shut  out  German  goods  from  passage 
through  her  territory?  Against  such  an  injurious 
action  Germany  might  not  be  able  to  reply  except  by 
a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  which  would  bring 
on  a  new  war.  Actually  there  is  no  danger  in  this 
specific  case,  since  Belgium  is  more  dependent  eco- 
nomically upon  Germany  than  Germany  upon  her. 
But  the  general  problem  none  the  less  exists.  Va- 
rious nations  hold  the  road  to  the  ocean,  control  of 
the  seas,  access  to  markets  and  raw  materials,  and 
they  are  able  to  exert  pressure  upon  other  nations  by 
the  threat  of  withdrawing  conceded  rights.  An  Aus- 
tria at  Constantinople  could  levy  tribute  as  could 
Greece  at  Salonica  or  Italy  at  Trieste.  Under  our 
present  static  conceptions  of  internationalism  each 
nation  might  levy  tribute  at  will. 

An  internationalism  which  would  permit  such  con- 
ditions is  a  barren  and  negative  doctrine,  holding 


266  THE  END  OF  THE  WAE 

forth  no  hope  of  justice  or  peace.  It  is  a  purely  con- 
servative internationalism,  a  mere  glorification  of 
possession.  It  has  no  vitality  since  it  is  not  flex- 
ible and  easily  adjusted  to  an  ever-changing  environ- 
ment. 

To  secure  a  real  internationalism  we  must  go  fur- 
ther. We  must  revolutionize  conditions  and  con- 
cepts and  secure  an  international  machinery  for  the 
progressive  adjustment  of  the  ever-changing  needs 
of  all  the  nations.  The  war  has  again  shown,  what 
was  manifest  before,  that  the  economic  interests  of 
the  nations  transcend  boundary  lines. 

Such  a  wider  internationalism  cannot  consist  of 
treaties  alone.  Even  though  we  formulate  new  rules 
of  international  law  and  give  to  them  a  new  sanction 
we  shall  have  gone  but  part  of  the  way.  Nothing  less 
is  required  than  a  complete  revolution  of  our  in- 
ternational life,  a  binding  together  by  new  bonds  of 
all  the  peoples.  Internationalism,  moreover,  must 
be  more  than  a  mere  legal  compact.  The  crucial 
defect  of  such  compacts  is  that  they  are  speedily 
destroyed  by  evasion  if  not  by  open  breach.  Back 
of  whatever  legal  formulation  is  necessary  must 
lie  a  support  for  the  new  system  in  the  public  opin- 
ion of  the  world.  The  international  court  may  en- 
force as  well  as  declare  the  law,  but  the  enforcement 
must  find  approval  with  the  vast  majority  of  the 
peoples.    Internationalism   will   evolve,   moreover, 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     267 

only  as  it  develops  side  by  side  with  new  habits  of 
thought.  Its  growth  is  an  evolutionary  process,  re- 
flecting a  similar  growth  in  the  minds  of  hundreds 
of  millions  of  people. 

At  this  stage  it  is  unnecessary  to  map  out  a  plan 
for  such  internationalism.  Plans  are  easy  enough ; 
a  plan  for  common  action  by  all  nations  could  be 
formulated  in  a  month  if  the  will  to  lead  an  in- 
ternational life  were  present.  The  will,  based  on 
a  common  consciousness,  is  the  important  element. 

That  consciousness  will  grow  as  a  result  of  this 
war.  In  a  very  real  sense  the  war  has  not  only 
negated  itself  but  has  irreparably  discredited  the  in- 
ternational anarchy  out  of  whicli  it  sprang.  It  has 
shown  that  no  hope  of  an  ordered  international  life 
is  to  be  found  in  a  balancing  of  rival  Powers.  It 
has  proved  that  no  nation  is  secure  without  arma- 
ments and  none  is  secure  with  them;  that  the  ma- 
terial weapons,  indispensable  to  safety  and  yet  not 
providing  safety,  are  themselves  automatic,  and 
often  actually  precipitate  the  wars  they  are  intended 
to  avert.  The  old  system,  it  is  now  seen,  is  so 
barren  of  criteria,  of  sanctions,  of  safeguards,  that 
arbitration  becomes  impossible,  except  in  controver- 
sies which  do  not  matter,  and  even  mediation  is  prac- 
tically worthless,  in  an  atmosphere  of  suspicion, 
especially  since  every  delay  in  declaring  war  favours 
certain  nations  and  handicaps  others.     There  is  no 


268  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

way  out  except  forward  to  a  plenary  international- 
ism, giving  security,  both  political  and  economic,  to 
all  nations. 

What  exact  forms  that  internationalism  may  ulti- 
mately take  is  of  importance;  what  matters  most, 
however,  is  its  quality,  intent  and  spirit.  We  want 
a  true  internationalism,  adapted  to  the  needs  of  all 
the  nations,  and  not  a  German  internationalism,  or 
a  British,  French,  Russian  or  American  internation- 
alism. No  pseudo-international  system,  giving  se- 
curity and  growth  to  one  nation  and  denying  them  to 
others,  is  worth  considering.  All  the  nations  must 
be  accorded  some  opportunity  to  develop,  and  all 
must  obtain  political  security  and  the  chance  of  a 
free  economic  life. 

Nor  may  the  internationalism  which  is  to  be 
achieved  be  founded  in  the  main  upon  compulsion 
exerted  upon  the  nations.  We  shall  not  by  means  of 
war  be  able  to  force  states  to  enter  into  a  permanent 
league  and  we  may  even  discover  at  the  close  of 
the  conflict  that  the  forces  which  are  in  the  end  to 
establish  internationalism  are  totally  different  from 
those  that  have  been  created  by  the  war.  Undoubt- 
edly some  power  of  compelling  members  of  any  in- 
ternational league  and  of  defending  international 
rights  against  outsiders  will  probably  prove  neces- 
sary especially  in  the  beginning,  but  in  the  last  anal- 
ysis, the  system  must  rest  upon  a  willing  consent  of 
the  peoples.     Just  as  a  democratic  state,  though  pro- 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     269 

tecting  itself  against  anti-social  classes,  yet  depends 
for  its  real  power  upon  the  voluntary  adhesion  of 
its  citizens,  so  must  any  international  organization 
rest  upon  a  similar  acquiescence.  But  to  secure  and 
maintain  that  consent  the  international  organization 
dare  not  be  conservative,  static,  unchanging.  If  it 
merely  sanctifies  the  possession  by  certain  nations 
of  special  national  advantages,  it  will  evoke  an  in- 
ternal opposition,  by  which  in  the  end  it  will  be  de- 
stroyed. It  can  hold  its  own  in  a  constantly  chang- 
ing world  society  only  by  a  continuous  progressive 
evolution.  It  must  change,  as  in  a  municipal  so- 
ciety the  law  changes,  moving  forward  constantly 
yet  preserving  continuity. 

On  the  economic  side  this  new  international  or- 
der must  grow  with  the  increasing  business  inter- 
relation of  the  peoples  of  the  world.  The  war  has 
shown  how  complete  is  the  economic  interdepend- 
ence of  the  nations  and  how  shadow^^  and  incomplete 
is  any  political  independence  where  economic  inde- 
pendence is  lacking.  This  economic  interdependence 
of  nations  is  rapidly  becoming  obvious.  Despite 
proposals  like  that  of  Mittel-Europa  and  of  an 
Economic  Union  Against  Germany  the  trend  of  eco- 
nomic development  is  strongly  towards  a  closer  co- 
hesion, and  even  these  projected  economic  super- 
states, although  in  intent  mutually  hostile,  would  be 
in  large  measure  mutually  dependent. 

Without  such  progress  towards  joint  economic  ac- 


270  THE  END  OP  THE  WAR 

tion  and  equal  economic  opportunity  among  the  na- 
tions no  internationalism  is  permanently  possible. 
Many  plans  have  been  proposed  looking  towards 
such  an  increased  community  of  interest  between  na- 
tions. If  instead  of  returning  her  colonies  to  Ger- 
many, the  Allies  would  constitute  the  whole  of  Cen- 
tral Africa  as  an  international  colony,  to  be  ruled 
by  an  international  body  and  open  on  equal  terms 
to  Germans  as  well  as  to  the  citizens  of  other  na- 
tions, we  should  have  the  beginnings  of  a  joint  eco- 
nomic action.  The  same  principle  might  be  applied 
to  a  part  of  Asiatic  Turkey  and  to  other  colonies, 
old  and  new.  A  similar  principle  might  also  cover 
investments  in  countries  like  China.  Similarly  the 
question  of  economic  rights  of  way  for  one  nation 
over  the  territory  of  another  might  be  amicably 
settled  either  by  arrangements  between  the  nations 
immediately  aiTected  or  by  international  agreement. 
It  would  not  be  impossible  to  devise  plans  by  which 
certain  cities,  like  Trieste  and  Salonica,  might  be 
made  free  ports,  whatever  flag  they  flew,  or  by  which 
Serbia  could  be  assured  of  an  access  to  the  sea  and 
Germany  of  an  uninterrupted  passage  of  her  mer- 
chandise through  Belgium  and  Holland. 

More  and  more  the  economic  needs  of  the  nations 
will  demand  the  granting  of  rights  which  it  is  in  the 
present  power  of  other  nations  to  refuse.  Arrange- 
ments, rendered  necessary  by  such  demands,  would 


OBSTACLES  TO  INTERNATIONALISM     271 

of  course  conflict  with  our  present  theories  of  ab- 
solute and  uncontrolled  national  sovereignty.  But 
that  conception  must  vanish  in  any  case  if  we  are 
to  secure  any  effective  international  organization. 

The  time  for  this  shrinking  of  sovereignty,  for  this 
creation  of  a  larger  loyalty,  for  the  laying  of  the 
foundation  of  a  new  internationalism  is  now.  With- 
out such  an  end  the  war  will  have  been  a  fail- 
ure. There  will  be  no  true  victory,  for  none  will 
have  gained  anything  except  a  return  to  the  old  in- 
security, the  old  injustice,  the  old  fear  and  cruelty 
and  bloodshed  of  the  past. 

Yet  we  do  not  know  and  cannot  surely  know 
whether  this  victory  is  to  be  really  won  and  inter- 
nationalism secured  or  whether  the  whole  war  has 
been  nothing  but  a  laboratory  demonstration  to 
prove  the  evils  of  the  old  system.  We  may  discover 
at  the  Peace  Conference  that  we  are  to  be  permitted 
only  to  secure  a  distant  vision  of  internationalism, 
are  to  be  permitted  only  to  take  a  few  short  steps  in 
that  direction.  We  may  even  learn  that  war  reveals 
rather  than  changes,  and  that  we  must  look  to  long 
years  of  peace  under  evil  conditions  to  evolve  the 
forces  which  in  the  end  are  to  give  us  a  permanent 
peace  and  internationalism.  If  this  proves  to  be 
the  case  we  shall  have  won  from  the  war  only  the 
chance  to  begin  the  struggle  anew.  But  we  should 
not  accept  this  disheartening  conclusion  until  it  is 


272  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

forced  upon  us.  Until  the  war  ends  and  the  Peace 
Conference  is  over  we  must  carry  on  the  conflict  for 
democracy  and  internationalism  with  the  same  high 
spirit  of  confidence  as  that  with  which  we  entered 
the  war. 


CHAPTER  XV 

AT   THE   PEACE   CONERENCE 

The  war  does  not  end  when  the  last  shot  is  fired 
but  continues  to  be  fought  at  the  peace  table  in  the 
same  spirit  as  on  the  battle-field.  Though  the  tone 
of  the  peace  conference  is  different,  its  spirit  is  not 
unlike  that  of  the  physical  war.  There  is  a  clash  of 
interests,  a  politely  embittered  conflict.  Even  the 
weapons  are  identical.  There  is  the  same  cold  diplo- 
macy and,  although  actual  violence  is  barred  and  the 
august  plenipotentiaries  are  in  no  danger  of  bodily 
injury,  there  is  the  same  reliance  upon  the  power  of 
armies  and  navies  to  effect  a  decision  as  during  the 
actual  war. 

For  those  who  have  the  cause  of  internationalism 
at  heart  it  is  salutary  to  remember  that  wars  have 
been  won  on  the  battle-field  and  lost  at  the  peace 
table.  In  peace  negotiations,  as  in  war,  it  is  the 
group  that  is  entrenched  and  prepared  that  is  the 
more  likely  to  win.  Tomorrow  the  same  ambitions, 
the  same  points  of  view,  the  same  inveterate  interests 
that  proved  obstacles  to  a  democratic  settlement  dur- 
ing the  war  will  become  obstacles  to  a  satisfactory 
conclusion  of  the  peace  negotiations.  The  same  op- 
positions will  arise.  Not  only  will  the  Central  Pow- 
ers and  the  Allies  be  mutually  opposed  but  the  na- 

273 


274  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tionalistic,  imperialistic  principle  and  the  principle 
of  internationalism  as  well.  If  internationalists  are 
not  to  lose  in  the  end  whatever  they  may  have  gained 
by  the  war,  they  must  come  to  the  Peace  Congress 
thoroughly  prepared. 

Tomorrow  that  Peace  Congress  will  meet.  A  few 
months  or  years  will  see  their  various  Excellencies 
travelling  by  boat  and  train  to  some  capital  of  Eu- 
rope, prepared  to  settle  the  acrid  controversies  of  the 
war  and  decide  in  council  room  and  lobby  the  fate 
of  the  world.  There  may  be  all  sorts  and  kinds  and 
varieties  of  Excellencies.  For  the  most  part,  how- 
ever, unless  the  democratic  elements  in  the  various 
nations  prevent,  these  peace  representatives  are 
likely  to  be  of  the  approved  diplomatic  type,  the 
aged,  bemedalled,  chilly,  narrow  and  conservative 
Excellency,  very  gentlemanly,  very  astute,  funda- 
mentally stupid. 

Visualize  it.  Here  again,  we  may  have  the  Berch- 
tolds,  and  Tiszas,  and  Cambons,  and  Greys,  and 
Goschens,  and  Sasonofs,  and  Salandras,  and  Mil- 
ners,  and  Curzons,  together  with  the  small  fry  of 
Excellencies  from  little  countries,  who  resemble 
their  big  brothers  as  the  stiff  little  courts  of  the 
Eighteenth  Century  Germany  resembled  adored 
Versailles.  These  nimble  intellects,  which  played 
and  parried  and  thrust  so  perfectly  and  with  such 
punctilio  in  the  year  while  the  Great  War  was  pre- 
paring— fiddled  while  the  world  was  aflame — are  to 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        275 

meet  again,  and  play  and  parry  and  thrust  over  the 
graves  of  ten  million  men.  What  will  they  have 
learned?  What  will  they  have  forgotten?  Whence 
will  come  the  inspiration  to  these  closed  minds? 
Again  we  may  hear  from  these  lips  the  same  old 
phrases  of  vested  interests  and  vital  rights  and  na- 
tional honour  and  guarantees  and  securities.  Again 
they  may  argue  and  debate  over  "equitable  consid- 
erations" and  "proper  indemnities."  The  ten  mil- 
lion slain  will  be  a  pawm  in  the  game,  a  something 
to  trade  with.  It  may  prove  to  be  the  most  gran- 
diose huckstering  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

Will  these  gentlemen  and  noblemen  be  guided  by 
the  unique  desire  "to  make  the  world  safe  for 
democracy"?  They  haven't  the  remotest  concep- 
tion of  what  the  words  mean.  Will  their  Excellen- 
cies, guided  by  a  common  inspiration,  unanimously 
agree  to  work  in  harmony  for  a  New  Europe  and  a 
New  World?  To  attempt  this  would  be  beyond  their 
imagination  and  powers,  while  to  succeed  would 
"spoil  their  addition."  Or  will  each  Excellency  be 
fighting  singly  for  all  the  possible  and  impossible 
interests  of  his  own  nation?  Will  he  ask  for  more 
than  he  expects,  conceding  gracefully  that  to  which 
he  has  no  right  the  better  to  secure  that  to  which 
he  also  has  no  right?  Will  there  be  friction  and 
cross  lines  of  interests  between  allies  and  a  furious 
scrambling  for  spoils?  Will  internationalism  be 
"shelved"? 


276  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Surely  whatever  progress  we  are  to  make  toward 
a  better  Europe  and  a  better  world  will  depend  in 
some  measure  upon  the  character  of  these  delegates. 
If  they  are  to  be  the  same  mentally  bewigged  diplo- 
mats with  whom  the  world  is  so  painfully  familiar, 
the  course  of  negotiations  will  not  diverge  from  what 
it  has  been  in  the  past.  There  will  be  secret  com- 
pacts, quiet  coalitions  between  allies  and  enemies, 
the  playing  off  of  one  group  against  another,  a 
manoeuvring  for  position,  an  attempt  to  gain  dubious 
ends  by  intrigue  and  manipulation.  Let  the  Peace 
Congress  run  along  lines  parallel  to  those  at  Vienna 
or  at  Berlin  and  there  will  be  little  chance  of  a 
peace  in  the  interests  of  a  broad  internationalism. 

Of  this  grave  danger  many  liberals  are  aware. 
Consequently  there  is  an  insistent  demand  that  the 
negotiations  be  public  and  that  the  whole  world  be 
taken  into  confidence.  Much  progress  has  lately 
been  made  toward  such  a  public  diplomacy.  Lloyd 
George,  Woodrow  Wilson,  Czernin,  Hertling  and 
Clemenceau,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Bolsheviki,  have 
been  shouting  their  peace  terms,  or  what  is  often 
the  same,  their  war  threats,  at  the  top  of  their  lungs. 
It  is  a  democratic  diplomacy  par  excellence,  a  talk- 
ing to  your  opponent,  not  in  a  quiet  room  over  a 
cup  of  black  coffee,  but  openly  and  publicly  through 
newspapers  which  reach  hundreds  of  millions. 

To  some  extent  similar  results  will  be  attained 
at  the  Conference.    The  journalists  will  outnumber 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        277 

the  diplomats,  and  their  newspapers  will  carry  much 
of  the  news  and  all  of  the  rumours  that  breed  so 
luxuriantly  in  such  an  atmosphere.  Doubtless,  if 
negotiations  are  continued  long,  popular  interest  will 
relax,  especially  in  America.  Nevertheless  what  is 
said  at  the  public  conferences,  and  much  that  is 
whispered  in  the  lobbies,  will  become  the  common 
property  of  the  world.  The  peoples  will  have  some 
opportunity  of  expressing  their  opinions,  although 
they  may  not  always  be  able  to  secure  the  reliable 
information  upon  which  a  fair  judgment  must  be 
based. 

In  the  end,  however,  it  will  be  the  plenipotentiaries 
who  count.  Once  these  representatives  agree  upon 
a  peace,  good  or  bad,  it  will  be  difficult  for  the 
democrats  in  the  various  countries  to  make  their 
opposition  effective,  especially  since  the  only  alter- 
native to  an  unsatisfactory  settlement  will  be  a  re- 
sumption of  the  war.  It  would  therefore  be  desir- 
able, if  possible,  that  these  plenipotentiaries  be 
chosen  democratically  and  be  truly  representative  of 
the  peoples. 

It  has  been  proposed  that  the  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference  be  elected  in  each  country  by  the 
most  popular  branch  of  the  national  legislature 
upon  a  basis  of  proportional  representation.  If, 
for  example,  in  any  parliament  two-fifths  of  the 
members  are  liberals,  two-fifths  conservatives  and 
one-fifth  socialists,  then  the  delegates  should  be  ap- 


278  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

pointed  in  the  same  proportion;  two  conservatives, 
two  liberals  and  one  socialist.  These  representa- 
tives might  constitute  the  Second  Chamber  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  with  the  right  to  reject  any  set- 
tlement reached  by  the  smaller  body  of  diplomats 
nominated  by  the  executives.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  members  of  this  Second  Chamber  might 
vote  as  individuals  and  not  as  national  units,  in 
order  that  the  liberal  and  democratic  elements  in 
the  various  countries  might  coalesce,  and  thus  pre- 
vent the  drafting  of  a  merely  imperialistic  treaty. 

Such  a  direct  representation  of  the  democracy, 
however,  is  hardly  probable.  The  proposal  that  the 
legislative  body  elect  representatives  to  a  peace  con- 
ference, is  revolutionary,  being  in  obvious  conflict 
with  all  traditions  of  treaty-making.  It  would  be 
urged  against  such  a  procedure  that  it  violated  na- 
tional constitutions  and  precedents,  and  that  it 
would  delay  peace  and  perhaps  render  it  unattain- 
able. Before  such  a  group  could  be  called  together, 
the  nations,  large  and  small,  powerful  and  weak, 
would  have  to  agree  upon  a  just  basis  of  represen- 
tation, and  the  controversies  over  these  prelimina- 
ries might  be  protracted  for  months.  Germany  and 
her  allies  would  stubbornly  object  to  any  system 
which  would  permit  the  Allies  to  outvote  them.  In 
all  likelihood  the  opposition  of  conservatives  would 
be  sufficient  to  obstruct  and  finally  to  nullify  the 
proposal.    The  most  that  could  probably  be  secured 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        279 

would  be  the  creation  of  an  advisory  body  elected 
according  to  this  method,  a  body  with  no  veto  power, 
but  with  a  right  to  make  representations  to  the  dip- 
lomats and  publicly  to  discuss  all  proposals.  Even 
the  election  of  such  an  advisory  body,  though  it 
would  meet  with  strong  opposition,  would  be  a  long 
advance  towards  a  democratic  diplomacy. 

Moreover,  the  crucial  problem  is  not  one  of  demo- 
cratic forms  but  of  organized  democratic  sentiment 
all  over  the  world.  To  secure  a  peace  based  on  in- 
ternationalism and  to  prevent  the  Conference  from 
degenerating  into  a  mere  scramble  for  territories,  a 
supreme  vigilance  is  necessary.  If  we  go  into  the 
Congress  blindfolded,  there  will  be  a  grave  danger 
that  the  essential  peace  negotiations  will  be  carried 
on  secretly  and  without  due  consideration  of  the 
wishes  of  the  majority  of  belligerents  or  of  perma- 
nent world  interests. 

Though  it  is  not  wise  to  borrow  trouble,  it  would 
be  folly  to  disregard  possible  and  not  wholly  im- 
probable contingencies,  which,  if  they  occur  may  rob 
the  peoples  of  all  direct  benefit  from  their  sacrifices. 
When  we  remember  how  treaties  have  been  made 
before  and  when  we  regard  the  types  of  men  who 
are  interested  in  making  the  same  kind  of  treaty  to- 
day, it  ceases  to  appear  impossible  that  the  stately 
peace  congress  may  prove  to  be  a  farce.  The  repre- 
sentatives of  three  or  four  strong  nations  may  meet 
in  secret  conference  and  agree  upon  the  essentials  of 


280  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

peace  while  the  delegates  are  noisily  discussing  un- 
important questions.  At  the  open  sessions  we  may 
listen  to  an  interminable  wrangling  over  minor  de- 
tails, such  as  whether  the  Italian  boundary  shall 
run  two  miles  to  the  east  or  west  of  a  certain  point, 
or  a  certain  rocky  isle  shall  belong  to  Austria  or  to 
Greece.  We  may  hear  inconsequent  discussions, 
frivolous  claims  and  trivial  counterclaims,  while  the 
real  work  of  dividing  up  the  world  is  carried  on  by 
unseen  gentlemen  in  a  quiet  room,  with  telephonic 
connections  with  their  capitals.  Under  such  an 
arrangement  the  Congress  would  have  the  speeches 
and  the  fireworks  while  the  manipulators  would  gain 
the  tangible  benefits.  Those  familiar  with  the 
method  in  which  our  American  presidential  nominat- 
ing conventions  were  once  handled  will  easily  grasp 
the  significance  of  a  like  control  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence. 

The  improbability  of  such  a  lobby  peace  is  dimin- 
ished by  the  fact  of  the  large  number  of  participants 
at  the  Congress  and  the  multiplicity  and  baffling  com- 
plexity of  the  problems.  Fully  twenty-three  nations 
will  be  represented  and  many  hundreds  of  claims  will 
demand  consideration.  The  conference  will  seethe 
with  arguments,  economic,  political,  strategic,  ethno- 
logical, historical;  arguments  good,  indifferent, 
utterly  bad ;  arguments  backed  up  not  only  by  logic 
but  by  the  threat  of  armies  and  navies.  There  will 
be   re-alignments   within   the    alliances.    Although 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        281 

Ruritania  is  one  of  the  Allies,  she  is  likely,  if  her 
interests  are  opposed  by  France  or  Italy  to  grav- 
itate diplomatically  towards  Germany.  Moreover, 
no  single  one  of  these  hundreds  of  questions  is  iso- 
lated and  independent  of  others.  Each,  according 
to  the  tradition  of  the  Balance  of  Power,  is  united 
with  all.^  If  you  are  to  give  certain  territories  to 
Bulgaria,  the  cession  affects  the  interests  of  Greece 
and  Roumania,  the  relations  of  Serbia  to  Italy,  the 
claims  of  Italy  to  Turkish  territory,  and  so  ad 
infinitum.  Each  nation,  if  we  assume  such  a  na- 
tionalistic trend  in  the  discussions,  will  demand  com- 
pensation for  any  advantage  accruing  to  a  rival. 
How,  on  what  principle,  in  what  manner,  by  what 
method,  can  a  few  hundred  irreconcilable  and  un- 
reasonable representatives  of  twenty  greedy  and  an- 
tagonistic nations  settle  hundreds  of  diverse  and 
bristling  problems  in  open  conference?    The  solu- 

1  In  his  address  to  Congress  on  February  12,  1918,  President 
Wilson  strongly  opposed  any  such  concatenation  or  kiting  of  issues. 
He  insists  "that  each  part  of  the  final  settlement  must  be  bastxi 
upon  the  essential  justice  of  that  particular  case,"  and  that  "every 
territorial  settlement  involved  in  this  war  must  be  made  in  the 
interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  populations  concerned,  and  not 
as  a  part  of  any  mere  adjustment  or  compromise  of  claims  among 
rival  States."  But  in  actual  practice  these  claims  cannot  be  settled 
even  to  the  approximate  satisfaction  of  the  nations,  if  each  part  of 
the  settlement  is  based  upon  "the  essential  justice  of  that  particular 
case."  Forty  years  of  discussion  over  the  question  of  Alsace-Tyor- 
raine  have  brought  Germans  and  Frenchmen  not  a  step  nearer  to 
agreement.  What  new  argument  will  carry  conviction  today?  Simi- 
larly a  freely  negotiating  Roumania  will  never  admit  that  she  ought 
to  give  up  the  Dobrudja,  unless  Bessarabia  is  oflfered  as  an  argu- 
ment. 


282  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tion  that  will  appeal  to  diplomats  of  the  old  type 
is  obvious  and  it  is  the  same  solution  that  has  always 
appealed.  The  conference  will  be  the  grand  per- 
formance which  will  attract  all  eyes;  the  actual 
business  will  be  off-stage. 

Even  were  this  form  of  negotiations  to  be  adopted 
it  is  not  utterly  impossible  that  the  resulting  peace 
might  be  dictated  by  a  desire  to  end  the  old  interna- 
tional anarchy  and  to  advance  toward  international- 
ism. More  probably,  however,  the  resulting  peace 
would  in  the  main  be  imperialistic.  It  would  be  a 
peace  worked  out  by  men  who  had  laid  aside  all 
recent  prejudices.  Englishmen,  Frenchmen  and 
Germans  would  meet  on  friendly  terms  and  discuss 
problems  of  Realpolitik  most  concretely.  They 
would  not  dilate  upon  Belgian  atrocities  nor  declaim 
about  democracy.  They  would  deal  with  such  ques- 
tions as.  What  is  there  to  divide?  What  shares  must 
we  give  to  what  powerful  nations?  Which  of  our 
enemies  or  allies  must  be  sacrificed?  How  can  we 
coat  the  pill? 

In  such  a  conference  the  cards  would  lie  on  the 
table  and  there  would  be  little  necessity  for  pretence. 
These  Realpolitiker  would  recognize  strength  where 
they  see  it,  and  would  know  how  to  treat  strong 
states  and  how  to  treat  weak  states.  Of  course,  an 
imperialistic  or  semi-imperialistic  peace  would  be 
carefully  veiled.  To  the  internationalist  at  least  a 
sop  would  be  given.    It  would,  however,  be  quite 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        283 

possible  to  accept  ''in  principle"  a  program  of  dis- 
armament without  putting  it  into  practice,  and  to 
make  apparent  concessions  to  arbitration  and  media- 
tion while  really  strengthening  imperialistic  prece- 
dents and  creating  a  territorial  status  which  would 
make  all  the  specious  approaches  to  internationalism 
a  mere  diplomatic  camouflage,  the  old,  old  window- 
dressing  in  which  simple  souls  delight.  At  bottom, 
however,  there  would  under  such  an  arrangement  be 
small  regard  for  sentimental  considerations.  A 
Realpolitiker  can  no  more  afford  sentiment  than  a 
burglar  or  railroad  wrecker. 

All  this  is  speculation  or  at  best  a  forecast  of  pos- 
sibilities, not  prophecy.  What  we  are  dealing  with 
is  not  an  inevitable  happening,  but  a  possible  con- 
tingency, against  which  we  must,  if  we  can,  protect 
ourselves.  Another  danger,  moreover,  lies  even 
nearer.  Instead  of  the  Peace  Conference  ending 
with  a  quiet  little  group  of  diplomatic  surgeons  cut- 
ting up  the  world  carcase,  this  work  may  actually  be 
completed  before  the  Congress  meets.  A  few  diplo- 
mats may  come  together  at  some  neutral  capital  and 
agree  in  advance  upon  the  bases  of  peace.  England 
and  France  went  to  Algegiras  with  a  secret  agree- 
ment in  their  pockets  (an  agreement  violating  the 
principles  of  the  public  treaty  which  they  subse- 
quently signed).  Is  it  inadmissible  to  fear  that,  un- 
less precautions  are  taken,  certain  great  states  may 
come  to  the  coming  conference  with  a  like  equip- 


284  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ment?  The  rulers  of  these  states  may  believe  that 
they  represent  valuable  interests  which  they  will  fear 
to  place  in  hazard  through  the  free  play  of  idealistic 
impulses,  which  in  any  case  they  consider  imprac- 
ticable and  noxious. 

In  the  present  state  of  the  world  and  of  the  world 
alliances  this  danger  of  a  secret  peace  prior  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Congress  is  sufficiently  imminent  to 
warrant  the  utmost  efforts  at  frustration.  England, 
France  and  Italy  will  quite  naturally  fear  to  enter 
into  a  blind  conference  with  the  Central  Alliance,  the 
internal  cohesion  of  which  is  greater  than  their  own. 
If  at  the  Peace  Congress  Germany  could  detach 
Italy,  France,  or  any  other  powerful  opponent,  she 
might,  by  a  threat  to  throw  over  the  whole  proceed- 
ings and  return  to  a  war  status,  force  great  conces- 
sions from  all  her  former  antagonists.  She  could 
play  off  one  against  the  other.  The  Allies,  there- 
fore, may  well  hesitate  to  enter  upon  negotiations  un- 
less the  general  boundaries  of  all  discussions  and 
decisions  are  determined  in  advance.  But  if  this 
must  be  done  what  is  more  tempting  than  to  go 
further  and  agree  in  common,  prior  to  the  confer- 
ence, concerning  the  actual  detailed  terms  of  peace. 
Such  a  treaty,  even  if  in  part  secret,  would  be  suf- 
ficiently binding.  It  would  be  a  treaty  based  not 
upon  generalities  and  aspirations,  but  upon  terri- 
torial changes,  trade  rights,  economic  privileges,  and 
other  concrete  advantages.    It  would  tend  to  be  a 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        285 

peace  of  give  and  take,  a  giving  to  the  strong  and  a 
taking  from  the  weak. 

If  such  an  imperialistic  peace  is  made  it  will  take 
place  not  because  of  the  wickedness  of  individual 
men,  but  because,  given  the  old  standards,  the  line  of 
least  resistance  runs  in  this  direction.  The  funda- 
mental result  of  this  war,  the  one  over-riding  event, 
has  been  the  temporary  dissolution  of  Russia. 
Poland,  Finland,  Lithuania,  Courland  and  the 
Ukraine  are  falling  away  from  the  government  at 
Petrograd,  and  the  Ukrainians  have  gone  so  far  as 
to  declare  their  independence  and  sign  a  separate 
treaty  with  Germany.  What  was  once  the  powerful 
unitary  state,  Russia,  has  now  become  a  series  of 
separate  states,  no  one  of  which  is  strong  enough 
to  deal  on  equal  terms  with  Germany,  or  resist  her 
economic,  financial,  intellectual,  political  or  military 
penetration.  The  situation  thus  created  is  in  one 
respect  similar  to  that  established  in  the  Eighteenth 
Century  by  the  gradual  paralysis  of  Poland.  It  was 
not  alone  the  greed  of  Prussia,  Russia  and  Austria 
that  caused  the  successful  partition  of  that  unhappy 
land,  but  the  fact  that  here  in  the  east  of  Europe  lay 
a  great  hulk  of  a  state,  ready  to  be  seized.  Russia 
today  is  in  much  the  same  situation;  for  the  time 
being  she  is  a  derelict.  The  essential  fact  of  the 
present  problem,  moreover,  is  that  because  of  geo- 
graphical reasons  the  chief  beneficiary  of  the  Rus- 
sian collapse  is  likely  to  be  Germany.    In  no  way 


286  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

can  England  or  France  secure  a  share,  (even  if  they 
wish)  of  this  vast  territory.  While  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Roumania,  Turkey  and  Japan  may  gain  certain 
advantages,  territorial  or  other,  the  bulk  of  the  gain 
seems  likely  to  go  to  Germany. 

To  secure  the  benefits  from  this  dissolution  of 
Russia  no  crude  annexation  is  necessary.  Germany 
by  reason  of  her  power  and  proximity  should  be 
able  to  penetrate  Russia,  secure  a  dominant  eco- 
nomic position  and  a  preponderatingly  political  in- 
fluence, and  these,  once  secure,  might  gradually  be 
strengthened.  All  rights  necessary  to  assure  this 
special  position  could  be  obtained  under  the  guise  of 
a  pious  adherence  to  the  canons  of  democracy  and 
internationalism.  The  full  right  of  self-determina- 
tion might  be  granted  to  Poland,  Lithuania  and 
Courland  and  yet  result  in  the  establishment  of 
German  dominance,  or  even  of  patent  German 
sovereignty.  Under  a  hundred  smiling  disguises 
Russia  might  be  turned  over  to  German  exploitation. 
In  the  same  manner  England  might  secure  rights  in 
Mesopotamia,  Central  Persia  or  Arabia  (as  a  coun- 
terweight to  German  claims)  without  apparently  vio- 
lating the  principles  for  which  British  and  American 
liberals  are  fighting.  True,  British  imperialists 
might  not  relish  this  hard  bargain,  any  more  than 
would  French  and  Italian  imperialists.  If,  however, 
they  found  German  imperialism  unconquerable,  they 
might  conclude  that  it  would  be  safer  to  permit  Ger- 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        287 

many  to  expand  in  a  quarter  where  it  would  mean  the 
least  danger  to  them  rather  than  to  fight  longer  for 
an  internationalism  which  they  do  not  wish.  More- 
over, to  many  imperialists  in  all  countries  the  fear  of 
revolution,  which  has  been  brought  to  the  surface  by 
this  war,  seems  more  menacing  than  that  of  a  Ger- 
man imperialism  with  its  eyes  set  towards  the  east. 
If  such  an  imperialistic  settlement  were  to  be 
sprung  suddenly  upon  the  Peace  Conference,  or  be 
revealed  gradually  during  the  negotiations,  Ameri- 
can representatives,  or  indeed  the  United  States  as  a 
nation,  would  be  practically  impotent  to  remedy  the 
evil.  It  would  be  too  late  to  interfere.  So  long  as 
the  two  groups  of  nations  stand  opposed,  whether  at 
war  or  in  a  Peace  Conference,  the  American  influ- 
ence, because  of  our  middle  position  and  our  relative 
disinterestedness,  is  powerful.  By  granting  or  with- 
holding our  aid  we  can  influence  each  group.  If, 
however,  the  major  nations  agree  upon  a  peace,  how- 
ever unworthy,  there  is  nothing  for  us  to  do  except  to 
pack  our  trunks  and  return  to  our  homes.  Our  in- 
terposition in  Europe  is  only  necessary  or  possible 
when  an  irreconcilable  conflict  arises  between  embit- 
tered and  approximately  equal  coalitions;  when,  on 
the  other  hand,  these  groups  are  of  one  mind  they 
will  naturally  consider  the  making  of  any  treaty  as 
their  business,  not  ours.  We  cannot  force  them  to 
return  to  the  struggle  nor  compel  them  to  remain  at 
enmity.     If  prior  to  the  Peace  Conference  we  have 


288  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

allowed  such  an  agreement,  secret  or  open,  to  be 
made,  we  shall  be  helpless  before  an  imperialistic 
impulse  backed  up  by  the  overwhelming  force  of 
the  world. 

It  would  be  almost  equally  difficult  for  the  liberal 
elements  of  the  Entente  nations  effectively  to  oppose 
such  a  fait  accompli.  Once  the  diplomats  have 
agreed  upon  a  peace,  whatever  its  terms,  a  reversal 
of  their  action  becomes  almost  impossible.  Demo- 
crats in  the  several  nations  can  make  protests,  can 
even  ultimately  punish  their  representatives.  As- 
suming, however,  that  the  imperialistic  features  of 
the  treaty  are  not  too  flagrant,  and  that  the  nation's 
obvious  material  interests  are  not  sacrificed,  the 
resistance  to  the  treaty  is  not  likely  to  be  formidable. 
While  the  war  lasts  democrats  and  liberals  are  in  an 
excellent  strategic  position,  since  inclining  to  a  mod- 
erate peace  they  must  be  won  over  to  a  vigorous  con- 
duct of  the  war.  If,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  however, 
these  democrats  can  offer  no  substitute  for  an  unsat- 
isfactory treaty  except  an  indefinite  continuance  of 
the  conflict  under  adverse  conditions,  is  it  not  prob- 
able that  their  opposition  will  be  overborne? 

In  favour  of  such  an  imperialistic  peace  many  per- 
suasive appeals  would  be  made.  The  peace  would 
be  described  as  the  best  attainable,  as  a  real  triumph 
for  internationalism,  or,  at  worst,  as  a  necessary 
preliminary  to  an  ultimate  triumph.  It  would  be 
argued  that  a  peace  of  this  nature  is  the  best  that  we 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        289 

may  hope  for  in  the  present  generation,  since  we  are 
not  yet  ripe  for  a  full  internationalism. 

The  argument  might  run  somewhat  as  follows: 
Seventy  years  ago  socialists  in  England,  France  and 
Germany  were  appealing  to  proletarians  to  unite  in 
a  struggle  which  would  bring  about  the  co-operative 
commonwealth.  The  great  revolution  was  at  hand. 
Yet  we  know  now  that  the  world  was  not  ripe  for 
socialism,  and  that  an  attempt  to  introduce  the  sys- 
tem prematurely  would  not  only  have  ended  in 
failure  but  would  have  delayed  its  ultimate  advent. 
The  factories  of  the  world  were  then  too  small,  the 
wage-earners  too  few  and  undisciplined ;  the  capital- 
istic development  was  only  at  its  beginning  and  not, 
as  was  assumed,  at  its  height.  The  world  needed 
many  decades  of  capitalism. 

Today,  it  will  be  argued,  the  task  of  creating  at 
once  a  full  international  organization  presents  equal 
and  similar  difficulties.  There  are  too  many  small 
states,  too  many  unbridled  nationalistic  anil)itions, 
too  much  economic  and  political  backwardness.  In- 
ternational co-ordination  and  co-operation  are  in 
their  infancy.  We  have  hardly  begun  to  solve  the 
problems  of  international  economic  adjustment. 
We  have  not  yet  learned  how  to  create  a  larger  eco- 
nomic unit  without  destroying  iiolitical  autonomy. 
Internationalism  cannot  be  made;  it  must  grow. 
We  have  not  yet  even  assembled  all  the  elements  out 
of  which  it  nmst  grow. 


290  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

It  might  further  be  argued  that  just  as  socialism 
required  decades  of  capitalism  to  bring  it  to  fruition, 
so  internationalism  may  require  that  slow  integra- 
tion of  the  world  which  we  call  imperialism. 
The  unattached  and  unorganized  raw  material  of 
the  political  world  must  first  be  grouped  and  crys- 
tallized about  a  few  centres.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
base  internationalism  upon  the  assent  of  a  large 
and  motley  group  of  independent  nations,  some 
great  and  others  small,  some  progressive  and  others 
reactionary,  some  advancing  and  some  hopelessly 
backward,  some  well-ordered  and  others  in  a  state 
of  chronic  revolution  for  profits.  It  would,  on  the 
other  hand,  be  easy  to  base  internationalism  upon  a 
few  large  federal  units,  the  British  Commonwealth, 
the  American  Commonwealth,  a  German  Common- 
wealth, a  Russian  Commonwealth,  each  of  which 
would  act  in  concert  with  a  number  of  nations,  peo- 
ples or  states,  with  which  it  had  a  more  or  less  vol- 
untary union,  and  the  interests  of  which  it  would  be 
obliged  to  represent.  Once  the  present  nations  of 
the  world  were  united  in  a  few  large  groups,  interna- 
tionalism would  grow  automatically,  not  only  from 
self-interest  but  also  out  of  mutual  relations  of 
fear  and  respect  between  these  well  co-ordinated 
federal  bodies,  each  of  which  represented  a  merg- 
ing and  compromising  of  divergent  interests.  The 
analogy  with  the  development  of  a  socialized  democ- 
racy is  obvious.     It  would  be  far  easier  to  create 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        291 

a  socialist  industry  by  the  merger  of  a  dozen  cartells 
than  to  create  it  out  of  innumerable  small  businesses 
operated  by  tens  of  thousands  of  short-sighted  men. 

If  this  be  true  then  the  path  of  internationalism, 
according  to  this  hypothetical  argument,  might  run 
parallel  for  a  part  of  the  way  with  the  gradual  de- 
velopment of  a  higher  form  of  imperialism.  Accept- 
ing this  premise,  what  valid  objection  could  be  urged 
against  a  German  organization  of  the  Ukraine  and 
the  Baltic  Provinces  or  a  British  administration  of 
Mesopotamia?  Might  not  such  an  imperialistic 
peace  lead  to  the  gradual  creation  of  a  group  of 
large  federated  world  commonwealths,  upon  which 
internationalism  would  finally  be  built? 

Undoubtedly  the  world  is  not  to  go  over  immedi- 
ately to  a  full  international  system.  But  no  serious 
thinker  ever  conceived  of  that  possibility;  we  shall 
be  satisfied  with  a  far  more  tentative  approach  to 
that  goal.  It  may  also  be  admitted  that  a  coales- 
cence of  the  present  nations  into  large  freely  organ- 
ized groups  might  render  peace  and  an  eventual  in- 
ternational world-system  more  probable.  The  real 
objection  to  an  imperialistic  settlement,  however,  is 
that  the  resulting  coalescence  is  not  free,  but  forced. 
It  does  not  represent  the  will  and  probably  would  not 
protect  the  interests  of  the  peoples  annexed  or  incor- 
porated. Such  an  imperialistic  peace  would  destroy 
the  Russian  Revolution,  intensify  the  enmity  be- 
tween   Teuton    and    Slav    and    in    the    end    create 


292  THE  END  OF  THE  AVAR 

new  wars.  The  defect  of  such  a  peace  lies  in  its 
essential  spirit.  Fundamentally  that  spirit  is  the 
old  inveterate  desire  for  nationalistic  gain,  for  na- 
tional prestige,  for  strategic  advantage.  It  is  the 
same  old  preference  of  the  nation's  interests  to  the 
interest  of  the  world.  It  might  be  admitted  that  it 
would  be  better  for  Mesopotamia  to  be  British  than 
to  remain  Turkish,  and  for  the  Ukraine  to  be  dom- 
inated by  Germany  than  be  ruled  by  the  Czar.  But 
that  argument  might  equally  well  be  made  for  most 
of  the  imperialistic  extensions  of  the  last  fifty  years. 
A  far  wiser  solution  presents  itself  for  both  these 
problems.  We  are  approaching  the  time  when  the 
backward  countries  may  be  ruled,  not  in  the  in- 
terest of  a  single  nation  but  in  the  common  interest 
of  all.  It  would  be  extremely  bad  if  an  extension 
of  German  rule  in  Russia  meant  a  new  suppression 
of  vital  nationalistic  interests;  it  would  be  almost 
equally  bad  if  Mesopotamia  were  made  a  private 
reserve  for  British  capitalists.  Even  though  we 
are  not  ready  for  a  full  internationalism,  we  may 
make  rapid  and  above  all  steady  progress  in  that 
direction.  We  shall  not  immediately  after  this  war 
end  all  insecurity  and  all  causes  of  friction  between 
nations,  but  we  may  mitigate  the  evil  and  can  at 
least  lay  the  bases  of  internationalism.  A  peace 
that  fails  to  make  whatever  progress  is  possible  in 
this  direction  is  no  peace;  a  settlement  that  goes 
back  to  old  precedents  of  conquest,  of  needless  sup- 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        293 

pression  of  nationalities,  of  a  bartering  over  terri- 
tories, is  a  retrograde  step,  an  incitement  to  new 
wars  and  a  reversion  to  international  anarchy. 

The  time  to  prevent  the  danger,  however,  remote, 
of  such  an  imperialistic  peace  is  7iow.  We  can  gain 
our  ends  only  by  uniting  the  liberal  elements  in  all 
countries.  If  we  wish  to  influence  the  action  of 
British  imperialists  we  must  reinforce  the  great 
mass  of  British  democratic  sentiment,  while  that 
sentiment  is  at  its  strongest.  If  we  are  to  prevent 
the  dismemberment  of  Russia  we  must  act  by  an  ap- 
peal to  British,  French,  Italian,  and  even  German 
liberals,  and  by  a  generous  recognition  of  the  de- 
jected and  seemingly  abandoned  democracy  of 
Russia. 

Already  there  are  evidences  of  American  action  in 
this  direction.  The  speech  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in 
January,  1918,  was  interpreted  by  certain  critics  as 
indicating  an  eventual  willingness  to  consider  the 
making  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany  at  the  ex- 
pense of  Russia.  Although  this  policy  would  meet 
with  the  determined  opposition  of  all  liberal  ele- 
ments in  Great  Britain,  it  would  not  be  deemed 
unworthy  of  consideration  by  British  imperialists. 
The  reference  by  President  Wilson  to  Russia  re- 
veals a  position  wliicli  is  not  capable  of  the  same 
equivocal  interpretation.  Among  other  things  Mr. 
Wilson  demands  "The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  ter- 
ritory and  such  a  settlement  of  all  questions  affect- 


294  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

ing  Russia  as  will  secure  the  best  and  freest  co- 
operation of  the  other  nations  of  the  world  in  obtain- 
ing for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembarrassed 
opportunity  for  the  independent  determination  of 
her  own  political  development  and  national  policy 
and  assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society 
of  free  nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choos- 
ing; and,  more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of 
every  kind  that  she  may  need  and  may  herself  desire. 
The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations 
in  the  months  to  come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their 
good-will,  of  their  comprehension  of  her  needs  as 
distinguished  from  their  own  interests,  and  of  their 
intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy."  ^ 

I  have  emphasized  the  danger  of  a  possible  imperi- 
alistic peace  somewhat  strongly,  and  have  run  the 
risk  of  appearing  to  scent  peril  where  there  may  be 
none,  because  it  would  seem  that  our  only  chance  of 
making  the  Peace  Conference  worthy  of  the  immense 
sacrifices  of  this  war,  and  of  the  splendid  idealism 
with  which  it  has  been  fought,  lies  in  a  union  of  all 
liberal  elements  in  all  nations  prior  to  the  meeting  of 
the  conference.  The  imperialists  plan  ahead;  their 
''hole  in  the  corner"  treaties  are  prepared  well  in 
advance.  They  come  to  the  table  with  the  cards 
stacked  against  their  opponents.    Those  who  desire 

1  In  his  handling  of  the  problem  of  a  Japanese  intervention  in 
Siberia  and  in  his  telegram  to  the  Soviet  (March  12,  1918)  President 
Wilson  made  his  position  even  clearer. 


AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE        295 

a  democratic  peace  must  also  prepare.  The  Peace 
Conference,  if  it  is  not  to  be  a  mere  repetition  of  the 
chicaneries  of  the  past,  must  meet  in  an  atmosphere 
of  public  discussion  and  of  intolerance  for  all  secrecy 
and  deviousness.  Important  as  is  the  form  or  struc- 
ture of  the  Peace  Congress,  important  as  is  the 
method  by  which  the  delegates  are  to  be  elected,  the 
crucial  factor  is  the  state  of  mind  of  the  world  when 
the  Congress  meets.  In  turn  this  depends  upon  the 
possibility  of  bringing  intellectual  and  moral  pres- 
sure to  bear  upon  the  several  governments  before  the 
war  comes  to  an  end. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

AFTER   THE   PEACE    CONFERENCE 

After  the  Peace  Conference  there  will  remain  a 
sense  of  frustration.  However  intelligent  or  well- 
intentioned  the  delegates,  they  cannot,  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  case,  find  solutions  for  all  the  intricate 
economic,  nationalistic  and  territorial  problems 
which  led  to  this  war.  The  most  that  can  be  accom- 
plished will  be  the  creation  of  a  machinery  of  inter- 
national government.  How  that  machinery  will 
work  will  depend  upon  the  spirit  governing  the  na- 
tions after  the  war. 

The  problem  of  attaining  internationalism  is  not 
one  of  form  but  of  substance  and  intent.  Even 
should  we  secure  general  promises  of  disarmament, 
mediation,  arbitration,  and  of  a  freedom  of  the  seas 
in  war,  even  should  we  begin  to  construct  a  league 
to  enforce  peace,  the  machinery  would  break  do-^Ti 
unless  upheld  by  the  pacific  intentions  of  the  nations. 
If  several  members  of  the  League  believed  that  their 
interests  were  being  sacrificed,  they  would  openly 
or  covertly  seek  to  ruin  the  international  machinery. 
It  is  easy  to  destroy,  to  take  advantage  of  technical 
points,  to  promise  and  not  fulfil,  to  be  unfair  and 
allege  unfairness  in  others.     For  any  fundamental 

296 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  297 

and  permanent  success  of  internationalism  we  must 
rely  upon  the  good  intentions  of  states,  which  per- 
ceive that  their  true  interest  no  longer  lies  in  a  re- 
sumption of  the  old  strife. 

Whether  an  effective  internationalism  is  possible 
at  all  under  the  present  economic  and  political 
regime  in  Western  lands  is  doubtful.  It  is  true  that 
even  the  greatest  financiers  find  war  and  provoca- 
tions to  war  on  the  whole  unprofitable.  Even  were 
all  profit-seeking  activities  of  a  nation  organized 
nationally,  and  were  the  interest  of  each  nation  in 
any  specific  quarrel  intensified  by  the  fact  that  the 
beneficiary  was  a  small  social  class,  there  would 
still  remain  an  advantage  in  the  maintenance  of 
peace.  But  the  temptation  to  war  in  such  circum- 
stances is  enormous.  If  conditions  within  a  country 
are  such  that  the  nation  is  forced  to  seek  its  ad- 
vantage in  foreign  economic  adventures,  and  if  the 
profits  from  those  adventures  accrue  to  a  small  co- 
hesive group,  with  vast  political  influence,  the  temp- 
tation to  seek  undue  advantage  over  rivals  is  likely 
to  lead  the  nation  to  the  brink  of  war.  Were  each 
Frenchman  or  German  to  gain  or  lose  only  a  few 
dollars  as  the  result  of  an  international  decision, 
compromise  would  be  more  profitable  than  war. 
When,  however,  as  in  the  past,  the  rights  or  priv- 
ileges contended  for  mean  not  a  dollar  or  two  to 
each  citizen  but  hundreds  of  millions  to  either  a 
French   or   a   German   sjaidicate,   then    patriotism 


298  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

flares  up  menacingly.  The  masses  in  eacli  commun- 
ity have  a  smaller  economic  interest  in  the  contro- 
versies leading  to  war,  and  have  more  to  lose  from 
war,  than  do  the  special  economic  groups  which  now 
control  national  decisions. 

This  disequilibrium  of  our  modem  economic  sys- 
tem constitutes  the  gravest  menace  to  peace  and  will 
continue  to  be  dangerous,  whatever  the  machinery 
for  international  government.  The  fact  that  small 
economic  groups  possessing  vast  influence  find  their 
interest  in  striving  for  special  advantages  in  back- 
ward countries,  even  at  the  risk  of  war,  makes  any 
progress  toward  internationalism  under  the  existing 
system  extremely  difficult.  Under  any  system,  of 
course,  many  differences  between  nations  can  be 
obviated.  Profit-sharing  privileges  can  be  pooled, 
and  states  can  be  prevented  from  taking  toll  upon 
the  international  highways.  But  at  best  the  result- 
ing internationalism  is  insecure.  If  after  the  war 
each  nation  is  to  be  controlled  by  the  same  groups 
and  ideas  as  in  July  1914,  the  divisive  and  war  pro- 
voking economic  interests  will  remain  strong,  and 
peace  will  be  unstable.  Imperialism  will  be  in  full 
tide. 

Moreover,  and  this  is  an  important  fact  to  Ameri- 
cans, the  United  States,  which  in  the  present  war 
has  been  a  champion  of  internationalism,  is  as  likely 
to  become  imperialistic  as  are  the  other  nations. 
After  the  war  we  too  have  a  victory  to  win,  over 


^ 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  299 

ourselves.  Unless  we  achieve  that  victory,  here,  at 
home,  we  may  become  an  aggressive  and  imperialis- 
tic power,  a  menace  to  the  nations,  a  foe  to  interna- 
tionalism, a  nation  against  which  other  nations  may 
league  in  order  *'to  make  the  world  safe  for  de- 
mocracy. ' ' 

It  is  diflScult  for  Americans,  with  our  subjective 
attitude  toward  ourselves,  to  realize  that  any  such 
menace  exists.  We  have  always  had  the  effortless 
virtue  that  inheres  in  a  comfortable  competence. 
Our  foreign  policy  has  been  "a  diplomacy  de  luxe," 
and  we  were  not  obliged,  as  were  other  nations,  to 
fight  hard  for  what  we  needed.  We  therefore  came 
to  believe,  that  by  reason  of  our  peculiarly  pacific 
nature  we  were  immune  from  imperialism. 

It  was  sheer  self-delusion.  Undoubtedly  we  have 
usually  had  what  we  wanted  and  our  sense  of  na- 
tional security  has  made  it  seem  unnecessary  for  us 
to  fight  for  strategic  positions.  Nevertheless  we 
have  been  gradually  strengthening  our  strategic 
positions  in  the  approved  English,  Russian  and  Ger- 
man manner.  We  have  acquired  Ilawciii  to  protect 
our  Western  shores,  the  Canal  Zone  to  permit  the 
passage  of  our  warships  from  Atlantic  to  Pacific, 
and  finally,  in  order  to  maintain  our  supremacy  in 
the  Caribbean  and  to  guard  the  Canal  Zone,  we  have 
taken  over  Porto  Rico,  a  few  naval  stations  in  Cuba, 
and  the  Danish  West  Indies,  and  have  acquired  a 
quasi-protectorate  over  Nicaragua,  Hayti  and  Santo 


300  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Domingo.  We  seem  to  be  moving  toward  some  form 
of  domination,  open  or  concealed,  partial  or  com- 
plete, over  all  Caribbean  countries.  Moreover,  while 
strengthening  our  defences,  we  have  also  begun  to 
enter  upon  the  phase  of  financial  imperialism.  W^e 
long  refrained  from  this  policy  because  we  had  no 
large  surplus  capital  to  export.  We  did  not  need 
to  invest  money  in  Brazil  or  China  so  long  as  there 
were  opportunities  in  Oklahoma  and  New  York. 
Our  abstention,  therefore,  was  the  result  of  mere 
convenience,  and  represented  a  stage  in  our  economic 
development  in  which  our  home  industry  absorbed 
our  capital.  Today  we  are  coming  into  a  new  phase 
in  which,  unless  we  change  conditions,  we  shall  de- 
sire to  take  our  part  in  a  furious  international  strug- 
gle for  spoils. 

The  war  has  immensely  increased  this  danger  of 
an  eventual  American  imperialism.  We  have  ac- 
quired the  military  means,  and  are  becoming  one  of 
the  strongest  and  certainly  the  least  assailable  of 
countries.  We  have  acquired  a  *' stake"  in  the  out- 
side world,  for  over-night  we  have  become  a  capital- 
exporting  country.  The  initiative  and  the  main 
profits  of  this  capital  export  fall  to  a  relatively  small 
class,  largely  controlling  our  economic,  political  and 
intellectual  life.  Will  these  men  be  less  concerned 
with  profitable  chances  in  Russia,  China  and  Latin 
America  than  in  plans  of  internationalism?  How- 
ever unimpeachable  their  intentions,  will  they  recog- 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  301 

nize  a  clear  mandate  for  internationalism  if  it  runs 
counter  to  anticipated  gains? 

We  must  face  this  issue  honestly.  Never  before 
have  we  been  so  likely  to  become  a  danger  to  our- 
selves and  to  the  world.  It  is  no  man's  fault  nor 
even  the  nation's,  but  the  inevitable  result  of  our 
own  economic  development.  Doubtless  the  process 
has  been  hastened  by  our  entrance  into  the  war,  but 
had  the  change  not  come  now  it  would  have  come  in 
another  ten  or  twenty  years. 

If  we  become  imperialistic  we  shall  act  much  as  do 
other  imperialistic  nations.  Our  financiers  are  es- 
sentially like  those  of  Britain  or  Germany.  True, 
Americans  as  a  whole  do  not  as  yet  desire  the  an- 
nexation of  other  lands  (although  not  a  few  would 
like  to  ''take"  Mexico)  but  there  are  other  ways  of 
being  imperialistic.  There  is  a  financial  imperial- 
ism, which  retains,  after  eviscerating,  the  native  po- 
litical government,  and  which  buys  control  of  for- 
eign nations  as  it  buys  lands,  mines  or  railroads. 
Our  future  imperialists  (and  it  is  only  their  actions 
which  are  in  the  future)  may  give  rein  to  all  their 
ambitions  without  hoisting  the  flag  over  a  single 
islet.  They  can  get  what  they  want  in  ways  seem- 
ingly innocuous.  And  in  getting  what  they  want 
they  will  be  bolstered  up  by  the  arguments  that  have 
aided  imperialism  since  the  beginning.  All  the  shin- 
ing moral  panoply  that  has  once  been  used  can  be 
used  again. 


302  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

This  means  tension — and  war. 

The  point  of  conflict  between  the  rival  imperial- 
ists, of  which  we  may  be  one,  may  be  anywhere.  A 
long  slow  conflict,  for  example,  may  break  out  ten 
years  hence  in  Russia,  Latin  America,  Africa  or 
China.  Such  a  struggle  would  not  confine  itself  to 
economic  weapons.  If  British,  German,  American 
and  French  capitalists  are  competing  for  strategic 
investments,  a  financial  coalition  is  likely  to  lead  to 
political  coalitions  in  case  these  prospective  in- 
vestors are  able  to  involve  their  states.  Naturally 
the  issue  will  never  appear  as  a  naked  struggle  for 
economic  advantage.  When  the  financial  dispute  is 
brought  to  a  head,  the  resulting  war  will  be  evoked 
upon  high  moral  grounds. 

Such  an  American  imperialism,  though  possible, 
and,  perhaps,  even  probable,  is  not  predestined.  It 
will  almost  surely  come  to  pass  if  we  permit  an  in- 
creasing proportion  of  our  national  surplus  to  pass 
into  the  control  of  a  few  politically  powerful  men, 
and  allow  this  surplus  to  fight  its  way  into  backward 
countries.  But  these  conditions  are  not  inevitable. 
It  is  possible  on  the  contrarj^  to  accelerate  the  move- 
ment toward  a  greater  social  control  of  the  national 
surplus  and  toward  a  deflection  of  that  surplus  into 
channels  where  there  will  be  the  least  danger  of  pre- 
cipitating international  conflicts. 

We  cannot  do  this,  however,  without  revolutionary 
changes  in  our  whole  economic  system. 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  COXFEREXCE  303 

The  war  has  revealed  the  feebleness  of  that  sys- 
tem. At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  not  only  did  we 
not  possess  economic  democracy  but  we  lacked  even 
an  economic  unity.  Industrially  we  were  working 
at  cross  purposes  and  with  only  a  small  fraction  of 
our  real  power.  We  were  wasting  energy  in  inter- 
nal friction.  Conditions  tolerable  in  peace  became 
unendurable  in  a  war  against  a  resourceful  enemy. 

Because  of  the  proved  defects  of  our  system  of 
production  there  is  a  greater  likelihood  of  our  at- 
taining an  industrial  reorganization  tending  to  pre- 
vent our  launching  into  a  financial  imperialism. 
The  breakdown  of  the  old  system  has  been  astonish- 
ingly rapid.  First  went  the  old  unregulated  play 
of  supply  and  demand.  We  began  to  fear  the 
vagaries  of  the  market  and  were  forced  to  regulate 
prices.  Our  system  of  private  railroad  manage- 
ment under  conditions  of  forced  competition  proved 
utterly  inadequate  and  we  were  obliged  to  pool  our 
several  railway  systems  and  make  a  common  use  of 
our  whole  transportation  machinery.  By  national- 
izing the  railroads  we  probably  added  billions  to  the 
country's  real  wealth  and  hundreds  of  millions  to  its 
future  annual  product. 

What  we  have  learned  in  war  we  shall  hardly  for- 
get in  peace.  We  shall  no  longer  be  content  with  an 
industrial  machine  which  is  so  ill-regulated  that  it 
loses  its  force  in  waste  heat  and  develops  little  drive. 
We  shall  be  obliged  to  retain  conceptions  and  prac- 


304  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

tices  acquired  during  the  war.  The  new  economic 
solidarity,  once  gained,  can  never  again  be  surren- 
dered. 

For  however  the  war  ends  we  shall  require  the 
full  use  of  our  productive  machinery.  If  no  inter- 
national system  is  developed  we  shall  be  involved  in 
new  conflicts  in  which  economic  capacity  and  the 
possibility  of  immediate  economic  mobilization  will 
be  decisive  factors.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  are 
fortunate  enough  to  secure  a  stable  international 
system  guaranteeing  peace,  the  economic  competi- 
tion between  nations  will  for  a  time  at  least  remain. 
For  our  own  progress  and  influence  the  best  possi- 
ble utilization  of  our  resources  will  be  essential. 

The  chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  such  improve- 
ment is  the  multiplicity  of  our  conflicting  economic 
interests  due  to  our  extreme  solicitude  for  special 
privilege.  We  still  hold  sacred  all  rights  to  exploit 
and  monopolize  and  we  divert  an  immense  share  of 
the  wealth  and  income  of  the  nation  to  a  small  social 
class.  Our  trust  movement,  though  it  has  proved 
itself  superior  to  industrial  anarchy,  has  led  to  a 
further  accentuation  of  inequality  and  to  a  further 
increase  in  the  power  of  financially  privileged 
classes.  Everywhere  we  find  a  stark  insistence  on 
special  rights  not  only  by  the  very  wealthy  but  by 
men  of  moderate  and  even  of  small  means.  As  a 
consequence,  although  our  industrial  plants  are  in- 
dividually effective,  they  are  collectively  ineffective. 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  305 

There  is  no  unifying  concept  to  our  economic  system. 

More  important,  however,  even  than  the  question 
of  our  economic  efficiency  is  that  of  regulating  the 
flow  of  profits  both  within  the  nation  and  outward  to 
foreign  countries.  If  we  permit  an  enormous  ac- 
cumulation of  wealth  and  profits  to  be  deflected,  as 
in  the  past,  to  a  few  small  groups,  we  shall  find  that 
these  groups,  in  control  of  billions  of  dollars,  will 
force  the  country  to  undertake  imperialistic  proj- 
ects. Our  financiers  will  discover  that  there  is  a 
much  greater  profit  in  foreign  than  in  home  invest- 
ments. The  rise  in  our  wages,  the  slackening  of  our 
immigration  and  the  general  movement  toward  a 
betterment  of  working  conditions  tend  generally  to 
reduce  the  rate  of  returns  upon  new  home  ventures, 
and  therefore  increase  the  tendency  toward  a  forced 
export  of  capital,  irrespective  of  the  political  conse- 
quences of  such  export.  We  are  approaching  a 
stage  in  our  economic  evolution  similar  to  that  which 
England  reached  some  sixty  years  ago.  And  the 
impulse  with  us  is  likely  to  be  equally  strong  and 
even  more  dangerous,  for  in  the  early  days  England 
stood  alone  as  the  purveyor  of  capital,  whereas  to- 
day we  enter  the  imperialistic  competition  at  a  time 
wlien  many  nations  strive  desperately  for  their 
shares  of  the  profits. 

It  would  not,  of  course,  be  wise,  even  were  it  pos- 
sible, to  prohibit  the  export  of  capital.  It  is  emi- 
nently proper  that  a  certain  portion  of  the  suriilus 


306  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

income  of  America  and  of  Western  Europe  should 
go  to  backward  countries  where  capital  is  more  nec- 
essary. It  should  be  the  endeavour  of  the  great  in- 
dustrial nations,  however,  to  regulate  this  outflow 
and  seek  to  convert  the  present  imperialistic  scram- 
ble into  an  international  imperialism,  in  which  all 
investment  in  backward  countries  would  be  made  on 
joint  international  account  and  under  joint  man- 
agement, with  full  consideration  given  to  the  needs, 
both  economic  and  political,  of  the  indigenous  races. 
Though  we  must  export  a  certain  portion  of  our  sur- 
plus capital,  it  will  be  disastrous  if  the  expulsive 
force  of  our  economic  system  should  be  so  great  as 
to  cause  an  exaggeration  of  this  tendency,  an  in- 
crease in  its  violence,  and  an  enhanced  liability  to 
drive  us  into  war. 

Our  policy,  therefore,  should  be  in  the  direction  of 
a  deflection  of  wealth  and  income  from  special  groups 
to  the  general  community,  an  increase  in  the  expendi- 
ture of  national  income  upon  the  general  welfare, 
and  finally  an  extension  of  democratic  control  over 
industry  and  other  phases  of  national  life.  The  first 
object  can  be  attained  partly  by  taxation  and  partly 
by  nationalization.  By  means  of  steeply  graduated 
income,  inheritance  and  excess  profit  taxes  we  may 
largely  prevent  the  present  perilous  concentration  of 
our  national  surplus.  We  should  hesitate  to  reduce 
to  any  great  extent  the  present  high  income  and  ex- 
cess profit  taxes  and  we  should  supplement  them 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  307 

with  heavy  and  sharply  graduated  inheritance  taxes. 
Every  form  of  unearned  increment,  whether  from 
lands,  mines  or  public  service  corporations,  should 
be  carefully  scrutinized  and  as  far  as  possible  turned 
to  public  account. 

An  equally  effective  method  of  diverting  wealth 
and  income  to  the  general  community  is  by  means  of 
the  nationalization  of  industries.  Not  only  should 
our  railroads  become  national  property,  but  also  our 
coal,  iron,  gold,  silver,  copper  and  zinc  mines.  The 
government  should  progressively  extend  its  power 
over  all  basic  industries  with  the  double  intention  of 
effecting  unity  and  of  securing  profits.  Under  such 
a  system  of  nationalization  it  would  be  possible  to 
make  vast  expenditures  upon  purposes  which  do  not 
now  pay  the  financier,  but  which  would  be  of  incal- 
culable advantage  to  the  community.  We  should 
act  upon  the  principle  that  large  quantities  of  capi- 
tal should  not  be  exported  until  we  can  properly  feed, 
clothe  and  house  all  our  citizens  and  can  give  them 
education,  recreation  and  all  other  essentials  of  a 
full  and  healthful  life.  In  other  words,  we  should 
take  from  the  small  ruling  groups  the  control  which 
they  now  possess  over  our  national  revenue.  With- 
out destroying  all  private  property  and  incentive  to 
gain,  without  undermining  individual  initiative  but 
by  canalizing  it,  we  should  conduct  our  national  busi- 
ness as  though  all  this  wealtli  belonged  to  the  nation 
as  a  whole,  as  though  all  income  were  primarily  for 


308  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

the  common  benefit.  In  other  words,  we  should 
move  toward  an  industrial  and  social  democracy. 

No  such  democracy  will,  of  course,  be  possible 
without  at  the  same  time  furthering,  and  being  fur- 
thered by,  a  political  democracy.  The  entire  pro- 
gram depends  upon  the  ability  of  the  masses  of  the 
community  politically  to  control  the  social  machin- 
ery and  thus  secure  the  national  product.  Such  a 
democracy  cannot  be  attained  in  our  country  by  a 
mere  struggle  between  the  wage-earning  proletariat 
and  all  who  possess  capital,  since  the  latter  consti- 
tute the  majority  of  the  people  and  the  overwhelm- 
ingly preponderant  group.  It  can  be  achieved  only 
by  the  alignment  of  the  great  mass  of  non-favoured 
Americans  against  those  who  are  the  signal  bene- 
ficiaries of  our  present  industrial  process. 

It  is  upon  such  a  democracy,  not  only  in  America 
but  in  all  countries  possessing  potential  military 
power,  that  the  hope  of  a  true  and  permanent  inter- 
nationalism must  primarily  rest.  If  we  can  divorce 
the  economic  advantages  accruing  to  each  nation 
from  the  special  privileged  groups  who  now  chiefly 
monopolize  them,  we  shall  have  at  least  a  basis  for 
an  international  concert.  Doubtless  many  differ- 
ences in  interest  will  continue  to  exist.  The  Ger- 
man people  as  a  whole  will  be  benefited  or  hindered 
by  the  same  sort  of  international  decisions  as  now 
benefit  or  hinder  their  capitalist  classes.  But  the 
gain  or  loss  will  then  be  less  and  will  be  more  equally 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  309 

divided,  and  there  will  be  more  possibility  of  com- 
promise and  of  adjustment  when  the  new  spirit, 
which  we  seek  to  incorporate  in  the  relations  be- 
tween nations,  will  already  be  represented  within 
the  nations  themselves.  It  will  then  be  seen  that 
while  the  economic  interests  of  the  peoples  still  di- 
verge, these  differences  are  not  sufficiently  great  to 
warrant  the  costly  and  dangerous  expedient  of  war. 
There  will  be  no  special  group  financially  interested, 
as  at  present,  in  stirring  up  national  animosity,  and 
there  will  be  no  groups  at  all  who  will  gain  by  war 
although  their  country  loses.  The  problem  of  secur- 
ing internationalism  is  not  one  of  intelligence  alone 
but  also  of  good-will;  it  is  not  a  problem  of  discov- 
ering intricate  devices  but  of  eliminating  real  dilTer- 
ences  of  interest.  Since  these  conflicts  of  interest 
lie  largely  within  the  nations  themselves  in  tlie  form 
of  internal  mal-adjustments,  the  progress  toward  a 
democracy  will  of  necessity  be  a  progress  toward 
internationalism. 

The  war  has  proved  that  the  present  control  of 
the  great  industrial  nations  by  militaristic,  bureau- 
cratic and  financial  groups  is  a  complete  and  tragic 
failure.  It  has  shown  tliat  in  these  classes  the  group 
interest  so  overweighs  the  national  interest  and  so 
destroys  any  international  interest  as  to  preclude 
all  far-sightedness  and  to  make  a  true  concert  among 
the  nations  almost  impossible.  It  was  recently  pre- 
dicted by  Count  Okuma,  the  experienced  and  far- 


310  THE  END  OP  THE  WAR 

sighted  Japanese  statesman,  that  the  war  would  lead 
to  the  death  of  European  civilization.  According  to 
the  British  Labour  Party,  *'we  can  so  far  agree  in 
this  estimate  as  to  recognize,  in  the  present  world 
catastrophe,  if  not  the  death,  in  Europe,  of  civiliza- 
tion itself,  at  any  rate  the  culmination  and  collapse 
of  a  distinctive  industrial  civilization. ' '  *  The  reign 
of  profiteering  must  cease ;  otherwise  Western  civil- 
ization itself  will  come  to  an  end. 

In  the  Reconstruction  program,  proposed  for 
adoption  by  the  British  Labour  Party,  a  document 
which  has  been  described  as  ''probably  the  most 
mature  and  carefully  formulated  program  ever  put 
forth  by  a  responsible  political  party,"  the  issue  be- 
tween a  full  democracy  on  the  one  hand  and  national 
imperialism  and  war  on  the  other  is  trenchantly 
stated.  ''If,"  it  says,  "we  in  Britain  are  to  escape 
from  the  decay  of  civilization  itself,  which  the  Japa- 
nese statesman  foresees,  we  must  ensure  that  what 
is  presently  to  be  built  up  is  a  new  social  order, 
based  not  on  fighting  but  on  fraternity — not  on  the 
competitive  struggle  for  the  means  of  bare  life,  but 
on  a  deliberately  planned  co-operation  in  production 
and  distribution  for  the  benefit  of  all  who  participate 
by  hand  or  by  brain — not  on  the  utmost  possible 
inequality  of  riches,  but  on  a  systematic  approach 

1  Labor  and  the  New  Social  Order.  A  Report  on  Reconstruction 
by  the  Sub-Committee  of  the  British  Labor  Party.  Published  by 
the  New  Republic  as  a  supplement.  Vol.  XIV,  No.  i72,  February  16, 
1918. 


AFTER  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  311 

towards  a  healthy  equality  of  material  circumstances 
for  every  person  born  into  the  world — not  on  an 
enforced  dominion  over  subject  nations,  subject 
races,  subject  colonies,  subject  classes,  or  a  subject 
sex,  but,  in  industry  as  well  as  in  government,  on 
that  equal  freedom,  that  general  consciousness  of 
consent,  and  that  widest  possible  participation  in 
power,  both  economic  and  political,  which  is  char- 
acteristic of  democracy." 

The  final  war  for  democracy  will  begin  after  the 
war.  It  will  be  a  wider  conflict  than  that  which  now 
rages  and  the  alignment  will  be  by  classes  and  inter- 
ests rather  than  by  nations.  It  will  be  a  war  wliich 
will  be  waged  until  separate  interests  within  each 
nation  are  completely  extinguished. 


THE   END 


INDEX 


Allies,  diplomatic  errors  and  ap- 
parently imperialistic  purposes 
of,  2-3;  opposition  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  to  aims  of,  3-4; 
course  that  might  have  been 
taken  with,  by  America,  4-6 ; 
hesitatinw  diplomacy  of  Amer- 
ica concerning  secret  treaties 
of,  6-7;  dangers  of  a  victory 
to,  25-26;  a  real  moral  victory 
endangered  by  war  aims  of, 
26-27;  reasons  for  desire  of 
America  for  victory  of,  00; 
confessed  nationalistic  ambi- 
tions of,  98-99;  both  morale 
and  military  power  of,  weak- 
ened by  engagements  among 
themselves  violative  of  inter- 
nationalism, 107  n;  disposi- 
tion of  conquered  territories 
among,  by  terms  of  secret 
treaties,  115-120;  specially  ob- 
jectionable character  of  secret 
treaties  among,  119-120;  bar- 
gain made  by  Italy  with,  127- 
128;  course  pursued  by,  re- 
garding New  Russia's  appeal 
for  peace  without  indemnities 
and  annexations,    176-177. 

America,  lost  ojjportunities  of, 
for  declaration  of  principles 
in  world  conllict,  1-7;  reasons 
to  be  found  for  course  of,  7-8; 
diminution  of  moral  value  of 
participation  of,  in  war,  8; 
false  position  occupied  by,  8- 
9;  discouraging  elTects  of  lack 
of  courage  of  convictions  by, 
9-10;  chief  hope  of  the  world's 

313 


peace  found  in,  33-34;  lea- 
sons  concerning  peace  learned 
by,  34-36;  mood  in  which 
problem  of  world  peace  must 
be  approached  by,  37;  ideals 
of  people  of,  before  and  after 
entering  war,  38;  pacifists, 
patriots,  and  the  policy  of 
neutrality  in,  38-49;  reasons 
for  conversion  of,  to  war.  50  ff; 
effect  of  modern  growth  of  in- 
dustry upon  entrance  into 
war,  57-62 ;  theory  of  respon- 
sibility of  financial  interests 
for  war,  62-60;  idealistic  fac- 
tors influencing  decision,  66- 
67;  influence  of  Russian  Revo- 
lution, 07-68;  obsolescent  be- 
lief still  prevalent  that  Amer- 
ica has  little  concern  with  Eu- 
rope, 68-70;  war  justified  by 
appeal  to  old  ideals  of,  70- 
71;  forced  to  admit  menace  of 
German  militarism,  84-85; 
democratic  ideal  of,  menaced 
by  Cierman  autocracy  and  mili- 
tarism, 85-90;  not  bound  by 
Italy's  bargain  with  the  Al- 
lies, 131-138;  position  of,  as 
arbitrator  between  claims  of 
her  Allies  and  of  her  enemies. 
139  fT  ;  President  Wilson's 
statement  of  peace  terms, 
139-141;  difference  between 
position  of,  and  that  of  Russia 
and  British  I,nl)our  Party, 
142;  strategic  position  of,  143- 
145;  necessity  of  going  against 
will    both    of    enemies    and    of 


314 


INDEX 


influential  groups  among  Al- 
lies, 145;  concrete  policy  to  be 
followed  by,  148-156;  failure 
of,  to  respond  to  appeal  of 
New  Russia  for  a  common 
peace  and  mutual  forgiveness, 
180-181;  the  present  the  time 
for  preventing  an  imperialistic 
settlement,  287-288;  likely  to 
become  as  imperialistic  as 
other  nations,  298-299;  steps 
taken  by,  on  road  to  imperial- 
ism, 299-300;  phase  of  finan- 
cial imperialism  entered  upon 
by,  300;  danger  of  imperial- 
ism in,  increased  by  the 
war,  300-301 ;  revolutionary 
changes  in  whole  economic  sys- 
tem demanded,  302-304;  so- 
licitude for  special  privilege 
in,  304-305;  importance  of 
regulation  of  flow  of  profits 
within  the  nation  and  outward 
to  foreign  countries,  305-308 ; 
the  kind  of  democracy  in,  upon 
which  hope  of  a  true  interna- 
tionalism rests,  308. 

Angell,  Norman,  quoted  on  curb- 
ing of  foreign  circulation  of 
Liberal  journals,  165-166. 

Arbitration  and  mediation,  in- 
ternational, an  element  of  in- 
ternationalism, 250. 

Asia  Minor,  proposed  disposition 
of,  among  Allies,  116-117; 
Italian  aspirations  for  col- 
onies in,  127-128;  disposition 
of,  under  program  of  interna- 
tionalism, 270. 

Autocracy,  principle  of,  ranged 
against  democratic  principle  in 
present  war,  13;  significance 
to,  of  victory  for  Germany, 
14;  special  reasons  for  Amer- 
ica's combating  German,  85- 
90;   surprising  power  and  vi- 


tality of,  revealed  by  the  war, 
88-89;  expansiveness  of,  89. 


Bainville,  Jacques,  "Italy  and 
the  War,"  quoted,  122;  defence 
of  narrow  Italian  policy  by, 
130-131. 

Balkans,  character  of  struggle 
between  Austria  and  Russia 
for  domination  of,  105 ;  Italian 
claims  as  an  obstacle  to  peace 
arrangement  on  nationalistic 
lines  in,  129-130. 

Bang,  Dr  J.  P.  "Hurrah  and 
Hallelujah"  by,  200  n. 

Benevolent  neutrality,  America's 
period  of,  55-56. 

Bitter-enders,  efi'orts  for  an  ideal 
peace  frustrated  by,  27;  pres- 
ent attitude  of,  29-30. 

Bolshevik  government,  respon- 
sibility of  Allies  for  rise  of, 
176-177;  source  of  strength 
of,  found  in  fact  that  it  repre- 
sents working  classes  of  the 
world,  182-183;  significance  of 
rise  of,  as  a  symptom  of  a 
world-wide  revelation  and  a 
coming  revolution,  184;  mean- 
ing of  Russian  propaganda 
which  has  culminated  in  ac- 
tivities of,  184-185;  mingled 
absurdities,  excesses,  and  wis- 
dom of,  185-186;  question  of 
eventual  success  of,  186-188. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  quoted  on  ef- 
fect on  America's  position,  of 
her  entrance  into  the  war,  139. 

British  Labour  Party,  statement 
of  liberal  peace  terms  issued 
by,  142;  culmination  and  col- 
lapse of  European  industrial 
civilization  recognized  by,  310; 
Reconstruction  program  pro- 
posed for  adoption  by,  310-311. 


INDEX 


315 


Callwell,  Gen.  C.  E.,  on  the  Ger- 
mans, l'J3. 

Classes,  struggle  between,  seen 
as  the  war  beneath  the  war, 
184-185. 

Colonial  possessions,  disposition 
of,  under  program  of  interna- 
tionalism, 270. 

Convention  of  April  27,  1915, 
disposing  of  territory  among 
Allied  powers,  115. 

Croce,  Benedetto,  quoted  on 
Italy's  attitude  in  the  war, 
122.' 

Democracy,  diminishing  chances 
of  settling  war  on  basis  of, 
2-3;  attempt  of  America  to 
fight  for,  while  countenancing 
imperialistic  aims,  8-9;  only 
course  open  to.  to  break  down 
German  militarism,  11-1.3; 
principle  of  autocracy  ranged 
against,  in  the  war,  13;  what 
victory  by  Germany  would 
mean  to,  14;  victory  for  inter- 
nationalism and,  the  goal  to  be 
achieved,  15;  recognized  by 
America  as  a  fundamental 
purpose  in  the  war,  54;  the 
force  that  caused  America  to 
take  sides  with  the  .'Mlica, 
60;  how  German  autocracy 
and  militarism  are  a  menace 
to  American  principle  of,  85- 
90;  like  autocracy,  is  aggres- 
sive and  intensely  missionary, 
91;  distinction  between  a  so- 
cialized, and  an  InefTicient  and 
brutalized  plutocracy,  94-95; 
the  war  beneath  the  war  a  war 
for,  188;  final  war  for,  to  be- 
gin after  the  war,  311, 

Democratic  groups,  common 
ground    of    feeling    amt)ng,    in 


different  countries,  159-1 02; 
true  American  policy  aims  at 
union  of  all  the,  l<;3-lt)4;  dif- 
ficulty of  uniting  those  of  war- 
ring countries.  104-hJt;;  points 
that  help  in  uniting,  lGO-107; 
sharp  cleavage  between  mili- 
tarists and.  found  in  all  coun- 
tries, 108-170;  danger  of  too 
long  delay  by,  in  exercising  in- 
fluence against  an  imperialis- 
tic peace,  2KK 

Dernburg,  Dr  Bernard,  defence  of 
German   militarism  by,  77-78. 

Disarmament,  an  element  of  in 
ternationalism,  250. 

Economic  interdependence  of  na- 
tions, 235-238. 

Economic  system,  menace  to 
peace  found  in  disequilibrium 
of  modern,  298. 

Economic  war  after  the  war,  un- 
advisability  of,  11  1-112. 

Election  of  delegates  to  future 
Peace  Conference  proposed, 
277-279. 

England,  Dr.  Dernburg's  i-om- 
parison  of  Germany  and.  77- 
78;  meaning  to,  of  a  complete 
German  victory.  82-83;  influ- 
ence of  trade  unions  felt  in, 
173.     See  Great  liritain. 

Europeans,  misconceptions  of. 
concerning  Americans  and  the 
American  mind.  39-41. 

E.xccss  profits  taxes,  mainte- 
nance of.  after  the  war,  30(5- 
307. 

Exploiters  and  exploited.  Bol 
shevik  conception  of  war  be- 
tween. 184-185. 

Financial  imperialism  in  Amer- 
ica, 300-301. 


316 


INDEX 


Financial  interests,  theory  of  re- 
sponsibility of,  for  America's 
entrance  into  the  war,  62-67. 

Foreign  policies  of  European 
powers  in  modern  times,  101- 
105. 

France,  nationalistic  aims  and 
demands  of,  early  in  war,  103 ; 
agreement  between  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Russia  and,  as  to  ter- 
ritorial acquisitions,  116-119; 
influence  of  labour  groups  felt 
in,  173. 

Freytag-Loringhoven,  General 
von,  "Deductions  from  the 
Great  War"  by,  243. 

German  Minority  Socialists, 
statement  of  principles  and 
aims  by,  157-158;  hope  for 
future  found  in  protests  of, 
202. 

Germany,  causes  leading  to  over- 
ruling of  liberalism  in,  11; 
militarism  of,  to  be  conquered 
only  by  creation  of  secure  in- 
ternational system,  11-13;  vic- 
tory by,  would  re-establish 
prestige  of  autocracy,  14;  early 
hopes  in,  of  a  speedy  victory, 
18-19;  not  the  sole  enemy  of 
peace,  35;  America's  reasons 
for  taking  sides  against,  60- 
62;  discussion  of  the  militar- 
ism of,  against  which  war  is 
being  waged,  74  ff. ;  results  to 
Western  Europe  in  case  of  vic- 
tory of,  in  first  Western  drive, 
81-83;  foreign  policy  of,  com- 
pared with  that  of  other  pow- 
ers, 104-105;  impossibility  of 
collecting  indemnities  from, 
110;  policy  of  trade  discrimi- 
nation against,  ill  advised, 
111-112;  resemblance  of  Ital- 
ian program  to  that  of,   134; 


sharp  cleavage  between  demo- 
cratic group  and  militarists 
in,  109;  question  of  possibility 
of  distinguishing  between  peo- 
ple and  government,  iHOff. ; 
submissive  and  militaristic 
character  of  people,  197;  sinis- 
ter change  in  population  with 
early  victories,  199-200; 
wherein  hope  lies  for  people  of, 
201-202;  signs  of  beginning  of 
change  of  mood  in,  202-203; 
possibilities  for  development 
of  democracy  in,  20.3-206 ; 
power  of  Grand  Alliance  over, 
through  economic  co-operation. 
241-244;  should  be  admitted 
to  new  international  system  in 
which  the  war  may  result, 
245;  the  State  Idea  in,  251, 
252-254 ;  probable  domination 
of,  in  Russia,  under  an  im- 
perialistic peace,  286-287. 

Gibbons,  H.  A  ,  quoted  on  bully- 
ing and  blundering  record  of 
European  diplomacy,  103-104; 
quoted  concerning  Italian  im- 
perialists,   130  n. 

Goldmann,  N.,  defender  of  mili- 
tarism, quoted,   92-94. 

Grand  Alliance,  the,  232  ff.;  eco- 
nomic co-operation  of.  234- 
241. 

Great  Britain,  material  national- 
istic aims  of,  in  the  war,  103; 
agreement  between  France  and 
Russia  and,  as  to  disposition 
of  territorial  acquisitions, 
116-119. 

Greece,  offer  of  conquered  terri- 
tory to  (November,  1914),  116. 

Grumbach,  S.,  anthology  of  Ger- 
man imperialistic  literature 
by,  109. 

Guarantees,  demand  for,  by  the 
warring       powers,       224-225 ; 


INDEX 


31' 


necessity  for,  225;  distinguish- 
ing  between  honest  and  ques- 
tionable, 225-220;  method  of 
securing,  by  debilitating  the 
enemy,  226-227 :  the  method  of 
the  covenant  and  the  method 
of  destruction  of  motive,  228- 
230;  should  be  secured  by 
making  cost  of  aggression 
greater  and  the  temptation  to 
be  aggressive  less,  230;  new  in- 
ternational organization  and 
international  spirit  essential 
for  enduring,  231. 

Harrison,  Frederic,  "The  Mean- 
ing of  War,"  quoted,  82-83. 

Idealism,  American,  before  and 
after  entering  war,  38-40 

Imperialism,  stamp  of,  upon  Al- 
lied cause,  2-3;  ideal  victory 
imperilled  by  element  of, 
among  Allies,  26-27;  discus- 
sion of  aims  of  Allies  based  on 
ideas  of,  08  ff. ;  the  demand  for 
indemnities,  107-111;  trade 
discrimination  against  Ger- 
many, 111-112;  demands  for 
new  territorial  possessions, 
113-120;  of  the  Italian  pro- 
gram, 121-138;  possible  ef- 
fect of  labour  groups  upon, 
172-173;  menace  of,  seen  in 
America,  208-300. 

Tinperiiilistic  peace,  the  danger 
of  an,  282-287;  possible  argu- 
ments in  favour  of,  by  oppo- 
nents of  internationalism,  288- 
201  ;  disastrous  consequences 
of,  201-202;  danger  of.  to  be 
averted  only  by  union  of  lib- 
eral elements  in  all  nations 
prior  to  Peace  Conference, 
204-205. 


Income  taxes,  continuation  of, 
after  the  war,  30G-3U7. 

Indemnities,  the  Allied  de- 
mand for,  107-100;  argument 
against,  100-111;  impossibil- 
ity of  collecting,  from  Ger- 
many,   110-111. 

Industry,  neutrality  impossible 
luider  modern  conditions  of, 
57-58. 

Internationalism,  lost  opportu- 
nities for  settling  war  on  basis 
of,  2-3;  necessary  characteris- 
tics of  a  poliey  aiming  at,  7-H; 
the  lessening  chances  of  a 
peace  based  on,  0-10;  the  only 
means  of  ending  menace  of 
German  militarism,  11-13; 
victory  for,  should  be  the  goal 
to  be  achieved  in  the  war,  15; 
question  of  the  achievement  of, 
by  fighting,  22-24 ;  danger  of 
fighting  war  for,  by  expedients 
opposed  to,  26-27 ;  doctrine  of, 
viewed  as  a  new  and  broader 
Americanism,  71-72;  little  at- 
tention paid  to,  in  modern  Eu- 
ropean politics,  103-104;  mo- 
rale and  military  power  of  Al- 
lies weakened  by  engagements 
violative  of,  107  n.;  Italian  im- 
perialistic designs  opposed  to 
policies  of,  134;  America's  war 
aims  inspired  by,  130  (T  ;  true 
alignment  in  the  war  found  in 
militarism  versus,  157-173; 
centre  and  core  of,  located  in 
labour  groups  of  different 
countries,  170-171;  shown  tt) 
be  the  only  basis  for  a  con- 
clusive peace,  212-222;  a 
nearer  approach  to,  madi-  pos- 
sible by  the  grand  alliance 
against  Germany.  234 ;  analy- 
sis of  prineii)nl  obsta<'les  to. 
248  ff. ;  question  of  aeceptabil- 


318 


INDEX 


ity  of,  to  our  enemies  or  all  of 
our  allies,  251;  antagonism 
to,  in  clash  between  the  State 
Idea  and  an  internationalism 
represented  by  Germany's 
enemies,  251 ;  contest  between 
State  Idea  or  New  National- 
ism and,  one  of  the  deepest  is- 
sues of  the  war,  256;  condi- 
tions inclining  nations  toward 
New  Nationalism  or,  257-258; 
ideals  of,  contravened  by  Mit- 
tel-Europa  idea,  261;  narrow 
type  of,  favoured  by  favour- 
ably located  states,  263-266; 
steps  for  securing  a  real,  266 
ff. ;  program  of,  268-269;  the 
present  the  time  for  laying 
foundation  of  the  new,  271; 
fate  of,  at  the  future  Peace 
Conference,  275;  supreme  vig- 
ilance necessary  to  secure 
peace  based  on,  279;  possible 
persuasive  arguments  against, 
at  Peace  Conference,  288-291; 
peace  which  makes  no  progress 
in  direction  of,  a  failure,  292- 
293;  possibility  of,  doubtful 
under  present  economic  and 
political  regime,  297;  basis  for 
firm  foundation  for,  in  Amer- 
ica and  other  countries,  308- 
309. 
Italy,  events  leading  to  defeat  of, 
in  1917,  3;  bargaining  attitude 
of,  in  the  war,  54;  selfish  aims 
and  motives  of,  121  ff.;  na- 
tional interest  the  controlling 
factor  in  policy  of,  122-123; 
egoistic,  nationalistic,  and  im- 
perialistic motives  of,  124-128; 
bargain  made  by,  with  Allies, 
128 ;  defence  and  criticism  of 
national  egoism  of,  130-131 ; 
reasons  why  America  should 
not   lend    aid    to    encouraging 


imperialistic  aims  of,  131- 
138;  question  of  Americas 
course  in  regard  to,  152-151; 
weight  of  influence  of  labour 
groups  in,  173. 

Japan,  significance  of  invasion 
of  Siberia  by,  to  cause  of  .\\ 
lies,  3;  necessity  for  8top])iiig 
plans  for  conquest  in  Siberia, 
to  secure  lasting  peace,  13; 
slight  significance  of  demo- 
cratic ideals  to,  54;  militaris- 
tic and  autocratic  charactrr 
of,  76;  Chinese  territory  ac- 
corded to,  by  secret  treaties, 
115;  position  of,  as  afi'ectiug 
America's  policy  and  war 
aims,  154-155;  President  Wil- 
son and  the  problem  of  inter- 
vention by,  in  Siberia,  294  n. 

Junkers,  present  ascendancy  of, 
11;  course  to  be  followed  to 
break  down  prestige  of,  11-13. 

Kautsky,  Karl,  quoted  on  So- 
cialist attitude  toward  mili- 
tary system,  94  n. 

Labour,  the  necessity  for  placat- 
ing, 185. 

Labour  groups,  hope  of  inter- 
nationalism placed  in,  170- 
172;  reason  for  great  influence 
of,  in  the  war  172-173;  pos- 
sibility of  sweeping  away  im- 
perialistic elements  by   173. 

League  of  Nations,  for  strength- 
ening guarantees,  231. 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  pacific 
intentions  of  nations  necessary 
to  machinery  of,  296 

Lehmann,  Pastor  Walter,  lauda- 
tion of  Germany  by.  200. 

Lieber,  F.,  cited  on  definition  of 
"nation,"  256, 


INDEX 


319 


lyiheralism. 
groups. 


See    Democratic 


Maxse,  L.  J.,  attack  on  Amer- 
ica's neutral  policy  by,  46- 
47 ;  quoted  as  an  advocate  of 
indemnities,  108. 

Militarism,  destruction  of  all 
kinds  of,  one  chief  aim  in  the 
war,  15;  what  is  meant  by  the 
war  against,  73  ff. ;  defence  of 
German  system,  77-78;  par- 
ticular reasons  why  America 
combats  German,  85-90;  argu- 
ments in  defence  of  German, 
n2-!»4;  not  identical  with 
maintenance  of  an  army,  94  ii  ; 
intt'rnationalism  versus,  the 
true  alignment  in  the  war, 
157-173;  an  obvious  implica- 
tion  of   Neo-Nationalism.   2(52. 

Militarists,  as  a  chief  obstacle 
to  an  ideal  peace,  27,  29-30; 
intellectual  chasm  between 
democratic  groups  and,  in  all 
countries,    168-170. 

Mittel-Europa,  antagonistic  to 
doctrine  of  unrestricted  rights 
of  nationalities,  261 ;  why 
Germany    desires    a,    261-262. 

^loney  power,  extent  of  respon- 
sibility of  the,  for  America's 
entrance   into  the  war,   62-67. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  to  carry  o\it 
promise  of  the,  one  object  of 
America  in  entering  the  war, 
71. 

Murray.  Sir  Gilbert,  "The  For- 
eign Policy  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,"  quoted,  101-102. 

Nationalistic  ambitiona  of  Al- 
lies, 08-106;  intcrnationalistic 
motive  opposed  to,  106-107; 
iho  demand  for  indemnities. 
]07-l  1  !  ;  the  demand  for  trade 


discrimination  against  Ger- 
many, 111-112;  the  d.-mand 
for  new  territorial  possessions, 
113-120. 

Nationality,  definition  of  a,  257. 
See  Self-determination  of  na- 
tionalities. 

Nationalization  of  industries,  de- 
sirability of,  in  America,  307- 
308. 

Neo-Nationalism  doctrine  of, 
253-254;  question  of  efTect  of 
war  on,  255;  conditions  inclin- 
ing nations  toward  interna- 
tionalism or,  257-25S;  mili- 
tarism an  obvious  implication 
of,  262;  minor  im|ilicalit)n8  of, 
263  n. 

Neutrality,  causes  leading  to 
American,  early  in  war,  38- 
44;  necessity  of,  emphasized 
by  internal  racial  divisions  in 
America,  44-46;  dilliculties  of 
policy  of,  46-47;  failure  of 
policy,  47-49;  the  period  of 
"benevolent  neutrality,"  55- 
56;  impossibility  of  a  real, 
under  modern  industrial  con- 
ditions, 57-58. 

Non-intervention.  See  Neutral- 
ity. 

Okuma,  Count,  death  of  Kuro 
pean  civilization  predicted  by, 
309-310. 

PacifistB,  89  obstacles  to  an  ideal 
peace,  27;  the  present  condi 
tion  of,  27-29;  reasons  for 
existence  of.  in  .\merica,  3S- 
42;  condescendingly  benevolent 
character  of  American  type. 
42-43. 

Patriotism,  pacific  character  of 
.Xmerican,  42 

Peace,    th<'    search    fur,    and    ob- 


320 


INDEX 


stacles  to,  27-32;  need  of  a 
constructive,  32-33 ;  position 
of  America  as  the  chief  liope 
of,  33-34;  lessons  learned  by 
America  concerning  a  real, 
34-36;  not  brought  by  the 
end  of  the  war  alone,  36-37; 
mood  in  which  America  must 
approach  problem  of,  37 ; 
terms  of,  as  outlined  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  140-141;  the 
means  of  attaining  a  conclu- 
sive, 207-223.  See  also  Im- 
perialistic peace. 

Peace  Conference,  supposititious 
activities  of  diplomats  at  fu- 
ture meeting  of,  273  S. ;  will 
internationalism  be  shelved 
at?  275;  importance  of  char- 
acter of  delegates  to,  276;  de- 
mand for  public  and  not  secret 
diplomacy  at,  276-277;  elec- 
tion of  delegates  to,  proposed, 
277-279;  supreme  vigilance 
necessary  to  secure  peace  based 
on  internationalism,  279;  con- 
tingencies which  may  rob  peo- 
ple of  benefit  of  their  sacri 
fiees,  279-282;  the  danger  of 
an  imperialistic  peace,  282- 
287;  America's  present  oppor- 
tunity to  prevent  an  imperial- 
istic settlement,  287-288;  pos- 
sible appeals  in  favour  of  an 
imperialistic  peace,  288-291 ; 
importance  of  union  of  liberal 
elements  in  all  nations,  prior 
to,  294-295. 

Pichon,  Stephen,  a  French  advo- 
cate of  indemnities,  108-109. 

Powers,  H.  H  ,  'Wmerica  among 
the  Nations,"  quoted,  75  n. 

Punitive  indomnities.  the  pro- 
posed policy  of,  to  be  adopted 
by  Allies.  107-109:  the  argu- 
ment  against.    109-111. 


Railroads,  benefits  from  nation- 
alizing of,  303. 

Reclus,  On^sime,  policy  of  in- 
demnities advocated  by,  109. 

Reichstag  Majority  program, 
202. 

Reinforcement  of  treaties,  an 
element  of  internationalism, 
250. 

Reply  to  the  Pope,  President 
Wilson's,  140. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  criticism  of 
views  of,  expressed  in  spwch 
calling  for  a  peace  of  over- 
whelming victory,  207-208. 

Roumania,  a  bargainer  in  the 
war,  54;  territories  to  be  ac- 
corded to,   115-116. 

Russia,  course  of  Allies  toward, 
2-3 ;  conditions  resulting  in 
handing  over  of,  to  Germany. 
9;  autocratic  and  militaristic 
character  of,  in  1914,  70;  mili- 
tarism of,  compared  with  that 
of  Germany,  77;  nationalistic 
aims  of  Imperial,  at  beginning 
of  war,  102-103;  territory  ac- 
corded to,  by  terms  of  secret 
treaties,  115;  territorial  ac- 
quisitions of,  under  agreement 
with  Great  Britain  and  France, 
116-119;  impulse  toward  lib- 
eral peace  terms  from  Repub- 
lic of,  142;  appeal  issued  by 
Republic  of,  for  peace  with 
out  punitive  indemnities  or 
forced  annexations,  174;  eflFects 
of  utterance  on  allies  of  New 
Russia,  174-175;  wisdom  of 
new-born  Republic  shown  by 
statement,  175;  President 
Wilson's  sympathetic  attitude. 
176:  procrastinating  course  of 
Allies,  resulting  in  rise  of  Bol- 
shevik government,  176-177; 
war-weatiness  and  clear-sight- 


INDEX 


321 


edncss  of,  177-170;  steps  lead- 
ing to  the  appeal  by,  for  u  com- 
mou  peace  and  mutual  forgive- 
ness. 170-180;  disposition  of, 
und<r  an  imperialistic  peace, 
2S5-2S7;  President  Wil- 
son's announcement  concerning 
treatment  of,  by  sister  nations, 
293-204. 

Russian  Republic,  right  spirit 
shown  in  declaration  by,  for 
"no  annexations  and  no  in- 
demnities," 5,  174-175;  at- 
titude of,  toward  secret  com- 
pacts of  Allies,  G-7 

Russian  Hevolution,  effect  of,  on 
deciding  America  to  enter  the 
wiir,  (i7-()S;  destruction  of,  by 
an  imperialistic  peace,  291. 


Saturday  Review,  reception  by, 
of  President  Wilson's  demand 
for  democratization  in  Ger- 
many and  promise  of  a  non- 
pimitive  peace,  162-163. 

Sayce,  Professor,  quoted  on  the 
Germans,  102. 

Secret  treaties  of  Allies,  to  be 
disapproved  by  America,  4-5; 
hesitating  diplomacy  of  Amer- 
ica in  regard  to,  6-7;  effect  of, 
upon  the  enemy,  90;  disposi- 
tion of  territorial  possessions 
under  terms  of,  113-120; 
specially  objectionable  fea- 
tures of,  119-120. 

Self-determination,  granting  of 
right  )f,  to  each  conscious  na- 
tionality, an  element  of  in- 
ternationalism, 250. 

Self-determination  of  national- 
ities, nations  which  find  it  dif- 
ficult to  subscribe  to  doctrine 
of,  2.")0-'260;  effect  upon  .Aus- 
tria Hungary,  Switzerbind. 


Great  Britain,  and  othtr  coun- 
tries, 260;  the  Statt  Idea  op 
posed  as  a  rival  eunception, 
260. 

Shaw,  Bernard,  quoted  on  im- 
possibility of  collecting  dam- 
ages from  Germany.   110. 

Socialized  democracy,  the  brand 
of  democracy  for  reorganizing 
the  world  after  the  war,  04- 
05. 

State  Idea,  the,  as  represented 
by  Germany,  251,  2r)2-2.")4;  re- 
lation of  (Jerman  socialism  to, 
254-255;  question  whether 
war  will  result  in  destroying 
or  propagating  the,  2.")5;  eon- 
test  between  internationalism 
and,  one  of  the  deep  issues  of 
the  war.  256;  oppose<l  as  a 
rival  conception  to  doctrine  of 
self-determination  of  nation- 
alities. 2()0. 

Status  quo  ante,  impossibility  of 
ending  war  on  basis  of,  215- 
220. 

Stockholm  Conference,  a  lost  op- 
portunity  for  .-Kmerica.  5-6. 

Stoddard,  T  Lathrop.  "Present- 
Day  Europe,"  quoted,  12S 

Taxes  on  incomes,  inheritances, 
and  excess  profits,  as  a  means 
of  deflecting  wealth  to  general 
community.  306-307. 

Territorial  possessions.  .-Mlied 
demands  for,  as  an  obstacle  to 
peace.   113-120 

Threats,  Germany's  use  of,  to  se- 
cure concessions.  HO. 

Trade  discrimination,  discussion 
of  the  .Allied  demand  for.  af 
ter  the  war,  111-112. 

Trade  unions.  Sec  l>al>our 
groups 

Treaties,    reinforcement    of,    nn 


322 


INDEX 


element    of    internationalism, 
250.     See  Secret  treaties. 
Turner,  Sir  Alfred  E.,  quoted  on 
the  Germans,  192. 

Veblen,  Thorstein,  "The  Nature 
of  Peace,"  quoted,  203. 

Victory,  present  elusiveness  of, 
17-19;  in  what  it  will  really 
consist,  20-22 ;  elusiveness 
even  of  a  real  moral,  22-24 ; 
dangers  lurking  in  a  merely 
material,  24-2G;  reasons  for 
elusiveness  of  a  real,  found  in 
war  aims  of  Allies,  26-27;  ob- 
stacles to  an  ideal,  found  in 
both  pacifists  and  militarists, 
27-30;  the  need  for  a  construc- 
tive peace  to  follow,  32-33; 
criticism  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
call  for  an  overwhelming,  207- 
208;  a  conclusive  peace  not 
necessarily  the  result  of  a  con- 
clusive victory,  209-212. 

Vorwdrts,  reception  by,  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  demand  for 
democratization  in  Germany 
and  promise  of  a  non-punitive 
peace,  162. 

Wage-earners,  promotion  of  in- 
ternationalism by,  170-172: 
great  influence  of,  in  the  war, 
due  to  law  of  supply  and  de- 
mand, 172-173;  imperialistic 
elements  may  be  swept  away 
by,  173;  strength  of  Bolsheviki 
found  in  fact  that  they  repre- 
sent the,  182-183. 

Wallas,  Graham,  early  forecast 
of  present  situation  by.  17-18. 

Wall  Street  and  the  war,  62-67, 

War  against  militarism,  mean- 
ing of  the,  73-97. 

War  beneath  the  war,  meaning 
of  phrase,  14,  184. 


Whyte,  A  F.,  quoted  on  the 
basis  of  a  eom|)lcte  victory, 
222  n. 

Wilson,  President,  efforts  of,  to 
secure  for  America  position  of 
arbiter  in  settlement  of  war, 
1-2;  opposition  of,  to  imper- 
ialistic designs  of  Allies,  3; 
reasons  for  failure  of,  to  hit 
his  mark,  3-4;  course  that 
might  have  been  followed  by, 
4-5 ;  lost  opportunities  of,  for 
declaration  of  principles,  5-7; 
possible  explanations  of  policy 
and  apparent  errors  of,  7-N; 
the  thought  behind  the  "too 
proud  to  fight"  speech,  44;  the 
plea  by,  that  Americans  re- 
main neutral  in  thought,  55 ; 
demonstrated  unwillingness  of, 
to  permit  financial  groups  to 
dictate  national  policy,  66- 
67;  significance  of  war  mes- 
sage of,  in  relation  to  uphold- 
ing of  America's  traditions. 
70-71;  steps  taken  by,  toward 
acting  as  arbitrator  between 
claims  of  Allies  and  of  ene- 
mies, 139-140;  principles 
enunciated  in  his  Reply  to  the 
Pope,  140;  terms  of  peace  as 
further  outlined  by,  140-141; 
reception  in  Germany  and  in 
England  of  demand  for  democ- 
ratization and  promise  of 
non-punitive  peace,  162-163 
sympathetic  attitude  of,  to- 
w^ard  Russian  Republican  ap- 
peal for  peace  without  in 
demnities  or  annexations,  176; 
failure  of,  to  meet  promptly 
the  Russian  appeal  for  a  com- 
mon peace  and  mutual  for- 
giveness, 180-181;  statement 
by,  as  to  basis  of  settlement  of 
disputed    issues,    281  n;     an- 


INDEX  323 

nouncoment    hy,    in    ropard    to       World  wxiety,  the  hope  of  a  new, 
treatment  to  ho  accorded   KMis-  21-22. 

sia  by  sister  nations,  2d3-2'J4. 


PKiNTcn  rv  TFTf:  rvirrn  tTATits  or  AVitmcA 


"THE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  boolcs  by  the 
same  author  or  on  kindred  subjects 


America  Among  the  Nations 

Bv  H.  H.  POWliRb 

Cloth,  i2tno,  $1.50 
To  arrive  at  an  estimate  of  national  character  from  the 
homely  facts  of  our  national  history  is  the  purpose  of  this 
volume,  as  expressed  by  the  author.  The  book  is  an  at- 
tempt at  an  historic  interpretation  of  our  national  character 
and  of  our  relation  to  other  nations.  With  this  purpose  in 
mind  he  devotes  the  first  part  of  his  text  to  a  consideration 
of  America  at  home,  taking  up  such  topics  as.  The  First 
Americans ;  The  Logic  of  Isolation ;  The  Great  Expansion  ; 
The  Break  with  Tradition  ;  The  Aftermath  of  Panama  ;  I'an- 
Americanism  and  The  Dependence  of  the  Tropics.  Tin- 
second  division  is  entitled  America  Among  the  World  Pow- 
ers, and  considers  among  other  things :  The  Greater  Powers  ; 
The  Mongolian  Menace ;  Greater  Japan ;  Germany,  the 
Storm  Centre ;  The  Greatest  Empire ;  and  The  Greatest  Fel- 
lowship. 

An  Inquiry  Into  the  Nature  of  Peace 
and  the  Terms  of  Its  Perpetuation 

By  THORSTEIX  VEBLEN 

Cloth,  i2mo,  $2.00 

Professor  Veblen's  new  book.  "The  Nature  of  Peace."  i"; 
a  close  analysis  of  war  and  the  basis  of  peace.  It  is  of 
special  interest  just  now  on  account  of  its  insistence  upon 
the  absolute  destruction  of  the  German  Imperial  State  n*^ 
the  only  assurance  of  a  permanent  peace.  The  ideals  to 
wards  which  civilization  is  moving  make  the  elimination  oi 
the  dynastic  powers  absolutely  necessary.  "The  new  situa- 
tion," says  Professor  Veblen.  "requires  the  putting  away  of 
the  German  Imperial  establishment  and  the  military  caste; 
the  reduction  of  the  German  peoples  to  a  footing  of  unre- 
served democracy." 

Readers  of  Professor  Veblen's  other  books  will  welcome 
this  new  volume  which  is  written  in  his  usual  suggestive  and 
convincing  mannir. 

THK   MACMII.l.AX   COMPANY 

Publishers      64-66  Fifth  Avenue      New  York 


The  World  War  and 
the  Road  to  Peace 


By  T.  B.  McLEOD 

Boards,  I^mo. 

This  volume  contains  a  judicial  consideration  of  the 
pacifist  positions  and  some  sound  advice  to  the  men  holding 
them.  Many  of  the  supporters  of  pacifism  Dr.  McLeod 
treats  in  short  order,  but  he  discusses  at  considerable  length 
and  with  sympathy  what  may  be  called  the  humanitarian 
basis  for  the  pacifist.  One  of  the  marked  features  of  the 
volume  is  the  clearness  with  which  the  author  shows  that 
Americans  are  all  essentially  pacifists  —  they  hate  war  and 
are  afraid  of  it,  but  they  are  undertaking  this  war  because 
as  Americans  they  feel  that  all  that  this  country  believes  in 
is  threatened  by  German  aggression. 

Through  War  to  Peace 

By  albert  G.  KELLER 

Cloth,  i2mo. 

Professor  Keller  discusses  the  present  war  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  sociological,  or  the  societal,  theory.  This 
theory,  briefly,  is  that  society  expands  by  developing  certain 
customs,  manners  or  folk-ways.  Gradually  these  customs 
become  a  religion,  ultimately  developing  into  what  may  be 
called  a  code.  There  has  been  growing  up  an  international 
code  of  recent  years  and  the  progress  of  civilization  is  de- 
termined by  the  character  and  eflficiency  of  this  code.  The 
Germans  marked  a  variation  from  this  code  and  notably 
during  the  last  few  years  have  been  developing  a  code  of 
their  own,  sharply  opposed  to  that  of  civilization.  The 
present  war  is  then  regarded  as  an  inevitable  conflict  be- 
tween the  code  of  civilization  and  the  German  variant. 


THE  MACMTLLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers      64-66  Fifth  Avenue      New  York 


American  World  Policies 

I2\  $2^5 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL 

"It  is  refreshing  to  read  Dr.  Weyl  ...  his  approach  to 
the  problem  is  absolutely  sound  and  right." — The  Dial. 

"An  economic  philosophy  neatly  balanced,  suavely  ex- 
pressed, and  of  finely  elastic  fibre." — New  York  Sun. 

"To  find  so  fine  and  true  and  well  reasoned  an  interpreta- 
tion of  that  attitude  which  has  been  so  shockingly  misrepre- 
sented at  home  and  deplorably  misunderstood  abroad  is 
something  to  be  thankful  for.  ...  It  is  a  book  that  will 
make  for  far-sightedness,  for  clarity  of  thought  and  sanity 
of  judgment  in  the  deciding  of  many  of  our  problems." — 
The  Bookman. 

"It  analyses  with  excellent  judgment  and  sound  scholar- 
ship the  various  factors  which  must  in  any  event  determine 
the  course  of  American  foreign  policy,  showing  at  every 
time  a  thorough  grasp  of  fundamentals." — The  Nation. 

"Readers  .  .  .  will  easily  believe  that  he  threw  his  whole 
heart  and  mind  into  it,  and  they  will  in  all  divers  ways  be 
repaid  for  reading  and  even  rereading  it.  .  .  .  It  is  full  of 
information  readily  used,  full  of  striking  passages,  often 
brilliant.  .  .  .  Dr.  Weyl  has  written  one  of  the  most  stimu- 
lating and  enlightening  books  on  our  foreign  policy  that  has 
been  published  during  the  war." — The  Independent. 


THE  MACMII.I.AX  COMPANY 

Publishers      64-66  Fifth  Avenue      New  York 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

The  New  Democracy 

An  Essay  on  Certain  Political  and  Economic  Tendencies 
in  the  United  States 

By  WALTER  E.  WEYL,  Ph.D. 

A  chief  issue  in  the  Presidential  Campaign  is  "  Socialized 
Democracy."  Dr.  Weyl's  new  work  gives  a  clear  summary 
of  its  causes  and  aims. 

Crown  8vo,  blue  cloth,  gilt  top,  $2.00 

SOME  PRESS  COMMENTS 

"  A  masterly,  scathing,  and  absolutely  fearless  arraignment  of 
things  that  ought  not  to  be  in  a  republic,  and  of  tendencies  that  no 
democracy  ought  to  tolerate." — Boston  Herald. 

"A  thoughtful  volume  ...  a  big  synthesis  of  the  whole  social 
problem  in  this  country.     A  keen  survey." — Chicago  Evening  Post. 

"  A  searching  and  suggestive  study  of  American  life.  ...  A  book 
to  make  people  think.  .  .  .  Notable  for  its  scholarship  and  brilliant 
in  execution,  it  is  not  merely  for  the  theorist,  but  for  the  citizen." — 

Newark  Evening  News. 

"Dr,  Weyl's  book  is  a  strong  analysis  of  the  whole  subject.  It 
will  be  read  widely  and  will  exercise  a  large  influence." —  The  Even- 
ing Mail. 

"  Dr.  Weyl  has  read  the  modern  writing  on  the  wall  and  interprets 
it  to  us  more  clearly  than  has  yet  been  done." — New  York  Globe. 

"  A  masterly  interpretation  of  the  industrial,  political,  social,  and 
moral  revolution  that  is  going  on  in  this  country." — Albany  Argus. 

"  A  complete  and  circumstantial  statement  of  the  whole  case  .  .  . 
our  social  and  economic  unrest  is  not  to  lead  to  a  war  of  classes, 
but  to  a  'National  Readjustment.'" — New  York  Tribune. 

"  The  best  and  most  comprehensive  survey  of  the  general  social 
and  political  status  and  prospects  that  has  been  published  of  late 
years." — The  Pittsburg  Post. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers      64-66  Fifth  Avenue      New  York 


m"^'  ^ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA   LIKRARY 

Los  Angeles 

p,  \^^|^is  book  is  UUE  on  the  last  date  stamjjed  below. 


LO 


"8to 


ii^G^^WP 


w 

URL 


^OV  25  1974 


ID 


Df^KA 


982 


Form  L9-Series  4939 


3    1158   00764   9717 


D 

523 
W5^7e 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGiO 

iiiiiiuntnililW"" 


'  ;.■  'jeaiP^  itniiTy 


AA    001  109  133 


